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Prelude
1. Have cultural differences been overcome in global negotiations?
The impact cultural differences have on different negotiations is incredibly relevant, especially due to the emerging global culture. In fact, after the end of the Cold War, American and western values were popularized everywhere; however, this does not mean that a cultural homogenization took place nor that cultural differences have been eliminated in negotiations. In fact, strong societies are able to incorporate foreign influences while remaining true to their believes. In fact, although global elites do tend to speak a “common language”, their professional ties can only ease, but not eliminate, cross-cultural dissonances. In light of this, there was initially a thesis that a universal diplomatic language of specialized words and phrases existed and allowed diplomats to overcome cultural barriers. It was promoted by sir Harold Nicholson in his study “ Diplomacy ”, written at a time when European diplomacy was dominant. The natural conclusion, as stated by Cohen, is that disagreements in diplomacy are based on objective conflicts of interest. Cohen, however, argued that he started doubting Nicholson’s theory when studying the Astoria Affair.
2. The Astoria Affair
The Astoria Affair took place after Hirosi Saito, a former Japanese Ambassador to the USA, died in Washington in 1938. As a sign of respect, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy to ship the ambassador’s ashes to Japan aboard the cruises Astoria ; R. made the decision without consulting the State Department and taking into consideration the current geopolitical asset (Japanese invasion of China), as he did not conceive the action could convey any diplomatic meaning. The Japanese, however, attach a great deal of importance to paying respect to the dead and therefore viewed the gesture as extraordinary. This first cross-cultural complication led to other consequences; great festivities were planned and a jeweller gave pearl necklaces for the wives of the officers of the Astoria; this caused American outrage, as this act was seen as a bribe, not a way to repay moral indebtedness. Joseph Grew , ambassador to Japan, had to work very hard to disentangle this cross-cultural misunderstanding. The reason why this simple act of courtesy turned into a diplomatic blunder was because of the quite different weight and significance attached in Japanese and American cultures to these simple acts (death and gift giving).
3. Cohen’s thesis
The thesis presented by Cohen is that cultural factors may hinder relations in general , and on occasion complicate, prolong and even frustrate particular negotiations where there otherwise exists an identifiable basis for cooperation.
Negotiation: the Cultural Roots
1. Negotiation defined
Diplomatic negotiation consists of a process of communication between states aiming to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome on some issues of shared concern; it is not merely and exchange of views or necessarily coercive. In an anarchic world, it is conceived as the primary mechanism for achieving peace and legitimate change ; in order for it to be authentic, it needs mutuality and reciprocity from both parties. The goal of diplomacy is certainly an agreed rearrangement of some elements of the relationship between two states , represented by accredited representatives. It is important to note that gestures without diplomatic intentions may still have diplomatic consequences, as proved by the Astoria affair.
2. The nature of culture
Culture was developed by anthropologists to describe the extraordinary richness of the different human societies, such as customs, manners and forms of social organization and it is the outward expression of a unifying and consistent vision of a particular community , created after its confrontation with core issues such as the origin of the cosmos (it is not a random accident, as pointed by Edward Tylor). There are three key aspects of culture:
- It is a quality of a society made up of individuals: it is not an innate or national character;
- It is acquired through socialization by individuals, through formal and conscious processes (such as religious and secular education, propaganda, role models and even advertising);
- It is a unique complex of attributes subsuming every area of social life , such as the etiquette of personal encounter, the manner in which relationships are conducted and how life’s activities should be conducted. Culture is essentially a property of information and a grammar for organizing reality and imparting meaning to the world; it is the “human software” which translates ideals into actuality and can be conceived as a “ shared common sense ”: it shapes our actions and structures our ideas. Language is extremely important and pivotal to cultural identity, as it essentially a conveyor belt by which shared meanings are stored and transmitted within human groups. It is a dynamic medium of social evolution and a record, and therefore the link between cultural meaning and practice. Moreover, it heavily influences political culture.
3. Problems of Intercultural Relations
Cohen wants to focus on the cultural gap (especially visible at a linguistic level) between the negotiating parties in bilateral negotiations and its effects: intercultural communication is often damaged by the confrontation of different assumptions on language, non-verbal gestures and social relationships. For example: ➢ In 1951 in San Francisco , negotiations between Japanese and Americans were successful because of the complementarity of cultural traits: the Japanese were familiar with dependency relationships ( amae ) and hierarchies, whereas the Americans were ready to accept a role of responsible leaderships (study my Maria Strazar); ➢ Soviet-Japanese talks in Moscow in 1977 , however, were unsuccessful due to their antithetical cultural traits (study by Kimura); A second approach focuses rather on the national negotiating styles on their own; Raymond Smith, in his studies of Soviet diplomacy (which focuses on authority, avoidance of risk and imperative need to assert control) argued that negotiating styles are not neutral and therefore need to be understood and studied in order to reach a successful negotiation.
Intercultural Dissonance
Cohen wishes to present a more systemic analysis of intercultural communication using a model proposed by Lorand Szalzay. He states that, since negotiation is simply a special case of communication, obstacles to communication may hinder negotiations.
1. The Szalay model
Szalay first makes a distinction between the form or code and content or meaning of a message. He argues that only the code of the message travels , not its idea, whose meaning depends on the person’s own mind, frame of reference and ideas. Szalay concluded that for there to be real understanding the parties engaged must be able to draw upon matching semantic assumptions ; this happens ideally within a common culture or language: if there is common knowledge, the rules of the game are known and culture is not an important factor, since it is assumed and understood. If the parties are from different cultural backgrounds , however, the meaning of the message could be interpreted differently by both. For example, Szalay used word association tests to show how complex concepts, such as “ corruption ”, have different meanings across cultures: ❖ For Americans , corruption implies immoral and criminal behavior; for example, civil servants must be impartial at all times; ❖ Koreans do not consider it morally wrong, but only believe its consequences to be unfortunate; for example, it is accepted for officials to have obligations to friends and relatives.
2. Individualistic and Interdependent Ethoses
Szalay’s antithesis in the discussion on corruption has been greatly expanded by other researchers, such as Hofstede and Triandis; this field of studies led to the conclusion that there are two different types of ethoses: ➢ Individualistic ethoses , such as that of the United States, where there is a great emphasis on the individual and its own conscience; consequently, its supreme values are freedom, development of one’s individual personality, self-expression and personal enterprise. Members of these ethoses belong to many different social groups, which means that there is great mobility and that status is acquired ; law, contracts and debate are highly valued; due to the success this model had in a developing nation like the United States, Americans (wrongly) believe their model should be universal; moreover, they are guilt-oriented; o Individualism is grounded in the Protestant concept of predestination which states that, since divine grace has already been granted, there is no need for a priestly intermediary; therefore, the individual must resort to their own conscience to interpret the Holy scriptures; ➢ Communal / Collectivistic / Relationship-oriented ethoses ; their origin can be traced back to the rural village community, in which group harmony and the maintaining of one’s face (standing in the eyes of the group) are incredibly important; group affiliations are inherited and acquired by birth, which leads to low mobility, and they accept hierarchy as part of the natural order of things; law is meaningless, as disputes are resolved by mechanisms of communal conciliation; moreover, they are shame-oriented;
3. The contrasting roles of language
This distinction between ethoses is reflected in the roles and uses of language, as Ting-Toomey’s studies, based on the Edward Hall’s studies, claim: ❖ Low-context cultures , associated with individual ethoses , they tend to be much more direct and blunter; therefore, they pay little attention to non-verbal gestures and believe language has only the role of conveying information , rather than building a relationship. ❖ High-context cultures , associated with communal ethoses , place a great value on maintaining face and group harmony; language is conceived as a social instrument and they communicate allusively, using rhetoric, as directness is disliked; there is a clear in-group/out-group distinction and therefore every business transaction must be preceded by the cultivation of a relationship and much small talk;
4. Monochronic versus polychronic concepts of time
In traditional societies, steadiness is perceived as a cardinal virtue; this is deeply rooted in rural cultures and peasant life, where time is measured by days and weeks and determined by nature, not by a clock. In the modern metropolis, on the other hand, society is governed by the clock and there is a great emphasis on rigorous schedule and “ getting things done ”. Moreover, America’s monochronic assumption often clashes with the Latin American or Middle Eastern polychronic one. As Hall claimed, this often happens because the United States are not a traditional society and are more invested in the future , which often leads them to believe history to be irrelevant; this contrasts highly more antique societies which might even hold grudges for past humiliations.
5. Low-context versus high-context negotiating styles: results versus relationships
Kinhide , a Japanese political scientist, believes that the main incompatibility between American and Japanese negotiations lies in different views on the relationship between humans and their environment: ❖ The American erabi style (“ manipulative ”), claims that men can manipulate their context to serve their own purposes and changes the environment according to their plan and objectives; this style places a great emphasis on results in negotiations and little weight to the cultivation of personal ties; ❖ The Japanese awase style (“ adaptive ”), which rejects the idea that man can manipulate his environment and that he therefore must adjust to it, with a great emphasis on social realities and the complexity of the world; therefore, there is a great focus on relationships in negotiations. Hoffman added to Kinhide’s studies by researching US foreign policy : he stated that, since the USA were a young and expanding nation, they believed that every problem , both material and social, could be solved through an engineering or technological lens ; political issues are first fragmented into small components, and then reduced to a set of technical problems solved by specific instruments. This belief led to the rise of the “ how to negotiate ” literature in the United States. High-context cultures, however, place a much lesser value to short-term solutions, especially if they compromise the relationship between the parties; in fact, they focus much more on the benefits of a long- term and healthy diplomatic relation.
6. The case of the “Recalcitrant” Prime Minister
This case took place in 1993 while there was a redrawing of the map of the Pacific Region and Australia, under prime minister Keating , tried to redirect itself towards Asia; the Malaysian PM Mahathir , however, believed Australia to be only a powerful and cultural alien. It all began when Mahathir refused to attend a trade summit of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum) in Seattle, due to America’s refusal to agree to an ASEAN (Association of Southeast
What is negotiable?
While dealing with the United States, the most delicate topics for non-European countries are status and sovereignty ; these themes are particularly important for communally minded societies since their relations have always been marked by inequality and they were always conceived as a supplicant or dependent, while some American officials were too interested in showing off their superiority (for example, U.S. ambassador Meyer while dealing with the Japanese). However, some things have started to change and some sensitivities have shifted: ❖ Egypt , the historic leader of the Arab world, despised being treated as a second-rate nation and having to depend on the United States; however, it understands that there is not much it can do about it; ❖ In India the humiliation of the British rule still persists along with the caste system, which makes subordination to the West hard to accept; despite this, it finds itself in the same position as Egypt; ❖ China dreads the human rights topic and believes it has not been given what is due, such as participation in the World Trade Organization; in fact, it considers itself a “ superpower-in- waiting ” and wishes to mend the wrongs of the twentieth century; ❖ Mexico has been dealing with this “ colossal neighbour ” for centuries now, but the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) has partially eased their relations; despite this, the fundamental asymmetry of this partnership was once again underlined by the 1995 U.S. rescue of the Mexican peso; ❖ The Japanese , however, welcomed the security of protection due to their amae point of view; nowadays it has changed its course of action, finding a more independent voice and wishing to be treated as an equal partner. When it comes to the United States, their strong belief that anything can be negotiated has led to many dissonances in negotiations.
1. Pride and Status
A major obstacle to diplomacy can be the inability of the parties to even get to the bargaining table or believing that nothing could be gained from a negotiation; however, in many cases studied by Cohen, it was clear that more subjective reasons were the cause of many failed negotiations. India ’s great sense of pride has often tampered with negotiations, leading many officers to claim that Indians carry a chip on their shoulder and a sense of “ Anglophilic snobbery ”; one officer even claimed, as Cohen reports, that they had a “ Krishna Menon syndrome ” (Indian foreign and defense minister), defined by a mixture of arrogance and hypersensitivity; although relations have improved since the breakup of the Soviet Union and liberalization of the Indian economy, some great sensitivities remain: o 1993 Raphael diplomatic crisis : the U.S. assistant secretary, Raphael, claimed that the USA did not recognize the 1947 document in which the local prince ceded Kashmir to India in an off-the-record briefing for journalists; the crisis was adverted only when Clinton expressed concern for human rights violation in the area and after a visit to Delhi in 1994 by Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. This crisis was due to the fact that not only was it a deeply offensive remark, but also to the neglect that India was suffering at the hands of the Clinton administration, since it took over a year for Washington to find a new ambassador in the region, after having transferred the original one to Moscow; during the Strobe Talbott trip, a new ambassador with a great diplomatic background was appointed and the crisis was therefore solved; Egypt has long been concerned with past occupations and the need to establish itself as an equal to the Wes t; after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the main concern was restoring Egypt’s wounded
prid e: this took lace only in 1973, when Kissinger first addressed Egypt’s military achievements in the recent war, implying that Sadat was not negotiating from weakness but was being treated as an equal; however, recently Egypt has felt neglected by the United States, especially due to the USA’s plan to create a “ new Middle East ” based on economic cooperation; o In 1995 the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was permanently extended, but Egypt refused to cooperate with the United States, claiming that the treaty should have also been extended to Israel (who refused to sign it in the absence of peace treaties with its regional opponents, such as Syria or Iraq); this opposition, however, was more caused by fear of losing status and not being America’s favourite ally in the Middle East and that Israel, with its greater economy, would become a regional magnet; this dispute was solved only through Clinton’s efforts to underline the equality of his Egyptian counterpart; China has made it very clear about its wishes to be treated like an equal partner , especially considering the unequal treaties of the past and its exclusion from a seat in the United Nations Security Council in the 1950s and 1960s; in 19 54 - 55, American acceptance of the principle of equality and reciprocity was fundamental for the repatriation of American civilians held in China; only in 1970 did China make it known that it would accept a U.S. envoy, through the offices of Pakistan, highlighting how this request was not born out of fear of weakness; o President Clinton , unlike Bush, struggled to form a long-term relationship with China’s president Jiang ; struggling with a series of quarrels regarding human rights, trade policy, arms proliferation and Taiwan, during a meeting in Seattle in 1993 the two parties returned to the old theme of establishing a relationship based on full equality ; In Mexico , offended pride by the “ colossus to the north ” has often hindered diplomatic negotiations; nowadays, most American diplomats (such as Jova and Gavin) have become too conscious of the need for tact , as any issue might trigger a sense of offended pride and public criticism; o Even after the NAFTA negotiations, Mexicans remain quite sensitive , as a small crisis in Mexico City in 1996 proved: during an international conference, Drug Enforcement Administration director Constantine claimed that drug traffickers were trying to launder money through the Mexican banking system; this caused great outrage and diverted attention from real problems; Japan has always been plagued by a sense of inferiority towards the West and, after the defeat in the Pacific War, it accepted the fact that they had been put into a secondary position in the world and the ward and guardian relationship they had with the USA; however, as Japan recovered its economic strength and national self-confidence, the treaties had to be revised; o Nixon Shock of 1971 : this crisis took place when Nixon visited Beijing without consulting Japan and this led the Japanese to believe that long-term damages were done to their relations; there was great disregard towards the form of their relation and the Japanese claimed it to be “ evidence that the USA placed a low value on its relationship with Japan as a whole ”; o Over the decades, the dynamic younger-older brother has greatly changed, which even lead the Japanese prime minister to reject America’s demands to open the country’s market to American products.
2. Sovereignty
Each culture has its own set of priorities and non-negotiable topics , often tied to past episodes of perceived injustice and national sense of wounded pride and resentment. This is greatly in contrast with
o Ever since its nationalization in 1938, the oil industry has been a great symbol of national pride and independence; this caused some tensions during the NAFTA talk and the United States had to accept in the end that oil would not be a part of free trade; o In the 1990s, Secretary of Defense Perry visited Mexico to discuss military cooperation and the two countries agreed on a joint training program for Mexican officers in U.S. military schools; however, when the public was informed, the proposal was quickly aborted since the Mexicans keep on viewing the Americans as historical aggressors ( imo, it was also a way to control Mexicans, since their generals would be educated in American schools and therefore their tactics would be predictable );
3. Human Rights
In the United States, human rights are incredibly important and they believe their view on human rights to be universal; moreover, human rights activism (that is, political action to promulgate human rights beyond national boundaries) is only a concern for Western countries, whereas traditional societies only view it as an interference in internal affairs. The International Bill of Human Rights has also been widely criticized over the decades, as it did not take into account “civilizational pluralism”. These differences in view particularly affected America’s relations with Egypt and the People’s Republic of China. ➢ Egypt , as many ambassadors have pointed out, is indifferent to the issue of human rights; for example, when Israeli requested the return of bodies lost in the Yom Kippur War, Egypt refused not out of spite but because it was indifferent to the issue; in fact, Egyptians even dismissed USA’s emphasis on human rights as a “pompous and empty slogan”; o The Achille Lauro affair (1985): when the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, was seized by a group from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and an American elderly disabled man , Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered , Egypt decided simply to ship the PLO men to Tunis. This was due to the fact that Egypt wanted to get the problem out of the way as quickly as possible and was unable to grasp the meaning of the death of the man; moreover, Egypt claimed that the United States was trying to violate the sacred Middle Eastern obligation of hospitality , since the PLO men had been presented as guests of the Egyptian government; o Another great cause of tension are Western reports on human rights violations in Egypt ; the 1995 annual U.S. department survey, for example, highlighted great violations towards Muslims extremists on the hands of the Egyptian government, which accused the USA of spreading “lies and fabrications”; moreover, the United States Agency for International Development ( USAID ) was able to use the leverage of foreign aid in limiting the practice of female genital circumcision, although it was met with opposition by some Islamic establishments; ➢ China has a different view from the United States as well and it justifies it by claiming that Asians and communal ethoses give greater emphasis to the right of the people , rather than the privileges of a few; during the Tiananmen Square movements, China was accused of inhumanity and the USA were accused of meddling in other people’s business; o The two sides keep on playing a cat-and-mouse game, in which China arrests dissidents on the eve of visits by U.S. officials to demonstrate its autonomy and the United States then demand the release of hostages ; China is aware of its history and how easy it is for it to descend into revolutionary chaos, and therefore views any American interference as a way to undermine the regime; o Three themes have been particularly prominent in negotiations on human rights: 1) the insistence of the United States that the matter involved an ethical imperative , while
China adopted a position devoid of moral content ; 2) the willingness of the Chinese side to use internees as pawns in a game in order to extract concessions in other areas and the U.S. high-minded unhappiness in haggling on humans ; 3) the infinite capacity of a negotiation on the subject to generate great mutual ill-will ; o These three aspects were clear during the 1954 - 55 civil repatriation talks , in which Americans wanted to free the civilians without bargaining, whereas the Chinese wanted to use the hostages to receive other concessions; this was due to the fact that China viewed this as an ancient practice and a political act directly related to other elements of the diplomatic relations; however, the Chinese strategy ultimately backfired and the hostages were released slowly over the years, which only reinforced its image of inhumanity.
Setting out the pieces: Prenegotiation Cohen divides for technical reasons negotiation into five phases: preparation, beginning, middle, end and implementation. The first phase to be discusses is the preparatory one with prenegotiations, that is “when one or more partiers considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties”.
- Establishing a personal relationship High-context cultures aim in this phase to develop warm and personal ties.
- Kinhide, in his studies on Japanese diplomacy, explained that the Japanese feel that personal relationships are necessary in order to be able to speak frankly and to give and receive favors. o 1971 monetary crisis: in this crisis, Treasury Secretary Connally made an effort to build relationships, understanding their importance in Japanese culture;
- The Chinese believe as well that personal relationships and guanxi (connections and access) are vital, which also leads them to manipulate friendship for negotiating gain; o They often lobby officials who are sympathetic to their causes in negotiations; o In order to repair its fall from grace after the suppression of the Tiananmen revolts, it welcomed lavishly the U.S. delegations to Beijing; however, general Scowcroft was heavily critisized by Americans due to this;
- This personal touch is incredibly important in Mexico-American relations as well and it proved invaluable in the resolution of the Chamizal boundary dispute and groundwork for NAFTA;
- Although they are valuable in relationships with Egypt as well, converging interests are still fundamental; these personal and informal talks were greatly cultivated by president Kissinger and believed Americans to have a special gift for friendship with the Arab country, since their egalitarian tradition contrasts British colonialism; o First friendly approaches took place in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, when president Sadat declared that he wished to break Nasser’s legacy and re-establish relations with the United States; o President Sadat placed the resolution of the Camp David conference entirely in President Carter’s hands.
- Preventing Surprises High-context cultures are shame cultures and therefore they do not want to lose face in any case; because of this, they always try to prevent surprises and have many stratagems in order to avoid them.
- Japanese engage in informal talks to father information (Nemawashi style, “testing of the water”) and avoid striking a premature posture;
- The Chinese establish ahead of time a number of irreducible principles that are their own preconditions for entering talks; o Before normalization with the USA, there were three conditions: ▪ Cessation of American diplomatic relations with Taipei; ▪ Withdrawal of U.S. military forces and installations from Taiwan; ▪ Abrogation of the US-Taiwanese defense treaty;
- When it comes to Mexica-American relations, two episodes are worth recalling: o 1963 settlement of the Chamizal boundary dispute, which arose when the Rio Grande changes its course and a small piece of land shifted from Mexican to American domain; before entering into talks, the Mexican government needed two guarantees: (1) the presence of Ambassador Mann; (2) both presidents agreed to “instruct their executive agencies to recommend a complete solution to this problem”, which Mexico interpreted as the entire Chamizal would be assigned to it; o Pollution of the Colorado River 1973: first, the two presidents met to make a commitment to the solution of this problem and then Nixon designed a special representative for talks. Americans tend to view negotiation as a problem-solving exercise, and this often leads literature to avoid the interpersonal side of the activity.
- India decided that it would accept assistance, but would not do it with gratitude or supplication; this absence of gratitude was then replaced by Gandhi with deliberate ingratitude and the neo- Marxist belief that India was owed a debt, since rich countries had exploited it to enrich themselves; o There were also cultural reasons, since the Hindu ethic Dharma (duty) states that mandatory obligation to give aims is reserved only to those with a religious vocation and the lowest of the low; so a person of status would never ask for charity.
- Assuming the moral high ground Since America presents itself as the moral arbiter, many Third World countries have used it as leverage.
- India has often criticized America for its moral shortcomings and believes itself to be the actual repository of righteousness; therefore, in negotiations they will try to make it as clear as possible very quickly; this, along with America’s closeness to Pakistan, hindered their relations; o NPT: India was aggravated by the fact that the U.S. insisted it participated in the NPA and adopt restrictions; India argued that the U.S. should have honored its initial commitments and that it was hypocritical to criticize India’s program when the superpowers were even worse; in the end, it was agreed that France would be supplying fuel;
- Chinese negotiators often cite past faults and errors which have damaged relations; It also gave many concessions and proved skillful at unilateral “goodwill” in order to establish American “indebtedness”;
- Mexican meetings also started with a series of grievances and the recent problems caused by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- Principles before details Glenn believed that there were three basic styles of persuasion:
- The factual-inductive, which plunges straight into detail and is typical of the Anglo-Saxon common law; o American negotiators adopt this style, which is similar to their legal training;
- The axiomatic-deductive, with argues from general principles to particular applications and is typical of Roman law; o Chinese negotiators adopt this one, seeking agreement on broad and philosophical principles; ▪ This lead to many complications on the talks on Taiwan in 1958, as China insisted that a general renunciation of the use of force should have been adopted, but the U.S. delegations refused; ▪ Relationships quelled only with the Shangai communique in 1972, possible due to Kissinger’s adoption of the Chinese approach
- The affective-intuitive style, which is grounded on emotions. Other cases of negotiations:
- Ever since Nasser, Egypt wished to be understood and to understand the nature of the relationship between the two countries; president Sadat and Kissinger managed to reach general principles, although the ambassador Eilts was not satisfied with the open-ended commitments;
- In the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico initially was focused on broad general principles, but then became more pragmatic; however, they still kept on appealing to many important principles, such as justice and equity;
- India and Japan tend to avoid the deductive style and are more compatible with the American one:
o India has been influenced by British law; o The Japanese awase style places emphasis on special circumstances. On tactics and players The concept of a middle game in negotiation is an artificial one, as it does not appear in Japanese and Chinese negotiating cultures. However, the American one does it as it seeks to go beyond the opening positions to discover where the real problem lies. America strongly believes in the value of compromise and assigns it a positive value, as the term “to negotiate” in itself means reaching a middle ground that satisfies both parties. However, in other languages it has a highly negative connotation, as it is related to integrity and retreat. The most common middle game model for Americans is the “concession-convergence”, in which the parties approach each other in a series of concessions until they reach a compromise.
- Bidding There two paradigmatic types of negotiation in the Middle East:
- Suq (Arab market) model, there is first an exchange of social courtesies in order to establish a personal relationship and then the bidding starts with the seller asking for a much higher price than expected; then the bid progressively converge until they arrive at an agreed cost; this is the classical bazaar style of bargaining; o This model was applied to the Colorado River case;
- Bedouin model, applied to matters of status, dignity, group honor or identity, which cannot be bargained; resolution therefore comes from restoring balance through mediators and conciliation gestures; Between the extremes of these two, there is the “normal diplomatic bargaining” that includes the reconciliation of contending positions and the search for a common view of a situation. The most common antinomy in the middle phase is the contrast between the claims of fairness (generosity) and power (greed): Americans believe strongly in compromise, whereas non-Americans are of the idea that if one has the upper hand he will capitalize on it.
- Mexicans maintain their positions much more tenaciously than their American counterparts, mostly because Americans want to resolve problems as quickly as possible;
- Indians are much more competitive bargainers than the Americans, as was showed by the 1953 thorium nitrate affair;
- Japanese, on the other hand, often reiterate their initial position and are strongly against compromise, struggling to find it even within their own nation and making concessions “slowly
Sounds, Signals, Silence: Middle Game II American’s negotiating style is rooted in low-context legalism and great emphasis is placed on procedures.
- Persuasive arguments In the legalistic negotiating tradition, forensic persuasion has a central role and logic is seen as the vehicle of progress. Japanese tend to reach a conclusion with no intervening steps and they are reluctant to try to persuade their interlocutors, generally viewing debate as unwelcome. Chinese negotiators usually wear down the American side in a war of attrition. In fact, to them negotiations are about power and interest, not mere talk. High-context cultures tend to apply personal touches to their dealings. The quality of the personal relationship at the highest executive level has also had substantial implications, such as the friendship between Kennedy and Nasser.
- The reluctance to say No Americans have a straightforward style, whereas high-context cultures disliked the negative and often intertwine personal impacts to their dealings. Japanese have a hard time saying no and they prefer the grey area and reconciliation, instead of categorization, using expressions such as “very difficult” to avoid directly disagreeing. The same is applied to Mexicans and Egyptians.
- Directness versus indirectness High-context cultures prefer indirect and understated formulations, because they wish to avoid an abrupt and abrasive presentation to maintain harmony and to save the face of the interlocutor; therefore, they often read between the lines (Japanese haragei). While Indians and Egyptians are characterized by understatement, China’s communicatory style is quite allusive, dense and indirectional. They just ramble.
- Non-verbal communication
High-context cultures place a high emphasis on nonverbal dimensions of communication and are sensitive to sign and symbol, which often leads them to exaggerate American behaviors. Egyptians, for example, wear their emotions on their sleeves as a sign of social solidarity. They are focuses and aware of the subtle messages of rank, reputation and choreography. Americans on the other hand to not take regulations of diplomatic etiquette too seriously. Indians, however, are very capable of masking their own emotions due to the British influence and the Hindu tradition of abjuring desire. Nehru was quite famous for his silence. Under pressure: End Game I Zartman and Berman define the final phase as the moment when negotiators cross from the formula stage of general principles to the elaboration of a detailed agreement. In this phase the most intractable problems may arise, but the parties are most often committed to completing the task.
- Breaking the deadlock
