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Content of Game Theory for Managers course includes ratiinality, prisoner dilemma, Loyal servant, assurance, credibility, stratigic subtitutes, entry, brinkmanship, negotiation, auctions, signaling, reputation etc. This file contains: Angry, Madness, Negotiation, Game, Material, Document, Payoff, Possible, Yield
Typology: Exercises
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Today we are playing the Angry Negotiation Game in class. As an optional follow-up , you may enter our Computerized Angry Negotiation Tournament. To do this, respond to Professor McAdams’ email later today.
You will play a slight variation of the game played in class. After Rounds 1-9, people get angry with probability 25% (rather than 10% after Round 1, 20% after Round 2, etc..) After Round 10, however, we still assume that people get Angry for certain.
Furthermore, half of the overall population of remaining players will survive each round. (You and your opponent might both survive or both perish.)
Gold Medal: bonus = 15% of total course grade Silver Medal: bonus = 10% of total course grade Bronze Medal: bonus = 5% of total course grade
There are at most ten rounds. For each possible payoff you may get from yielding (M = 100, 200, or 400)^1 specify how likely you will be to Yield in each round, if that round is reached. (See Example on next pages.)
(^1) To keep things simple, I’ll use refer to you as Management. (This is business school, after all.) Half of
you will play as “Labor”, however, and half as “Management”, but you don’t know which.
Unlike February Madness, luck will not at all be a factor in this tournament. In each match, I will compute each player’s exact expected payoff to determine the survivor.
Note: If you will be yielding 100% of the time if ever round R is reached, there is no way that round R+1 will be reached. That’s why those boxes are empty.
When M = $100 When M = $200 When M = $ Round 1 50% 0% 100% Round 2 100% 0% Round 3 0% Round 4 0% Round 5 0% Round 6 100% Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
When U = $100 When U = $200 When U = $ Round 1 0% 50% 0% Round 2 0% 25% 0% Round 3 0% 75% 0% Round 4 100% 100% 0% Round 5 0% Round 6 0% Round 7 0% Round 8 0% Round 9 0% Round 10 0%