Assignment - Game theory, Assignments of Production and Operations Management

Game theory document including nash equilibria

Typology: Assignments

2021/2022

Uploaded on 04/06/2022

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MCL361 Manufacturing System Design: Assignment 1
Due date: 11.59PM February 21, 2021
Submit a PDF file to Moodle named as follows: MCL361_Entry#_Assignment1.pdf
Legible scanned handwritten notes in PDF format should be submitted. Late submissions shall
automatically be awarded a deduction of −3 marks. If there is convincing evidence of cheating,
zero marks shall be awarded to both the parties. Minimum marks: 0; Maximum marks: 5.
1.
[0.5 mark] Describe the Economic Production Lot (EPL) model and explain how it differs
from the EOQ model in one short paragraph.
2.
[0.5 mark] If, in the classical static EOQ model, lead time is greater than cycle period, then
where should you set the reorder point?
3.
[1 mark] What is a mixed strategy? How does it differ from a pure strategy? Illustrate using
an example.
4.
[1 mark] Show that if, in a two-player strategic game, X is a dominant strategy for Player 1
and Y is a dominant strategy for Player 2, then (X, Y) is a Nash equilibrium.
5.
Two hunters are deciding between working together to catch a deer, which is swift and large,
and working independently to catch a much smaller rabbit. It takes both to catch the deer
which they will then share. A caught rabbit only belongs to the hunter who catches it.
Strategy Profiles
Outcomes
Hunter 1’s payoff
Hunter 2’s payoff
(Deer, Deer)
Deer caught but shared
2
2
(Deer, Rabbit)
Only Hunter 2 gets rabbit
0
1
(Rabbit, Deer)
Only Hunter 1 gets rabbit
1
0
(Rabbit, Rabbit)
Each get one rabbit
1
1
a. [0.25 mark] Determine all dominated strategies.
b. [0.25 mark] Determine all prudential strategies and the corresponding security level.
c. [0.25 mark] Determine all Nash equilibria.
d. [0.25 mark] Determine all efficient strategy profiles.
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MCL 361 Manufacturing System Design: Assignment 1 Due date: 11.59PM February 2 1, 20 21 Submit a PDF file to Moodle named as follows: MCL361_Entry#_Assignment 1 .pdf Legible scanned handwritten notes in PDF format should be submitted. Late submissions shall automatically be awarded a deduction of − 3 marks. If there is convincing evidence of cheating, zero marks shall be awarded to both the parties. Minimum marks: 0; Maximum marks: 5.

  1. [0.5 mark] Describe the Economic Production Lot (EPL) model and explain how it differs from the EOQ model in one short paragraph.
  2. [0.5 mark] If, in the classical static EOQ model, lead time is greater than cycle period, then where should you set the reorder point?
  3. [1 mark] What is a mixed strategy? How does it differ from a pure strategy? Illustrate using an example.
  4. [1 mark] Show that if, in a two-player strategic game, X is a dominant strategy for Player 1 and Y is a dominant strategy for Player 2, then (X, Y) is a Nash equilibrium.
  5. Two hunters are deciding between working together to catch a deer, which is swift and large, and working independently to catch a much smaller rabbit. It takes both to catch the deer which they will then share. A caught rabbit only belongs to the hunter who catches it. Strategy Profiles Outcomes Hunter 1’s payoff Hunter 2’s payoff (Deer, Deer) Deer caught but shared 2 2 (Deer, Rabbit) Only Hunter 2 gets rabbit 0 1 (Rabbit, Deer) Only Hunter 1 gets rabbit 1 0 (Rabbit, Rabbit) Each get one rabbit 1 1 a. [0.25 mark] Determine all dominated strategies. b. [0.25 mark] Determine all prudential strategies and the corresponding security level. c. [0.25 mark] Determine all Nash equilibria. d. [0. 2 5 mark] Determine all efficient strategy profiles.
  1. Two people are driving towards each other in cars. The one who turns away loses. Both are seriously hurt if neither turns away. (R, C) Turn Straight Turn ( 2 , 2 ) (− 2 , 4 ) Straight ( 4 , − 2 ) (− 4 , − 4 ) a. [0.25 mark] Determine all dominated strategies. b. [0.25 mark] Determine all prudential strategies and the corresponding security level. c. [0.25 mark] Determine all Nash equilibria. d. [0. 2 5 mark] Determine all efficient strategy profiles.