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ATTITUDE
STRUCTURE
and FUNCTION ____ _
111c Third Ohio State University Volume on Attitudes and Persuasion
Edited by
Anthony R. Pratkanis
Steven J. Breckler
Anthony G. Greenwald
fA 1989
LAWRENCE ERIBAUM ASSOCIATES, PUBI.ISHERS
Hillsdale, New Jersey Hove and I.omlon
1
2
CONTENTS
Foreword Daniel Katz
Why are Attitudes Important? AlllbcJIlY G. Greeml'afd
What Answers Have Been Offered? 1 Why has it Been so Difficult to Demonstrate the Importance of Attitudes? Conclusion: Implications for the Concept of Attitude 8
Interdependence of Attitude Theory and Measurement Tbomas M. Ostrom
Thurstone: A Case Study of Theory and Measurement 12 The Influence of Method on Understanding Attitudes 16 The Influence of lheory on Attitude Measurement 21 Social Cognition and Attitudes 30 Concluding Comments 32
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vi
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CONTENTS
The Structure of Individual Attitudes and Attitude Systems
William J McGuire
TIle Structure of Individual Attitudes 38 Stru(;ture of Attitude Systems 44 Attitude Systems in Relation to Other Systems Within the Person 51 Indications for Future Work 57
The Cognitive Representation of Attitudes AnthollY R Pmtkanis
Previous Conceptualizations of Attitude Structure 72 Attitudes and Conceptual Cognitive Proccsses 75 Attitudes and Episodic Memory A Sociocognitive Model of Attitude Structure 89
The Structural Bases of Consistency Among Political Attitudes: Effects of Political
71
Expertise and Attitude Importance 99 Charles AI. judd ami JOIl A Krosllick
Attitude ConSistency: Theory and Research 101 A Representational Model for the Evaluation of Political Attitude Objects 108 Some Empirical Support for These Speculations 116 Conclusion 123
Structure and Function in Political Belief Systems 129 Philip E Tetlock
Early Personality Rcsearch of Cognitive Style and Political Ideology 131 Early Support for the Rigidity-of-the-Right Hypothesis A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning 138
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9
CONTINI'S
Ideology-by-Issue Interactions in Integrative Complexity 142 Political Roles and Integrative Complexity 143 Concluding Remarks: The Need for a Flexible Functionalist Framework 146
On the Power and Functionality of Attitudes: The Role of Attitude Accessibility Russell H. Fazio
Conceptualizing Attitudes and Attitude Accessibility Accessible Attitudes Guide
Information Processing 161 Accessible Attitudes Guide Behavior 167 Accessible Attitudes are Functional 171 Further Implications of Attitude Accessibility 174
Automatic and Controlled Processes in Prejudice: The Role of Stereotypes and Personal Beliefs Patricia G. De"ille
Socialization Factors: Learning Stereotypes and Prejudice 182 Stereotypes Versus Personal Beliefs: An Integrative Model 184 Beyond Stereotypes and Personal Beliefs: The Role of Situational Factors 200 Conclusions 204
Attitudes, Decisions, and Habits as Determinants of Repeated Behavior
David L Ronis, J Frallk Yate~ and john P. Kirscht
The Utilitarian Function of Attitudes and Attitude-Behavior Consistency 214 Importance of Repeated Behaviors 215 Decisions Versus Habits 218 111C Utilitarian Function (or Nonfunction) of Attitudes Among Habitual Behaviors Why do People Make Decisions? 223 Decision Processes 224
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181
Foreword
Daniel Katz
University of Michigan
TIlis volume returns to a central problem of social psychology but not in the sense of Schlesinger's cycles of history. It is not just a revival of the issues of yesteryear, though they are part of the story, as it is a new attack upon the structure and function of attitudes. It reformulates old concepts, explores new angles, seeks relationships among research findings from various sub- areas, digs deeper into the meaning of relevant psychological processes, and shows progress in the sophistication of research design and the specifica- tion of the variables concerned. The concept of attitude has an interesting history as a broadly defrned construct combining affect, conation, and belief intervening between stimu- lus and response. It was incorporated into social psychology by early writers including McDougall in his notion of sentiments and by floyd AJlport in his idea of pre dispositional sets to respond. In fact John 8. Watson defined social psychology as the study of attitudes. The anlbiguity of defini- tion gave behaviorists a theoretical back door to admit mental processes and social meaning, on the one hand, and field theorists like Krech and Crutchfield to deal with relatively stable substructures in a dynanlic field on the other. Thus attitude research burgeoned during the 1920s and 1930s and Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb in their E:ICperimelltal50cial Psychol - ogy (1937) devoted some 157 pages and over 100 references to attitudes and their measurement. But attitude research did not maintain its momen- tum for two reasons. First, the many investigations produced few generaliz- able principles. Second, there was little to distinguish attitude from other concepts such as social conformity, stercot)'pes, habit strength, personalit)' charactcristics, schemata, sentiments, or values. There was no set of pro-
x i
xii fORI· ',(' OR!)
positions or systematic hypotheses to guide the researcher and bring clarification to the field. A push toward unification came with the functional approach. It tried to combine beliefs and motives and to take account of the diversity of motiva- tional patterns. Attitudes were seen as a means for meeting some need of the individual including personal value systems. It called for analysis of the reasons for attitude formation, maintenance, and change. It assumed that change attempts, if they were to be successful, had to be directed at the specific conditions related to the causal basis of the attitude in question. There was some recognition of the plausibility of such theorizing in the early 1950s and some research was generated. But functionalism declined as an area of interest long before it matured and developed as a significant movement. Four related reasons account for the failure of functionalism to take hold the first time around. First, it lacked a ready and rigorous methodology for the compleXity of the problems attacked. Second, it called for a large sc.:ale research program of resources and personnel rather than a single ex- per iment--one more readily publishable. Third, it ran counter to the search for a single explanatory concept. Psychologists were essentially mOalistic in their thinking and had difficulty with a two-factor theory of leaming let alone a fo ur·factor theory of attitude formation. And finally, consistency theory with its emphasis on cognitive processes was sweeping everything before it. Field theory replaced behaviorism and Freudian doc..·, rines in social psychology. The concepts of balance, congrUity, and dissonallce were implemented hy ingenious and well-controlled experiments. The swing was hack to the rational man. The impact of consistency theory was great and it made useful con- tributions-some of lasting importance. The present volume employs some of these findings and theorizing of the consistency literature. The concern with the psychologic.:al field of the individual c.:orrected a prior neglect of human being as an active perceiver, interpreter, and thinking creature. People structure and restructure their changing world in ways that make sense to them. A dilemma arose, however, with respect to objective logic and psycho- logic. Questions were raised about the predictability and permanence of the changes induc.:ed by the experimental setting, often highly c.:ontr ived and gamelike in c.:haracter. In more natural settings would individuals be as constrained by logical consistency or would they turn to a psycho-logic that allowed for selectivity, rationalization, and even distortion and denial? With a multitudl' of experiences and beliefs and conflicting demands, could wish thinking and the will to believe be ignored. When inconsistencies appeared in behavior, why not go beyond some idiosyncratic psycho-logic of an individual to look at the motivational patterns involved? Ilow otherwise
FOREWORD xiii
could one account for differences produced by the social setting as in the Simple case of private and public attitudes? Why exclude studies dealing with the needs, the drives, and the desires of people emphasized by theories of social motivation, reinforcement and reward and the nature of personal- ity determinants? Consistency of cognitive processes was only one chapter in attitude formation and change. A functional approach provided a broader franlework and basically this is what the present volume is all about. Attitude Stnlcture and Function brings together the advances made by linking older functionalism with related bodies of research utilizing more sophisticated methodology and more precision in the definition of con- cepts. Its chapters examine the relationships between levels of cognitive structure, motives, and behavior in various social settings. It is both more inclusive of psychological findings and digs deeper into the specifics of structure and change. It embraces, as most earlier functional work did not, such important topics as level of representational structure, cognitive style, the relationship of attitudes to other systems, types of value conflict, the salvaging of ideology, the need for structure, the biological homeostatic modd, intra-individual relationships of beliefs, behavioral habits and atti- tudes, the imitiation and persistence of attitude change, beliefs as posses- sions, objective constraints and social settings on attitude formation and change, and the basis for individual differences in functional needs. TIle shift toward functionalism came, however, in good part from the impingement of societal forces, often mediated by the other social SCiences, upon the narrow scientism of the laboratory and its heavy concern with cognitive processes. The social diSCiplines bordering and interrelated with social psychology were increasingly under pressure to move from an armchair approach to empirical research to help in the solution of problems in the hcalth field to issues of intergroup relations. Their studies of the dilemmas of racism, discrimination, the institutionalization of social inequi- ties, group conflict, and individual and group adjustment reinstated the interests of the early realistic social psychology concerned with significant social issues. In fact SPSSI has been founded in 1938 for this purpose. 11l0Ugh SPSSl's influence declined after the depression and war years the objects of its concerns have become more salient in public thinking in recent years and once again a functional franlework has gained adherents as motivational patterns in all their complexities call for increased study. 'I1le use of a functional approach aids and abets the trend of psychologists to join social scientists to deal more broadly with social issues as the present work attests. The influence of system thinking from hiology and sociology is c..·videnet·d in a number of chapters. The growth of political psychology is explicitly recognized in discussing the rise and fall of political movements, ther relationship between attitudes and larger belief structures, and the role of elite opinion and political leadership.
2 GRE^ f.^ NWAJ.1)
Attitudes Are Pervasive
This observation is accurate, as can be verified by noticing (a) the ease with which people report evaluative reactions to a wide variety of objects, (b) the difficulty of identifying categories of objects within which evaluative distinctions arc not made, and (c) the pervasiveness of an evaluative com- ponent in judgments of meaning (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of attitudes is itself not a reason for con- cluding that attitudes are important in explaining social behavior. As Bern (1967) suggested, attitudes might be cognitive illusions that arc con- structed after the fact of behavior.
Attitudes Predict Behavior Toward Their Objects
An important, early critique of the usefulness of attitudes in predicting behavior was given by laPiere (1934). (Problems with LaPicre's critique arc reviewed later in this chapter.) Thirty years later, festinger (1964) critically noted the lack of published support for the reasonable expectation that changes in attitudes should lead to changes in beha'ior toward their objects. Subsequently, Wicker (1969) reviewed a body of research that revealed only weak correlations between measures of attitudes and mea- sures of behavior toward their objects. In the 1970s and 1980s two major programs of research succeeded in clarifying attitude-behavior relations. The first of these, directed by Martin Fishbein and leek Ajzen (e.g., 1974; see chap. 10 in this volume), demon- strated that attitude and behavior are correlated (a) when the observed behavior is judged to be relevant to the attitude, (h) when attitude ,lOd behavior are observed at comparable levels of specificity, and (c) when mediation of the attitude-behavior relation by behavioral intentions is taken into account. -nle second major program, directed by Russell Fazio (e .g., 1986; see chap. 7 in this volume), showed that attitude and behavior, and changes therein, are correlated (a) when the attitude is based on direct experience with the attitude object, and (b) to the extent that the attitude is cognitivcly accessible. Although the successful Fishbcin-Ajzen and FaziO research programs have established that attitudes can and do predict behavior toward their objects, these programs have also placed important qualifying conditions on the attitude-behavior relationship. Attitude-behavior relations do not appear to be sufficiently powerful or robust to establish the importance of attitude as a theoretical construct. (Further discussion of attitude-behavior relations is found in chap. 3, 7, and 9 of this volume.)
- WHY ARE Al1TruOF$ IMPORTANT
Attitudes Are a Selective Force in Perception and Memory
3
It has long been supposed that perceptual and cognitive processes are guided by attitudes. The two most-often-stated principles regarding atti- tude-guided information processing are that persons selectively (a) seek information that agrees with their attitudes while avoiding disagreeing informatiun (e .g., Festingcr, 1957), and (b) remember attitude-agreeable information in preference to disagreeable information (e.g., Levine & Mur- phy, 19·13). However, the empirical basis for both of these hypothesized distortions of perception and memory was sharply questioned in the 1960s (e.g., Freedman & Sears, 196~; Greenwald & Sakumura, 1967; \VaI)' & Cook, 1966). It now appears that these selective effects on information seeking and memory occur only under rather limited circumstances (see Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Consequently, these phenomena do not establish the importance of attitude as a theoretical construct. (Chap. 4 in this volume gives. a more detailed review of the role of attitudes in cognitive processes, including evidence for substantial effects on cognitive processes more cumplex than the seeking and remembering of agreeable infurmation.)
Attitudes Serve Various Psychic Functions
111e most direct attention to the importance of attitudes was given in the fimctiollai analyses of Smith, Bruner, and White ( 1956) and Katz ( 1960); they proposed that attitudes serve functions deSignated by labels such as utilitarian, social adjustment, object appraisal, knowledge, value expression, and egO-defense. Because these functional theories genet"ated little re- search, claims for functions of attitudes remain largely unsubstantiated. (The poverty of empirical support for attitude functions is only recently beginning to be addressed, with the initiation of research programs such as those described in chap. 4, 6, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in this volume.)
WHY HAS IT BEEN SO DIFFICULT
TO DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE
OF ATTITUDES?
Answering this question depends on understanding the relation of attitudes to behavior. Of the three answers to be suggested here, only the first encourages satisfaction with the current understanding of attitudes in rela- tion to behavior.
4 GREENWAlD
Difficulty 1: Ordinary Situations Are AttitudinaUy Complex
In expecting attitudes to predict behavior toward their objects, researchers have often assumed that only a single attitude should be operative in the situation on which their research focused. This assumption is often implaus- ible. LaPiere's (1934) research, which played an important role in criticism of the attitude construct, is used here to illustrate a setting complicated not only by uncertain identification of the focal attitude object, but also by multiple attitude objects beyond the one focal for the researcher.
Uncertain Identification of the Focal Object
In LaPiere's study, he and a young Chinese couple traveled widely in the United States, seeking accommodation at many hotels and restaurants while observing the hotel and restaurant proprietors' attitudes toward Chinese (assessed with a mailed questionnaire) and their behavior of providing accommodations or service to the Chinese couple. LaPiere assumed that the salient attitude object was "members of the Chinese race." However, the couple (who were described as "personable" and "charming") could also
have been identified as customers, as middle-class persons, as a young
married COUPle, and so forth. There is little justification for assuming that
the only (or even the most) salient attitude-object identification was "members of the Chinese race."
Multiple Attitude Objects
A restaurant proprietor might be concerned that an unpleasant scene
with the young Chinese couple could intrude on the meals of other patrons
or harm the reputation of the restaurant The proprietor's behavior toward
the Chinese couple might therefore be as much (or more) influenced by attitudes toward those other objects (i.e., other patrons, the restaurant) as by attitudes toward the young couple. When, as in this situation, additional objects are important, attitude toward the presumably focal object should not dominate the prediction of behavior. LaPiere's research is not an isolated example of the problems that (a) objects of behavior are difficult to identify in compact verbal labels, and (b) multiple attitude objects are potentially salient. I When these problems
I M Dillehay ( 1973 ) and others observed, the Interpretation of UPierc's research in teons of attitude-behavior relations was problematic In other respects. His study compared, not statements of attitude, but predictions of behavior ("Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests In your establishment?") with actual behavior of hotel and restaurant proprietors toward the Chinese couple. Furthermore, the predictions and actual behavior must often have been assessed for differe:nt persolL", because of the low likelihood that the: person who answered each eslahlislunent's mail was also the person who greeted potential patrons.
- WHY ARE ATIlllJDES IMPORTANT 5
characterize a research situation, the attitude measured by the researcher should predict behavior only weakly, if at all. Some solutions are to limit research on attitude-behavior relations to objects that are easily identifiable verbally, and to use behavior assessments that lack multiple potential atti- tude objects. The research successes of Fazio (1986) and of Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) were achieved in large part through such limitations.
Importance of a Phenomenon in Relation
to the Difficulty of Demonstrating It
Because strong attitude-behavior correlations are difficult fO produce, it may appear that attitudes are only weakly connected to behavior. On the contrary, however, the need for well-controlled research settings to demon- strate strong attitude-behavior relations may mean only that the influence of attitudes on behavior is so pervasive that it is difficult to observe the isolated effect of a single attitude. (An example of a parallel point is the difficulty of observing a classically conditioned response in isolation; in ordinary situations, such as eating a meal, classically conditioned responses are certainly important but are not easily observed due to masking by multiple other conditioned responses.) In general, the difficulty of demon- strating a phenomenon in research is irrelevant to a conclusion about its importance; the difficulty may mean only that the phenomenon is typically embedded in an obscuring degree of complexity.
Difliculty 2: The Concept of Attitude Needs to Be Refined
The Conception of "Attitude Object"
Collectively, and for the most part also individually, attitude researchers have treated virtually any nameable or describable entity as an attitude object. One can find studies of attitudes toward (a) sensory qualities (col- ors, odors, textures), (b) concrete objects (animals, persons, places, foods), (c) abstract concepts (personality traits, subjects of academic study), (d) verbal statements (beliefs, opinions, policies), (e) systems of thought (aesthetic styles, ideologies), (f) actions (e.g., drinking alcohol, sexual behavior), and even (g) attitudes (e.g., an attitude toward prejudice). The conceptual tolerance represented by this breadth is surely to be encour- aged in the early stages of a concept's developmenL However, the present breadth of the attitude concept may now be an obstacle to theoretical developmenL That is, the cost that is exchanged for this benefit of breadth may be a lack of preciSion.
8 GREF.NWAI.D
hours per day at a disliked job may be explainable only in terms of the positive attitudes toward the family members who are supported by the resulting income. Similarly, if one considers the behavior at the disliked joh only in terms of the attitude toward the job, again it would appear that attitude and behavior are inconsistent. This is a situation in which the attitude toward each object is inconsistent with the behavior toward that ohject, but nevertheless the attitude toward one ohject (family) fully ex· plains the behavior toward another (joh). A negative attitude toward memhers of a racial group (prejudice) may explain little in the way of behavior toward persons of that race-with whom the prejudiced person may have little or no contact. However, it can explain much behavior that occurs within groups of persons who share the prejudice or who perceive themselves collectively to be targets of the prejudice. An attitude against nuclear power may be most apparent in convero;ations (with friends or acquaintances) that touch on nuclear power, in protest directed against persons who advocate nucIe:tc power or corporations that use nuclear power, or in contributions to organizations that oppose \lUcIear power. Here tht: significant behavior is toward some object other I,lan the attitude ohject (which in this case is an abstract concept). These examples stand as thOUght experiments in support of the proposi- tion that an attitude toward one object is often more significant in control· ling behavior toward other ohjects than toward its own ohject. 'Ibis major point has not yet been incorporated into theoretical analyses of attitude functions.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR mE CONCEPT OF AITITUDE
The first answer to the question, "Why has it been so difficult to demon- strate the importance of attitudes?" attributed the difficulty to the attitudinal complexity of ordinary situations, justifying a business-a-;-usual approach to attitude research. In contrast, the second and third answers identified conceptual prohlems that encourage efforts to strengthen theoretical an- alyses of attitude structure and function. Each of the chapters in this volume presents current programs by researchers who have not heen content with the business·as-usual approach. Their research constitutes the \cading wave of a revolution in attitude theory. lbis revolution can he expected to complete the already-hegun overthrow of the three-component definition, and to establish effective methods for investigating attitude functions. The concluding chapter of this volume continues the prescnt discu~~ion and attempts to anticipate the next generation of conceptions of attitude struc- ture and function.
I. WHY ARE ArnnJDES IMPORTANT (^9)
REFERENCES
Allport, G. W. ( 1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed.), A handbook 0/ social psycbology (pp. 798-844). Worcester, MA : Clark University Press. Bern, D. ). (1967). Self· perception : An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phen o mcna. Psychological Rel'ieu: 74. 18~. "reckler, S. ). (1984). Empirical validation of affect, behavior, and cognition as distinct c om p on cnlS of atlitude.journal of Personality and Social Ps)'cholog); 47. 1191-1205. Byrne, D. (1969). Attitudes and attraction. In L Berkowitz (Ed). Adva"ces in experimental social p sycho logy (Vol. 4, pp. 3~9). New York: Academic Press. Cl ore, G. L. & Baldridge, B. ( 1968). Interpersonal attractio n: The role of agreement and topic interest. joun/al of Personality and Social Psychology. 9. 340-346. DeFlcur, M. L, & Weslie, F. R. (1963). Attitude as a scientic concept. Social Forces. 42. 17-
Dillehay. R. C. (1973). On the irrelevance of the classical negative evidence concerning the effect of altitudes on behavior. American Psychologist, 28. 887-. Doob, L W. (1947). The behnior of attitudes. Psychological Rwieu; 54. 135-156. F31io. R. H. ( 1986). How do attitudes guide: behavior? In R. M. Sorrenlino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook o/motivation and cognition (pp. 204-243). New York, Guilford Press. Feslinger, L ( 1957). Theory 0/ cognitive disso"ance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Festinger, L (1964). Behavioral suppor! for opinion change. Public Opinion Quartcrl)~ 28. 404-. l'ishbcin, M., & AJ7.en, I. (1974). Attitudes toward objeclS as predictors of single and multiple beha"ioral critcria. Psychological Review, 81. 59-. Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. ( 1975). Beliet attitude. intention and behavior: An introdllction to t!Jeor), and researclJ. Realling, MA : Addison·Wesley. Freedman,). L , & Sears, D. O. (1965). Selective exposure. In L Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimemal social psychology (Vol. I, pp. 57-97) New York: Academic Press (;reenwald, A. G. ( 1968a). Cognitive learning, cogniti"e responses to persuasion, and attitude change. In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds. ), Ps)'chological/oundations 0/ atliwdes (pp. 147-170). New York: Academic Press. Greenwald, A. G. (1968b). On defining attitude and attitude theory. In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds. ), PS)'chological fOllndations ofattitudes (pp. 361-388). New York: AcademiC Press. (;re:enwald, A. G.• & Sakumura,). S. (1967). Attitude and selective learning: Where are the phenomena of yesteryear? jOllrnal of Personality and Social Psychology. 7. 387-39 7. Katz, D. ( 196(). The functional approach to the study of attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly.
- I 63-2()4. Kothandapani, V. ( 1971 ). Validation of feeling. belief. and intention to act as three componenlS of attitude and their contribution to the prediction of contracepth'e behavior. journal of Personality and Social PS.l'c/)ology. 19. 321-. Krech, D., Crutchfield, R. S., & 8allachey, E. L (1962). I"di"idllal in society. New York: I\kGraw·11i11. I.aPiere, R. T. (1')3·1). Allitudes "ersus actions. Social Forces. 13, 23a-23 7. I.nine,). M., & Murphy. G. (19·13). The \t:arning and forgetting of contro,'er..ial material. JOIln/al of Abnomwl and Social Psychology. 38, 507-. ~Id;uire, \V. ). ([969). lbe: nature ofattitudes and attitude change. In G. lJndzey, & E. Aronson (Ells. ). Jlmlt/book of social psyc/)ology (2nd ed ., V"I. 3, pp. 136-314). Reading. MA : Addis()n · We~ley. (hgood, C. E.. Suci, G.)., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. Urbana. II .: 1'IIh cr,Hy "f lII in oi~ Press.
10 GRF.F.NW All)
lhlrom, T. M. (1969). ' lbe relationship between the affet:tive, bchavioral, and cO/lnlll'c componcnts of attitude. JOllmal of E:,:perimental Social Psychology. 5. 12-30. Petty, R. E., Ostrom , T. M , & Brock, T. C. (Eds.). ( 1981). Cogllitillf! respollses to persllasimt Hillsdale, N): l.awrence Erlbaum Associates. Rosenberg, M. J., & Hovlmd, C. I. ( 1960). Cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of attitudes. In C. I. Hovland & M.]. Rosenberg (Eds.), Attitllde organizatioll alld change (pp. I- I·,). New Hn en, <:1" : Yale University Press. Smith, M B" Bruner,]. S., & White, R W. (1956). Opillions alld persollality. Ncw York: WilC)·. Waly, P., & Cook, S. W. ( 1966). Attitude as a dcterminant of Il'arning and mcmory: A failurc to confirm. JOI/mal of Perso nality and Social Psycholog)_ 4, 28U-28H. Wicker, A. W. (1969) , Attitudes versus actions: The relation of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. ]ollmal of Social Issues, 25, 41-7H. Wicklund, R A., & Brehm, J. W. (1976). Perspectives 011 cogllitilJe dissolltlllcf!. Hillsdale, NJ: l.awrence Erlbaum Associates. 7.anna, M. P., & Rempel,]. K. (in press). Attitudes: A new look at an old concept. In U. 8ar-Tal & A. Kruglanski (Ells.), The social ps)'choloR,V of kllowledge New York: Cambridge Unh-c rsity Press.
,
430 GREENWAl.D
starts by attempting to define the position of attitude more precisely in relation to the broader set of motivational constructs. Just as in its motivational domain, in psychology's cognitive domain there exists a diverse array of theoretical constructs, among which relationships have not been well described. The author has recently proposed that relations among these cognitive (mental representation) concepts can be
interpreted in terms of levels of representation (Greenwald, 1987). In a
levels·of-representation (LOR) system, representational units of each of several systems (levels) are constructed from units of an immediately subordinate, but qualitatively distinct, system of representations. Each level succeeds in representing properties of the environment that arc not cap- tured by lower levels (i.e., these are emergent properties of the multilevel system). A specific LOR theory on which Greenwald (1987) focused described five representational levels: features, objects, categories, propositions, and schemata. (This theory was identified as LOR (^) h5 - u^ h" for human and "5" for
its number of levels.) In LOR h5 the most elementary level,featllres, consists
of primitive sensory qualities such as brightness, loudness, warmth, and sharpness. Combinations of features that are capable of becoming figural
constitute objects, the second level. A class membership relation permits
objects to be grouped into units of the third level, categories. Syntal: O: ic
relations among abstract category types (such as action, actor, instrument,
and target) produce units of the fourth level, propositions. TIle units of the
fifth and highest level, schemata, are rule-governed groupings of proposi-
tions, such as narrative sequences or logical proofs. The present approach to defining attitude starts by associating motivational terms with each of the~e five levels of representation. These associations are discoverable by first noting variations in motivational properties of the units at each level.
At the level of sensory features, one can distinguish pleasant features
(warm temperature, soft texture, quiet sound, moderate illumination) from painful ones (cold temperature, shrill sound, rough texture, glaring light).
At the level of objects one can identify liked objects (an ice cream cone, a
20-dollar bill) and disliked ones (a rotten apple, a hand grenade). People
recognize both evaluatively positive categories (such as food or money)
and evaluatively negative ones (such as garbage or weapons). Propositiotls
describe actions and states that range from desirable to undesirable. The
units of LOR h5 'S highest level, schemata, include (among other subtypes)
stories, persuasive arguments, mathematical proofs, and scientifk theories; for each of thesc types of schemata, there are readily noticeable evaluative variations, identified by terms such as aesthetic quality of prose, rhetori- cal excellence of persuasion, parsimony of proofs, and validity of theories. Table 17.1 suggests relationships of motivational terms to LORh<;'s levels. I
- WHY AITITUDES ARE IMPORTANT
TABLE 17. Relations Among Levels of Representation and Motivational Constructs
Level
Feature Object Category Proposition Schema
Motil/aliol/a/ Terms
affect, appetite, drive, feeling attitllde, emotion, incentive attitllde, value attitllde, belief, intention, opinion, va/lie atlilllde, emolion, ideology, justification (moral reasoning), motive, plan, script Note: Italicized terms appear at two or more Ie\·els.
431
The breadth of the current concept of attitude is indicated by its place- ment at four of Table 17.1's five levels. The problems with such broad usage can be illustrated with an example in which these multiple interpretations are applied simultaneously. Consider a professor's motivational orientation
toward a new graduate student. Should attitude refer to the professor's (a)
(object-level) liking response to the particular student, (b) (category-level) evaluations that relate to the student (e.g., students, women, Chinese per- sons, etc.), (c) (proposition-level) intentions that relate to students (e.g.,
Dotl't judge a book by its COlIer, Be encouraging but resen'ed), or to
women or to Chinese persons, or (d) (schema-level) complexes of beliefs, policies, and evaluation that relate to students, etc.? By permitting several interpretations simultaneously, the current broad conception of attitude precludes precise reference; it obligl's attitude to serve only as a general motivational term. Two possible solutions to this problem are: (a) to adopt a more restrictive use of attitude, or (b) to develop new labels for level-of-motivation distinctions that are not ade·
I Previous hierarchical conceptions of relations among motivational constructs have rarely sought to encompa.~ more than two of Table 17.I·s five levels. Examples include the prinury. secondary process distinction in psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1900/19';3). the distinction be",vecn innate (primary) and acquired (secondary) drives in learning·bc:ha\ior theory (e.g., Miller, 1951 ), the distinction between first and second signaling systems by Pa\ 10' ( 1955), and the relation between e' a1u a ti on of subject·verb-object propositions and evaluations of their calt.-gory-level components (c.g., Gollob, 1974; In~ko, 1981; Osgood & Tanncbaum. 19';5; Wycr, 1974). "lbe social behaviorist treatment of motivation b)' St.l3ts (19<:J1i) is unusual Iv differentiated in encompa.'i..~ing three levcls (which approximate the first threc of Table 17.1·~ fivc InTIs). VaJlaeher and WegOl:r's (191-15; 191-17) recent analysis of actioll identification descrihes 'arialions in the perceh'cd l"<lnlrol of behavior. ranging from ab~tr Jct. high Ic:'els (e.g .. In terms of long·term goals) to lower, more concrete levels (e.g., in tccms of specific mo\·ements). However. their theory does not commit itself to specific ident iti t' ~ of Inels, nor docs it take a pclloition on the number of distinct Ic:vcJs.
432 GREENWAI.D
quately captured by existing terms. However, even if it is clear that one of these solutions is desirable, either would be strongly opposed by the inertia of long-established usages. Accordingly, the present treatment attempts a compromise that is in part a narrowing of the usage of attitude and in part a proposal to make distinctions (among types of attitudes) that can permit increased precision of usage while preserving much of the term's present breadth. In the present treatment, attitude is defined as the affect associated with a mental object. This is both (a) a substantial rctreat to the past (the definition is virtually identical to Thurstone's ( 1931), "Attitude is the affect for or against a psychological object") and (b) a narrowing relative to recently popular definitions that have permitted attitudes to be proposition- or schema-level entities. (In particular, this definition excludes the 3- component interpretation of attitude, which is a schema-Ievcl conception.) The prescnt definition's reference to the object of attitude as a mental object requires clarification to avoid confusion with the more restricted notion of object as one of LORho;'s five levels of representation. A mental object is a representation at any of LOR (^) h5 's four high cst Icvels (object, category, proposition, or schema). In contrast, object (qua level) in LORtto; deSignates an entity that is conceived as being lo~ated in physical spacc and time. These two uses of "object" will be kept distinct by referring to mental object or attitudf> object for the broader conception, and o,.dinary object or spatiotemporal object or object (without qualifier) for the narrower one. Table 17.2 gives examples of attitude objects at each of LOR.. ,; 's four highest representational levels.
TABLE 17. Examples of Mental (Attitude) Objects at 1.014.'s Object. CategorJ. Proposition. and Schema l.evcls of Represcntalion
lC'tl(!l
Object'
Category
PropoSition
Schema
Examples
a friend. an automobile. an insect. a poison Ivy plant Eskimos. paintings. snakes. Christll1a.~ trees Terrorists hijacking airplancs, citizens pa)'ing Income tax, drinking to become intoxicated, using contraceptive devices Psychoanalytic theor)" the game of b.t'>C- ball, TIle 10 Commandmenls, a career in medicine "111e listed objects should be interpreted as specific in· dividuals (e .g .. the polson h'Y plant on which one is about 10 sit ).
- WHY A1TITIJDES ARE IMPORTANT
The distinctions among levels of attitude objects in Table 17.2 can be used to avoid confusions of the sort that were noted in chapter l's discus- sion of LaPiere's (1934) research. The young couple who accompanied LaPiere can be construed as attitute objects (a) in their identities as in- dividual persons, or (b) as the intersection of several categories, or (c) as constituents of various propositions, and so forth. Confusion results if it is not clear that just one of these levels of mental object is intended in any context. This analysis has used the theory of levels of representation in two ways. First, LOR (^) h,; was used in noting that attitude has sometimes been defined as having the structure of a high-level representation such as a proposition or schema. (The three-component definition, for example, is a schema struc- ture.) The presently preferred definition interprets attitude a<; an affective associate of a mental representation, a compound structure that links a mental object at one of the four higher lcvels with lowest (kature- )Ievel affective qualities. Second, LOR",; was used to make distinctions within the broad class of mental rcpresentations that can be attitude objccts. Attitude objects can be represcntations at any of the four highest Ic"ds of LOR.. ".
Implications for Attitude Research If the author were reading rather than writing this chapter, his reaction to the proposal just made would be: Why bother? Why not maintain the present broad conception of attitude as is? What is to be gained by in- troducing distinctions that othcrs haven't seen fit to make previously? or (borrowing from the chapter-opening quote from Smith, Bruner, & 'White,
- Why is it now the time to become "theoretically solemn" br in- troducing "greater precision"? The answer can equally be taken from the Smith. Bruner, and White quote-from their obsen'ation that "Definitions are matters of convenience." The broad definition of attitude appears to have become inconvenient, as reflected in the difficulty of both (a) produc- ing a satisfying account of the relationship of attitudes to behavior and (b) reaching consensus on the functions of attitudes. (See the introductory discussions of these points in chap. I.) The major research-procedural recommendation of the present analy!;is concerns the necessity for care in specifying the attitude object in attitude measurement; the attitude object should be presented so as to target the single representationallc"cI (i.e.,1 ordinary) object, category, proposition, or schema) that is most appropriate for the research objectives. For example. in measuring an attitude toward snakes as a category, one should present the respondmt with a photograph of a prototypical snake, or with the category name "snake" rather than presenting a live (ordinary objc~t) snake. (Breckler, 1984, found that these variations in presenting the attitude
CoREF.NWAI.D
Three Facets of the Self In a recent analysis, Greenwald and Breckler ( 1985; see also Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Greenwald, 1982) identified three classes of strategies for establishing and maintaining self-esteem, which they labeled ego tasks of public, private, and collective facets of the self. The public selfs strategy is to establish self-worth by earning favorable evaluations from important others (a public audience); the private self achieves self-worth by meeting or exceeding internalized evaluative standards (the approval of an internal, private audience); and the collective self establishes self-worth by seeking to attain the goals of reference groups (a collective audience). Attitudes toward objects other than the self readily participate in these strategks for establishing and maintaining self regard. When the public facet is emphasized, the person should displ'ly attitudes that are agreeable to significant others; these attitudes can be instrumental in earning the approval of significant others and, via this public-self strategy, self-regard. This strategy of the public self corresponds to Smith, Bruner, and White's social adjustment function ("(Olne will more readily ami forthrightly express acceptable attitudes while inhibiting or modulating thl' expression of less approved ones" (pp. 41-42]). 111e private facet of the self earns self·regard by meeting or exceeding internalized criteria of success. Consistency within one's repertory of ohjeet appraisals is such a criterion, and consistency-maintenance is a privatl:·<;df strategy. By this analysis, Katz's (1960) value-expressive function ("the individual derives satisfactions from expressing attitudes appropriate to his personal valucs" Ip, 170 I) is a manifestation of the private facet of the s('lf. The collectille facet of the self establishcs self·worth by helping to achieve the goa ls of important reference groups (family, church, prolCssion, etc.). An oh vious str ategy toward that end is to value objects that arc identified w ith one 's reference groups. Attitudes that arc shaped by th is strategy may be said to serve a group solidarity or social idelttificatim. function. Ollis l:ist is not one that appcars in the Smith, Bruner, and Whitc or Katz lists: in ch ap. 12 in this volume, howc ver, Shavitt de~crihes such a social idcntification function.)
Self-appraisal, Attitude FlmctiOllS, a1ld Social l1lfluence Pmn'ss('s Insko ( 1967) rightly identified Kelman's (1961) analysis of the influl'nce processes of cumpl iance, internalization, and identification as all original analysis of attitude functions. The Greenwald·8reckler three·strate~,' ego· task analYSi s converges w ith Kelman's analysis. As descrihed by Kdlllan. compliance is yielding to influence in the presence of powerti.d olhl'rs. which corresponds to the public selfs strategy for earning appro v al: i,,· tenzalizatioll is the acceptance of influence that is con sis tent wilh c!>'
- WHY ATnnlDF.C; ARF. IMPORTANT
tablished values, corresponding to the pri'ate selfs cognitive consistency strategy; and ide1ltificatio1l, the acceptance of influence that comes from admired others, corresponds to the collective selfs strategy of adopting refcrence·group attitudes.
WHY ATTITUDES ARE IMPORTANT
Chapter 1 raised the question of the attitudc concept's importance in social psychology, and stated a criterion for establishing that attitudes are impor· tanto lbere must bc some important social bchaviors that cannot be ex· plained without appealing to attitudcs. It remains to determine whether the present treatmcnt of attitude structure and function has prm'ided a basis for making the importance of attitudes compcllingly apparent.
Summary
'Ibc preliminary analysis given in Chapter 1 identificd three correctible sources of interference with many pre'ious attempts to describe rela· tionships of attitudes to social behavior. These arc:
1. 71Je attitude ohject may be illappropriale~J' ide1ltified Studies of hehavior directed at objects (such as a specific person) ha\ 'e often at· tempted to predict the object·directed behavior from measures of attitude toward just onc of sevcral categories into which the object falls ( e.g.. a racial group). This problem is related to one dcscribed in previous analyses as a diftcrcnn' bctwcen attitude and hehavior measurcs in their let 'el of specific, i~l' (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen. 1975). 2. Behal'iol' may be IINder tbe control of attitudes toward o/)jects oth" thall that ()11 whicb the res£'arch is focllsed Attitude objects can be arrayed in a hierarchy of importance , with the self and persons on whom one is dependent often being at or near the top. In a research setting that focuses on attitude and behavior toward an unimportant object , the attempt to demonstrate attitude·behavior relations is likely to be undermined by thc relcvallce of some more important object. As an cxample. the subject may Hnd it morc important to act on the self-attitude ( e.g., by doing what would earn the experimcnter's approval) than to act on the attitude toward some less important object that is the ostensible focus of study. 3. Tbe COllCL'Plioll (~r the attitude·/Jehatlior relation is ilttrinsically coltfllsed I~J' the widely atill()cated three-COmpOlle1lt defillitio1l of attitude. When the three · component definition is used, a set of data that includes measures of attitude and hehavior can be interpretcd interchangeably as a'o sl'ssing (a) the attitudl'·behavior rc:lationship, (b) relations of the he·
HR GREENWAlD
havioral (conative) attitude component to other attitude components, or (c) the relation between behavior and the conative attitude component. Such theoretical ambiguity undermines the achievement of consensus on conceptual analysis.
The present chapter sought to overcome these recurrent difficulties through its formulations of attitude structure and function. Attitude was defmed as the association of a mental representation (i.e., an object, cate- gory, proposition, or schema) with affect, and attitude function was an- alyzed in terms of a single major function, object appraisal (a synthesis of Smith, Bruner, & White's (1956) function of that name and Katz's (1960) adjustive and knowledge functions). The implications of this analysis can be summarized as a set of three propositions that specify conditions under which attitudes playa powerful role in determining social behavior.
1. Attitude toward the self (self-esteem) is a powerful detern, inalll of
social behavior. The self is for many people the most important attitude
object. Behavior that is interpreted in terms of evaluation apprehension and impression management is esteem-related, and self-esteem has sometimes been credited as the effective basis for the broad range of phenomena studied in investigations of cognitive dissonance (see Aronson, 1969; Greenwald & Ronis, 1978). Additionally, the powerful phenomena of attrac- tion to similar others (Byrne, 1969) or repulsion from dissimilar ot hers (Rosenbaum, 1986) can be understood in terms of the self-esteem im- plications of these responses.
2. Attitude is a powerful detenninant of evaluative responses to the
source and content of influence attempts. The person with a favorable
attitude toward some mental object can be counted on to respond favorably to statements that place that object in a favorable light, or to oppose communications that evaluate the object negatively. The sources of such communications will be evaluated in correspondingly positive or negative fashion.
3. Attitude is a powerful detenninant of behavior in relation to nOllel
(ordinary) objects with which the person has had direct experience. Fazio
and Zanna (1981) demonstrated that direct experience increases the strength of prediction of behavior from measures of attitude toward an object. As noted in discussing the object appraisal functiop, people arc adept at rapidly forming attitudes toward unfamiliar objects. However, it is rare for attitude researchers to confront subjects with novel objects. (The subject in the typical attitude investigation inhabits a largely abstract world.) Consequently, the rapid development and attachment of attitudes to novel (ordinary) objects may be the most understudied aspect of atti- tudes.
- WHY ATnTIJDES ARE IMPORTANT (^439)
Attitude Theory: Past, Present, and Future Twenty years ago, there was a broad acceptance of a definition of attitude that was stated in terms of the venerable partition of mental activity into affection, conation, and cognition. Presently, this three-component defmi· tion of attitude is being abandoned. Twenty years ago, attitude theory was strongly dominated by cognitive consistency principles that were associ- ated with the concepts of balance, congruity, and dissonance. Presently, the influence of consistency theories has been replaced with analyses of the role of the self in cognition and behavior. Twenty years ago, it was regarded as evident that attitude was social psychology's most important theoretical construct. Presently, the importance of attitudes is questioned. These observations could suggest that the attitude construct is in its twilight. However, a decidedly optimistic view of the attitude construct comes from considering its position in the evolution of psychological theory of motivation. In the behaviorist and learning theory years of psy- chology (from the 1920s to the 1960s), theories of human motivation
focused on the role of physical stimuli (such as electric shock, sexual
contact, hunger contractions, intracranial electrical stimulation, and food taste) in directing and energizing behavior. During those same years, social psychologists were gradually evolving the construct of attitude as a concep-
tion of motivation in relation to melltal objects.
The physical stimuli studied by learning-behavior theorists correspond to the lowest (feature) level of a representational system such as the five-level system (LO~5) used in the present analysis. In contrast, the motivational functioning of attitudes depends on the representational abil- ity needed to cognize mental objects and to comprehend such objects' instrumentality in achieving desired goals. Attitude is thus the central theoretical construct for describing the motivational significance of mental objects.
REFERENCES Aronson, E. ( 19(8). Dissonance theory: Progrc:ss and probkms. In R P. Abdson. E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire. T. M. Nc:wcomb. M. J. Rosc:nberg. & P. H. Tannebaum (Eds. ). Tht'ories 0/ cognilil¥! consislenCJ~ A sOllrcebook (pp. 5-27). Chicago: lUnd McN.tIly. Aronson. E. ( 1969). The theory of co~nitive di.-.sonance: A current perspe.:th e. In L Berkov';tz (Ed .). Adl'tlllcf.'s ill (!Xperimelllal social psychology (Vol. 4. pp. 1-34). New York: Academ· ic Press.
Brcckler. S. J. «( 9R4). Empirical validation of affect, behaVior, and cognition as distinct
componl'llts of altitude. jOltnwl of Persollalily and Sodal Psychology. 4 7. 1191-. Dreckler. S. ] .. & Greenwald. A. G. (1986). Motivational facets of the self. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins ([d~. ). Handbook 0/ molilld/iOlI and cORniliml (pp. 14')-16·0. Nl-W York: Guilford Pro s. B)rne, D. (1%9). Altitudes and attraction. In L Berkowitz (Ed.), Adloances in experimenlal social psycho/c.gy (Vol. 4. pp. 36-89). Nl-vl' York: Academic Press.
