Basic Concepts - Political Science - Lecture Slides, Slides of Political Science

Basic Concepts, Regularities, Everyday Interests, Enforcement, Regularities, Internalized Sense of Duty, Obligated, Expectations, Normative Expectations, Regularity of a Behavior are some points of this lecture. This lecture is for Political Science.

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II. Basic Concepts
II.1. Norms
The following list consists of some definitions from the
literature.
Question: What are the criteria used in the definitions?
(Perhaps make notes when we go through the definitions.)
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II. Basic Concepts

II.1. Norms

The following list consists of some definitions from the literature.

Question: What are the criteria used in the definitions? (Perhaps make notes when we go through the definitions.)

  • (1) "A norm will be defined as an expectation about how one ought to act, enforced by the threat of sanctions or the promise of reward" (Kerr 1995: 33).
  • (2) "In this model … social norm … is a term for behavioral regularities that emerge as people interact with each other in pursuit of their everyday interests" (Posner 2000: 26).
  • (3) “ … a social norm is (i) a behavioural regularity that is (ii) based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave which triggers (III) the enforcement of the prescribed behaviours by informal social sanctions " (Gächter and Fehr 1997: 276 – italics in the paper).
  • (4) R. H. McAdams (1997) summarizes the definitions of an extensive literature (see the quotations on pp. 339-340): "Roughly speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both" (340).

(1) Is a simple or complex definition (one consisting of several criteria) preferable?

Two questions arise:

(2) What is the most useful dimension (property) or what are the most useful dimensions to be included in a definition?

NOTE : no author provides any reason why he or she chooses the definition he or she suggests!

I. Stipulating complex definitions

Acceptance and Causes sanctioning and regularity

II. Explaining the dimensions of norms

Extent to which an expectation is shared Causes Probability of sanctioning

Behavioral regularity

From: Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2001. "How Do Norms Emerge? An Outline of a Theory." Mind and Society 2:101-128.

  • All other definitional characteristics could be dependent or independent variables.
  • Conditionality is taken account of in the definition.
  • The norm does not only refer to behavior. Also cognitive beliefs or attitudes or preferences may be subject to oughtness – see religious beliefs.

Some implications:

II.2. Institutions

  • (1) "We define institutions as a system of human-made, nonphysical elements – norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules – exogenous to each individual whose behavior it influences that generates behavioral regularities." (Greif and Laitin 2004: 635)
  • (2) "In general, historical institutionalists work with a definition of institutions that include both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct." (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2).
  • (3) "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990: 3).

Some examples for definitions:

Examples for institutions:

Constitution of Germany, the US, and other “basic” laws

Inheritance laws of a country

Voting rights

Institution of the market

Health care system

Institutions for regulating common pool resources

System of rules for getting a Ph.D. or, in general, a doctorate

II.3. Values

There are different definitions as well. A frequent definition reads: values are relatively general norms such as human rights.

Why do we need a concept that denotes relatively general norms – if it is not clear how general a norm must be in order to be called a value?

Thus: we don’t need the concept of value! However, using it in the above sense does not hurt either.

Why not distinguish simply between more or less general norms?

Sometimes “values” are defined as attitudes (evaluations) – here the term attitude/evaluation is clearer!

• Reactions to a norm violation with the

goal to influence future behavior (1) –

intention of the sanctioner relevant;

• reward/punishment from the

perspective of the sanctionee – the

person who is the target of the sanction

– for following a norm or for refraining

from norm violation (2);

• reaction to norm violation that changes

the sanctioned behavior in the future (3 –

The definitional criteria are:

Which definition is to be preferred?

We can thus distinguish the following definitions:

intention definition (first definition before),

reward-punishment definition (second definition before) ,

effect definition (third definition before) ,

combination of the definitions.

One question social scientists are concerned with is to explain when and how individuals react to norm violations. This speaks in favor of the intention definition.

Note : reactions to a norm violations that are only intended to hurt the norm violator (“revenge”) are not sanctions! Useful? (Example: instructor gives low grade!)

Perhaps the intention definition could be extended:

Sanctions = df. reactions to a norm violation with the goal to influence future behavior or to hurt the violator (i.e. to impose costs on the norm violator).

II.5. Cited Literature in II:

Coleman, James S. 1990. "The Emergence of Norms." Pp. 35-60 in Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects , edited by Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr. 1997. "Social Norms as a Social Exchange." Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 133:275-292.

Greif, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." American Political Science Review 98:633-652.

Kerr, Norbert L. 1995. "Norms in Social Dilemmas." in Social Dilemmas: Perspectives on Individual Groups , edited by David A. Schroeder. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Kuran, Timur. 1998. "Moral Overload and Its Alleviation." Pp. 231-266 in Economics, Values, and Organization , edited by Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Labovitz, Sanford, and Robert Hagedorn. 1973. "Measuring Social Norms." Pacific Sociological Review 16:283-303.