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Computation in a Distributed
Information Markets
Presented by Zhenming Liu
Information Aggregation Mechanisms
- Prediction Market - Example: Logarithmic scoring rule, betting on permutation, pricing tournament. - These examples are more relevant to the be- havior of the market.
- This Paper: study on a process whose goal is to jointly compute the value of a function. - A ”classy” model that is closely related to the filtration defined over a probability space. - Less focused on the behavior of the market, e.g., motivation to trade, the cost of the mar- ket.
- Model of an information market - There are n traders in the system; i th trader holds the bit xi. - All agents have a common prior on the distri- bution x = ( x 1 , ..., xn ). - Security being traded: a function f ( x ), where f is a common knowledge.
- More simplifying assumptions: - Each round every trader reports to the cen- tralized agent the E[ f ( x )| σ ], where σ is all the available information to that trader. - the centralized agent broadcasts the average value to all traders. - The market ”terminates” when there is no more trader can update E[ f ( x )| σ ]. - These assumptions may not be realistic.
- Model of an information market - There are n traders in the system; i th trader holds the bit xi. - All agents have a common prior on the distri- bution x = ( x 1 , ..., xn ). - Security being traded: a function f ( x ), where f is a common knowledge.
- More simplifying assumptions: - Each round every trader reports to the cen- tralized agent the E[ f ( x )| σ ], where σ is all the available information to that trader. - the centralized agent broadcasts the average value to all traders. - The market ”terminates” when there is no more trader can update E[ f ( x )| σ ]. - These assumptions may not be realistic.
Example 1: Two agents holding two bits x 1 and x 2 in the market. The function f ( x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 ∨ x 2.
- Both agents know x 1 , x 2 are uniformly distributed.
- Agent 1 observed x 1 = 0 ; Agent 2 observed x 2 = 1.
- Agent 1 reports: E[ f ( x 1 , x 2 ) | x 1 = 0 ] = 0. 5.
- Agent 2 reports: E[ f ( x 1 , x 2 ) | x 2 = 1 ] = 1.
- Centralized agent received ( A 1 , 0. 5 ) and ( A 2 , 1 ) and broadcasts ( 0. 5 + 1 )/ 2 = 0. 75.
- Now based on knowing the average value 0. 75 , agents enters the 2nd round and provide their new estimate on the expectation of f ( x 1 , x 2 ).
Example 1: Two agents holding two bits x 1 and x 2 in the market. The function f ( x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 ∨ x 2.
- Both agents know x 1 , x 2 are uniformly distributed.
- Agent 1 observed x 1 = 0 ; Agent 2 observed x 2 = 1.
- Agent 1 reports: E[ f ( x 1 , x 2 ) | x 1 = 0 ] = 0. 5.
- Agent 2 reports: E[ f ( x 1 , x 2 ) | x 2 = 1 ] = 1.
- Centralized agent received ( A 1 , 0. 5 ) and ( A 2 , 1 ) and broadcasts ( 0. 5 + 1 )/ 2 = 0. 75.
- Now based on knowing the average value 0. 75 , agents enters the 2nd round and provide their new estimate on the expectation of f ( x 1 , x 2 ).
Example 1: Two agents holding two bits x 1 and x 2 in the market. The function f ( x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 ∨ x 2.
- Both agents know x 1 , x 2 are uniformly distributed.
- Agent 1 observed x 1 = 0 ; Agent 2 observed x 2 = 1.
- Agent 1 reports: E[ f ( x 1 , x 2 ) | x 1 = 0 ] = 0. 5.
- Agent 2 reports: E[ f ( x 1 , x 2 ) | x 2 = 1 ] = 1.
- Centralized agent received ( A 1 , 0. 5 ) and ( A 2 , 1 ) and broadcasts ( 0. 5 + 1 )/ 2 = 0. 75.
- Now based on knowing the average value 0. 75 , agents enters the 2nd round and provide their new estimate on the expectation of f ( x 1 , x 2 ).
History/Literature Review
- [PP82]: We cannot disagree forever.
- [MP86]: Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information - Provide a necessary condition on when all agents will finally “agree” on f ( x ). - But it is not always true that the converged value is the actual f ( x ).
- This paper: - Deal with discrete information and discrete func- tion. - Provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the agents’ estimate on E[ f ( x )] converges to f ( x ). - Provided upper bound for round complexity be- fore the process terminates.
Outline for the rest of the talk.
- A few more examples.
- Convergence result.
- Necessary and sufficient condition for converging to the correct value.
- Round complexity result.
- Discussion on the open problems.
- Relevant Followup work.
Outline for the rest of the talk.
- A few more examples.
- Convergence result.
- Necessary and sufficient condition for converging to the correct value.
- Round complexity result.
- Discussion on the open problems.
- Relevant Followup work.
Example 2. There are three agents holding 3 bits x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 , uniformly distributed. f ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) is ma- jority function. i.e., f ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = I[ x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ≥ 2 ].
- x 1 = 1 , x 2 = 1 , and x 3 = 0.
- Round 1: Agent 1 reports 0.75, agent 2 reports 0.75, agent 3 reports 0.25.
- Centralized agent broadcast 0. 583.
- New common knowledge: { 110 , 011 , 101 }.
- Round 2: all agents know this common knowl- edge and output 1. The process terminates.
Example 2. There are three agents holding 3 bits x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 , uniformly distributed. f ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) is ma- jority function. i.e., f ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = I[ x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ≥ 2 ].
- x 1 = 1 , x 2 = 1 , and x 3 = 0.
- Round 1: Agent 1 reports 0.75, agent 2 reports 0.75, agent 3 reports 0.25.
- Centralized agent broadcast 0. 583.
- New common knowledge: { 110 , 011 , 101 }.
- Round 2: all agents know this common knowl- edge and output 1. The process terminates.
Example 2. There are three agents holding 3 bits x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 , uniformly distributed. f ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) is ma- jority function. i.e., f ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = I[ x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ≥ 2 ].
- x 1 = 1 , x 2 = 1 , and x 3 = 0.
- Round 1: Agent 1 reports 0.75, agent 2 reports 0.75, agent 3 reports 0.25.
- Centralized agent broadcast 0. 583.
- New common knowledge: { 110 , 011 , 101 }.
- Round 2: all agents know this common knowl- edge and output 1. The process terminates.
Example 3 Two agent 1 and 2 with private input x 1 and x 2. f ( x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 ⊕ x 2. And x 1 , x 2 distributed uniformly.
- x 1 = 1 and x 2 = 0.
- For agent 1, he/she knows with half of the chance x 1 ⊕ x 2 is 1.
- For agent 2, he/she knows with half of the chance x 1 ⊕ x 2 is 1.
- They both output 0.5. The process terminates.