Constitutional Law (Con Law) Outline 5 - Reasonable Relationship, Classification, 13th Amendment, Discriminatory Intent - Professor Mazur, Study notes of Law

Constitutional Law (Con Law) study outline for final exams for Professor Mazur's Constitutional Law class at UF Levin College of Law. Section 5 topics include but not limited to: Reasonable Relationship, Classification, 13th Amendment, Discriminatory Intent

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Constitutional Law Outline
Professor Mazur, Spring 2010
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I. The Requirement for a “Reasonable Relationship”
1. The Court repeatedly has expressed that this is “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial
scrutiny.” Thus laws are upheld unless the action is “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment.”
2. Under rational basis the Court will allow laws that are both significantly underinclusive and
overinclusive.
3. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New YorkTolerance for Underinclusiveness
a. Facts: Court upheld a law that prohibited the operation of advertising vehiclesonly
advertisements for business notices upon business delivery vehicles engaging in their
usual business allowed.
i. Law was legitimate because purpose of enhancing traffic safety and advertising
vehicles could be more distracting.
ii. Underinclusiveness not reason for striking down law. “It is no requirement of EP that
all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.”
iii. Overinclusive because not all advertisements are distracting
4. New York City Transit Authority v. BeazerTolerance for Overinclusiveness
a. Court upheld city regulation that prevented those in methadone maintenance programs
from holding positions in the Transit Authority.
i. Even though law both underinclusive and overinclusive, the exclusion of all
methadone addicts, alternative rules were likely to be less precise or too costly.
Perfection not required by equal protection .
ii. Total ban therefore rationally related to the law’s legitimate purpose of transportation
safety.
iii. “The Constitution does not authorize a federal court to interfere in that policy
decision.”
5. Cases Where Laws are Deemed Arbitrary and Unreasonable
a. Occasionally, the Court has found laws to be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to fair
rational basis.
b. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno
i. The Court invalidated, as violating the rational basis test, a federal law that prevented
a household from receiving food stamps if it included individuals who were not
related to one another.
ii. The Court explained that the express congressional purpose of discrimination against
“hippies” could not constitute a legitimate purpose.
c. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. rational basis with a bite.
i. Court declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that required a special permit for the
operation of a home for the mentally handicapped. Either purpose illegitimate, or
means arbitrary and not related to the stated purpose.
Fails means ends test. Looked like Bite
Protecting mentally disabled from getting railed on not a legitimate purpose
indulging private biases not constitutionally legitimate.
Requiring permit not rationally related to city’s concern that home was located
on floodplain. Other institutions located on floodplain, and city did not require
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Download Constitutional Law (Con Law) Outline 5 - Reasonable Relationship, Classification, 13th Amendment, Discriminatory Intent - Professor Mazur and more Study notes Law in PDF only on Docsity!

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 I. The Requirement for a “Reasonable Relationship”

  1. The Court repeatedly has expressed that this is “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny.” Thus laws are upheld unless the action is “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”
  2. Under rational basis the Court will allow laws that are both significantly underinclusive and overinclusive.
  3. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York – Tolerance for Underinclusiveness a. Facts: Court upheld a law that prohibited the operation of advertising vehicles—only advertisements for business notices upon business delivery vehicles engaging in their usual business allowed. i. Law was legitimate because purpose of enhancing traffic safety and advertising vehicles could be more distracting. ii. Underinclusiveness not reason for striking down law. “It is no requirement of EP that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.” iii. Overinclusive because not all advertisements are distracting
  4. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer – Tolerance for Overinclusiveness a. Court upheld city regulation that prevented those in methadone maintenance programs from holding positions in the Transit Authority. i. Even though law both underinclusive and overinclusive, the exclusion of all methadone addicts, alternative rules were likely to be less precise or too costly. Perfection not required by equal protection. ii. Total ban therefore rationally related to the law’s legitimate purpose of transportation safety. iii. “The Constitution does not authorize a federal court to interfere in that policy decision.”
  5. Cases Where Laws are Deemed Arbitrary and Unreasonable a. Occasionally, the Court has found laws to be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to fair rational basis. b. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno i. The Court invalidated, as violating the rational basis test, a federal law that prevented a household from receiving food stamps if it included individuals who were not related to one another. ii. The Court explained that the express congressional purpose of discrimination against “hippies” could not constitute a legitimate purpose. c. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. – rational basis with a bite. i. Court declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that required a special permit for the operation of a home for the mentally handicapped. Either purpose illegitimate, or means arbitrary and not related to the stated purpose. - Fails means ends test. Looked like Bite - Protecting mentally disabled from getting railed on not a legitimate purpose— indulging private biases not constitutionally legitimate. - Requiring permit not rationally related to city’s concern that home was located on floodplain. Other institutions located on floodplain, and city did not require

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 permits from them. Distinction b/t home for the elderly and mentally disabled arbitrary. B. Classifications Based on Race and National Origin I. Race Discrimination and Slavery Before the 13th^ and 14th^ Amendments

  1. Dred Scott v. Sandford – Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, and slaves were property a. Facts: Congress admitted Missouri as a slave state, but outlawed slavery north a specified latitude as part of the Missouri Compromise. Territories below that line could decide for themselves whether to allow slavery and could make that choice when admitted as states. Scott was a slave owned in Missouri, but taken to Illinois, a free state. When Scott’s owner died, Scott sued estate to be released on the grounds that he was an Illinois resident. b. Holding: SC held MO Compromise unconstitutional and ruled against Scott, stating that slaves were not citizens, but property. i. Because not citizens, slaves could not invoke federal diversity jurisdiction and could not sue in federal court. ii. Perpetual and impassable barrier was intended by Framers to be erected b/t whites and slaves. iii. Missouri Compromise unconstitutional because Congress could not grant citizenship to slaves. This would be a taking of property from owners without Due process or just compensation. iv. Ruling became the focal point in debate over slavery and precipitated the Civil War.
  2. 13th Amendment —prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.
  3. 14th Amendment (1868) a. Overruled Dred Scott by declaring that all persons “born or naturalized in the US are citizens of the US and the State wherein they reside.” b. §1—Guarantees that no state shall deprive any citizen of the Privileges or Immunities of citizenship, or deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without Due Process of law, or deny any person Equal Protection of the law. II. Strict Scrutiny for Discrimination Based on Race and National Origin
  4. The government must show an extremely important reason for its actions and it must demonstrate that the goal cannot be achieved through any less discriminatory way.
  5. Whether disadvantaging or helping minorities, the law must meet strict scrutiny
  6. Ironically, Courts first articulated the requirement in Korematsu v. U.S., which upheld the constitutionality of the relocation of Japanese Americans during World War II. “ All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”
  7. It is unfair to discriminate against people for a characteristic that is acquired at birth and cannot be changed. III. Proving the Existence of a Race or National Origin Classification
  8. There are two alternative ways of demonstrating this: a. One is where the classification exists on the face of the law

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 b. Holding: “in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate education facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situation for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th^ Amendment” i. “To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a why unlikely ever to be undone.” c. Opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren. i. Stated that the historical sources of the 14th amendment were at best inconclusive, and the changes in the nature of education had rendered the framer’s intent of little value. Thus, the framer’s intent could not resolve the segregation question. ii. Decision could not turn on a comparison of the tangible factors of the white and black education facilities and resources. Instead, the focus was to be on the effect of segregation. V. Remedies: The Problem of School Segregation

  1. In some cases, the Court must go further than simply invalidating a law, and issue an injunction. a. In desegregation cases the Court generally will issue an order prohibiting the offended conduct.
  2. Brown v. Board of Education – 1955 – issue of remedy a. “School authorities have the primary responsibility of elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.” “Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner.’ b. “The judgments below are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessarily and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases” i. A de facto segregated school (segregated by fact - back of layout of where people live) looks similar to De jure unitary system (which is racially unitary by law – by law there is no requirement that students attend school on a racially segregated bases - there is no longer mandated a state white school or black school. This makes little difference because there may be a de facto unitary system.) 3. Massive Resistance a. Southern states openly and aggressively resisted compliance. i. Ex. The Governor called out the Arkansas National Guard to keep blacks out of the Little Rock School District. Only after President Eisenhower used federal troops to protect them did blacks start attending white schools. b. In 1964, a decade after Brown , in the South, just 1.2% of black school children were attending school with whites. c. In a series of cases in the mid-and-late 1960s, the Court declared unconstitutional various obstructionist techniques used throughout the South 4. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education a. Court addressed the issue of the federal courts’ power to issue remedies in school desegregation cases. District courts have broad authority in formulating remedies in

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 desegregation cases. Mathematical ratios – such as comparisons of the race in particular schools with the overall race of the district – are a “useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations.” i. Court says not every school district has to reflect proper %ages and “some small number of one-race, or virtually one race schools within a district” may be unavoidable. ii. Court said that bus transportation is an important tool of school desegregation unless “the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process”, and should use affirmative action to achieve non discriminatory results.

5. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell a. Facts: π sought dissolution of a decree entered by the District Court imposing a school desegregation plan. b. Holding: Remand to district courts to decide whether the Board made a sufficient showing of constitutional compliance as of 1985, when the SRP was adopted, to allow the injunction to be dissolved. The district court should address “whether the board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated “ i. Unitary: some courts define it as a school district that has met the mandate of Brown , others have used it to describe any school that has currently desegregated student assignments, whether or not that status is solely the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan

  1. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007) a. Facts: School districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend. Race is not a problem with these schools and with one it never was and the other school has corrected the problem. b. Holding: “[B]ecause it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.” “we have reaffirmed that “[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.” i. “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again--even for very different reasons” ii. “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” iii. In all cases involving affirmative action, strict scrutiny will apply C. Discriminatory Intent I. Loving v. Virginia
  2. SC declared Virginia anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional that made it a crime for a white person to marry outside the Caucasian race; that it deprived the Loving’s of a constitutionally protected liberty without DP of the law.
  3. The Court expressly rejected the state’s argument that the law was permissible because it burdened both whites and minorities. “We reject the notion that the mere equal application of

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 c. Also claimed that women are a political majority who are no isolated from men and thus cannot be considered a discrete and insular minority III. Emergence of Intermediate Scrutiny

1. Frontiero v. Richardson a. Facts: A serviceman may claim his wife as a “dependent” without regard to whether she is in fact dependent upon him for any part of her support. A servicewoman, may not claim her husband as “dependent” under these programs unless he is in fact dependent upon her for over ½ of his support. Plaintiff sought increased quarters allowance, and housing and medical benefits for her husband but her application was denied because she failed to show he was a dependant. b. 4 judges, including Justice Brennan who wrote the main opinion wanted there to be strict scrutiny. But because there wasn’t a majority supporting strict scrutiny, the level of scrutiny for gender classifications remained uncertain and for 2 years the court decided cases without stating what level of scrutiny. 2. Craig v. Boren a. Facts: A distinction was made in the law between prohibiting alcohol sales to males and females. b. Holding: “To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives.” The Court declared unconstitutional the law, although traffic safety is undoubtedly important governmental interest, the court concluded that it was not substantially related to that objective i. Since this case the Court on many occasions, reaffirmed and applied intermediate scrutiny 3. United States v. Virginia a. Facts: Woman were excluded from VMI and there was a separate school called Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College for women. b. Holding: Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that action….The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.” The justification must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females. c. They claim the sex base classification would destroy the educational process that it offers but this is not a valid reason. IV. Gender Classifications Benefiting Women 1. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County a. Facts: Men burdened by law that if they have sex with a girl under the age of 18, even if they are under the age of 18 they are guilty of statutory rape. Woman also under the age of 18 are not allowed to have sex with anyone unless they are married. Men under the age of 18 are allowed to have sex as long as the girl is over the age of 18. b. Holding: Such a statute is sufficiently related to the State’s objectives to pass constitutional muster. Because virtually all the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. c. Dissent: argued that law was not substantially related to the government’s interest and that it was based on stereotypes of woman’s ability to consent to sexual intercourse.

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 i. There is no doubt that preventing teenage pregnancy is an important governmental interest; the issue is whether a gender-based law is substantially related to the goal

2. Rostker v. Goldberg a. The question presented is whether the Military Selective Service Act violates the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution in authorizing the President to require registration of males and not females. The MSSA registration provision serves no other purpose other than providing a pool for subsequent induction in case of a draft. b. Holding: Women, unlike men, are not eligible for combat and that Congress and the President had evidenced an intent to retain that policy in the future. The Court said that the exclusion of women from combat justifies Congress's decision to have only men register for possible conscription. i. "Congress simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of including women in draft and registration plans..... Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing noncombat positions with women would be positively detrimental to the important goal of military flexibility." c. Dissent : Argued that the law was founded on sex-based stereotypes and the male-only registration is unconstitutional even assuming that it is constitutional to exclude women from serving in combat F. Alienage Classification I. This refers to discrimination against non-citizens. II. Distinguished from national origin classifications that discriminate against individuals because of the country that a person, or his or her ancestors, came from. III. Aliens are protected from discrimination because the Equal Protection Clause explicitly says that no "person" shall be denied equal protection of the laws. The clause does not mention citizen IV. The Supreme Court has held that federal immigration laws wholly occupy the field and preempt state efforts to regulate immigration. V. Strict Scrutiny as the General Rule 1. Graham v. Richardson a. Facts: Arizona, concerns the State's participation in federal categorical assistance. The law states "No person shall be entitled to general assistance who does not meet and maintain the following requirements: 1. Is a citizen of the United States, or has resided in the United States a total of fifteen years... ." b. Holding: The Court overruled the statutes using strict scrutiny. "Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are prime example of a 'discrete and insular minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." i. The court holds that a state statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have no resided in the U.S. for a specified number of years violates the equal protection clause. This is not ok for states to do, its not within their constitutional interest.

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 a. "if the rule were expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption." VIII. Undocumented Aliens and Equal Protection

1. Plyler v. Doe a. The Court declared unconstitutional a Texas law that provided a free public education for children of citizens and of documented aliens, but required that undocumented aliens pay for their schooling. b. "Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the 5th and 14th Amendments." c. The Court did not expressly articulate a level of scrutiny, but it did say that "undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a constitutional irrelevancy. Nor is education a fundamental right ." d. Court made it clear that it was using more than rational basis review. The state's claim of a desire to reserve benefits for its own citizens likely would meet a rational basis test. Looks like intermediate scrutiny. i. Court stressed the blamelessness of the children: They were being punished by being denied an education because their parents' choice to bring them into this country 2. Future of Plyler a. Courts will likely have the opportunity to relook at Plyler because states are adopting broad laws discriminating against undocumented aliens G. Other Types of Discrimination: Only Rational Basis Review I. Laws that determine who can practice law, who can have a driver's license, who can receive welfare, who can be a police officer, and who can have a broadcast license, all involve classifications that can be challenged as denying equal protection (rational basis) II. The Court has ruled that only rational basis review should be used for discrimination based on age, disability, wealth, and sexual orientation, even though these classifications share much in common with the types of discrimination for which heightened scrutiny is used. III. Age Classifications:

  1. A person's age is immutable in the sense that a person cannot voluntarily change it and it is a characteristic that is visible. Yet the Court has expressly declared that only rational basis review 2. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia a. Court upheld a state law that required police officers to retire at age 50. The Court gave several reasons for choosing rational basis review for age classifications; "while discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities." i. "Since physical ability generally declines with age mandatory retirement at age 50 serves to remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work

Professor Mazur, Spring 2010 presumptively has diminished with age. This is clearly rationally related to the State's objective." IV. Wealth Discrimination

  1. Held that only rational basis review should be used for wealth classifications.
  2. Poverty is not a suspect classification and that discrimination against the poor should only receive rational basis review.
  3. Discrimination against the poor does not warrant heightened scrutiny V. Sexual Orientation - Direct from Ian's outline in book on page 942
  4. SC has not yet ruled as to whether discrimination based on sexual orientation warrants strict or intermediate scrutiny. (According to our book on page 936 sexual orientation was ruled rational basis)
  5. Analogy to Areas of Heightened Scrutiny a. Long history of discrimination b. Laws generally based on stereotypes instead of actual differences c. Sexuality may be immutable.
  6. Arguments Against Strict Scrutiny a. Waters down strict scrutiny—slippery slope problem. b. Label may discourage beneficial legislation down the road. c. Legislative expertise v. judicial expertise—characteristic may spell out real differences. May not be an illogical proxy.