Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
This document, published by the Industrial Strategy Council, provides an in-depth analysis of devolution and governance structures in the UK. The report covers the history of devolution, its principles, and current practices across different regions of the UK. It also includes recommendations for future devolution policies.
Typology: Lecture notes
1 / 51
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
The Industrial Strategy Council (‘the Council’) was an independent non-statutory advisory group established from November 2018 to March 2021. It provided impartial and expert evaluation of the government’s progress in delivering the aims of the Industrial Strategy. Its membership comprised of leading men and women from business, academia, and civil society.
This work was overseen by Council members Emma Bridgewater, Dame Kate Barker DBE FAcSS, Christine Gaskell CBE DL and Dame Rotha Johnston, DBE. The Council would like to thank all survey respondents, focus group attendees and interviewees, and experts for their contribution to this research paper. The Council would further like to thank Professor Joyce Liddle, Professor Anne Green, Dr John Harrison and Will Rossiter for their participation in a roundtable discussion of the draft report. Martin Quinn would like to thank the ESRC for funding his secondment to the Industrial Strategy Council from the University of Leicester. Ben Brittain and Abigail Taylor contributed to this paper as part of the West Midlands Regional Economic Development Institute (WM REDI), which was made possible by the Research England Development (RED) Fund. This report also draws on interviews conducted in the West Midlands as part of the ESRC funded Local Institutions, Productivity, Sustainability and Inclusivity Trade-offs (LIPSIT) project’. The team would also like to express their thanks to Charlotte Hoole (University of Birmingham) for enabling this collaboration.
The UK is one of the most inter-regionally unequal countries in the industrialised world. It is also one of the most politically and fiscally centralised large countries in the developed world. The Council’s research suggests this is not a coincidence. Based on two years of research, the Council’s 2021 Annual Report argued that devolution of spending and decision-making powers is an essential tool for ‘levelling up’. This report presents a devolution framework for ambitious and effective devolution that will help unlock the potential of regions across the UK. The UK has a tendency to oscillate between advancements and reversals in decentralisation policy. Policies regarding sub-national governance have been piecemeal rather than coherent strategies. As a result, the current local institutional landscape is confusing and fragmented. Having no clear, long-term, coherent vision for sub-national policy is problematic for local institutions as they have to continuously adapt and change direction. Some regions will be more adept at doing this, and therefore this can exacerbate geographical inequalities.
The Council undertook substantial primary research into devolution and governance structures across the UK. The aim was to draw lessons from how local institutions work together to drive policy implementation, which structures seem to work best, and gauge appetite for greater devolution. The findings from this research have been grouped under four pillars: Political; Administrative; Fiscal, and People and Place. The key messages under each of the four pillars are:
The Council has distilled these findings into a devolution framework (Figure 1). This framework is designed to provide a structure and set of principles that can survive changes of national government and ensure some continuity for the devolution process. The audience for this framework is both central and local policy makers. The framework contains two parts: policy principles and guiding principles. The policy principles are tangible, actionable evidence-based recommendations, which should inform central government policy officials on the creation of devolution policy. The guiding principles should be used by both central and local leaders and are a set of behaviours, which should be embodied by those who work with, or in, sub-national governance structures. Taken together, they provide a basis for long-term devolution and governance solutions for the UK. Figure 1: Policy and guiding Principles for Devolution and Governance
Based on two years of research, the Council’s 2021 Annual Report argued that devolution of spending and decision-making powers is an essential ingredient for ‘levelling up’. This ‘Devolution and Governance Structures in the UK: Lessons from Evidence’ report and its recommendations propose a roadmap for ambitious and effective devolution that will help unlock the potential of regions across the UK. Devolution in the UK has a long and complicated history. The roots of today’s devolved systems and governance structures date back to at least 1886 when the first Home Rule Bill was introduced to Parliament. Since then, devolution has continued to be debated within Parliament and among academics, researchers, and practitioners. The UK is a centralised country^4 and one of the most regionally unequal countries in the developed world.^5 Inner London is one of the most productive areas in Europe, whilst in other parts of the UK productivity is similar to that of Poland, Hungary, and Romania.^6 Alongside inter-regional inequality, there is intra-regional inequality, with stark income and well-being differences between neighbourhoods within the same local authorities. It is widely recognised that these inequalities need to be tackled and ‘levelling up’ is one of the Government’s priorities. In March 2021, it published ‘Build Back Better: our plan for growth’,^7 and has committed to a ‘levelling up’ White Paper later this year. In the ‘plan for growth’, it is recognised that devolution will need to play a role in ‘levelling up’. There are advantages and disadvantages to devolution. Some see devolution as an opportunity to develop policy tailored to local contexts as well as freeing up the national government to focus on national issues and the bigger picture.^8 Others see it as a loss of central control that results in incoherent and contradictory policies, slower decision-making and increasing instability.^9 The existing evidence is limited in terms of concrete findings on the impact of devolution, with a surprising lack of quantitative evaluation of current and historic devolution deals in the UK. (^4) Institute for Government. (2015). UK ‘almost most centralised developed country’, says Treasury chief. Retrieved from: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/news/in-the-press/uk-%E2%80%98almost- most-centralised-developed-country%E2%80%99-says-treasury-chief (^5) Industrial Strategy Council (2020a). UK Regional Productivity Differences: An Evidence Review. Retrieved from: www.industrialstrategycouncil.org/uk-regional-productivity-differences-evidence- review (^6) Raikes, J. (2020) THE DEVOLUTION PARLIAMENT DEVOLVING POWER TO ENGLAND’S REGIONS, TOWNS AND CITIES. Retrieved from: https://www.ippr.org/files/2020-02/the-devolution- parliament-feb20.pdf. (^7) HM Treasury (2021). Build Back Better: our plan for growth. Retrieved from: www.gov.uk/government/publications/build-back-better-our-plan-for-growth (^8) Bradbury, J. (2003) The Political Dynamics of Sub-State Regionalism: A Neo-Functionalist Perspective and the Case of Devolution in the UK, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5(4): 543 – 575. (^9) Mitchell, J. (2013), Devolution in the UK , Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Devolution is not a ‘silver bullet’, but it could provide the opportunity to bring elements of decision-making to a more local level. This has the potential to improve economic prosperity and accountability across the country. The theory underlying this is that local policy makers and politicians are better placed to tailor, develop and coordinate policy to respond to the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities of the place they belong to, and identify with. This can lead to the creation of policies that should tackle place-specific inequalities and support the wider government agenda of ‘levelling up’. For devolution to be successful, it needs to be ambitious in scope and conscious of context. It will require commitment and leadership at the national level. At the sub- national level, devolved governance and institutions must be robust, coherent, and transparent, with strong central-local coordination and collaboration.^10 This report contributes to the debate by identifying principles, which will support and facilitate successful future devolution particularly at the sub-national level. To do this the history of devolution in the UK is set out to shed light on why, despite a long history of attempts at devolution, the UK remains such an unequal county both within and between regions. A range of primary evidence was gathered from stakeholders who engage with or work in sub-national governance across the UK, to understand what works, and what needs to change, regarding sub-national devolution. Using this evidence, the Council has developed a four-pillar model (Figure 2), building on an OECD model for decentralisation.^11 The four-pillar model covers all aspects of devolution. The evidence from the Council’s primary research and the subsequent recommendations are presented using this framework. Figure 2 sets out the Council’s interpretation of what each of the four pillars encompasses. As devolution is discussed throughout the report, the below figure serves to remind the reader of what constitutes political, administrative, fiscal, and people and place devolution. (^10) Zymek, R. and Jones, B. UK Regional Productivity Differences: An Evidence Review. Industrial Strategy Council. Retrieved from: https://industrialstrategycouncil.org/uk-regional-productivity- differences-evidence-review (^11) OECD. (2019). Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers, OECD Multi-level governance studies. Retrieved from: www.oecd.org/regional/making-decentralisation-work-g2g9faa7- en.htm
Devolution is a process, which enables more place-based policy development and implementation. It can be defined as “the transfer of power and control from national to sub-national level” and is a part of decentralisation, which aims to build a more co- operative and strategic role for national and subnational governments.^12 Based on the OECD definition, devolution is a subcategory of decentralisation. It is a stronger form of decentralisation as it consists of the transfer of powers from the central government to lower-level autonomous governments, which are legally constituted as separate levels of government. Decentralisation generally refers to the transfer of powers and responsibilities from central government level to elected authorities at the subnational level (regional governments, municipalities, etc.) that have some degree of autonomy.^13 The concept of devolution used in this report covers four pillars: Political, Administrative, Fiscal and People and Places (Figure 2). These dimensions are inter- dependent. There can be no fiscal devolution without political and administrative devolution. On the other hand, without fiscal devolution, political and administrative devolution can become meaningless.^14 The importance of progressing all four dimensions has clear relevance for further sub-national devolution in the UK. This section briefly sets out the literature on why devolution matters and the role it can play in reducing inequalities and supporting the ‘levelling up’ agenda.
In recent years, there has been an increased focus on inter-regional disparities in the UK, which are large compared to similar European countries. The Council’s evidence review of regional disparities found that differences in productivity across UK regions are large, in absolute terms and by international standards, and are longstanding.^15 A Council report showcasing international case studies of levelling up showed that strong local leadership and efficient governance are key ingredients in driving local economic growth. The evidence, therefore, suggests that devolution can play an important role in the ‘levelling up’ agenda.^16 Recent qualitative studies arguing for devolution and governance at the sub-national tier have tended to focus on three core themes: globalisation, innovation, and governance and leadership.^17 (^12) OECD. (2019). Op cit. (^13) OECD. (2019). Op cit. (^14) OECD. (2019). Op cit. (^15) Industrial Strategy Council (2020a). Op cit. (^16) Industrial Strategy Council (2020b). What does it take to level up? Evidence from international experience. Retrieved from: www.industrialstrategycouncil.org/what-does-it-take-level-places (^17) Quinn, M. (2013) New Labour’s Regional Policy: Lessons from the East Midlands, Local Economy 28(7-8): 738 - 751.
The first of these posits that globalisation has ‘hollowed’ out the state and increased the power of multi-national corporations, supra-national bodies, and trade agreements.^18 Logically, there are policies, which are better designed and implemented at the supra-national level (World Trade Organization (WTO), European Union (EU), and United Nations (UN)) such as defence, trade, climate change, immigration etc. Similarly, some policies are more appropriately designed at the national level such as justice and policing, education and training and health and social care. However, often the impacts of globalisation are felt more acutely at a regional/local level. Consequently, some elements of policy development and decision-making are better suited to the regional level. Local leaders are better positioned to adapt their local economies to both economic shocks and long-term structural shifts, and to determine how their area can support national strategy. Having decision-makers embedded in localities with a better knowledge of issues facing local businesses and people should also lead to an improvement in economic performance.^19 The second argument is that innovation, being key to economic growth and development, requires infrastructures specifically designed to underpin it (systems of innovation, such as financial institutions, higher education, and vocational training). Effective governance structures at the local or regional tier can offer the support needed to form and manage collaborations between firms and the public sector as they emerge.^20 Research shows that mayors in devolved authorities have been effectively using their ‘soft power’ to build consensus and develop new partnerships.^21 This typically has positive spillover effects as it can create and encourage new opportunities for investment, as well as wider benefits of social inclusion. It can also lead to a ‘crowding in’ effect and support development of private sector resources and investment in an area.^22 This all should have a positive impact on productivity. The third theme highlights that economic development requires a system of good governance and leadership to encourage growth.^23 Studies show that decentralisation (of which devolution is a sub-category) can be conducive to public sector efficiency, democratisation and political stability.^24 A larger sub-national share of public expenditures has been found to correlate with lower corruption. The sub- (^18) Davies, J. S. (2002) ‘The governance of urban regeneration: A critique of the governing without government thesis’, Public Administration 80(2): 301-22. (^19) Pike, A., MacKinnon, D., O’Brien, P. & Tomaney, J. (2019). Submission to HCLG Select Committee Inquiry on Progress on Devolution in England : A submission by the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University, UK. (^20) Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1998) The Associational Economy: Firms, Regions and Innovation, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (^21) Johns, M., Raikes, L., & Hunter, J. (2019) Decent Work: Harnessing the Power of Local Government, IPPR North; Paun, A. & Macrory, S., (2019) Has Devolution Worked? The First 20 Years. Retrieved from: www.instituteforgovernment.org (^22) Raikes, J. (2020) THE DEVOLUTION PARLIAMENT DEVOLVING POWER TO ENGLAND’S REGIONS, TOWNS AND CITIES. Retrieved from: www.ippr.org/files/2020-02/the-devolution- parliament-feb20.pdf. (^23) Geddes, M. (2005) ‘Neo-liberalism and local governance – cross national perspectives and speculations’, Policy Studies 26(3/4): 359-77. (^24) OECD (2019). Op cit. Chapter 4: Decentralisation: Its Benefits and challenges.
Broadening out beyond the UK, an OECD study found that local fiscal power is positively associated with economic activity.^30 Doubling sub-central tax or spending was associated with an increase of around 3 per cent GDP per capita (irrespective of starting level). The study also found that revenue decentralisation was more strongly associated with income gains than spending decentralisation, suggesting the importance of places being able to self-fund. Further, a study of EU countries found the devolution of fiscal power to subnational governments was negatively correlated with the level of regional inequality within the sample countries.^31 There is limited evidence to suggest that devolution has negative effects on the economy. Rather than presenting evidence ‘against’ devolution, the literature focuses on the limitations it can have if not implemented properly. Some argue that arbitrary boundaries can lead to unfair disparity (across a range of issues including power, rules, policies, charges etc) and confusion between neighbouring areas that fall on either side of the boundary.^32 Devolution can be asymmetrical and unfair if one place has more power than others do with little justification for the differences. Others fear that it may lead to the breakup of the UK because demands for independence will be fuelled by devolution.^33 Ultimately, devolution has a role to play in supporting the ‘levelling up’ agenda, but its success depends on how the process is carried out and the principles that guide it. The aim of this report is to identify those principles that can support successful devolution. To do that, the next section explores the history of devolution in the UK, to understand how it has evolved and identify factors missing from the process which have hindered its effectiveness. (^30) Note: Sub-central fiscal power measured by revenue or spending shares. Blöchliger, H. (2013), Decentralisation and Economic Growth - Part 1: How Fiscal Federalism Affects Long-Term Development , OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism, No. 14. Retrieved from: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/decentralisation-and-economic-growth-part- 1 - how-fiscal- federalism-affects-long-term-development_5k4559gx1q8r-en#page (^31) Pike, A., Rodriguez-Pose, A., Tomaney, J., Torrisi, G. & Tselios, V. (2010). In Search of ‘Economic Dividend’ of Devolution: Spatial Disparities, Spatial Economic Policy and Decentralisation in the UK, SERC Discussion Paper 62. Retrieved from: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/192488544.pdf (^32) Herrschel, T. and Newman, P. (2000) ‘New regions in England and Germany: an examination of the interaction of constitutional structures, formal regions and informal institutions’, Regional Studies 37(7): 1185-202. (^33) Mitchell. (2013). Op cit.
An examination of the history of devolution in the UK helps in assessing current governance structures and understanding why devolution has not the impact suggested by the evidence. The purpose of this historical review is to try to identify lessons from the past devolution process to inform future devolution principles.
The policy landscape in the UK has been dominated by the national tier, punctuated by occasional initiatives from Westminster specifically designed to drive local economic growth. These initiatives have been largely inconsistent with regard to scale and longevity. This longevity point chimes with a previous Council report (‘UK Regional Productivity Differences: An Evidence Review’) which found that there is a need to end the tendency to abolish and recreate regional policy. Additionally, the powers and funding committed to the sub-national tier have also varied over time and across places. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were, with a few exceptions for Scotland, largely subject to the same national policies as England for much of the period leading up to 1998.
Prior to World War II economic policy was developed at the national tier. There were debates on Home Rule for Ireland and Scotland, but notably not for Wales, bearing out Christopher Harvie’s famous description of English regionalism as the ‘dog that never barked’.^34 Local institutions and governance arrangements have long been in constant flux.^35 Historically, the country was composed of counties, parishes, boroughs, and towns. With industrialisation and population growth the need for urban and rural administrations increased. ‘A key feature of the 19th century authorities was their ‘municipalisation’: each council acted on its own initiative, often funded by local property taxes, and provided services which it thought would best benefit its residents, such as gas, water, electricity, or tramway services’.^36 This complex system of local institutions was added to in 1939 by the creation of what is recognised today as the nine regions of England. These were based on earlier (^34) Harvie, C. (1991) English Regionalism: The Dog that Never Barked, in Crick, B. (ed) National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom, The Political Quarterly, pp 105 - 118, London, Blackwell. (^35) Industrial Strategy Council. (2020a). Op cit. (^36) Crewe, T. (2016). The Strange Death of Municipal England. London Review of Books, 38 (24)
Scotland’. (The Scotland Act powers of the Scottish Parliament were extended in 2012 and again in 2016.) Meanwhile, in Wales a weaker National Assembly was set up, which reflected the closer referendum result. Although subsequent referenda and acts of Parliament have strengthened the role and the remit of the Welsh Government, it still does not have the same powers as its Scottish equivalent. Alongside this, the nine English regions were given significant budgets and institutions for the first time through the Regional Development Agencies Act (1998). Initial proposals for additional elected regional assemblies in England were defeated in the 2004 North East Referendum.^42 Following on from this, the Regional Assemblies^43 were established as unelected bodies largely limited to providing scrutiny of the RDAs. The RDAs, although unelected, were statutory public bodies and were given the capability to identify and address regionally and locally specific issues.^44 RDAs had a sizeable budget (an average of £1.9 billion a year) and received a Single Programme budget that allowed for the money to be spent flexibly on local priorities. RDAs had responsibility for developing 10- 15 - year regional economic strategies with local partners^45 , but they did suffer from lack of certainty over future budgets.^46 This absence of certainty remains one of the key obstacles in long-term planning and policy implementation. The 2007 Sub-National Review saw the RDAs develop further plans at the sub- regional tier, moving closer to a multi-level governance model. Alongside this, Multi- Area Agreements were launched allowing local authorities to put in place structures to receive funding and create strategy. In addition to the scrutiny provided by the Regional Assemblies, the Government also created Select Committees in Parliament for each region. This infrastructure provided the regions with a degree of institutional and fiscal stability that has not been seen since. As described in more detail below, this lack of institutional and fiscal stability has transcended over institutional re- shuffles and remains one of the key obstacles in long-term planning and policy implementation.
The 2010 election saw a significant reduction in funding for regions and another change in the make-up of the sub-national policy landscape in England.^47 The (^42) Byrne, D. & Benneworth, P. (2006) Where and What is the North East of England? in Hardill, I., Benneworth, P., Baker, M. and Budd, L. (2006), The Rise of the English Regions, London, Routledge. (^43) The regional chambers of England were a group of indirectly elected regional bodies that were created by the provisions of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998. (^44) UK Parliament. (2012). The role of the Department – Governance arrangements. Retrieved from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmcomloc/81/8106.htm (^45) See Stuart McDonald (2005). Regional Economic Strategies , CLES Bulletin. Retrieved from: https://cles.org.uk/publications/regional-economic-strategies/ for more info (^46) UK Parliament. (2009). Role and Effectiveness of Regional Development Agencies. Retrieved from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmberr/89/8906.htm#:~:text=Since%20their %20creation%20in%201999,Programme%20(April%202006)%2C%20European (^47) Taylor, A. (2019). The Realities, Challenges and Strengths of the External Funding Environment at LEP Level. Smart Specialisation Hub, March. Retrieved from: www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/business/research/city-redi/Projects- Docs/EXTERNAL-FUNDING-ENVIRONMENT-FINAL-REPORT-c.pdf
Coalition Government led by David Cameron removed the regional tier in England and instead operated at a lower level (usually based around Counties or City Regions). This period also saw an increase in policy areas devolved to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish authorities.^48 In England, the Government introduced a number of devolved elected leadership roles, including Mayoral Combined Authorities (MCAs) and Police and Crime Commissioners.^49 Sub-national funding was shifted to a competitive model with more stringent rules on spending along with ring-fenced budgets.^50 The May and Johnson Governments have maintained these principles with the recent Spending Review seeing the addition of MPs to the decision-making process.^51 With reduced responsibility over administering funds and smaller budgets, the introduction of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in 2011 has been considered by some critics as a move towards greater centralisation of power.^52 For the most part England (and to some extent Wales) heavily relies on central government to make “good decisions” for regions and as such, controls the majority of the funding by taking control of the vast majority of tax revenues.^53 CAs can be set up by local authorities in England. Additional powers (e.g. local infrastructure, education and skills, housing, and planning) may be agreed through devolution deals with central government. However, it is important to note that each devolution deal is slightly different, meaning that each CA and MCA has its own characteristics and powers. In May 2021, there were ten CA areas in England, nine of which have metro mayors. In addition, a number of cities (including Bristol, Leicester, and Liverpool) have elected City Mayors. To summarise this section, Table 1 presents the main policy developments in each constituent part of the UK by decade, while a more detailed outline is reported in Annex A. (^48) Vlahos, N. (2020) The Political Economy of Devolution in Britain from the Postwar Era to Brexit, Palgrave MacMillan, London. (^49) Vlahos. (2020). Op cit. (^50) Bentley, G., Bailey, D., and J. Shutt. (2010). From RDAs to LEPs: A New Localism? Case Examples of West Midlands and Yorkshire. Local Economy , 25(7): 535 - 557. (^51) www.gov.uk. Retrieved from: www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 052/SR20_Web_Accessible.pdf (^52) McCann, P. (2013). Modern Urban and Regional Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. (^53) McCann, P. (2020). Op cit.
The complex and fragmented history of devolution in the UK demonstrates the need for a comprehensive review of its sub-national governance landscape. This report seeks to understand how sub-national governance structures currently work, and what could work better, with a view to developing a principles-based framework for future devolution policy. Substantial qualitative primary and secondary research has been conducted to build the evidence base. In collaboration with WM-REDI, the Council conducted a survey, ran a series of focus groups, and conducted interviews, engaging with a total of over fifty local stakeholders. The purpose of the survey was to collect data from LEPs and MCAs to gain information and insights into devolution and governance structures in England. The aim was to enhance understanding of how local institutions work together to drive policy implementation, which structures seem to work best, and what LEPs, CAs and other organisations think about greater devolution. There was a total of thirty-one responses to the survey (23 LEPs, six CAs and two from other types of government institutions) from across England and from both rural and urban areas. This variety of responses enabled the Council to gather quantitative and qualitative data which has been used to inform the recommendations in this report. The purpose of the focus groups was to gain a deeper understanding of the specifics of what works well and what could work better within the local governance structures. Twenty-five attendees from the LEPs and CAs across England, from both rural and urban areas, participated in seven focus groups. Attendees included chief executives and other senior local officials. The focus groups explored in more detail the themes that emerged from the survey, particularly around funding, boundaries, structure, roles and responsibilities. In addition to the survey and focus groups, six case studies were conducted covering Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, West Midlands, Leicester and Leicestershire, Glasgow, and Liverpool. This mix of areas was chosen because they were sufficiently different in terms of their governance structures, level of devolution, and economies. The case studies were primarily based on desk research, supplemented by interviews with academics, businesses, council workers and members of local bodies from the six areas who provided insight and information beyond what was publicly available. The report also drew on 17 interviews
conducted with key regional and local stakeholders in the West Midlands as part of the LIPSIT research project.^54 The evidence from the survey, focus groups, case studies and interviews were grouped into themes, which have formed the basis of the findings in this report and resulted in the creation of the devolution framework in Section 5. There are some limitations to the methodology. There was engagement with central government departments to share the findings of this report, however, there was no primary evidence gathered from central government. In addition, there may be some selection bias. Those who decided to respond to the survey and attend focus groups and interviews may have a vested interest in the recommendations stemming from this report. (^54) The LIPSIT research project ‘aims to identify institutional and organisational arrangements at the regional level that tend to lead to the ‘good’ management of policy trade-offs associated with increasing productivity.
