Externalities - Intermediate Microeconomics - Lecture Slides, Slides of Microeconomics

This lecture is part of lecture series on Intermediate Microeconomics course. Key points in this lecture are: Externalities, External Costs, Efficient Level of Emissions, Correcting Market Failure, Case for Fees, Case for Standards, Transferable Emissions Permits, Externalities and Property Rights, Bargaining and Economic Efficiency, Coase Theorem

Typology: Slides

2012/2013

Uploaded on 09/26/2013

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Externalities
Negative
Action by one party imposes a cost on another party
Scenario
Steel plant dumping waste in a river
The entire steel market effluent can be reduced by lowering
output (fixed proportions production function)
Marginal External Cost (MEC) is the cost imposed on
fishermen downstream for each level of production.
Marginal Social Cost (MSC) is MC plus MEC.
Negative Externalities encourage inefficient firms to remain in the
industry and create excessive production in the long run.
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Externalities

  • Negative
    • Action by one party imposes a cost on another party
  • Scenario
    • Steel plant dumping waste in a river
    • The entire steel market effluent can be reduced by lowering

output (fixed proportions production function)

  • Marginal External Cost (MEC) is the cost imposed on

fishermen downstream for each level of production.

  • Marginal Social Cost (MSC) is MC plus MEC.
  • Negative Externalities encourage inefficient firms to remain in the

industry and create excessive production in the long run.

MC

S = MCI

D

P 1

Aggregate social cost of negative externality

P 1

q 1 Q 1

MSC

MSCI

When there are negative externalities, the marginal social cost MSC is higher than the marginal cost.

External Costs

Firm output

Price

Industry output

Price

MEC

MECI

The difference is the marginal external cost, MEC.

q*

P*

Q*

The industry competitive output is Q 1 while the efficient level is _Q._*

The profit maximizing firm produces at q1 while the efficient output level is q*.

Ways of Correcting Market Failure

  • Options for Reducing Emissions to E*
    • Emission Standard: Set a legal limit on emissions at

E* (12) which increases the cost of production and the threshold price to enter the industry. Enforced

by monetary and criminal penalties.

  • Emissions Fee: Charge levied on each unit of

emission.

  • Assumptions:
    • Policymakers have asymmetric information
    • Administrative costs require the same fee or

standard for all firms

The Case for Fees

Firm 2’s Reduced Abatement Costs

Firm 1’s Increased Abatement Costs

MCA 1

MCA 2

Level of Emissions

Fee per

Unit of

Emissions

The cost minimizing solution would be an abatement of 6 for firm 1 and 8 for firm 2 and MCA 1 = MCA 2 = $3.

The impact of a standard of abatement of 7 for both firms is illustrated. Not efficient because MCA 2 < MCA 1.

If a fee of $3 was imposed Firm 1 emissions would fall From 14 to 8. Firm 2 emissions would fall from 14 to 6. MCA 1 = MCA 2 : efficient solution.

Ways of Correcting Market Failure

  • Advantages of Fees
    • When equal standards must be used, fees achieve the same

emission abatement at lower cost.

  • Fees create an incentive to install equipment that would

reduce emissions further.

  • Summary: Fees vs. Standards
    • Standards are preferred when MSC is steep and MCA is flat.
    • Standards (incomplete information) yield more certainty on

emission levels and less certainty on the cost of abatement.

  • Fees have certainty on cost and uncertainty on emissions.
  • Preferred policy depends on the nature of uncertainty and the

slopes of the cost curves.

Ways of Correcting Market Failure

  • Transferable Emissions Permits
    • Permits help develop a competitive market

for externalities.

  • Agency determines the level of emissions and

number of permits

  • Permits are marketable
  • High cost firm will purchase permits from low

cost firms

Example: Bargaining with Alternative Property Rights: Fishermen and

a Factory!

No Cooperation

Profit of factory $500 $

Profit of fishermen $200 $

Cooperation

Profit of factory $550 $

Profit of fishermen $250 $

Right to Dump Right to Clean Water

Externalities and Property Rights

  • Costly Bargaining - The Role of Strategic Behavior
    • Bargaining requires clearly defined rules and property rights.
  • A Legal Solution - Suing for Damages
    • Fishermen have the right to clean water
    • Factory has two options
      • No filter, pay damages
        • Profit = $100 ($500 - $400)
      • Filter, no damages
        • Profit = $300 ($500 - $200)

Common Property Resources

  • Common Property Resource
    • Everyone has free access.
    • Likely to be overutilized
    • Examples: Air and water; Fish and animal populations
  • Solution: Private ownership
  • Question: When would private ownership be impractical?

Common Property Resources

Fish per Month

Benefits,

Costs

($ per

fish)

Demand

However, private costs underestimate true cost. The efficient level of fish/month is _F_* where MSC = MB (D)

Marginal Social Cost

F*

Private Cost

FC

Without control the number of fish/month is FC where PC = MB.