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Concepts and Relationship between Language and cognition.
Typology: Summaries
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Cognitive scientists have long debated whether lan- guage and cognition are separate mental faculties, or whether language emerges from general cogni- tive abilities.
0559.001 What is the relationship between language and cognition? Do people who speak different lan- guages think differently? Is a certain level of cognitive development required for language ac- quisition? These questions were ofkeen interest to thinkers in the early twentieth century and remain important in anthropology, linguistics and psych- ology. However, the cognitive revolution ofthe 1950s brought a new question about the relation- ship between language and cognition: is language the same type ofmental entity as other cognitive abilities, or is it fundamentally different? 0559.002 A hallmark ofmodern cognitive science is the goal ofdeveloping a theory ofcognition powerful enough to encompass all human mental abilities, including language abilities. A long-standing con- troversy concerns two ways ofconceptualizing the architecture (or basic design) ofcognition. One ap- proach proposes that general-purpose processes and mechanisms provide a foundation for all var- ieties ofhuman intelligence. We can refer to this as `general purpose' cognition. Examples ofpossible universal processes are the ability to induce a category from exposure to examples (category in- duction), and the ability to mentally complete a known pattern when confronted with a piece of it (pattern completion). Cognitive scientists fre- quently attempt to precisely specify their proposed mechanisms by implementing them as computer algorithms which can be tested in artificial intelli- gence (AI) programs. Researchers have tried to use AI programs to show that the same principles that can explain general problem-solving can also explain aspects oflanguage acquisition and pro- cessing.
The second way ofconceptualizing human cog- 0559. nition emphasizes the differences between lan- guage and other abilities. A key idea is that many distinct domains ofcognition exist and must be learned separately, using different mental mechan- isms. This approach is referred to as the modular- ity ofcognition' ormental modules' approach. At first glance it may seem contrary to the interdiscip- linary spirit ofcognitive science and to the possibil- ity ofa unified theory ofcognition. However, the unifying theory is the thesis of distinct mental modules, which are believed to have evolved to accomplish specific tasks relevant to mammalian evolution, such as visual exploration, or relevant to human evolution, such as language use. Much of the appeal of this approach comes from findings in neuropsychology showing that distinct areas ofthe brain serve distinct functions such as vision, lan- guage processing, motor coordination, memory, and face recognition. The interdisciplinary spirit is maintained because advocates ofthis approach reach out to biological scientists and evolutionary theorists. Those favoring modularity embrace the principle ofconverging methodologies: a theory must have explanatory power in the distinct aca- demic disciplines that compose the cognitive sci- ences. These two approaches to the architecture of cognition developed out ofdifferent philosophical traditions, and have evolved considerably during the half-century history of cognitive science.
Why are there two different views on the relation- 0559. ship between language and cognition? At the dawn ofthe cognitive revolution, in the late 1950s, there were two distinct ideas about the nature ofmind. Discussed first are the views of linguist Noam Chomsky and the field of generative linguistics
Introduction Concepts of cognition and language Connectionism
Cognitive linguistics The Cognitive neuroscience movement Conclusion
which he developed, because the underlying phil- osophy has remained fairly constant over the inter- vening years. 0559.005 Chomsky's major innovation was to conceive of language abilities as akin to a mental organ. According to this view, children are born with a language acquisition device' and with specific lin- guistic knowledge. This knowledge is thought to include the concepts ofnoun, verb, grammatical subject, and structures that constrain possible grammatical rules. In contrast to the views ofthe dominant psychological theory ofthe 1950s, behav- iorism, Chomsky argued that children do not learn to speak by imitating adults. His key evidence was that children spontaneously use incorrect forms they could not have heard, likegoed' and breaked'. Linguistic overregularizations like these suggest that children are extracting rules from the language they hear, not merely imitating. Theorists at that time found it noteworthy that parents do not generally tell children that their utterances are un- grammatical. Because the language input to chil- dren is full of mistakes, stops and restarts, Chomsky felt that children could not learn lan- guage using general purpose problem-solving or regularity-extraction skills. They needed to come to the task with a rich set ofexpectations about the nature oflanguage. These expectations were believed to be specific to language, and thus did not share commonalities with other aspects ofcog- nition. This set oflanguage-specific abilities has been variously called thelanguage acquisition device' (the historically early term) and universal grammar' (a more recent term). Chomsky's ap- proach to linguistics is calledgenerative linguis- tics' because its early goal was to describe mental structures that can generate all the grammatically valid sentences ofa language. 0559.006 Chomsky felt that the aspect of language that is unique is syntactic ability. An example ofspecific- ally syntactic knowledge is illustrated by the sen- tence, `Colorless green ideas sleep furiously'. Although the words in this sentence contradict each other and do not correspond to a possible reality (green is not colorless, ideas cannot sleep furiously), speakers nevertheless recognize the sen- tence as having a correct grammatical structure. Chomsky used this sentence as an example of how syntactic structure represents information in- dependently from the meaning of the words in the sentence. He argued that syntax is a unique, inde- pendent human capacity and not derivative from other abilities. The proposal that syntax is not influ- enced by the meaning ofthe words in the sentence
or speakers' communicative goals came to be called the `autonomy ofsyntax' hypothesis. Chomsky's innovations developed in tandem 0559. with the dawn ofthe cognitive revolution. With the birth ofcomputer science a new way ofconcep- tualizing human cognition arose, using the meta- phor ofthe brain as a computer and the mind as software. Much of Chomsky's early work depended on this metaphor: he conceived ofgram- mar as a set ofrules for generating novel combin- ations ofwords, just as a computer program could generate a string ofsymbols according to a formula. Thinking ofmental operations as akin to steps in a computer program allowed psychologists and workers in the new field of artificial intelligence to begin to subdivide mental tasks, such as arithmetic or language comprehension, into a series ofsteps in a computer program. Their research evolved in a different direction from Chomsky's. Computer sci- entists and psychologists such as Alan Newell, John Anderson, Roger Schank and Patrick Winston began to describe a range ofhuman abilities ± from visual object recognition and general problem solv- ing, to metaphor use and story understanding ± in terms ofa set ofinternal representations and pro- cesses that transform those representations. A key aspect ofthis approach to cognition was that the theorist could write computer programs that would provide a formalizable theory of mental op- erations. A rigorous test ofthe theory could be performed by running the program and seeing if output matched human output. Many ofthe early successes ofthis field involved 0559. language, including sentence comprehension, story understanding and metaphor use. An important aspect ofthe language and cognition relationship is that the AI models oflanguage did not draw on language-special algorithms or knowledge struc- tures. The new AI tradition and the information processing movement within psychology empha- sized learning, particularly general-purpose learn- ing, and was thus opposed to the emphasis on innate knowledge structures that was part of Chomsky's new linguistics. Psychologists drawn to the information processing movement were fre- quently inspired by the work ofSwiss psychologist Jean Piaget, whose works began to be translated into English in the 1960s. Piaget also emphasized the commonalities between language and cogni- tion, and proposed that language emerged out of the same broad cognitive changes that transform the sensorimotor processing ofinfants into the formal and logical mind of adults. In the 1970s and 1980s, among those researchers 0559. who aligned themselves with the interdisciplinary
2 Language and Cognition
conveying the relevance and background/fore- ground structure ofthe message are outside the language system. The proposal that the form of grammatical rules is influenced by communication is thus inconsistent with the autonomy ofsyntax hypothesis. That hypothesis specified that syntax was its own system, not shaped by the need for efficient processing or other exigencies of commu- nication. 0559.014 Functionalist linguists as well as other linguists were dissatisfied with the range of linguistic phe- nomena excluded by generative linguistics. They rejected the Chomskyan view that the most import- ant aspect oflanguage was a mechanical device for generating only legitimate grammatical sentences. They wanted to understand language in all its di- versity, including narrative, discourse, dialects, sociocultural influences on language use, and metaphor. Some functionalist linguists even pro- posed that rule use is just a minor aspect oflan- guage. Linguists such as Dwight Bolinger and Charles Fillmore argued that speech utterances, not rules for generating utterances, are what is mentally stored. They noted that every language speaker has memorized huge numbers ofodd coinages, colloquialisms, idioms and collocations, many ofwhich share patterns. An example is the phrase know by heart' which has the variationlearn by heart'. Rules, partial regularities and rule exceptions appear to differ in degree, occupying a continuum from fully idiosyncratic, to partially regular, to fully rule-governed. This idea made re- searchers in this nascent linguistic movement sym- pathetic to the connectionist movement, although the commonalities have not yet been fully explored. 0559.015 Although trained in the generative grammar tradition, linguists such as George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker noted that one could not de- scribe which sentences are syntactically valid and which are invalid without reference to nonlinguis- tic concepts. They pointed to the tendency for the same words describing movement in space to be used to describe movement in time (This meeting runs until 3 o'clock'), and emphasized the necessity ofincorporating the cognitive psychology of human category formation into linguistics. This approach to linguistics came to be calledcognitive' linguistics because aspects ofgeneral cognition ± such as how we construe the meaning ofa gram- matical construction ± were proposed to be import- ant for describing linguistic structure. For example, one descriptive problem ofgrammar is to account for why some sentences, but not others, can under- go the passivization' transformation. The sentenceJohn was hit by Mary' sounds fine, but `John was
known by Mary' does not. To fully describe which transitive sentences can undergo passivization, one needs to invoke the notion that the subject and direct object are in dynamic interaction with each other. Thus, one cannot passivize a sentence like John left the auditorium' because John is not acting on the auditorium in a way that has consequences for it; but the sentenceJohn left the auditorium unguarded' can transformed into `The auditor- ium was left unguarded by John', presumably because John's action affects the status of the audi- torium. By 2000 the cognitive linguistics movement had 0559. grown into an enduring subfield, but it has remained outside the mainstream oflinguistics. While some cognitive linguists have remained focused on specific linguistic questions, others have addressed questions in an interdisciplinary manner, drawing on experimental psychology, brain science, and category induction performed by artificial neural networks.
The field of cognitive neuroscience emerged from 0559. work in neuroscience and cognitive science. Cogni- tive neuroscience differs from basic neuroscience by having the goal ofexplaining complex cognitive abilities, but rejects the tradition ofartificial intelli- gence (and much ofcognitive science) that one can understand cognition abstractly, without reference to its neural underpinnings. In the 1990s some cognitive neuroscientists 0559. argued that basic aspects ofthe language±cognition relationship, such as the autonomy ofsyntax hy- pothesis and the innateness and modularity oflan- guage, could be evaluated from the neuroscientific point ofview. Neurobiologists have noted that de- veloping neural tissue is very plastic. For example, the auditory association areas ofthe brains fre- quently represent visual and gestural language in individuals who are born deaf. The regions of the brain that mediate language use appear to be espe- cially malleable. Like other aspects ofcognition, language acquisition is heavily dependent on ex- perience. R-A Mueller has remarked that regional special- 0559. ization in the brain is beyond doubt, but modular- ity ofcognitive functions, including language, is highly debatable from the view of neurobiology and evolution. Functional specialization ofbrain areas most probably emerges because some brain areas are near to the site ofsensory input, such as
4 Language and Cognition
sensory systems for vision and audition. Scientists such as Jeffrey Elman, Elizabeth Bates and their colleagues note that however closely one looks at the anatomy and physiology ofthe brain, there is no evidence ofcortical structures unique to lan- guage or unique to humans. These researchers argue that language has an epigenetic' not agen- etic' origin. Epigenetic development is the proposal that behavior results from a complex dynamic evo- lution ofgenes and environmental forces during prenatal and postnatal development. The concept ofepigenesis dates back to psychologist Jean Pia- get, who argued that cognitive abilities emerge from a biological structure which evolves, both before and after birth, in tandem with environmen- tal forces. Contemporary researchers who embrace the epigenetic view point out that are too few genes in the human genome to code directly for outcomes such as the ability to use language. Like other brain regions, the language areas in the adult brain are the end product ofcomplex chains ofinteractions with internal and external environments. These se- quences ofevents are based probabilistically on genes rather than being rigidly determined by the genome. 0559.020 The neurobiological evidence thus may run counter to what would be expected under the au- tonomy ofsyntax hypothesis. There is no known way that genes could encode for concepts like sub- ject' andverb'. Thus the most parsimonious per- spective is that language is similar to other aspects ofcognition in terms ofemerging out ofa brain which evolved to have an oversized frontal cortex (relative to other primates) and an elongated period ofchildhood, which privilege the role oflearning. 0559.021 Cognitive neuroscientists share a view oflan- guage that resonates with the cognitive linguists: they emphasize the jointdevelopment oflanguage and perceptuomotor processes, with language ac- quisition understood to be semantically driven and embodied. The neurological representation of grammar is continuous with the representation of other language `components' and the neural sub- strate.
0559.022 In the first half of the twentieth century the main question about the relationship between language and cognition was whether the grammatical struc- ture or vocabulary ofour language influenced thought processes. Cognitive science introduced a new question: are language and cognition similar or distinct human abilities? The last 50 years have seen considerable controversy on this question,
mirroring the development within cognitive sci- ence of two fundamentally different conceptions ofthe cognitive architecture. The tradition ofartifi- cial intelligence emphasized general-purpose prob- lem-solving abilities, while the tradition of linguistics and philosophy led to an emphasis on distinct mental modules. The four different theoretical perspectives on the 0559. language±cognition relationship were summarized in Table 1. The view at the beginning ofthe twenty- first century appears to be best captured by the idea that cognition and language have complex similar- ities and differences, and both develop over the human life span from genetic factors constrained by environmental input and cultural learning. New possibilities for synthesis continue to emerge, espe- cially as cognitive scientists pay more attention to evolutionary, neurobiological and cultural factors. It may be possible to set aside the question of whether language is distinct from cognition and whether the brain is composed ofdistinct mental modules. The theorist Howard Gardner has noted a growing consensus about the importance ofa new set ofquestions about how to divide up the grand areas ofmind and brain. Scientists are emphasizing the distinction between areas ofhuman ability that are available to all humans and played a part in the evolution ofour species (such as language and basic number use), and areas requiring cultural elaboration (such as algebra and the ability to play musical instruments). The era ofsimplistic state- ments about the language±cognition relationship is drawing to a close, as cognitive scientists begin to deliver on the promise ofa truly interdisciplin- ary approach to understanding the mind±brain.
Further Reading Baars BJ (1986) The Cognitive Revolution in Psychology. New York: Guilford Press. Dromi E, ed. (1993) Language and Cognition: A Developmental Perspective. Norword, NJ: Ablex. Edelman GM (1992) Bright Air,Brilliant Fire. New York: Basic Books. Elman JL, Bates E, Johnson MH et al. (1996) Rethinking Innateness: A Connectionist Perspective on Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gardner H (1985) The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution. New York: Basic Books. Gumperz JJ and Levinson SC (1996) Rethinking Linguistic Relativity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Harris CL (1990) Connectionism and cognitive linguistics. Connection Science. Lakoff G and Johnson M (1999) Philosophy in The Flesh. New York: Basic Books.
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