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Module 8: Internalism vs. Externalism
1. The Theories
A theory of epistemic justification is internalist =Df. S’s belief that p depends
solely on factors that are directly accessible through S’s internal reflection.^1
A theory of epistemic justification is externalist =Df. S’s belief that p does not
depend solely on factors that are directly accessible through S’s internal
reflection.
Internalist Externalist Coherentism Reliabilism Cartesian (Classical) Foundationalism Givenist Foundationalism Virtue Epistemology
2. An Argument for Internalism
(i) A is epistemically justified in A’s belief that p provided a belief in p is
epistemically responsible (whatever that means).
(ii) A’s belief that p is epistemically responsible depends upon factors that A has
cognitive access.
(iii) Everything that A has cognitive access to is internal to A’s perspective.
(iv) A is epistemically justified in A’s belief that p only if p depends upon factors
internal to A’s perspective.
(v) Likewise, if A believes p, q, r on factors x, y, z (all internal to A’s perspective)
and B believes p, q, r (all internal to B’s perspective), then A and B are equally
justified in their beliefs.
3. Objections
Rejection of (i), why?
Rejection of (ii), why? An alternative formulation of (ii) might read that A is not
epistemically responsible for factors beyond A’s cognitive access.
(^1) There are a number of other possible formulations of internalism, e.g. (i) S can show that p , or (ii) S’s
belief that p is accessible from an internal standpoint, or (iii) S’s belief that p depends upon a factors that are internal to S’s perspective. See Alvin, Goldman. 1980. The Internalist Conception of Justification.
4. An Argument for Externalism
A theory of epistemic justification is externalist =Df. S’s belief that p does not depend solely on factors that are directly accessible through S’s internal reflection.
An externalist theory might argue that S’s belief that p is justified provided it was formed
in a reliable belief-formation process R (reliabilism) or by an intellectual virtue V (virtue
epistemology). Since it may be the case that both R and V are outside (or not accessible)
to S upon reflection, S is justified that p on the basis of factors external to S’s
perspective.
Consider (v) from the argument for internalism.
(v) Likewise, if A believes p, q, r on factors x, y, z (all internal to A’s perspective)
and B believes p, q, r (all internal to B’s perspective), then A and B are equally
justified in their beliefs.
One argument for externalism claims that how p, q, r were formed (or caused) are
relevant for justification. If A’s beliefs were formed by perception and valid reasoning ,
while B’s beliefs were formed by guessing, an externalist claims that A is justified but B
is not. Therefore (v) is false, and externalism is true.
Here is a concrete example. Suppose that A and B are both tasting wine. Suppose
that A was trained to distinguish varieties of wine whereas B is not. That is, A has a
unique intellectual virtue. Suppose that both A and B believe that a certain wine is a
certain vintage of merlot. Here, we suppose that A is justified and B is not.
Here is a different example. Suppose that A has a unique power that A does not
know about (clairvoyance) and B does not have such a power. Suppose that both A and B
believe that ‘The stock market will crash tomorrow’, A’s belief formed by clairvoyance
while B’s by guessing. We might say that A’s belief is justified (or apt) but B’s belief is
not. And, since the justification of A’s belief depends upon a factor external to A’s
perspective, internalism is wrong and externalism is right.
5. Splitting the Difference?
Much like how the virtue epistemologist distinguishes between a belief being apt
(produced by an intellectual virtue) from it being justified (a belief being coherent), one
could argue that S’s belief that p is justified on the basis of internal factors, S’s belief that
p is responsible on the basis of external factors.
The idea here is that there are multiple ways in which one might epistemic evaluate one’s
belief. We might argue that some factors should be understood in an externalist fashion,
while others should be understood in an internalist fashion.
The difficulty with this is giving an account of which kinds of beliefs should be justified
by an internalist standpoint while which kinds should be justified by an externalist one.
general. That is, animals and children have particular beliefs (p, q, r) but don’t necessarily belief anything about the faculty F in general. Therefore they cannot be justified about p, q, r, because they cannot be justified about F. But, animals and children are justified about p, q, r , therefore the objection is absurd.
#2 There are many particular beliefs (e.g. 2+2=4, I am in pain, I exist) that we are justified in but we don’t know if we are justified in the procedure that produces them.
The argument is logically circular.^2
Reply #2 to Track Record Argument (the argument from Practical Rationality)
- Forming beliefs on the basis of perception is very different than by a crystal ball. The former is out of our control, the latter is not.
- It would be extremely difficult to change how we normally form our beliefs.
- The crystal ball method offers no theoretical advantage (since it is also subject to the same objections as perception).
- We should continue to form our beliefs based upon firmly-established, time-tested methods (perception, memory, reason, etc.).
Objection #2 to Track Record Argument
The track record argument is absurd because it makes every belief-formation process reliable (i.e. justified).
For example, consider a set of beliefs formed by a variety of suspicious belief-formation processes (e.g. crystal ball, method of tenacity, method of authority, a priori method). In using the crystal ball, John believes p, q, r. If John wants to determine whether or not p, q, and r are the case, in order to do this, John uses the crystal ball to check. This is absurd. Reply #3 to the Objection from Practical Rationality
There is an obvious difference between forming one’s belief by a crystal ball, the method of authority, or the method of tenacity, and forming one’s belief on the basis of perception, memory, reason. The former are only thought to be reliable , while the latter are actually reliable.
Objection #3 to Argument from Practical Rationality
The argument is absurd for two reasons.
#1 The argument is circular. How does one know that perception, memory, reason are firmly-established, time-tested methods without assuming to perception, memory, and reason.
#2 The argument is not convincing. A crystal ball user will argue that using a crystal ball is firmly established in him/her. Also, there are other methods that are (perhaps) more firmly established, e.g. the method of authority.
(^2) A justification/argument for the reliability of a faculty F is epistemically circular = Df. (1) the beliefs b
that justify F are formed by F. That is, assuming the reliability of the source of belief in order to argue for the reliability of the source of that belief. A justification/argument for the reliability of a faculty F is logically circular = Df. (1) the conclusion of the argument is identical to one of the premises.
