Offline Markets - E-Commerce - Lecture Slides, Slides of Fundamentals of E-Commerce

E-Commerce is a growing and dynamic field. It is of special concern for the IT students. Following are the fundamental aspects of these Lecture Slides : Offline Markets, Shared Reputation, Closed Boundaries, Clear, Online Market, Negative Reputation, Positive Reputation, Dishonest, Market, Entrace Cost

Typology: Slides

2012/2013

Uploaded on 07/30/2013

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Online
vs
Offline Markets
Online
vs
Offline
Markets
Offline Markets have closed boundaries whereas Online
Mkt
M
ar
k
e
t
s are open
Incentive for Shared Reputation not clear in Online market
eBay in the early days
vs
now
eBay
in
the
early
days
vs
now
Existence of Negative Reputation and Positive Reputation
Positive reputation is more effective in solving the
“lemons” problem (Kollock ‘99)
dishonest agents can move to a different market without
paying penalty or exit/
cost
paying
penalty
or
exit/
cost
Stability of Identity
dishonest agents can change identity
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Online

vs

Offline Markets

Online

vs Offline Markets

-^

Offline Markets have closed boundaries whereas OnlineM^

k t

Markets are open

-^

Incentive for Shared Reputation not clear in Online marketeBay in the early days vs noweBay in the early days vs now

-^

Existence of Negative Reputation and Positive Reputation

Positive reputation is more effective in solving the“lemons” problem (Kollock ‘99)dishonest agents can move to a different market withoutpaying penalty or exit/entrace costpaying penalty or exit/entrace cost

-^

Stability of Identity

dishonest agents can change identity

Yamagishi

Experiments

Yamagishi

Experiments

•^

Conclusions•^

Information Asymmetry leads to lemon markets•^

Lower quality goods are traded and opportunity forhi h

lit^

d

higher quality goods gone

-^

Reputation alleviates lemon markets where tradersidentities are permanent

p

-^

Power of reputation reduced by identity changesand/or cancel reputationsN^

ti^

t ti

l^

bl^

t^

id^

tit^

h

-^

Negative reputation vulnerable to identity changeswhere positive reputation is not vulnerable to it

•^

Properly designed reputation mechanismProperly designed reputation mechanismshould resolve lemons problem

eBay FeedbackeBay

Feedback

•^

HistoryBefore 1999Before 1999

Anybody could leave feedback for anybody Now

Feedbacks are per-transaction between seller and winning bidderFeedbacks are per transaction between seller and winning bidder

-^

AccumulativePositive (+1), Negative (-1), Neutral(0)1 line of qualitative textual feedback

q

•^

Feedback Profile is publicAny prospective buyer can see all per-transaction feedback with scores

and text F^

db k 2 0

•^

Feedback 2.0Revealed on multiple aspects of the user feedback

-^

TodayOnly buyers can leave feedbacks sellers can only leave positiveOnly buyers can leave feedbacks, sellers can only leave positive

feedbacks

eBay FeedbackeBay

Feedback

•^

Most Feedbacks are positive (Pollyanna

p^

(^

y

effect)•^

Negatives are fewer

-^

Fear of retaliation

-^

Satisfaction of receipt

-^

No Feedbacks instead

-^

Positive with text specifying negative experiences

-^

High courtesy Equilibrium (Resnick/Zeckhauser ’01)

-^

Mutually negative feedbacks may represent misplaced blame

-^

Mutually negative feedbacks may represent misplaced blame

-^

Who goes first?•^

Since buyer typically pays first, expect seller to go first

-^

Buyer goes first twice as often (Resnick/Zeckhauser ’01)

Analysis of Feedback Text

(Sundaresan et al

Expression/SentimentExpression/Sentiment •^

Expression is a metaphor for Trust

•^

When Trust is expressed through feedback ortextual communication it influences mutual Trustand future Trust

•^

Factors to take into accountWh

ll

What a user usually saysWhat is the change in what the user usually saysHow does what someone says affects what the next user says

y^

y

Only those who have significantly significant things to say do say

anything at all