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Philosophy vs. Theory: Reshaping the Debate
John McCumber Germanic Languages
I: A “Debate” or a “Squabble”?
Calling the by-play which occasionally surfaces between philosophy and theory a “debate” is perhaps doing it too much honor. What I have in mind is the squabbling between those, from Habermas across to Quine, who uphold the values of “reason, truth, and scholarship,”^1 and those, from Nietzsche to Derrida, who question or even mock those values. This may seem an unduly narrow conception of “theory,” for in a sense all the “theoreticians” I will discuss here can be called philosophers, and “postmodernist” ones at that; I will mention this again. At the moment, it is clear that no “debate” is possible between two positions such as I have characterized. For theoreticians, to argue “rationally” with philosophers would be to give up in advance. For philosophers, to use reason against theoreticians would be to expose themselves to questions, and even to mockery—as John Searle found out most spectacularly.^2 So, instead of a debate, we get clashes in which the theoreticians indulge in mordant badinage, while the philosophers take refuge in stony silence. The Searle/Derrida encounter is only one of these. It and its like, I am afraid, generally resemble nothing so much as the penultimate scene of ”Monty
(^1) The phrase is from the open letter, signed by Quine among others, protesting Cambridge University’s awarding of an honorary degree to Jacques Derrida: quoted at John CaputoUniversity Press, 1997 p. 39. Deconstruction in a Nutshell New York: Fordham (^2) John Searle, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida” Glyph 22 (1877) pp. 198-208; Derrida’s response is in Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Gerald Graff, ed.) Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988.
Python and the Holy Grail,” in which John Cleese, playing a Frenchman, prances about on Castle Doune while hurling insults at Graham Chapman’s utterly flummoxed King Arthur. Getting beyond this, it seems, requires not so much “reshaping a debate” as reshaping a debacle into a debate. But how to do so? I think we can make some early headway by thinking about the word “theory.” Theôria in Greek, is compounded of the words theia , “divine things,” and horaô , “to see.” It originally meant to witness divine things and was the activity of a theoros , one who consulted an oracle^3 Because divine things are on a higher level than we humans we cannot change them, and “theoretical” knowledge came to mean knowledge which, in contrast to “practical” knowledge, does not change its object. The Greek gods are immortal and so exempt from the ravages of time. As Sophocles put it, monoi ou gignetai theoisi gêras oude kat’thanein pote. Ta d’alla sugkhei panth’ ho pagkratês khronos (Oe .
In my translation:
Only for the immortal gods Do old age and never dying not come-to-pass. All other things are obliterated by all-ruling time.
(^3) This meaning of the term is beautifully played out in the opening lines of Plato’s Republic , where theôresthai is paired with proseukhesthai , to address in prayer.
willing to allow. If we accept this construal of the debate, two further steps will be called for: we must articulate the ontologies underlying the two positions, and we must attempt to evaluate them. From the philosophical side this is an old and complex story, and I will not retell it here; the main effort at articulating a “postmodern” or “theoretical” ontology is that of Gilles Deleuze, and I will not rehearse that either. The process of mutual evaluation has not begun. Recent history suggests an answer more congenial to theory. The last four decades have seen a vast movement by the oppressed of this earth to shake off their oppression. Beginning with Rosa Parks on a Birmingham bus and continuing into the recent stunning walkout by the Group of 21 from the World Trade Organization conference in Cancún, this “Great Liberation” (as I will call it) has embraced diverse struggles by racial, religious, and ethnic minorities, women, gays, and formerly colonized peoples—among others. At its abstract end, it has been seen in epistemological terms as a struggle against ”presence” (Derrida), “unity” as an historical category (Foucault), and “representation” (Deleuze)—underlying concepts which are held to validate those of “reason, truth, and scholarship” which Habermas, Quine, et al, seek to defend. “Theory” as I define it here thus signifies (as I noted in the first paragraph) only one part, the abstract part, of a much larger enterprise—“theory” in the various forms of cultural, literary, political theory, and so on (not all of which, by the way, are “postmodern”!). From this point of view, philosophers are to be judged politically—and negatively—in terms of their stubborn adherence to “reactionary” positions.
Neither of these two candidates for a deeper construal of the philosophy-theory debate will work. The philosophical response, for its part, places us back in the safely philosophical domain of abstract argument—with no connection to recent history. That domain is congenial (certainly to me!), but it has its dangers. Even for philosophers, such disconnection from history is problematic, for philosophers gain legitimacy from their relation to history as much as any other field. Analytical philosophy, for example, is often accused of being thoroughly ahistorical. But it developed in this country as an attempt to understand and appropriate the single most important historical process of the three and half centuries up to 1950—the rise of science, which made possible capitalism, the nation-state, bourgeois social institutions, and the various colonial systems. (It is no accident at all that one of the most important books of this tradition is entitled “The Rise of Scientific Philosophy.”)^4 The Great Liberation, which began at almost the moment when Cold War funding and the aporias of the Quantum Theory ended Great Science and left us mainly with Big Science, deserves equally intense philosophical reflection today. But recent history seems to teach us that philosophers cannot engage in such reflection without questioning the very things on which they trade, concepts such as those of truth and reason. If we accept the theory-candidate, a different problem arises. For when the basic concepts of reason and truth are identified as oppressive, we undermine discourse itself. And this, too, leads us to abrogate something: the Delphic imperative gnôthe seauton , know thyself—interpreted by Plato, following Socrates, as the demand to logon didonai , to give an account to others of what you are doing. This imperative is not merely an
(^4) Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951
and so from common action. This invites us to ask if the two construals themselves need to be separate, or if there is some important connection between ontology and liberation. If there is, then arguing about ontology would not chase us from our historical situation. It would be a way of clarifying it. I have argued elsewhere^6 that the main version of ontology in the Western world, which I will call “ousia ontology”, is intrinsically allied to oppression, for it writes domination into the nature of being itself. According to it, something is a ”being” in the plenary sense if:
- It is securely and determinately bounded;
- One unitary component within its boundaries—what Aristotle calls the "form"—generates and/or orders everything else within those boundaries.
- Only that governing unit affects the world outside those boundaries.
I call these traits "boundary", "disposition", and "initiative" respectively. They suffice, I suggest, as a very general characterization of what the world’s oppressed are fighting. They are appealed to, under different names, in Valentin Mudimbe’s characterization of “the colonial project,” in Frederick Douglass’s account of the slave plantation where he was the property of Colonel Lloyd, and in Simone de Beauvoir’s account of bourgeois household and marriage. They are also at play in Marx’s account of capitalist production and in Freud’s account of the structure of the human mind. 7 But they have nothing to do with concepts such as those of reason and truth. Those arise, as Aristotle’s Categories shows us, from the basic activity of predication; and (as he also shows us) the ontology they presuppose is one in which the unity of a being is
(^67) John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999 See my Metaphysics and Oppression pp. 96, 180-
established, not by a bounding, disposing, and initiating form, but by an inert substrate. I call this ontology the “substance ontology;” where ousiai are intrinsically oppressive, substances are merely boring.^8 Thus: discussing ontology does not necessarily take us away from history. Ousia ontology, in particular, is relevant to today’s liberation struggle because it articulates the very structures from which modern liberation movements seek to free us all. At its most general level, the Great Liberation needs a critique of the ousia ontology, of those other ontologies which write domination into the nature of being itself, and of the many “theoretical practices” which trade upon that inscription. What theory should be questioning, then, is not presence, but the dominance of presence; not unity, but the dominance of the category of unity over historical practice; not representation, but the dominance of representation. And to conduct that questioning, theory as I have characterized it can make free use of all the techniques of argument and truth philosophers have advanced over the centuries (well, of many of them, anyway!): it can become philosophical. But showing how that battle can be fought requires some reshaping of philosophy itself, in the sense of a bringing-together of strands within philosophy that have been kept too far apart for far too long.
(^8) And, as substrates, unknowable: as Appendix 2 suggests in more detail, it is the substance-ontology which makes epistemology pressing.
investigation, we are taking them out of the temporal flow, exempting them from time (this was the second of my complaints about the word “theory” above). But how can we do otherwise? How can we talk about the past without uttering true sentences about it?
V. Philosophical Narrative and the Untrue Past: Hegel
Hegel gives us an answer. His philosophy is a giant rationalization of history. It can be viewed as making no standard truth claim at all.^11 What it does claim is twofold: it claims to be comprehensive, and it claims to be ordered. In general, we can say, a narrative of the type Hegel offers—what I will call a “philosophical” narrative—is better the more materials it links together, and the greater the rational transparency with which it links them. The final stage of such a narrative, as for Hegel, is ourselves—our present situation. A philosophical narrative, like certain other types of historical narrative, thus enables us to see ourselves as the outcome of a past. All the stages in such a narrative must, of course, be truthfully reported. In constructing a philosophical narrative, we still try, in all the traditional ways, to describe the Before of what we are talking about accurately, to “get the facts right.” But we do not stop there, for historical narratives, whether philosophical or not, may include only true statements but fail to be comprehensive. On this view, it was not, strictly speaking, false for such classic historians of the American West as Eugene C. Barker, T. R. Fehrenbach, and Walter Prescott Webb to focus exclusively on characters and situations who were not African Americans; they may have described their selected historical objects accurately
(^11) That is how I view it in my The Company of Words: Hegel, Language, and Systematic Philosophy Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993
enough. But the resulting narrative failed comprehensiveness in morally repugnant ways. 12 Hegel has an account of rational transparency as well as of comprehensiveness. It lies in his view of what he calls "determinate negation." To "negate" for Hegel means, very generally, to move on from a thing.^13 In determinate negation, just one feature of a thing is moved on from at a time (hence, I prefer to call it "minimal negation").^14 For an historical development to be "transparent" is just for it to be reconstructible as a series of minimal negations—the fewer, of course, the better. Such negations are not explanatory factors (and dialectics does not explain anything). They are merely a certain way of organizing data.^15 When the transparency is "rational," as I use that term, each such change can be seen to solve a problem in the preceding stage (typically, for Hegel, a contradiction). Hegelian philosophical narrative is thus a way of reconstructing the past as a cumulative series of solutions. So we can talk about the past without just saying true things about it, by using Hegelian narrative strategies. As to the future, we can take some cues from Heidegger.
(^1213) Cf. Sara Massey (ed.) Black Cowboys of Texas College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2000 p. ix Hegel. For a highly pitched example see Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?" in Popper,A good deal of mischief has been done by reading contemporary, atemporal versions of logical negation back into Conjectures and Refutations New York: Basic Books, 1965 pp. 312-335. (^14) See my The Company of Words pp. 143-148. (^15) A minimal change is not necessarily a trivial one. It changes only a single aspect of the situation, but that aspect might be central to it. If we look at the criticisms of Plato's theory of forms in the ninth chapter of the first book ofAristotle's Metaphysics , for example, we find that they are all directed to just one of its assertions: that forms are "separate" from the things of which they are the forms. This single, minimal negation of Plato's philosophy, however,was central enough to produce a massive transformation in philosophy itself.
expression of architecture. I think people are still in shock at the difference.’^18 That a set of beings, or of aspects of one being, is diakenically structured is evident when: A. None of them is adequately understood apart from the others; B. None grounds or explains the others; C. No yet more basic phenomenon can ground, i.e. explain, all of them together.
For anything to have what I will call an "essential future" is for it to exhibit this sort of structure. The activity of aiding this sort of exhibition is what I call “demarcation,” and it comprises the other half of what I call “situating reason;” the half which opens philosophy and theory up to the unknown-but-impending future. Since we will never know anything fully, our encounters with things are always incomplete and underway towards further encounters; everything we experience has diakenic aspects. The various techniques and gestures of demarcation, like those of narrative, can thus apply to anything whatsoever. From the present point of view, they apply most particularly to the dialectical continuities established in Hegelian narrative—a crucial move that Hegel himself never makes, and which I call “demarcation.” Demarcation does not “refer” to diakena or point them, out, but allows them to happen. For we can always cover them up—as when we form our best conjecture for the final words of Lost in Translation and go on to “understand” the movie in terms of that conjecture. Demarcation counters this by reminding us, I manifold ways, that we have not yet discovered all of the possible unifying factors in any thing, and that there is a
(^18) Sam Farmer, “Bowl of Contention: How Successfully the New Soldier Field blends in with the Old Façade is an Open Question” Los Angeles Times Monday, September 29, 2003 p. D11 (sports section)
definite space within the thing as we have experienced it so far where such unifying factors may come to be evident. Like dialectical continuity, diakenicity is not so much a matter of what is in things as of how we take them, and so cannot be captured by the notion of “truth.” Postmodern theory can thus be understood as a way of opening up futures, in which case I call it “demarcation.” The centrality of the future as a category of postmodern thought is underlined by Derrida himself in a cri de coeur in his recently published interview on terrorism: [What is unacceptable about Bin Laden etc.] is not only the cruelty, the disregard for human life, the disrespect for law, for women, the use of what is worst in technocapitalist modernity for the purposes of religious fanaticism. No, it is, above all, the fact that such actions and such discourse open onto no future and, in my view, have no future.^19
VII. Conclusion To recapitulate my argument: getting a common intellectual space within which the various squabbles between philosophers and theoreticians can become debates required seeing that the basic issues between the two camps are not epistemological. The camps in fact divide, I suggested, in answering the question of whether thought and reason need be affairs of the present tense only. Is it possible for them to respond in different ways to the past and the future? I tried to suggest, if not actually to show, that it is. It then became clear, I hope, that “postmodern theory” does not need to undermine the traditional values of truth, reason, or clarity. Rather, I claimed, it seeks to supplement them by introducing
(^19) Giovanna Borradori Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 2003 p. 113
forms, not to sensibles, soul can truly be itself only when unaffected by sensibles, and true knowledge is of only of the non-sensible forms. The ancient Skeptics illustrate the same thing, though in less interesting ways than Plato. They follow him in believing that the soul becomes most itself, i.e. achieves serenity ( ataraxia ), when involvement with the sensory world is suspended (especially cognitive involvement); again, the objects of which knowledge is sought were for them not similar to thinking minds, but mere “substrates”.^21 When ancient and medieval thinkers, in the wake of Aristotle, conceived both knower and known as alike structured by form, the first part of philosophy had as its task not validating the possibility or impossibility of knowledge, but laying out the basic nature of form: it was “logic,” not “epistemology,”^22 and indeed in that famous sense of “logic” which coincides with “metaphysics.” Only when “substantial forms” were evicted from nature, leaving only matter in motion (and taking us back to the “substrates” of Skepticism), did the question of whether knowledge as a whole was possible at all become pressing. Skepticism, and so epistemology as the antidote to it, is thus associable with what I will call “substrate ontologies”—ontologies which see all beings as consisting of a substrate in which various properties inhere. Combined with the view that all we can know of things is the properties they have, such ontologies raise the problem that we cannot know what is moss basic—the substrates. If we are Cartesians, we can appeal to intellectual intuition of some sort, as Descartes does in the Second Meditation (AT VII 30-32). But if we are Empiricists, the nut is tougher. At one point, for example, Locke characterizes the attribution of substrates somehow underlying the properties we actually perceive to be a matter of "custom" and "supposition," which suggests that the idea of substance could be entirely dispensed with--an attractive move, in view of the epistemological problems it would put to rest ( Essay II. xxiii.1f). But when challenged on this ground by Lord Stillingfleet, who thought that Locke was making substance an optional concept, Locke responded that any other explanation for the subsistence of concatenated ideas is "inconceivable." 23 It is Berkeley who will establish definitively that the idea of an unknown material substratum for the concatenated ideas we actually perceive is untenable--a main thesis of his "subjective idealism". 24
(^2122) hypokeimena : Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 19 VII.10 11035b27f, VII.14 1035b20f.Hence, as Aristotle put it, ”…in syllogisms ousia is the start of everything:”^ Metaphysics^ VII.10 1034a30ff; see also (^2324) Locke, Essay II. 23.1f. See also the Editor's Note at Essay II.23.1 (p. 390 n.3). Philosophical Writings See, e.g., George Berkeley, New York: Collier, 1965 pp. 74-96. The qualities we actually sense cannot for Berkeley be^ The Principles of Human Knowledge^ in David M. Armstrong (ed.)^ Berkeley's shown to be caused by external substances, or at least by a plurality of unintelligent ones: they are all caused directly byGod: see Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge pp. 71f. See my Metaphysics and Oppression pp. 109-179.
Appendix 2: The Three Wise Men (from “Philosophy and Freedom)”^25
[Note: this criticism of Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze is important enough to some of my claims here that I am including here brief sketches of arguments I make in my Philosophy and Freedom ). We can begin to see Derrida’s problem with explaining himself by considering his characterization of “presence” in "Force and Signification": To be "present" means most basically to be "summed up ( résumée ) in some absolute simultaneity or instantaneity".^26 This is ambiguous. To be "summed up" means, in one sense, to be complete, i.e. not to require anything else to be or to be given. But that a being's completeness at some “absolute…instantaneity” sums it up may mean not only that it is complete and independent at that instant but also that what it is right then is all it ever “really” is. This sense of "summing up" is more extended than the other, for what gets summed up is the thing over the entire duration of its existence. These two characterizations of presence are clearly quite different from one another. For it is entirely possible to take something as being complete at a particular moment without going on to say that that momentary completeness "sums up" what it was earlier, and will be later: that its whole existence is determined from its completeness or givenness at this (or some) present moment. This extended version of presence arises, Derrida says, from a certain interpretation of time: one which takes the punctuality of the present moment as the "indisplacable center" of time. It is only in virtue of giving such special status to the present state of something that we can presume that what the being is right now is what it has been and will be.^27 I will call this further move the "privileging of presence", to distinguish it from the narrower sense, i.e. from what I will call "presence" itself. This distinction is not always made by Derrida, and when he runs the two senses together, as he does in "Force and Signification", he generates what I call the Derridean Knot.
(^25) John McCumber, Philosophy and Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, Foucault Bloomington, Indiana: University Indiana Press, 2000 (^26) Jacques Derrida, "Force et signification" at Derrida, L'écriture et la différence Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967; English translation, Derrida,(hereinafter: ED; references to translations will be given after a slash) p. 26 /14. This concept of presence has for Writing and Difference (Alan Bass, trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978 Derrida undergone only one major modification in the history of the West: its transformation from an "objective" sensein which something is present if it exists on its own in a state of completion (which the tradition, following Aristotle, calls "actuality") into a "modern" sense of complete givenness to a subject (which Descartes called "clearness anddistinctness") VP p. 70 /63; Derrida, De la grammatologie Paris: Minuit, 1967; English translation, Derrida, Of Grammatology 60, 146 /40, 97; for a discussion of clearness and distinctness in Descartes, see my (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, trans.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974 (hereinafter: The Company of Words Gramm pp. 100-102..) pp. For a discussion of actuality in Aristotle, see the first two chapters of my (^27) Derrida, La voix et le phénomène Paris: PUF, 1967 pp. 66f, 69; "La structure, le signe, et le jeu dans le discours des Metaphysics and Oppression. sciences humaines" at ED Dissemination (Barbara Johnson, trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.(hereinafter: p. 426 /291; Derrida, La dissémination Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972; English translation, Diss. ). p. 336/302; "Ousia et grammé" at Derrda, Philosophy (Alan Bass, trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (hereinafter: Marges de la philosophie Paris: Minuit, 1972; English translation in Derrida, Marges ) 1982 p. 75 /64f; Margins of Gramm. pp. 97, 236f /66f, 166
challenge authority, or privilege, rather than presence (II).^30 On the other hand, the famous argument against the "transcendental signified", given elsewhere in "La différance" and again in Positions, suggests that the object of what Barbara Johnson has called "deconstructive critique"^31 is presence itself, not its privilege (Ia). A transcendental signified would be something that is, in Derrida's sense, present in that it "refers only to itself": it is detachable from other things, and hence can be located on what I called the first level of Derrida's characterization of presence. His argument, which I will not recount, is that nothing is ever given that way: The play of differences supposes, in short, syntheses or referrals which forbid that at any moment, or in any sense, a simple element could be present in itself and not refer to anything but itself.^32 Derrida's claim here is that presence is a concept which has no referents. It is problematic in itself, independently of any structures of domination: even right now at this instant nothing "really" is present as anything. If “metaphysics” is discourse based on such a conception of presence, then it is indeed inescapable: we can leave it only at the price of intelligibility. In some places, Derrida in fact seems to be quite clear that such is the case: There is no sense in passing up the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language--no syntax and no lexicon--which is foreign to this history: we cannot enunciate any destructuring proposition that has not already had to slip itself into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulates of the very thing which it wishes to challenge.^33 Freeing ourselves from presence, i.e. from metaphysics, is impossible. Metaphysics is a house which sits nowhere, and every door leads back inside: One must then attempt to free oneself from this language. Not to attempt to get free, for that is impossible without forgetting our history. But to dream of it. Not to get free of it,
(^30) Derrida, "La différance" at Marges p. 10 /10. But even here the situation is equivocal: absence conceived as a "simple symmetrical opposite" is presumably absence conceived as given all at once, as present. (^31) See Barbara Johnson's "Translator's Introduction" to Diss. p. xv. (^3233) Pos. p. 37 /26; see generally pp. 28-41 /18-29, and "La différance" passim. Derrida,Derrida, "La structure, le signe, et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines" at Derrida, ED p. 412 /280; also cf. De la grammatologie p. 24 /13 and Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique" at ED p. 166 /113.
which would have no sense and would deprive us of the light of sense. But to resist as long as possible.^34 But Derrida also views the completeness, or complete givenness of a being all at once as a sort of essentialistic ideal (Ib). An example occurs in La différance: "…the signified concept is never present in itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself".^35 What, we may ask, is "sufficient" presence, and how does it differ from presence tout court? Is a more relaxed version of presence possible in which a signified refers mostly to itself? Or, perhaps, just a little bit to itself? On this view, presence is not something that must actually be achieved in order for speech to become possible, but an idealized concept which has an undue dominance over thought and language, a dominance which can be undone without destroying them: The absolute parousia of the literal meaning… should be situated as a function responding to an indestructible but relative necessity, at the interior of a system which comprehends it. Which amounts to situating metaphysics of the onto-theology of the logos.^36 Derrida is thus unclear about the aims and limits of his own discourse. Is he uncovering something he claims to be unhealthy in truth and reason themselves, as people like Quine and Habermas insist? Or is he targeting something more specific? Foucault considers his own practice to be one of description. Indeed, for an object of Foucaldian discourse, a “discursive formation,” to exist is for it to be describable.^37 It is therefore not lightly, or exclusively with ironic intent, that in The Archeology of Knowledge Foucault calls himself a "positivist" with respect to truth (AS p. 164-167 /125-127). Archeology is to be, on its basic level, theory-free: it does not seek a hidden meaning in the statements it describes, but simply asks how they arise and pass away (AS p. 143f /109). On the other hand, Foucault’s discourse seeks not merely truth but also a form of liberation as well. This is presumably why he says (for example) that archeology seeks not to "describe" defining lacunae or ruptures but to "multiply" them.^38 Archeology is to introduce rupture, or isolation, into the proliferating networks of discursive formation and reformation. Discontinuity for Foucault is not
(^3435) Derrida, "Force et signification" at ED p. 46 / 36 Derrida, "La différance" atDerrda, De la grammatologie^ Marges. p. 136 /89; see also the references to "pure" presence, suggesting that there is some^ p. 11/ other kind, at Derrida, "Signature, événement contexte" atpresence" in Husserl at Derrida, La voix et le phénomène p. 109. Marges p. 378 /318, and Diss p. 336 /302, as well as to "full (^37) Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir Paris: Gallimard, 1969; English translation, Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge (^38) AS p. 13, 15, 221 /6 (where (A. M. Sheridan Smith, trans.) New York: Pantheon, 1972 (hereinafter: AS) p. 208/159. multiplie is translated as "seeking and discovering"), 7, 170.
