Pragmatics lecture notes - speech acts - indirect speech acts | Lecture notes English Language

PRAGMATICS – 4.1. – INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS

Indirect speech acts

What is an indirect speech act?

Most of the world’s languages have three basic sentence types: (i) declarative,

(ii) interrogative, and (iii) imperative. In some languages, the three major sentence types are

distinguished morphologically and/or syntactically. See (4.33)

The three major sentence types are typically associated with the three basic illocutionary

forces, namely, asserting/stating, asking/questioning, and ordering/requesting, respectively.

Thus, the three Somali sentences in (4.33), for instance, may be paraphrased using explicit

performatives.

(4.36) a. I (hereby) state that you listened to the news.

b. I (hereby) enquire whether you listened to the news.

c. I (hereby) order you to listen to the news.

Now, if there is a direct match between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we

have a direct speech act. In addition, explicit performatives, which happen to be in the

declarative form, are also taken to be direct speech acts, because they have their illocutionary

force explicitly named by the performative verb in the main part (or ‘matrix clause’) of the

sentence.

On the other hand, if there is no direct relationship between a sentence type and an

illocutionary force, we are faced with an indirect speech act. Thus, when an explicit

performative is used to make a request, as in (4.37), it functions as a direct speech act; the

same is the case when an imperative is employed, as in (4.38). By comparison, when an

interrogative is used to make a request, as in (4.39), we have an indirect speech act.

(4.37) I request you to pass the salt. (direct speech act)

(4.38) Pass the salt. (direct speech act)

(4.39) Can you pass the salt? (indirect speech act)

In short, the validity of the distinction between direct and indirect speech act is dependent on

whether or not one subscribes to what Levinson called the literal force hypothesis.

There are, however, problems at the very heart of the literal force hypothesis. One is that there

are cases of speech acts where even the direct link between performative verbs and speech

acts breaks down. Consider (4.40).

(4.40) I promise to sack you if you don’t finish the job by this weekend.

In (4.40), the performative verb is promise, but the illocutionary force that is most naturally

ascribed to this speech act is that of either a threat or a warning. This shows that contrary to

the main prediction of the literal force hypothesis, we cannot always identify speech acts even

with sentences that contain a performative verb.

NB! Most usages are indirect. The speech act of requesting, for example, is very rarely

performed by means of an imperative in English.

(4.41)

a. I want you to close the window.

b. Can you close the window?

c. Will you close the window?

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Indirect speech acts What is an indirect speech act? Most of the world’s languages have three basic sentence types: (i) declarative, (ii) interrogative, and (iii) imperative. In some languages, the three major sentence types are distinguished morphologically and/or syntactically. See (4.33) The three major sentence types are typically associated with the three basic illocutionary forces, namely, asserting/stating, asking/questioning, and ordering/requesting, respectively. Thus, the three Somali sentences in (4.33), for instance, may be paraphrased using explicit performatives. (4.36) a. I (hereby) state that you listened to the news. b. I (hereby) enquire whether you listened to the news. c. I (hereby) order you to listen to the news. Now, if there is a direct match between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we have a direct speech act. In addition, explicit performatives, which happen to be in the declarative form, are also taken to be direct speech acts, because they have their illocutionary force explicitly named by the performative verb in the main part (or ‘matrix clause’) of the sentence. On the other hand, if there is no direct relationship between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we are faced with an indirect speech act. Thus, when an explicit performative is used to make a request, as in (4.37), it functions as a direct speech act; the same is the case when an imperative is employed, as in (4.38). By comparison, when an interrogative is used to make a request, as in (4.39), we have an indirect speech act. (4.37) I request you to pass the salt. (direct speech act) (4.38) Pass the salt. (direct speech act) (4.39) Can you pass the salt? (indirect speech act) In short, the validity of the distinction between direct and indirect speech act is dependent on whether or not one subscribes to what Levinson called the literal force hypothesis. There are, however, problems at the very heart of the literal force hypothesis. One is that there are cases of speech acts where even the direct link between performative verbs and speech acts breaks down. Consider (4.40). (4.40) I promise to sack you if you don’t finish the job by this weekend. In (4.40), the performative verb is promise , but the illocutionary force that is most naturally ascribed to this speech act is that of either a threat or a warning. This shows that contrary to the main prediction of the literal force hypothesis, we cannot always identify speech acts even with sentences that contain a performative verb. NB! Most usages are indirect. The speech act of requesting, for example, is very rarely performed by means of an imperative in English. (4.41) a. I want you to close the window. b. Can you close the window? c. Will you close the window?

d. Would you close the window? e. Would you mind closing the window? f. You ought to close the window. g. May I ask you to close the window? h. I wonder if you’d mind closing the window. 4.6.2. How is an indirect speech act analysed? Roughly, there are three main approaches. The first is to assume the existence of a dual illocutionary force (direct vs indirect). Next, whether an utterance operates as an indirect speech act or not has to do with the relevant felicity conditions. Finally, on Searle’s view, a speaker’s performing and an addressee’s understanding an indirect speech act always involves some kind of inference. One interesting characteristic of indirect speech acts is that they are frequently conventionalized (Morgan 1978). This can be illustrated by the fact that of various, apparently synonymous linguistic expressions, only one may conventionally be used to convey an indirect speech act. Consider (4.43). (4. 43) a. Are you able to pass the salt? b. Do you have the ability to pass the salt? Conversational postulates - reduce the amount of inference needed to interpret an indirect speech act. The interpretation of indirect speech acts involves both inference and conventionality; the major difference concerns the question of balance. The idiom model - In this model, sentences like (4.39) are semantically ambiguous, and the request interpretation constitutes a speech act idiom that involves no inference at all. On this view, (4.39) is simply recognized as a request with no question being perceived. For example, like their English equivalent in (4.45), (4.46)–(4.49) can all be used to indirectly request the addressee to turn on the central heating system, depending on context. (4.45) It’s cold in here. (4.46) (Arabic) ?na-hu barid huma. it’s-3-M-S cold in here ‘It’s cold in here.’ 4.6.3. Why is an indirect speech act used? Some remarks on politeness Indirect speech acts are usually considered to be more polite than their direct counterparts. Furthermore, the more indirect a speech act, the more polite.  Currently, there are four main theoretical models of politeness: (i) the ‘social norm’ model , (ii) the ‘conversational maxim’ model (e.g., Leech 1983,2003) (see note 12 in Chapter 2), (iii) the ‘face-saving’ model (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987), and (iv) the ‘conversational contract’ model. Of these four models, the most influential and comprehensive is Brown and Levinson’s now classic ‘face-saving’ model.

This is particularly so in the case of institutionalized speech acts, which typically use standardized and stereotyped formulae and are performed in public ceremonies. A good example is provided by the speech act of divorcing. In some Muslim cultures, under the appropriate circumstances, the uttering of a sentence with the import of (4.53) three times consecutively by a husband to his wife will ipso facto constitute a divorce. By contrast, in Western cultures, no one (no matter what his or her religion is) can felicitously use (4.53) to obtain a divorce. (4.53) ‘I hereby divorce you.’ Rosaldo (1982) observed that the speech act of promising has no place among the Ilongots—a tribal group of hunters in the Philippines. Another example of this kind has been reported for the Australian aboriginal language Yolngu. According to Harris (1984: 134–5), there does not seem to be any speech act of thanking in the Yolngu speaker’s repertoire. Second, given a particular speech situation, pertinent speech acts are carried out differently in different languages/cultures. For instance, in some East Asian and Western cultures, if one steps on another person’s toes, one normally performs the speech act of apologizing. But apparently this is not the case among the Akans, a West African culture. As reported by Mey (2001: 287 crediting Felix Ameka), in that culture, such a situation does not call for an apology but calls for an expression of sympathy. Another example: While in English, thanks and compliments are usually offered to the hosts when leaving a dinner party, in Japanese society, apologies such as o-jama itashimashita ‘I have intruded on you’ are more likely to be offered by the guests. As our final example, there is the following exchange of insisting on repaying a debt and ritually refusing to accept repayment between two male speakers in Persian. A: ‘Let me... er... [takes out money] before I forget.’ B: ‘Leave it, really.’ A: ‘Please.’ B: ‘I don’t need it now, really.’ A: ‘Please.’ B: ‘I don’t need it.’ A: ‘I even got it in fifty pound notes for you.’ B: ‘But I don’t need it I say! Fourthly, the same speech act may differ in its directness/indirectness in different cultures. The Argentinian Spanish speakers are the most direct, followed by the speakers of Hebrew. The least direct are the Australian English speakers, while the speakers of Canadian French and German are positioned at the mid-point of the directness/indirectness continuum. 4.7.2. Interlanguage variation This language system is intermediate between the learner’s native language and his or her target language. For example, when a native speaker of Chinese is learning German as a second language, then the German used by him or her is an interlanguage.

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