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Pragmatics lecture notes - speech acts direct speech acts
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Speech act theory, though foreshadowed by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views about language-games, is usually attributed to the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin. These lectures were finally published posthumously as How to do things with words in 1962. Simply stated, the central tenet of speech act theory is that the uttering of a sentence is, or is part of, an action within the framework of social institutions and conventions. 4.1. Performatives versus constatives 4.1.1. The performative/constative dichotomy In the 1930s, a very influential school of thought in philosophy was logical positivism, developed by a group of philosophers and mathematicians principally in Vienna. One of the central doctrines of logical positivism is what is now called the descriptive fallacy, namely, the view that the only philosophically interesting function of language is that of making true or false statements. Verificationist thesis of meaning, namely, the idea that ‘unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verifieed (i.e., tested for its truth or falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless’. On such a view, sentences like those in (4.1) are simply meaningless, because they are not used to make verifiable or falsifiable propositions. Instead they express subjective judgments. (4.1) a. Shouting and screaming at your children is wrong. b. Elizabeth is more beautiful than Mary. c. Getting married and having children is better than having children and getting married. Some ordinary language sentences such as those in (4.2) are not employed to make a statement, and as such they cannot be said to be true or false. (4.2) a. Good morning! b. Is she a vegetarian? c. Put the car in the garage, please. Austin observed that there are ordinary language declarative sentences that resist a truth- conditional analysis in a similar fashion. The point of uttering such sentences is not just to say things, but also actively to do things. In other words, such utterances have both a descriptive and an effective aspect. Accordingly, Austin called them performatives, and he distinguished them from assertions, or statement making utterances, which he called constatives. Performatives are utterances that are used to do things or perform acts, as in (4.3). By contrast, constatives are utterances that are employed to make assertions or statements, as in (4.4). (4.3) a. I christen/name this ship the Princess Elizabeth. b. I now pronounce you man/husband and wife. c. I sentence you to ten years in prison. d. I promise to come to your talk tomorrow afternoon. e. I command you to surrender immediately. f. I apologize for being late. (4.4)
a. My daughter is called Elizabeth. b. The children are chasing squirrels in the park. c. Maurice Garin won the first Tour de France in 1903. Unlike those in (4.4), the declarative sentences in (4.3) have two characteristics: 1.they are not used intentionally to say anything, true or false, about states of affairs in the external world, and (ii) their use constitutes (part of) an action, namely, that of christening/naming a ship in (4.3a). Secondly, while the performative verb, that is, the verb naming the action while performing it in (4.3a–c) is in general an essential element and cannot be omitted, it can in (4.3d–f ). We can make a promise without using the verb promise, as in (4.5). (4.5) I’ll come to your talk tomorrow afternoon. Explicit versus implicit performatives Performatives can further be divided into two types: explicit and implicit. Explicit performatives are performative utterances which contain a performative verb that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed. By contrast, implicit performatives are performative utterances in which there is no such a verb. (4.6) a. Surrender immediately. b. How about going to New York on Saturday? c. Leave me alone, or I’ll call the police. Syntactic and semantic properties of explicit performatives explicit performatives contain a performative verb, (ii) the performative nature of such a verb can be reinforced by adding the adverb hereby, and (iii) explicit performatives occur in sentences with a first-person singular subject of a verb in the simple present tense, indicative mood, and active voice. (4.7) We suggest that you go to the embassy and apply for your visa in person. (4.8) You are hereby warned that legal action will be taken. (4.9) Passengers are hereby requested to wear a seat belt. (4.10) a. Taken from a company’s AGM notice Notice is hereby given that the Annual General Meeting of O2 plc will be held at The Hexagon, Queens Walk, Reading, Berkshire RG1 7UA on Wednesday, 27 July 2005 at 11.00 am for the following purposes:... b. (Hurford and Heasley 1983: 239) The management hereby warns customers that mistakes in change cannot be rectified once the customer has left the counter. c. (Levinson 1983: 260) It is herewith disclosed that the value of the estate left by Marcus T. Bloomingdale was 4,785,758 dollars. (4.11)(Thomas 1995: 45) a. A radio journalist is interviewing the chairman of Railtrack during a strike by signal workers. A: Are you denying that the government has interfered? B: I am denying that.
A locutionary act is the basic act of speaking, which itself consists of three related subacts. They are (i) a phonic act of producing an utterance inscription, (ii) a phatic act of composing a particular linguistic expression in a particular language, and (iii) a rhetic act of contextualizing the utterance-inscription. When we say something, we usually say it with some purpose in mind. This is the illocutionary act. In other words, an illocutionary act refers to the type of function the speaker intends to fulfil, or the type of action the speaker intends to accomplish in the course of producing an utterance. Examples of illocutionary acts include accusing, apologizing, blaming, congratulating, giving permission, joking, nagging, naming, promising, ordering, refusing, swearing, and thanking. Depending on the circumstances, one may utter (4.23) below to make a threat, to issue a warning or to give an explanation. (4.23) The gun is loaded. The utterances in (4.24), for example, illustrate different ways of carrying out the same speech act of requesting. (4.24) (At ticket office in railway station) a. A day return ticket to Oxford, please. b. Can I have a day return ticket to Oxford, please? c. I’d like a day return ticket to Oxford. A perlocutionary act represents a consequence or by-product of speaking, whether intentional or not. For example, in an armed bank robbery, a robber may utter (4.23) to get the cashier to open the safe. 4.4. Searle’s felicity conditions on speech acts The felicity conditions are the constitutive rules—rules that create the activity itself—of speech acts. On Searle’s view, to perform a speech act is to obey certain conventional rules that are constitutive of that type of act. Searle developed the neo-Austinian classification of four basic categories - (i) propositional content, (ii) preparatory condition, (iii) sincerity condition, and (iv) essential condition. Consider (4.25) and (4.26). The propositional content condition is in essence concerned with what the speech act is about. For a promise, the propositional content is to predicate some future act of the speaker, whereas in the case of a request, it is to predicate some future act of the addressee. The preparatory conditions state the real-world prerequisites for the speech act. The sincerity condition must be satisfied if the act is to be performed sincerely. Thus, when carrying out an act of promising, the speaker must genuinely intend to keep the promise. The essential condition defines the act being performed in the sense that the speaker has the intention that his or her utterance will count as the identifiable act, and that this intention is recognized by the addressee. 4.5. Searle’s typology of speech acts (i) Representatives - kinds of speech act that commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition, and thus carry a truth-value. They express the speaker’s belief. (4.27) a. Chinese characters were borrowed to write other languages, notably Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese.
b. Francis Crick and Jim Watson discovered the double helix structure of DNA. c. The soldiers are struggling on through the snow. (ii) Directives are those kinds of speech act that represent attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something. They express the speaker’s desire/wish for the addressee to do something. (see 4.28) (4.28) a. Turn the TV down. b. Don’t use my electric shaver. c. Could you please get that lid off for me? (iii) Commissives are those kinds of speech act that commit the speaker to some future course of action. They express the speaker’s intention to do something. (4.29) a. I’ll be back in five minutes. b. We’ll be launching a new policing unit to fight cybercrime on the internet soon. c. I’ll never buy you another computer game. (iv) Expressives are those kinds of speech act that express a psychological attitude or state in the speaker such as joy, sorrow, and likes/dislikes. (4.30) a. Well done, Elizabeth! b. I’m so happy. c. Wow, great (v) Declarations - speech acts that effect immediate changes in some current state of affairs. In performing this type of speech act, the speaker brings about changes in the world. (4.31) a. President: I declare a state of national emergency. b. Chairman: The meeting is adjourned. c. Jury foreman: We find the defendant not guilty.