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Prosocial Behavior theory in explain altruism, diffusion on reposibility, exchange fictions, inclusive fitness, norm of social responsibilities and prosocial personality.
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altruism diffusion of responsibility empathy exchange fiction fear of embarrassment helping implicit modelling of ‘nothing has happened’ inclusive fitness interpersonal guilt just-world belief kin selection negative-state-relief hypothesis norm of reciprocity norm of social responsibility number effect personal norm prosocial behaviour prosocial personality reciprocal altruism volunteerism
Prosocial behaviour may range from small favours to great deeds. It may take merely a moment,
or it may be a long-term endeavour. It may be done without much conscious thought or weighing
up the pros and cons. It may be under the control of situational forces or may express the person-
ality of the donor. The findings of studies on prosocial behaviour seem to be ambiguous: on the one
hand, people are committed to helping victims of disasters; on the other, there are many examples
of people not helping a victim in urgent need. The factors which ultimately determine the choice
of the onlooker – to be either an unresponsive bystander or a ‘Good Samaritan’ – are topics dealt
with by the social psychology of prosocial behaviour. This chapter looks first at situations when
onlookers of emergencies intervene, and when they fail to do so. Next, it reviews explanations of
prosocial behaviour from different theoretical perspectives. These range from the most general
explanation in terms of principles of evolution to more specific explanations, including moods,
personality characteristics and true altruism. This chapter also considers the importance of the
relationships between people, social norms and values. Finally, we discuss why being helped is not
always appreciated by the help-recipient.
Introduction
The Indian Ocean tsunami which dominated the news in late December of 2004 evoked an unprecedented outpouring of sympathy and a willingness to help all over the world. For example, charities across Europe launched appeals to help the victims and raised an unprecedented amount of money to ease their suffering. In a TV interview an expert from Oxfam explained this great helpfulness by the heartbreaking emotions that were triggered by the catastrophe and the fact that, although the disaster happened far away, it affected many European tourists.
Plate 9.1 The Indian Ocean tsunami of late December 2004 evoked an unprecedented willingness to help all over the world.
HELPING, PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR AND ALTRUISM 179
somewhat different meanings to each of the three terms. ‘Helping’ is the broadest term, whereas the meaning of ‘altruism’ is much more narrow (cf. Schwartz & Howard, 1981, p. 190). The overlap among the three terms is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Helping refers to actions intended to improve the situ- ation of the help-recipient. The definition of prosocial behaviour is narrower because ‘helping’ is not considered as ‘prosocial behaviour’ if the act is motivated by professional obligations, or if help-givers or help-recipients are organizations. However, there is one excep- tion to the last constraint: charities are organizations whose goal is to promote the well-being of people in need (e.g., the elderly). To support a charity means that the helper uses an agent to increase the efficiency of the help that she intends to give. For example, if you wanted to help victims of the tsunami you might rely on charities like Oxfam or the Red Cross in order to get basic medical supplies to the affected parts of Asia. Finally, the term altruism has an additional constraint, namely that the ultimate goal of the helper is to benefit another person. The ultimate goal of prosocial behaviour might well be to receive social approval or to reduce one’s own distress when witnessing an emergency involving another person. However, the term altruism is reserved for cases where the helper tries to improve the welfare of another person as an end in itself. In practice, prosocial behaviour is often based on a mixture of more selfish (egoistic) and more selfless (altruistic) motivations (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley & Birch, 1981). An example of helping that would not be considered prosocial behaviour is a cabin-crew member who helped a passenger with her luggage, because this behaviour was performed in the line of duty. An example of prosocial behaviour is someone helping a neighbour to fill out an insurance form. Since this person helped without any professional obligation to do so, the behaviour would be considered prosocial, even if the helper expected her neighbour to reciprocate with a comparable favour in the future. Finally, a
classic example of altruism is found in the parable of the Good Samaritan. As recorded in the New Testament, Jesus told the story of a man who was travelling from Jerusalem to Jericho. On the road he was attacked and seriously injured by thieves. Several other people who came that way did not stop to help. Finally, a Samaritan saw the helpless victim and was immediately moved by compassion: he ‘went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him’ (Luke 10:34, King James version). In this quotation from the Bible, the motivational force behind the altruistic behaviour of the Samaritan is called ‘compassion’. We will return to the role of compassion later when we discuss Batson’s (1991) theory of altruistic behaviour. The people who helped save Jews during the Nazi terror in Europe provide further examples of true altruists. Steven Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List recounts the true story of the dramatic rescue of more than 1, Jews from Nazi Germany by German industrialist Oskar Schindler. He took great personal risks and invested both time and money to find ways to help Jews escape from the Nazis. He was a hero, and an altruist.
behaviourHelping behaviourProsocial^ Altruism
Figure 9.1 Relationship between the concepts of helping, prosocial behaviour and altruism.
Plate 9.2 Helping refers to actions intended to improve the situation of the recipient, e.g. an elderly person.
helping refers to actions intended to improve the situation of the help-recipient
prosocial behaviour refers to helping that is not motivated by professional obligations and that is not based on an organization (except charities)
altruism refers to prosocial behaviour that has the ultimate goal of benefiting another person
180 CHAPTER 9 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
Whereas many acts of prosocial behaviour take place in private, other acts of prosocial behaviour take place in public. Consider, for example, emergency aid for the starving people of Africa, organized by Bob Geldof in 1985 (Live Aid), in 2004 (Band
Aid 20) and again in 2005 as Band 8. There are, in fact, numerous examples of generosity which show that prosocial responses need not be without personal gain. For example, pop stars like Dido and Robbie Williams might profit indirectly from sacrificing their time and money for people in need, because their prosocial behaviour could promote their records. In addition, many people will admire their unselfishness. In general, prosocial behaviour may result either from the ultimate goal of benefiting oneself (i.e., egoistically motivated behaviour) or from the ultimate goal of benefiting another person (i.e., altruistically motivated behaviour). In this chapter, the main focus is on the middle-level term prosocial behaviour, which in- cludes egoistically and altruistically motivated helping behaviour. We use the term altruistic behaviour only to emphasize the fact that a particular behaviour serves the ultimate goal of benefiting another person.
We have noted that helping others can have costs as well as benefits. We have also seen that it is important to distin- guish the general class of helping behaviour (which can in- clude behaviour performed due to professional obligations) from more specific prosocial behaviour, and from altruism, which is motivated by compassion. In the following sections we consider the psychology of the unresponsive bystander and theories of prosocial behaviour. Besides evolutionary explanations, psychological theories refer to individualistic approaches including moods and emotion, prosocial per- sonality and compassion. In addition, interpersonal expla- nations contrast exchange and communal relationships. Cultural explanations refer to social norms of fairness and humanitarian values. Finally, from the perspective of the help-recipient, we consider the issue of whether aid is experienced as supporting or threatening.
WHY DON’T PEOPLE
HELP?
Why does the presence of more onlookers lead to less helping in emergencies?
The question ‘Why don’t people help?’ arises whenever we are confronted with incidents such as the murder of Kitty Genovese, who could have been saved if only one witness had intervened during the first half hour of the attack. Laypeople and experts alike explained the neighbours’ failure to intervene as due to their ‘apathy’. As we shall see, this explanation of what happened is false. Ingenious experiments that were stimulated by the incident show
Plate 9.3 Oskar Schindler (shown here in the film) took great personal risks and invested both time and money to help Jews escape from the Nazis.
Plate 9.4 Bob Geldof’s organization of emergency aid for the starving people of Africa is a public example of prosocial behaviour.
182 CHAPTER 9 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
The theory of the unresponsive bystander: Threefold inhibitions
Several processes in combination may contribute to the social inhibition of prosocial behaviour. The theory of the unresponsive bystander highlights three inhibition processes: 1 Diffusion of responsibility : A single bystander feels that the responsibility for intervening is focused on him or her. With other bystanders present, each bystander perceives less responsibility, because it is diffused across all others present; this reduces the motivation to act prosocially on behalf of the victim.
connection with the victim was cut off (see Figure 9.2). Eighty- five per cent of participants who assumed they were the only witness of the breakdown intervened. Compare this with the 62 per cent intervention rate of participants who thought that one additional student was aware of the emergency and the 31 per cent intervention rate of participants who assumed that they were among five potential helpers.
Discussion The results confirm the hypothesis that there would be less help in larger groups of onlookers. As expected, the awareness that four others could intervene on behalf of the victim in the six-person group (which included both the participant and the victim) reduced helpfulness much more than the awareness that one or two onlookers of the emergency could offer help.
Intervention rate (%)
0
30 20 10
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Six Three Number of people present
Two
Figure 9.2 Helping as a function of number of people present (from Darley & Latané, 1968).
John M. Darley (b. 1938) earned his PhD from Harvard University and has spent most of his academic career at Princeton University. Among his first publications were studies on fear, social comparison and affiliation. Together with Bibb Latané (see p. 178), he developed the psychology of the unresponsive bystander. Their article on ‘Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility’ has become one of the most highly cited articles in social psychology. He has also contributed to applied social psychology and public policy by his studies on energy conservation and on the legal system.
Percentage of students
who intervened
0
30 20 10
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
With passive confederate Number and nature of persons present
Two strangers
Two friends
Alone
Observed per cent Corrected per cent
Figure 9.3 Effect of a second bystander (confederate, stranger or friend) on emergency intervention (from Latané & Rodin, 1969).
diffusion of responsibility cognitive appraisal which divides responsibility among several onlookers or bystanders. As a consequence, each individual member in the group feels less responsible than when alone. When there are several bystanders present in an emergency, the responsibility of any one of the bystanders is reduced
was instructed to be passive. In the third condition two strangers were present at the time of the accident, and in the fourth condi- tion two friends were present. Although two people could have intervened in the third and fourth condition, in only 40 per cent of dyads of strangers and 70 per cent of dyads of friends did at least one student intervene. The individual likelihood of intervention was calculated according to a special formula as 22.5 per cent for strangers and 45.2 per cent for friends. 1 These corrected interven- tion rates are lower than in the alone-condition, but higher than in the passive-confederate condition (see Figure 9.3). Additional anal- yses indicated that friends intervened faster than strangers within the 130 seconds of the emergency.
WHY DON’T PEOPLE HELP? 183
2 Implicit modelling of ‘nothing has happened’ : Emergencies take place rarely and, if they do occur, are quite unique in character: bystanders are not sure how to respond. Because bystanders hesitate and try to figure out what should be done, they become – unintentionally – models of passivity for one another. This modelling process defines the appropriate response in the situation: do nothing. Thus, a social definition of the situation emerges which reduces the bystander’s tendency to act; passivity is then established as the social norm. 3 Fear of embarrassment : A third factor which presumably reduces the willingness to help is embarrassment. The presence of other bystanders elicits feelings of uneasiness because the others would be observers of a potential intervention. The resulting social anxiety inhibits intervention especially in situations in which bystanders are in doubt about whether they will be able to intervene successfully, because they believe they lack the ability to act in an appropriate manner. An alternative term is ‘evaluation apprehension’. Potential helpers may also fear embarrassment at misconstruing a situation as an emergency when it is not. Rushing in to break up a fight leaves you feeling foolish if it turns out that two people were just kidding around.
Latané and Darley (1976) investigated these processes in an ex- periment which measured prosocial behaviour across five condi- tions. At one extreme, no inhibitory factors were present: the participant was alone while seeing on a monitor a person receiv- ing an electric shock and then falling on the floor. At the other ex- treme, social inhibition was strongly manipulated. The participants assumed that a second witness was present during the incident, making it likely that diffusion of responsibility would occur (cf. Darley & Latané, 1968). In addition, two communication channels were switched on. The participant could also see the other wit- ness, who responded passively to the emergency and thus pro- vided a model of inaction. The participant also had two monitors in front of him, one showing the victim and one showing the other witness. This presumably increased the participant’s social anxi- ety because he knew his responses were being observed. Thus the participant was under the combined influence of all three factors: diffusion of responsibility, implicit modelling of ‘nothing has happened’ and fear of embarrassment. Under these conditions helping should be minimal. The experimental hypothesis was straightforward: helping would decrease the more processes of
social inhibition were ‘switched on’. The results confirmed this prediction (see Table 9.1). Social inhibition of prosocial behaviour in the general public clearly constitutes a social problem. Thus, it is important to learn how it might be avoided. Might it help to inform the public about the findings of studies on this topic in order to influence such negative behavioural tendencies? One experiment studied whether information on the unresponsive bystander would be effective in reducing the indifference typically shown by onlookers of emergencies. The theory of the unresponsive bystander was explained to students during a 50-minute lecture. The lecturer used research examples to illustrate each of the three inhibition processes. Later, in an apparently unrelated study, students who were accompanied by a passive confederate were confronted with the helpless victim of a bicycle accident. Compared with a control group of students who did not hear the lecture but who encountered the victim of the bicycle accident, the experimental group offered more help (Beaman, Barnes, Klentz & McQuirk, 1978). Mere knowledge of the social processes that contribute to the unresponsive bystander led stu- dents to respond in a more responsible way. Therefore, informing the public, making them aware of the problem of the unresponsive bystander, may reduce the negative impact of this problem on our society. Another measure that can be taken against unresponsive bystanders is to increase their competence in providing help, because competence reduces fear of embarrassment. For example, people who have just completed a first-aid course will presum- ably stop when they encounter a person in need of help. If onlookers believe that they are competent and able to perform well, the presence of other onlookers may even serve as an incentive for them to intervene (Schwartz & Gottlieb, 1976). High competence shifts the balance of costs and rewards by adding rewards for intervention and eliminating costs. Confirming these
implicit modelling of ‘nothing has happened’ because bystanders in emergencies are overwhelmed by the sudden and unexpected event, they initially hesitate to provide help. When they see that other bystanders are doing the same, they each reach the false conclusion that the other bystanders interpret the event as harmless. This is sometimes called ‘pluralistic ignorance’
fear of embarrassment the stressful experience of a person whose behaviour in a situation is observed by bystanders. Especially when the situation is unfamiliar, social anxiety is elicited which reduces the tendency to help victims of emergencies. Related terms are ‘audience inhibition’ and ‘evaluation apprehension’
Table 9.1 Emergency intervention as a function of number of inhibitory influences on the bystander (from Latané & Darley, 1976)
Condition Number of Level of inhibitory helping processes
1: Alone 0 high
2: Mere awareness of other witness 1 intermediate
3 and 4: Mere awareness plus one communication channel switched on 2 low
5: Mere awareness plus two communication channels 3 very low switched on
Statistical comparisons indicated that level of helping was significantly different between rows.
WHY DO PEOPLE HELP ONE ANOTHER? 185
individual traits, social learning and perception of the immediate social circumstances (Buss, 2004).
Kin selection and reciprocal altruism The evolutionary approach to prosocial behaviour is based on inborn or genetic tendencies. This raises the interesting question of how the pro- cess of natural selection could favour a gene that increases the tendency of an individual to help others. Prosocial behaviour can be understood as the result of natural selection if it increases rather than decreases an individual’s (or his or her relatives’) chance of reproducing. The theory of kin selection assumes that ‘kindness-to-kin genes’ (Miller, 2001) have evolved. Another issue is that prosocial behaviour is part of a giving- and-receiving cycle, called reciprocal altruism , which may promote the survival of the individual, thus contribut- ing to his or her reproductive success. We consider kin selection first. The reproductive suc- cess of an individual (that is, his or her inclusive fitness ) is dependent on the distribution of his or her genes in the next generation. Inclusive fitness is the sum of two components. The first is an individual’s own re- productive success – direct fitness. The second is the proportion of the reproductive success of relatives that is elicited by the helping behaviour of the individual – indirect fitness (Hamilton, 1964). For example, the genetic relatedness between siblings is .50. Therefore, one’s own genes can be favoured by increasing the survival chances of brothers or sisters. In terms of reproductive success, two children of a brother count the same as one’s own child. Empirical evidence supports the theory. For example, people indicate that they are willing to help a brother (genetic relatedness .50) more than a nephew (.25), who in turn may expect more help than a cousin (.125). An acquaintance (.00) is least likely to receive help (Burnstein, Crandall & Kitayama, 1994). These results are more pronounced for scenarios which describe life-threatening situations than for everyday scenarios (when help is useful but not a life-or-death matter). Because life-threatening emergencies are directly threatening to the survival of the help-recipient, they con- stitute the more crucial test of the theory of kin selection. What about friends? Why do they help each other? In this case the theory of reciprocal altruism developed by Trivers (1971) ap- plies: this explains prosocial behaviour on the basis of reciprocity among non-relatives. The principle of reciprocal altruism is illus- trated by the following example: it makes sense for Tania to lend fellow student Stephanie her lecture notes, if she expects to be helped by Stephanie when she herself misses a lecture. Whereas evolutionary psychologists have described reciprocal altruism as part of the shared genetic make-up, social scientists have identified reciprocity as a universal cultural norm. Gouldner
(1960) proposed that the norm of reciprocity includes two prescriptions: (1) people should help those who have helped them and (2) they should not injure those who have helped them. He assumed that the norm of reciprocity is a uni- versal element of all human cultures. In support of this idea, cross- cultural evidence on giving and receiving help indicates that reciprocity is found in all cultures (Johnson et al., 1989). The fre- quency of giving and receiving aid is also highly correlated in all cultures studied. Prosocial reciprocity is threatened by cheating. Cheaters may exploit any prosocial tendencies which are based on the assump- tion that the helped person will repay the favour in the future. To avoid becoming the victim of cheats, we therefore tend to limit reciprocal altruism (and in the same vein, the norm of reciprocity) to certain circumstances and preconditions. These include a high level of trust between the parties involved (Yamagishi, 1986), but also stability of group membership, longevity of the group and a high degree of recognizability among group members (Buss, 2004).
The individualistic approach
Like the evolutionary approach, the individualistic approach ex- plains altruism in terms of individual tendencies to be helpful. These tendencies are not, however, necessarily assumed to be genetically determined (although they can be), but rather are acquired by social learning (for reviews see Bierhoff, 2005; Kochanska & Thompson, 1997). There are basically two types of individualistic theories of prosocial behaviour: one explains it in terms of feeling states, whereas the other assumes that prosocial behaviour is determined by enduring personality characteristics. Individualistic approaches examine how you feel and who you are in order to predict your likelihood of behaving in a prosocial manner.
Moods and emotions People’s feelings fluctuate during their daily activities. They feel delighted after passing an exam, but disappointed when rejected by a friend. The intensity of feelings varies from more subtle ‘background’ moods to stronger emotions which may interrupt day-to-day activities. Both moods and emo- tions are described as varying from positive to negative affect. For example, love is a positive emotion, whereas guilt is a negative emotion. Current mood may colour someone’s willingness to respond prosocially to the needs of others. Empirical studies show that helping is fostered by a positive mood. For example, children who are in a happy mood share more with others than children in a neutral mood (Rosenhan, Underwood & Moore, 1974). The posi- tive relationship between good mood and helping was confirmed in a meta-analysis by Carlson, Charlin and Miller (1988), based on 61 positive mood vs. neutral mood comparisons. In the examined studies (including student and non-student samples), positive mood was induced by a variety of methods, including success on
kin selection theory developed by William Hamilton that natural selection favours those individuals who support their relatives. To provide help to relatives enhances inclusive fitness
reciprocal altruism theory that people will support another person if they expect that he or she will respond prosocially. The repayment of the favour in the future is anticipated. Prosocial behaviour is embedded in a cycle of give and take
inclusive fitness the sum of an individual’s own reproductive success in passing on genes through the procreation of offspring (= direct fitness) and the effect of his of her support on the reproductive success of his or her relatives, weighted by their genetic relatedness coefficient (= indirect fitness)
norm of reciprocity the norm that we should do to others as they do to us. Reciprocity calls for positive responses to favourable treatment but negative responses to unfavourable treatment. Prosocial reciprocity occurs when people help in return for having been helped
186 CHAPTER 9 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
a task, finding a small amount of money, thinking about a happy experience and receiving a free gift. The mean amount of time that elapsed between the positive mood induction and the request for help was about 4 minutes. This meta-analysis yielded a significant coefficient of d = .54, generally considered to indicate a medium- size effect which is relevant in daily life. The effects of good mood on helping are, however, relatively short-lived, as shown in a field experiment in the USA. Participants in the study received a packet of stationery as a gift at home (Isen, Clark & Schwartz, 1976). Shortly afterwards they received a tele- phone call that was obviously a wrong number. Participants were asked to help the caller by making a phone call. The telephone rang 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16 or 20 minutes after the first contact. As illustrated in Figure 9.5, the request was highly successful if it was made 1, 4 or 7 minutes after the presentation of the gift (on aver- age, 83 per cent of the participants made the phone call). With a time delay of 10, 13 or 16 minutes, the response rate decreased to about 50 per cent. Finally, 20 minutes later only 12 per cent of the participants made the phone call – a response rate that comes close to the results in the control condition, where no gift was received. These results can be explained in terms of the affect-as- information model developed by Schwarz (1990). The model assumes that people follow a ‘How do I feel about it?’ heuristic in the sense that they use current mood as a piece of information that is integrated into their overall judgement. For example, if a per- son is asked to evaluate another person, he or she might simply refer to his or her feelings about the other person and then make the judgement. From this perspective, feelings carry an informational value which may substitute for careful analytic reasoning. Specifically, positive feelings may inform the person that the current environ- ment is a safe place (Schwarz, 1990). The affect-as-information model simply implies that actors take their mood as an index of the safety of the given situation. Since prosocial responses are sup- pressed by danger signals (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1993), we can infer from being in a good mood that the situation is not danger- ous; this inference may encourage prosocial behaviour.
Forgas (2000) points out that positive and negative moods do not exert equal influences. The effects of a positive mood seem to be stronger and more consistent than the effects of negative moods. From an evolutionary perspective, it might be argued that bad mood signals problems and possibly danger (Schwarz, 1990). Thus when a person is in a state of high self-focus, bad mood undermines altruistic intentions by increasing the perceived cost of intervention (cf. Underwood, Froming & Moore, 1977). A cursory look at the literature on negative feeling states and prosocial behaviour shows that the results are contradictory. For example, the induction of guilt feelings by a transgression (e.g., cheating on a test) increases prosocial behaviour (Freedman, Wallington & Bless, 1967), whereas participants who are induced to feel sad hesitate to help other people (Thompson, Cowan & Rosenhan, 1980). In their meta-analysis, Carlson and Miller (1987; see also Miller & Carlson, 1990) found that the effects of negative mood on helping were variable. In some studies, negative mood enhanced the level of prosocial behaviour, whereas in others the opposite effect occurred. The results are clearer, however, when effects of sadness and guilt are separated (Carlson & Miller, 1987). Sadness is associated with a low willingness to help others, while interpersonal guilt is associ- ated with a high level of pro- social behaviour. One possible explanation of the influence of guilt on helping is that participants try to compensate for their nega- tive feelings by doing good deeds. This negative-state- relief hypothesis (Cialdini, Kenrick & Baumann, 1982) assumes that negative affect is accompanied by a drive to reduce unpleasant feeling states, and that prosocial behaviour is one of several techniques which the individual might employ to attain this end. But the negative-state-relief hypothesis does not explain why guilt leads to very high willingness to help, while sadness does not. Why does interpersonal guilt exert such a strong influence on prosocial behaviour? Prosocial behaviour following a transgres- sion can be understood as reparation. It is possible that this special meaning of prosocial behaviour in the context of a transgression explains the very high level of helpfulness of persons who feel guilty. In general, guilt feelings contribute to the maintenance of personal relationships (Baumeister, 1998; Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998). Guilt is primarily aroused after hurting a rela- tionship partner (e.g., friend, colleague). It functions like a warn- ing signal, indicating that the person must compensate his or her partner (e.g., repair damage that they have caused) in order to restore the relationship. Guilt feelings motivate actions (e.g., reparation, apologies, compensation) which help to restore the threatened relationship and strengthen social bonds (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Guilt is a complex emotion and there are several types of guilt, but interpersonal, situation-specific guilt is a proso- cial emotion that functions positively to restore personal relation- ships (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994).
Percentage helping
0
20
40
60
80
100
Control 0 condition (^) Minutes since receiving gift
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Figure 9.5 Percentage of helpful participants depending on time elapsed between mood induction and request for help (based on Isen et al., 1976).
interpersonal guilt negative feelings about oneself which result from the knowledge that one is responsible for the distress of others or for damage done to them negative-state-relief hypothesis idea that prosocial behaviour is a mood- management technique. During socialization people have learned that prosocial behaviour is self-reinforcing. When they feel bad they employ prosocial behaviour to improve their feeling state
188 CHAPTER 9 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
helping (Miller, 1977b). Instead, people tend to restore their belief in a just world by devaluing the victim (Hafer, 2000). For example, in the Kitty Genovese case, derogation of the victim might have focused on blaming her for walking alone at night. Whereas much research is devoted to spontaneous prosocial behaviour, less is known about voluntary work and regular, longer-term commitment in general. Volunteerism refers to unpaid work in an organ- izational context. It represents ‘voluntary, sustained, and on- going helpfulness’ (Clary et al., 1998, p. 1517) and is usually dependent on planning and individual capabilities. Figure 9. illustrates the combined influence of prosocial traits and motives on helpfulness. The enduring motivation underlying volunteer work is mea- sured by the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI; Clary et al., 1998). It is based on the functional approach to attitudes which was originally developed by Katz and Stotland (1959; see Chapter 6, this volume). In this approach it is assumed that actions serve cer- tain functions (e.g., to acquire knowledge, to express one’s values). The VFI measures six orthogonal dimensions which tap the fol- lowing functions: 1 Understanding (‘I can explore my own personal strengths’). 2 Protective (‘By volunteering I feel less lonely’). 3 Values (‘I feel it is important to help others’). 4 Career (‘I can make new contacts that might help my business or career’). 5 Social (‘My friends volunteer’). 6 Enhancement (‘Volunteering makes me feel important’). Omoto and Snyder (1995) examined the question of why people get involved in long-term helping. In a large survey of AIDS volunteers they found that some people were more motivated by altruistic reasons, whereas others were more motivated by ego-
istic ones. Besides the motivation to volunteer, these researchers also assessed prosocial personality. They found that egoistic motives (career, understanding and self-enhancement) – but not altruistic ones – were positively related to length of service in an AIDS organization for at least one year. Thus, the ‘better’ motives are not always the ones that determine who will stay the course. In another study on long-term helping by AIDS volunteers, however, Penner and Finkelstein (1998) found that altruistic motives were the best predictors of length of service in AIDS organizations. This relationship was stronger in males than females. Because 90 per cent of the males in this study were gay, it was probably easier for them to identify and empathize with the pri- mary beneficiaries of their care. This result shows that altruistic concerns can be salient and more predictive of helping under certain conditions. The study of volunteers in charities illustrates the influence of enduring motives on satisfaction and regular commitment. These results have important practical implications. They suggest that
Prosocial behaviour
Remove injustice completely
Injustice continues
Prosocial motives
Career Understanding Self-enhancement
Devaluation of victims
Prosocial traits
Just-world belief
Responsibility Internal control Empathy
Figure 9.6 Model of prosocial personality. (based on Batson, 1991)
Plate 9.5 Altruistic motives have been found to be the best predictors of length of service in AIDS organizations.
volunteerism regular commitment to prosocial behaviour in an organizational context
WHY DO PEOPLE HELP ONE ANOTHER? 189
volunteers may be motivated by various concerns and that either altruistic or egoistic motives, or indeed both, may play a promin- ent role in maintaining commitment in the long run.
Empathy-based altruism: Does true altruism exist? Surely most of us would agree that altruistically motivated helping is somehow more worthy than egoistically motivated helping. The distinction between both types of motivation rests upon the question of whether the ultimate goal of the prosocial behaviour is to increase the helper’s own welfare or to increase the welfare of another person (Batson, 1991). Several lines of research converge in their findings that motiva- tion to help is either egoistic or altruistic. The first evidence comes from the World Values Survey, which assessed kinds of motiva- tion for doing unpaid voluntary work in 33 countries with a total of 13,584 respondents. A factor analysis of responses indicated the existence of four predominantly egoistic motivations and five predominantly altruistic motivations (van de Vliert, Huang & Levine, 2004). The four egoistic motivations were: ‘time on my hands, wanted something worthwhile to do’, ‘purely for personal satisfaction’, ‘for social reasons, to meet people’ and ‘to gain new skills and useful experience’. The five altruistic motivations were: ‘a sense of solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged’, ‘compas- sion for those in need’, ‘identifying with people who are suffering’, ‘religious beliefs’ and ‘to help give disadvantaged people hope and dignity’. Further analyses indicated that the distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivations was an almost universal finding in the cross-national comparisons. Carefully designed experiments have tried to decide conclu- sively when prosocial behaviour is motivated altruistically or egoistically. The basic idea is to confront people with a victim and offer them the opportunity to leave a distressing situation. If people are egoistically motivated, they might prefer the ‘escape’ alternative because it allows them to reduce any negative arousal elicited by the presence of the victim. In contrast, people who are altruistically motivated are not as likely to leave the situation since their desire to alleviate the suffering of the victim would still exist after having left. Because the altruistic motivation is equated with empathy, this assumption has become known as the empathy– altruism hypothesis (Figure 9.7). Batson and colleagues (1981) tested the empathy–altruism hypothesis in a classic experiment (see Research close-up 9.2). The
results confirmed the hypothesis that altruistically motivated people will help even when it is possible to leave the situation, but egoistically motivated people only help when leaving the situation is made difficult. The pattern of results is typical of the findings of several experiments conducted by Batson and co-workers (sum- marized by Batson, Fultz & Schoenrade, 1987). Further research on the empathy–altruism hypothesis is based on the distinction between two feeling states which might be aroused by perceiving a person in need (Batson, 1991). On the one hand, feelings of personal distress may arise in the observer. Personal distress is defined as a self-oriented vicarious emotion, which is described by adjectives such as ‘alarmed’, ‘grieved’, ‘upset’ and ‘disturbed’. This unpleasant feeling state can be reduced by helping. It is also possible to reduce personal distress by leaving the situation, because the escape reduces the impact of the victim’s suffering on the non-helper. The other feeling state that may follow from perceiving the other person’s need is termed empathic concern. It is described by adjectives such as ‘sympathetic’, ‘moved’, ‘compassionate’, ‘warm’ and ‘soft-hearted’. Studies that have measured empathy in this way have found results consistent with the experimental studies that manipulated empathy. Toi and Batson (1982) found that participants who were high on self- reported relative empathy (empathic concern minus personal dis- tress) were willing to help a person in need even if they had an escape option. In contrast, participants who expressed more per- sonal distress than empathic concern were quite helpful when no escape option was available, but their willingness to help decreased substantially if an escape route was available (see also Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004). How could the empathy–altruism hypothesis be explained from an egoistic perspective? One possibility is the negative- state-relief hypothesis, which would argue that compassionate people feel sad when they watch others suffering. The altruistic response of compassionate people would be motivated by the goal of relieving their own sadness (rather than helping the victim for her own sake). This interpretation is, however, not very convinc- ing because empirical studies have shown that mood management related to sadness is not the decisive factor that motivates com- passionate people to act (Batson et al., 1989). An alternative inter- pretation is based on the perception of ‘oneness’, which is defined as a ‘sense of shared, merged, or interconnected personal identities’ (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce & Neuberg, 1997, p. 483). This inter- pretation implies that people help similar others (see Research close-up 9.2, p. 190) due to their own self-interest (see the section on the evolutionary approach, above). People derive cues for genetic commonality from kinship, similarity and closeness, cues which are identical to the conditions mentioned by Batson (1991) as factors that elicit true altruism. Cialdini et al. manipulated closeness by designing scenarios in which the person who needed help was a near-stranger, acquain- tance, good friend or close family member of the potential helper. Participants indicated the amount of help they would offer by choosing one of seven alternatives (from no help at all to a very substantial amount of helping). They also rated the extent of ‘one- ness’ they felt with the needy person. In one study the situation portrayed a person who was evicted from her apartment, while the second study concerned two children whose parents had died
Yes
High Altruistic Helping
Empathic emotion
Motivation Response No
Escape alternative?
Yes
Low Egoistic Escaping
No
Figure 9.7 Empathy–altruism hypothesis (based on Batson, 1991).
WHY DO PEOPLE HELP ONE ANOTHER? 191
in an accident. Results indicated that relationship closeness intensified feelings of empathy and feelings of oneness, which both correlated significantly with prosocial behaviour ( r = .45 and r = .76, respectively, in Cialdini et al., 1997, Study 1). In the final step of the analysis, which took into account the combined effects of feelings of empathy and feelings of oneness on prosocial beha- viour, feelings of oneness had greater weight than empathy for the prediction of prosocial behaviour. These results, however, contradict the empathy–altruism hypothesis only on the surface. It is difficult to conceptualize em- pathy as a feeling state that does not involve a feeling of oneness. High empathy naturally co-varies with strong feelings of oneness. Therefore, to partial out feelings of oneness from empathy is equivalent to neutralizing empathy as a predictor of prosocial behaviour. A different line of research has distinguished between personal distress and situational empathy in the study of children’s prosocial behaviour. Eisenberg and colleagues (1993) showed that empathy (or sympathy) – and not distress – is positively related to prosocial behaviour in children. This evidence is more in line with the empathy–altruism hypothesis than with the negative-state-relief hypothesis. Eisenberg et al. used a ‘baby cry helping task’. While the child (i.e., the participant) was sitting in a room with the ex- perimenter, the sound of a crying baby could be heard through a speaker in the room. The experimenter explained that the baby was in another room and tried to calm the baby by talking to him or her via a microphone. In addition, the child was encouraged to do the same. Finally, in order to offer an ‘escape’ option, the child learned that it was possible to switch the speaker on or off. Then the experimenter left the room, and the baby crying episode was repeated while the children’s facial and behavioural responses were videotaped. Raters assessed the extent of situational distress from the child’s facial reactions. They also rated the child’s tone of voice for expression of comfort and irritation, and the researchers timed how long the child talked to the baby. Results indicated that facial distress was negatively correlated with time spent talking to the baby, whereas no significant relationship was found with tone of
voice. This study again rules out personal distress as a cause of helping, because more facial distress was associated with talking to the baby for less time.
The interpersonal approach
The type of relationship (from superficial to more intimate) influences whether help is provided or not, and the contrast between exchange and communal relationships appears crucial.
Exchange vs. communal relationships Interpersonal rela- tions may be close or superficial. In close relationships (such as between friends), but not in superficial ones, people emphasize sol- idarity, interpersonal harmony and cohesiveness (see Chapter 10, this volume). In addition, in close relationships rewards for suc- cessful performance of a task are distributed according to the equality norm, whereas in superficial relationships rewards are dis- tributed according to the contributions of each person to the task (on the basis of the equity norm; cf. Bierhoff, Buck & Klein, 1986). Clark and Mills (1993; see also Clark & Grote, 2003) have con- trasted exchange and communal relationships. Examples of ex- change relationships are those between strangers or acquaintances, whereas communal relationships refer to relationships between friends, family members or romantic partners. In exchange rela- tionships people strive for maximal rewards, whereas in com- munal relationships people are concerned with the other’s welfare. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that in exchange relationships people are motivated by egoistic motives, whereas in communal relationships they are motivated by the desire to alleviate the suffering of the victim. In accordance with this description, empirical studies show that people in exchange relationships respond positively to repayments for given benefits and keep careful track of individual inputs into joint tasks (Clark, 1984). For communal relationships a different pattern of results emerges. In a study by Clark, Mills and Powell (1986), students were led to believe that another student might need their help. Students who were in a communal relationship with the other student paid more attention to the other’s need when no opportunity to repay was expected (in comparison with students who were in an exchange relationship). In contrast, when they expected that the other person would have an oppor- tunity to reciprocate in kind in a later part of the experiment, the participants kept track of the needs of the other person with equal care in exchange and in communal relationships. This pattern of results suggests that people in communal relationships are more helpful than people in exchange relationships if no mutual give- and-take is expected (see also Clark, Ouellette, Powell & Milberg, 1987). We mentioned that people in exchange relationships strive for positive consequences. They firmly believe that they must decide according to their self-interest and that doing otherwise would be foolish (Miller, 1999). This widely shared assumption of the appropriateness of economic thinking in exchange relationships is likely to restrict prosocial behaviour unless people can (be made to) believe that prosocial behaviour is actually in their own best interests. We call this ‘trick’ an exchange fiction.
C. Daniel Batson (b. 1943) has spent most of his academic career at the University of Kansas after earning his PhD from Princeton University in 1972. He is widely known for the development of the empathy–altruism hypothesis, which is based on the assumption that people are driven by two motivational systems: an ego- istic one and an altruistic one. He developed an experimental paradigm which represents a huge step towards disentangling these two motivational systems. Batson is also widely cited for his work on religious experience.
192 CHAPTER 9 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
The exchange fiction To organize one’s life in terms of eco- nomic exchange would seem to be highly rational and to fit with the widely shared view that self-interest rules the world. Indeed, accounts of behaviour in terms of self-interest and rational choice are the dominant lay theories that people use in explaining their actions (Miller, 1999). Lay people tend to believe that it would be a waste of time not to pursue one’s self-interest; they also fear ridicule if they fail to act in their own interest. This emphasis on rational choice has negative implications for donations to charities. Recall the example of the high level of donations after the tsunami disaster in South Asia. Such donations are not fully compatible with the image of a self-interested person that many lay people have of themselves. Holmes, Miller and Lerner (2002) assumed that such people need a ‘cover story’ in order to donate money to charities. They need to explain their generosity as behaviour which actually serves their own self- interest. Although they may want to do what their compassion with the victims tells them to do, they hesitate because they prefer to give a reason for their monetary transactions (even gifts to charity) which is based on their self-interest. Holmes et al. (2002) as- sumed that the exchange fiction would be especially compelling if people were confronted with charity col- lections which serve high- need victims, for example a collection to establish ‘a train- ing and remedial program for handicapped and emotionally disturbed children’ (p. 146). They confirmed the effectiveness of the exchange fiction in high-need situations. Passers-by were approached by a representative of a charitable organization in a field experiment. Simply asking for a donation of at least $1 (standard solicitation) resulted in an average donation of 41 cents per person. In contrast, when the exchange framing was induced by offering a candle, on average $1.85 was donated. The passer-by was told that the candle was available for
a bargain price of $3 which was said to be $1 lower than the normal store price. This information presumably induced a cognitive reframing of the request (i.e., shifting it from a ‘charity’ context into an ‘exchange’ context; cf. Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). One might argue that people in the bargain-price condition were still acting rationally because they bought the candle. But the results in the low-need condition tell a different story. In this condition, people were told that the money was needed to buy equipment for the local softball team. Here people gave on aver- age about 30 cents in response to both appeals (see Figure 9.9). Therefore, the offer of the candle per se did not generally increase contributions. Only when the money was for children in high need, which presumably elicited compassion, did the offer of the candle have a positive effect on generosity. The exchange fiction seems to be a reliable technique for increasing people’s willingness to donate money to charities that seek to help the especially needy.
Culture and society
People are rule followers (Messick, 2000). Social rules which are applied in specific social settings are internalized as the result of social learning. Once acquired, they are incorporated in a self- reinforcement system (Bandura, 1997). Social behaviour is influ- enced by factors that are inherent in cultural settings. There are cultural norms, values and rituals that are shared by the whole community; there are reciprocal expectations among the holders of social roles; and there are rights and obligations based on tradi- tion and general ethical principles, such as the Declaration of Human Rights, which mould the attitudes of people in society (Doise, 2002). Social institutions can promote prosocial values by means of interventions that encourage children to cooperate with one an- other by teaching them social skills such as perspective taking, fair play and concern for others (Battistich, Schnaps, Watson, Solomon & Lewis, 1997).
Social responsibility One of the most important ‘do’s’ that children learn is de- scribed by the norm of social responsibility , which pre- scribes that individuals should help other people who are dependent on their help. Berkowitz (1978) assumed that prosocial behaviour is a direct function of how responsible people feel in a social situation. Earlier research had indicated that people worked harder on behalf of their partner the more dependent the partner was. Researchers assumed that perceived dependency elicited the norm of social responsibility, which in turn motivated prosocial responses. But prosocial activities require sacrifices, which can be avoided by passing the responsibility to others; and as we have seen, the presence of other people diffuses responsibility (see Berkowitz, 1978). Normative beliefs are learned during the socialization process. In an attempt to integrate cultural rules with individual feelings,
Amount of donations in cents 0
120 100 80 60 40 20
140
160
180
200
Low Need condition
High
Standard Bargain price
Figure 9.9 Donations as a function of solicitation form and level of need (from Holmes et al., 2002, Exp. 2).
exchange fiction people need a cover story in order to donate money to charities. To fulfil this need, people are offered something in exchange for their donation which – although it is low in value – creates the impression that a generous contribution is also a rational exchange
norm of social responsibility prescribes that people should help others who are dependent on them. It is contrasted with the norm of self-sufficiency, which implies that people should take care of themselves first
194 CHAPTER 9 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
CONSEQUENCES OF
RECEIVING HELP
How do the perspectives of helpers and of help-recipients differ from each other? What are the possible negative consequences of being helped?
It is important to understand the differing perspectives of help- givers and help-recipients. Being helped is not always appreciated, because it sometimes has negative connotations. Receiving help can define the help-recipient as somebody who needs help, and it can make them indebted to the helper. To be defined as a help- recipient is particularly irritating when the help-recipient does not feel in need of help. An old man who is helped across the road, for example, may feel annoyed because he felt perfectly capable of crossing the road himself. Even if the help-recipient is in need of help, he may resent the implications of the offered help. Because receiving help establishes a debt to the helper, the freedom of choice of the help-recipient is restricted, and this is likely to arouse reactance (i.e., a desire to restore one’s freedom; cf. Brehm & Brehm, 1981, and Chapter 7, this volume). In general, these nega- tive aspects of help are assumed to become less important the greater is the need for help. Donors and recipients have different perspectives in the giving–receiving relationship (Dunkel-Schetter, Blasband, Feinstein & Bennett, 1992). The donor profits from the fact that giving help is regarded as a desirable and fair thing to do. Although costs (time, money and effort, for example) are incurred, the positive conse- quences of giving help may outweigh the negative consequences. On the other hand, the recipient wants to prevent the other per- son from thinking that he is unable to manage on his own. Because of the negative implications of weakness and inferiority associated with receiving support, help-recipients are vulnerable to receiving aid. For example, black people who received unsolicited and un- necessary help from a white peer expressed lower self-esteem than blacks who received no imposed help (Schneider, Major, Luthanen & Crocker, 1996).
Receiving and being seen to receive help is not always a positive experience. Help-givers need to be sensitive to the perspective of the help-recipient, to give help only when it is needed and without it constituting a threat to the help- recipient’s self-esteem.
l (^) Helping behaviour (which can include behaviour performed due to professional obligations) can be distinguished from more specific prosocial behaviour, and from altruism, which is motivated by compassion. l (^) Prosocial behaviour has costs as well as benefits, so sometimes does not occur, even when it is desperately needed. l (^) Prosocial behaviour is less likely to occur when other people are around because responsibility is diffused across bystanders, who then model passive behaviour to each other. The presence of others also reduces helping because it increases embarrassment. People may also fail to help because they lack competence, or are under time pressure. l (^) The theories developed to explain prosocial behaviour complement each other and may be applied simultaneously to reach a full understanding of the determinants of a specific episode of help or passivity. l (^) The evolutionary approach helps to explain why people are more likely to help those who are genetically closer to themselves, but also friends, who are not genetically related. l (^) The psychological approach shows that people are more likely to help when in a positive mood, but also when they feel guilt and when they have attributes of the prosocial personality (especially a sense of social responsibility, empathy and internal locus of control). l (^) Longer-term helping (e.g., volunteering) is a function of both egoistic and altruistic motivations. l (^) There is support for the empathy–altruism hypothesis in cases where prosocial behaviour is performed even when the helper could easily have avoided doing so; in this case the underlying motivation appears likely to be true altruism. l (^) People are also more likely to help in communal than in exchange relationships, when they believe they are serving their own interests, and when guided by norms of social responsibility and fairness. l (^) Receiving help is not unequivocally positive. It can imply weakness and need. It is therefore important that help-givers adopt the perspective of the help-recipient, give help sensitively and only when it is needed, and are careful not to threaten the help-recipient’s self-esteem.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 195
Note
1 The formula for calculating the corrected individual likelihood of intervention is PI = 1 − N^ 1 − PG , where PG is the likelihood that at least one person intervenes in the group, and N is the number of group members. On the other hand, it is possible to calculate the corrected group likelihood of intervention on the basis of the individual intervention rate by the formula P (^) G = 1 − (1 − P (^) I ) N.
Suggestions for further reading
Batson, C.D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social- psychological answer. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. On the basis of a historical overview of the altruism question, the empathy–altruism hypothesis is developed and research presented in its support. Bierhoff, H.W. (2002). Prosocial behaviour. New York: Psychology Press. Summarizes research from developmental and social
psychology. In addition, areas of applications are discussed in some detail (e.g., first aid, voluntary work engagement in organizations and unpaid volunteer work). Clarke, D. (2003). Pro-social and anti-social behaviour. Hove: Routledge. Presents a short and informative overview and contrasts prosocial behaviour with aggression. Miller, G. (2001). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. London: Vintage. A fresh approach to evolutionary psychology emphasizing the mechanism of sexual selection. Piliavin, J.A. & Callero, P. (1991). Giving blood: The development of an altruistic identity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. An example of applied research on prosocial behaviour. Schroeder, D.A., Penner, L.A., Dovidio, J.F. & Piliavin, J.A. (1995). The psychology of helping and altruism. New York: McGraw-Hill. The most comprehensive monograph on prosocial behaviour currently available. Spacapan, S. & Oskamp, S. (Eds.) (1992). Helping and being helped: Naturalistic studies. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. A collection of contributions examining prosocial behaviour in everyday life.
