Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
1 / 60
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
Att
too
011
AIR COMMAND. ).TT-,
STAFF COLLEGE DTICELEc-rEmI
AN (^) PRINCIPLESAPPLICATION OF INWAR: THE B THE SOHLIEFFEN PLAN MAJOR JAMES A. GOODIN 84-
AiL
DWMTPBnrBN A|ptoled istkbto,, t" (^) public STATEMIEN Unlimite release,; A 8,4 10 1 7 15 4"
- -rl i
DI SCI.A IMER The views and conclusions expressed in this document are t ho ot^ the^ author.^ They^ are notrepresent intended Oft^ andcta,^ hiouldideas,^ not attitudes,^ be^ thought or^ to policies of any agency of the United States Government. The author has not had special accesshas employed to official only (^) open-sourceinformation m~aterialor ideas^ and iva !able to any writer on this subject. This document is^ the^ proper"^ y^ of^ the^ United Statesdistribution Government.to the^ general.t^ is^ available public. forA loan copyAir Universityof the document Interlibrary may be obtainedLoan Service from the (AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFb, Alabama, 36112) or the Defense Technical informnation Center. Request must include the author's name and complete title ot the itud'. T'his3ther docume::tresearch ma" report he reproduceds or educational for use pursuits in contingent upon the following^ stipulations: any copyrightediReproduction material^ rights thatdo maynot beextend contained^ to in the research report. -- A'I reproduced copies must contain the fol'ow4ng cr~d itne: "Reprinted by permiss-oiCo leg e. - ii th-( Air Command and^ Staff -- A. reproduced (opies must cont.a4.r the riame s) of the roport's author(s). better-- se:if^ veIormat the user's,m^ di^ ficationneeds,^ isadjustments^ neces-ary mayto be made to this report--this author:.zation doesmaterial. not extendThe followingto copyrighted statemmerit information must or accompa-iyfrom Air Commandthe modified and Staff doc-ament: Reseaich "Adapted Report _(nur.ber) entitIed (titl. _ by -auL 1 - hoLr ." This notice nust be included with any reproduced or adaptel portions of this docua1ent.
$EC RI S I It,$CA -IC.N Oý TI'V, P A ,E 'IWh-, (^0) Fl-"
84-1010 _____ (^) '~--~~'
~R~T
ACSC/EL ,AX"WELL AI'B Al 36!
~R<~.,---r ENAME ANC ADCRESS 2 R OR OAE__
___ _____ _______ ____ ____ ____
- A~VLN' - l~-;,*1' L AS'! A '3. * G C,
Approved^ STATEM fcr^ ENT puU~c^ "A" release- ~R, P'-' IO 'A E T ~f ,h. h~- --- d 111- 2'-. il .ý ,hop R.por,'
,a SuPP-FMFNA CIV %T' .S
1-.A(% RAR, TA ' Ol,,.0 ~4A *i.'. _It -d~A_* id-Id. h,i,'hl -o.Arob,'-
Gernauuy ead~.ng Inand a (^) thesGai Allirso matreat and accountsat the Batl tht I (^) iZ'Irut 33 days of UW I,I opening~ oauppign (^) of WW I. this projec', drawn of^ theexamples^ Marns. for-Promi iJ.1.1u-^ the trating the prinr~ilex (^) c'f war (as defilued in AnR 1-1). It al.mo provide s 9LJO uv rigý d~o~qq (^) agaia. If04t .... DD 'A-U 143i EC .11%1 IS-O IS 9ABSOLE- (^) UNP03 J.AfELIE ~P F1 BD~ ~5n~~ f~~a
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
eeringMajor from^ JamesCalifornia^ A.^ Goodin State^ has University^ earned^ a^ BSat^ Longin^ Electrical Beach and^ Engin-a MA into Industrialenlisting iu Management the Air Forcefrom inCentral 1970,^ Michiganhe was employedUniversity. for^ tivePrior years by Fickwell Corp anC- Burroughs Corp as a draftsman, tech- nical writ.r, and electrical engineer. Major Goodin was commis- sioned through Officer Training^ School^ in^ 1971,^ has^ completed
Following Undergraduate Navigator Training at Mlather AFB, he was assigned as^ a^ sqaadron^ C.-141^ navigator^ from^ 19712-76^ at^ Cb.arleston AFBof standardization/evaluationMAC). While at^ Charleston, navigator,^ he^ held theselect-lead^ crew^ ,ualifications combat navi- gator,next assigned and^ Berlin to ClarkCorridor AB,^ RP,flight as 3.ifeexaminer., supprt^ Ma•orofficer^ Goodin in thewas 3TF'W
-~; and^ life^ supportt- O.a^ C advisorT1 to^ .n,4.'^1^13 A.^^ AF^ (PACAF). Ag:^^ eFrom^ F^ 1978-1981 9Q1,T-,w^ e^ e^ hhe^ was
returned1981-83. toAt navigatingY'rtca he (^) alsoC-141 servedaircraft as^ ata l4ngNorton tactics^ AB^ (MAC)officer^ from and planner of joltt-.sArvice airdrop training ant exercises. His militarythreie Air decorationsForce Commendation include twoMedf.Is, Marrltori,)us aud tw Humanitarian Service Medals, Service Medals.
tt
LIST (^) OF ILLUSTRATIONS -_
FIGURE 2 - (^) Disposition of Armies, Outbreak of War -.- 50
vi
Chapter Onu INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND T (^) he Schlieffeni (^) Plan was Germazy's contingency plan for (^) a two-front wwr with France (^) and Russia at the outbreak of E.uropean hostilities in (^) 1914. Germany was c:oncerned in th, '.ate 19th century with Russia undorgoing a slow ivderni'.ation of her 6. millton-man army and with France usiag (^) conscription to rebaild her &rn4 following the devastating (^) loss of *'" Franco-P.,ussian War ir 1870. (^) The Franco-Prutssian War was a pre-emptive3 (^) war. d•:•oluhL by Geruuanv, w 2ich waF foug ht to a quicK, de:.i6sve V ci..
4.,-. Humiliatingt-rteGra peaceA'ý^ termsneaion^ Included (^) of a^ victorythe Fr'ench^ march (^) provirrees^ tbrouga of saris Alsace and Lorraine to keep ýrance forever (^) on the defensive, and i;-, Indemnity of five billion (^) francs intended to hobbl3 France for a generation. (5:46) These concerns (^) proupted the G'erman General Staff to start preparation for a oiiiultanecus (^) var with ?rance
& (^) The repulse uf the opening GFruiani offen31ve (^) by rhe 1lle!e, in 1.914 was followad by "our years of carn•.ge, (^) the result. o. wnich turned the worldi upsicde (^) down. The monarchles in Germeny, Russia, .. (^4) H
-1II:! :. a
each prinolple of w~r followed by a positive or negative (^) applica- tion from taq 33-day campaign. Chapter Five, Seminar Chairman Guidance, pr- .des that ILformation necessary (^) for an ACSC seminar chairman vo lead a guided discussion on the Sch]leffen Plan's application of the (^) principles of war.
,.~
(^3) 1; .- }I
Chapter Two WJAR PLANS THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN The Schlieffen Plan started^ its^ evolution^ following^ the decisive Prussian victory^ over^ France^ in^ 1871.^ The^ problem^ to be solved was what Helmuth von MoLtke,^ tle^ Chief^ of^ the^ German General Staff, considered^ th3^ worBt-casB^ military^ situation:^ a tw.-front war in which^ Germany^ faced^ ?rance^ in^ the^ west^ and Russia In^ the^ east.^ This^ combination^ of^ forces^ was^ numerically superior to^ those^ cf^ Germany^ although^ separated^ from^ one^ another. He had several plan3 during th-^ ne.t^18 years,^ but^ two^ events settled him^ on^ one^ plan.^ T1,e^ fLrsat^ was^ that^ YTeance^ ouiOlt^ a. fortress chain^ (Verdan,^ ou`.,^ Epinal,^ Belfort)^ along^ the^ l_-mile frontier between Swii;ze~land and^ the^ Alps^ on^ the^ south^ and^ the neutral countries^ of^ .'3-gium^ and^ Luxembourg^ on^ the^ north^ mLking a quick victory o',e.:^ _rance^ improbable^ "figure^ 1).^ The^ other^ was^ a German allianoe w" 'h Alustria adding^ additional^ strength^ on^ the Russian frintiei. (2:11.9)^ Moltke's^ plan,^ ther,^ called^ for^ a defens' ie actisn in the^ west^ behidu^ the^ GO.rman^ fortresses^ falling bac' to the .Thine, if nsoessary, with^ &^ combinei^ German^ and Austrian offense^ againsý.;^ Russia.^ Uis^ objective^ was^ a^ quick negottat, settlement^ with^ Rurpsia^ and^ rrance,^ In-turn.^ (4:18-21) Moltke'in plan remained Intact^ vntl].^ Alfred^ von^ Sohlieffen^ became i IF-
Atlwaia~z e-.
harm. His often quoted examples of Inferior (^) forces bringing superior (^) strength against the flanks of a more numerous opponent in a double-envelopment rmovement were Hannibtl (at Ca .ea,in 216 BC), ?rederick the Great, Nap, leor, (^) and Schlieffen's predecesscor Moltke. (^) (2:134) On these prinoi, an he rethoaght the problem of a two-front war. His plan was (^) nk complet, when an .cident forced his retirement (^) in 1906. He presented the plan to hie successor in a memorandum and continued to (^) modify it in retirement until his death in 1913. This plan became the basis for (^) the
operational plan with whioh the Germans entered WW I and is generally referred to as "ihe Schlieffen Plan". Schlieffen (^) wrote that "in a two-front war, the whole of
Germany must throw itself upon the one. enemy, the strongeat, most powerful, most dangexous eaemy (^) and that can only be Pran(Je." (5:3`) nTue (^) orgn.(90) ýhtffe- P llan o~,n&A4 mi- TJoal-La sV j-_ eighths of Germany's forces to smash Prance while one-eighth wee (^) to hold her eastern frontier against Russia (^) until tho bulk of the army could be brought to face the second enemy. Pran'3e waa chasen first because Russia could frustrate a quick victory by Aimply withdrawing (^) into the heart of Russia. France was both close,- at hand and quicker to mobilize. The Cerman and French (^) Armies both required two weeks (^) to complete mobilization before a major attack could begin on the (^) fifteenth day. fusela, thought the German
General Staff because of vast distaxtoes, huge nambera, bnd meager rallroadb, would take six weeks before (^) sho noule, launch ,A maajor offensive., By this time Prance couL'. ba be'.4ter.. (^) (5:35) Tn insure
6
would be deu'troysd .* minimum tf.me. (^) ;n order to do this he
"sweeping the earire (^) French Arn and any Znglish expeditionary
supply 3f MexI anr. mater!el to keep this powerful (^) right wing on ScheduSe. (4:57) The sa'tond (^) key wea Paris. This gigantic fortress neede. to be Isolated cr (^) eliminated, because it was the rallying "point of all French reserveii a-d .he center of (^) the entire French
;Ii
nA.'
in 1870-71.. (4:8) Plan XVII was titled an In antlon to Attack. It called for an ImmedlaTe and brutal offensive through Lurralne which would break th#e German center and throw tne twc wings a&,under (figure 2). Details and planning, were unimportant. Succees was guaranteed^ by^ French^ ilan^ (r.pIrit).^ "flan^ was greater than bullets." (7:208) The plan had no objective si.ace it was zonsidered to De a restoesa to German attack. Its mo'.i- vating Idea was to reach Berlin through Mainz. Its intention was Ir.flexible: attacK! The French, even though not defendirng an attack •hrough Belglum, welzomed one. They tnought that their two-pronged offensive would smaen through the German center aEd left on either side cf the fort1i:ied area at Metz and by victory wculd sever germany's right wing, if any, from its base rendering *.t logistically unsupportable. (5:45-58) France did not believe ",.hat ýierraany had enough fortes under arms to provide the trooi density rcquired fo- the envelopment maneuver, and German security prevented the French from knowing about the Scnlieffen Plan. T7{E RUSSIAN PLANS The Russians had two contingency plans depending on whether Germany applied the bulk of its forces towards ?rance or Russia. To support Plan XVII France wanted Russia to attack the &erman eastern front by tha 15th day of mobilization to insure that ýermany bad to fight on two fronts from *he start, keeping Germany from having superior numbers on the western fr.ont. The Russian's A-plan (for Austrii) assumed that the first German attack would be against the West. In which case, the Russian main
41
forces (32 divisions) would (^) attack Austria leav4.ng. 24 divlL'.onsla
-elo-Russia (^) in tho, fortifiecL area north of (^) the Pripet marshes " a defensive scrategy. Employment of (^) either the A-plrn or 3-plan would then give Russia time to mobilize (^) tne remainder of her huge army. "The (^) Russi.ans could mebill.ze a total' land (^) force of 6.5 ralliorn
"s:,jam (^) roiler" was (^) a myth. It was (^) tne Russian (^) winter, not (^) their arIV that turned back Napolean. (^) Th12ey were defeated on ihelr own soil by the (^) ?rench and Britiah 'n the Crimea. They wert, outfought by the Turks in 1877, but eveutvally won wl-:h overwhelming numbers, and they (^) hau recently been outfought by the Japanese (^) in Mancnuria. (5:75) Thus, (^) Germany was not as concerned with Russia (^) as Prance.
THE ENGLISH (^) PLAN The English (^) plan for intervention In a European (^) war depended completely on poT, ular (^) support. England had no written (^) treaties with France or Russia. (^) Her only pertAinent treaty was signed with all European (^) powers guaranteeing BolgLan neutrality. (^) However, French and (^) English geaeral staffs pirformea. Joint planning (^) in case (^) of a German war. In 1911 the 1!glish (^) staff committel t send sevei divisions (^) (150,000 men aad 67,0o0 ioraee) for (^) tttach- mert (^) to the French I.rmy and protect ;he (^) French left flank from 10 .
-+.L ,.. (^) q ,,,. - ,, - - t - -.. (^) • , ... ,. - ... -
I
"Thi.ter Three
THE WIAR THE 4Aa BEGINS (,,erriany broke Belgian (^) neutrality at t1he very sta.rt (^) of hc~s^4 "Ai•te•. A c:omplicated '-Alliaice (^) system brought a.1 of ELJo',) (^) major powers to wax in Aukgust (^1914) over the 28 June anIsa3s•nation uf Austria's crown (^) prince ir. the Balkans. (^) ueustria rtsoIv6d (^) to end the long standing Slav-I- (^) agitatior in !,.er empire once a'id for all. (^) Austria pondered for four (^) weekE. ovor the
,'rper course (^) of a.ct5ýn, while soliciting German (^) ni•iurance of backluic In the (^) advent of Russian Intervention. (^) Rfceiving nAry.•incas -. rom Germae-y, (^) Austria declared war cia (^) 3erbla and on Z9 July co=Aen, ad a bombardment (^) of Belgreade. Russi`'a, (^) in o.,de-r "toprotect (^) her prietige az the major (^) .lav powez, mi211.e., ,along Ler Liustrin boric:r. (^) Stinding up for the Balkan (^) states, Riv'ai& ';hen declared w..r on Luntria, (^) then Germany on Ruec..a, (^) then Pramce ,.n Germany. (1:36) (^) In order to execute (^) the Schl1offen "l'.n, 3erMany demand,:d (^) tbht Belgium allow Germany (^) to pties throi•h enroute (^) to France allowing use af standing (^) Belgiin tresniJportat:Lon dy•tems (rord3, railroads) (^) and communication (^) sysene. When Belgiuam reftused, Gwrriany de:-lE.red (^) war on Belgium, brlrgi (^) :,g Erq/].mnd Into the
war. Englard probably (^) would have entered the (^) war soca.rwy. She
Germany (^) thrvjatened. C.ermany` breaklnj Belgian neutra11(y guri~r- %nteed (^) by - ngland, as well as all other biropean powe'.rs, tbough,
back the wez. (5:Ch 8,9) As war became eminent, Ga.'many st•rLted maresing its armies along the (^) lielgium-Luxeabourg-.Franoe froutier (flgukre 2) in order to implewdaL. the SchliEoffen Pla.i as mo.ified by M-Itke (the younger).
They cor.tauied (^34) divisions (640,,OOJ men). The First Army, on the extrea.e righ.., was commanded by G!naral (^) von KlucK; and, having to tr.rel the farthest, its pace ;rwuld regulate the pace or tne genral advance. (2:1-6) The Fo'.Arh aj.d Fifth (^) Armies, composed of 20 divisions (40O,OO men), formed• th,: German center about which
f, the right^ wing^ wAs^ to^ rotate.^ The^ Sixth^ and^ Seventh^ Armies, composed of If; divisions (32,OOOC men), formed the German left. .flank and wire (^) to fight delaying 8c ions in Aleace-Lorralne to hold up the French Army until t'h.e right (^) wing envelopment wouli hit the ?rench frcm the re-ar. ('::1881 Nine divisions (^) were placed *in Zast Pruaia to guard (^) agains.t Rust is. -"he German right wing
prescri'ea (^) in Plan XVII (figure 2). The Frencb aP3sembled sl'.gbtly more than a 'zilli~n men in five armies along the German fron';Ier.
