Stochastic Dynamic Equilibrium Models: Markov Economies and Recursive Equilibria - Prof. M, Study notes of Introduction to Macroeconomics

An introduction to stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models, focusing on markov economies and recursive competitive equilibria. The concept of state in markov economies, the evolution of the state governed by a markov process, and the determination of recursive competitive equilibria. Suitable for advanced undergraduate or graduate students in economics, particularly those studying macroeconomics or econometrics.

Typology: Study notes

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Mark J. Gibson
Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium Models
The state of the economy in period t is a history of events 01
( , ,..., )
tt
ssss. The probability of
a particular history is ( )
t
s
. The initial event 0
s is given. All equilibrium objects are functions
of the state of the economy.
Pure exchange economy
Consider an economy with heterogeneous consumers in which there is uncertainty about
endowments, ( )
t
is
. Consumer i has the expected utility function
0()log()
t
tt t
i
ts scs

 .
An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is ˆˆ
(), ()
tt
i
cs ps such that
ˆ()
t
i
cs solve
0
max ( )log ( )
t
tt t
i
ts scs


00
ˆˆ
s.t. ()() ()()
tt
tt t t
ii
ts ts
p
scs ps s


 
() 0
t
i
cs
ˆ() ()
tt
ii
ii
cs s

.
With a sequential markets structure, ( )
t
i
bs is an Arrow security that delivers one unit of the
consumption good to consumer i in state t
s. The price of this security is ( )
t
qs .
A sequential markets equilibrium is ˆ
ˆˆ
(), (), ()
ttt
ii
cs bs qs such that
ˆ
ˆ(), ()
tt
ii
cs bs solve
0
max ( )log ( )
t
tt t
i
ts scs


111
ˆ
s.t. () (, )(, ) () ()
t
ttttt
ititii
s
cs qss bss s bs


() 0
t
i
cs , ( )
t
i
bs B , 0
()0
i
bs
ˆ() ()
tt
ii
ii
cs s

ˆ() 0
t
i
ibs
.
pf3

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Download Stochastic Dynamic Equilibrium Models: Markov Economies and Recursive Equilibria - Prof. M and more Study notes Introduction to Macroeconomics in PDF only on Docsity!

Mark J. Gibson

Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium Models

The state of the economy in period t is a history of events

0 1

t

t

ss s s. The probability of

a particular history is ( )

t

 s. The initial event

0

s is given. All equilibrium objects are functions

of the state of the economy.

Pure exchange economy

Consider an economy with heterogeneous consumers in which there is uncertainty about

endowments, ( )

t

i

 s. Consumer i has the expected utility function

0

( ) log ( )

t

t t t

i

t s

  s c s

 

An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is ˆ

t t

i

c s p s such that

t

i

c s solve

0

max ( ) log ( ) t

t t t

i

t s

  s c s

 

0 0

s.t. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t

t t t t

i i

t s t s

p s c s p s  s

 

 

   

t

i

c s

t t

i i

i i

c s   s

 

With a sequential markets structure, ( )

t

i

b s is an Arrow security that delivers one unit of the

consumption good to consumer i in state

t

s. The price of this security is ( )

t

q s.

A sequential markets equilibrium is

t t t

i i

c s b s q s such that

t t

i i

c s b s solve

0

max ( ) log ( )

t

t t t

i

t s

  s c s

 

1

1 1

s.t. ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )

t

t t t t t

i t i t i i

s

c s q s s b s s  s b s

 

t

i

c s  , ( )

t

i

b s   B ,

0

i

b s

t t

i i

i i

c s   s

 

t

i

i

b s

Production economy

Consider a growth model in which there is uncertainty about total factor productivity. The

representative consumer is endowed with one unit of labor in each period and

0

k units of initial

capital. The consumer’s expected utility is

0

( ) log ( ) (1 ) log 1 ( )

t

t t t t

t s

  s  c s  s

The resource constraint for this economy is

1 1

t t t t t t

c s k s k s z s k s s

 

 

An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is

t t t t t t

c ss k s r s w s p s such that

t t t

c ss k s solve

0

max ( ) log ( ) (1 ) log 1 ( )

t

t t t t

t s

  s  c s  s

1

0 0

s.t. ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

t t

t t t t t t t t

t s t s

p s c s k sk s w s s r s k s

 

 

1 0

0

t t t t

c s s k s  k s k s k

1 1

ˆ ˆ

t t t t t

r s p s z s k s s

 

 

t t t t t

w s p s z s k s s

 

1 1

ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ

t t t t t t

c s k s k s z s k s s

 

 

A sequential markets equilibrium is

t t t t t

c ss k s r s w s such that

t t t

c ss k s solve

0

max ( ) log ( ) (1 ) log 1 ( )

t

t t t t

t s

  s  c s  s

1

s.t. ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

t t t t t t t

c s k s  k s w s s r s k s

1 0

0

t t t t

c s s k s  k s k s k

1 1

ˆ ˆ

t t t t

r s z s k s s

 

 

t t t t

w s z s k s s

 

1 1

ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ

t t t t t t

c s k s k s z s k s s

 

 