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Explore Aquinas' first cause argument, a classical conception of God as creator, and the objections to the kalām argument. Discover the significance of efficient causes and the implications for the existence of God.
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Three views about the universe Aquinas’ first cause argument Two objections to Aquinas the kalām argument Our first topic is the question of whether God exists. But what does it mean to say that God exists? Don’t people have different ideas of what God could be? In this class, we’ll be working with the conception of God common to what are often thought of as the major monotheistic religions — Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Here is the view of God common to these religions: The classical conception of God God is not part of the universe, but is the creator of the universe. God is also all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good. God has always existed, and always will exist. God is the greatest being that could exist.
Three views about the universe Aquinas’ first cause argument Two objections to Aquinas the kalām argument With this conception of God in mind, we can state two views about the nature of reality. Simple theism God exists, and created the universe. Simple atheism The universe (or perhaps several universes) are all that exists. Nothing created it (or them). These two views are exclusive: if one is true, the other is false. Are they the only possible views? No. One might think that the universe was created by something outside of the universe, but that that being is not God. Let’s call this view ‘quasi-theism’: Quasi-theism The universe was created by something outside of it, but not by God.
Three views about the universe Aquinas’ first cause argument Two objections to Aquinas the kalām argument
St. Thomas was born in 1225 and, while his works were extremely controversial in their time — some were condemned as heretical by the bishop of Paris — he has since come to be regarded as the greatest theologian and philosopher in the history of the Church. His Summa Theologiae — from which the arguments we will be discussing were taken — is regarded by many as the definitive philosophical exposition of the Catholic faith. Let’s turn then to our first argument for the existence of God: the first cause argument we find in the reading from Thomas Aquinas. Three views about the universe Aquinas’ first cause argument Two objections to Aquinas the kalām argument
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither, indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause … Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. Here is the central argument of Aquinas’ second way - the second of five proofs that Aquinas gave for the existence of God. Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām What we want to know is: Is this a good argument for God’s existence? Is it valid? Is it sound? But to answer these questions, we first need to figure out what the premises of Aquinas’ argument are.
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither, indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause … Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām Let’s start with the second sentence. Our goal is to come up with a simple, straightforward way to state the main point of this sentence. We always want to use language which is as simple and clear as possible. There are some causes.
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither, indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause … Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām Let’s have a look at the next sentence. How would you state this claim in simple language? There are some causes. Nothing is the cause of itself.
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither, indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause … Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām There are some causes. Nothing is the cause of itself. We get a hint when we look at the rest of the sentence, which seems to provide a mini-argument for the claim that nothing is the cause of itself.
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither, indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause … Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām There are some causes. Nothing is the cause of itself. If something were the cause of itself, it would be prior to itself. Nothing is prior to itself.
The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither, indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause … Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām There are some causes. Nothing is the cause of itself. If something were the cause of itself, it would be prior to itself. Nothing is prior to itself. There are no infinite causal chains. It is pretty clear that this is a derived premise, since we get a long argument for it in the passage immediately following. Let’s set this difficult passage to the side for now, and see if we can figure out the shape of Aquinas’ argument.
Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām There are some causes. Nothing is the cause of itself. If something were the cause of itself, it would be prior to itself. Nothing is prior to itself. There are no infinite causal chains. We’ve now got some premises on the table. But to figure out whether they make for a valid argument, we need to first figure out what conclusion they are supposed to be an argument for. Fortunately, it is pretty clear that at least one thing Aquinas is arguing for is the following: There is a first cause. By this Aquinas means “there is something which causes other things to exist but was not itself caused to exist by anything.”
Three views the universe about first cause argumentAquinas’ to Aquinas^ objectionsTwo the kal^ argumentām There are some causes. Nothing is the cause of itself. If something were the cause of itself, it would be prior to itself. Nothing is prior to itself. There are no infinite causal chains. There is a first cause. Every causal chain must be (i) circular, (ii) infinite, or (iii) have a first cause. Now that we have mapped out the structure of the argument, we can put it premise/ conclusion form.