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Chapter 5
The Military Decision-Making Process
Decision making is knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide. It includes understanding the conse- quence of decisions. Decisions are the means by which the commander translates his vision of the end state into action.
Decision making is both science and art. Many as- pects of military operations—movement rates, fuel con- sumption, weapons effects—are quantifiable and, therefore, part of the science of war. Other aspects—the impact of leadership, complexity of operations, and un- certainty regarding enemy intentions—belong to the art of war.
The military decision-making process (MDMP) is a single, established, and proven analytical process. (See Figure 5-1, page 5-2.) The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving. The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a plan. While the formal problem-solving process described in this chapter may start with the receipt of a mission, and has as its goal the production of an order, the analytical aspects of the MDMP continue at all levels during operations.
The MDMP helps the commander and his staff exam- ine a battlefield situation and reach logical decisions. The process helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach a decision. The full MDMP is a detailed, deliber- ate, sequential, and time-consuming process used when adequate planning time and sufficient staff support are available to thoroughly examine numerous friendly and enemy courses of action (COAs). This typically occurs when developing the commander’s estimate and opera- tion plans (OPLANs), when planning for an entirely new mission, during extended operations, and during staff training designed specifically to teach the MDMP.
The MDMP is the foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is based. The products created during the full MDMP can and should be used during subsequent planning sessions when time may not be available for a thorough relook, but where existing METT-T factors have not changed substantially. (See page 5-27 for a discussion of decision making in a time- constrained environment.)
The MDMP relies on doctrine, especially the terms and symbols (graphics) found in FM 101-5-1. The use of approved terms and symbols facilitates the rapid and consistent assessment of the situation and creation and implementation of plans and orders by minimizing con- fusion over the meanings of terms and symbols used in the process. The advantages of using the complete MDMP in- stead of abbreviating the process are that—
- It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and en- emy COAs in an attempt to identify the best possible friendly COA.
- It produces the greatest integration, coordination, and synchronization for an operation and minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation.
- It results in a detailed operation order or operation plan. The disadvantage of using the complete MDMP is that it is a time-consuming process.
ROLES OF THE COMMANDER
AND STAFF
The commander is in charge of the military decision-making process and decides what procedures to use in each situation. The planning process hinges on a clear articulation of his battlefield visualization. He is personally responsible for planning, preparing for, and executing operations. From start to finish, the com- mander’s personal role is central: his participation in the process provides focus and guidance to the staff. How- ever, there are responsibilities and decisions that are the commander’s alone (Figure 5-1). The amount of his di- rect involvement is driven by the time available, his per- sonal preferences, and the experience and accessibility of the staff. The less time available, the less experienced the staff, and the less accessible the staff, generally the greater the commander involvement. Examples for dis- cussion of increased commander involvement are found in Decision Making in a Time-Constrained Environ- ment, page 5-27. The commander uses the entire staff during the MDMP to explore the full range of probable and likely
enemy and friendly COAs, and to analyze and compare his own organization’s capabilities with the enemy’s. This staff effort has one objective—to collectively inte- grate information with sound doctrine and technical competence to assist the commander in his decisions, leading ultimately to effective plans.
The CofS (XO) manages, coordinates, and disci- plines the staff’s work and provides quality control. He must understand the commander’s guidance because he supervises the entire process. He ensures the staff has the information, guidance, and facilities it needs. He provides time lines to the staff, establishes briefback times and locations, and provides any unique instructions.
By issuing guidance and participating in formal and informal briefings, the commander and CofS (XO)
guide the staff through the decision-making process. Such interaction helps the staff resolve questions and in- volves the entire staff in the total process. The selected course of action and its implementing operation order are directly linked to how well both the commander and staff accomplish each phase of the MDMP.
THE ROLE OF
RECONNAISSANCE DURING
THE PLANNING PROCESS
The commander and staff deploy reconnaissance assets early in the planning process to facilitate early collection. However, reconnaissance assets should not be launched without using, as a minimum, the reconnaissance planning factors found in step 9 of mission analysis (page 5-8). The
RECEIPT OF MISSION Issue cdr’s initial guidance
MISSION ANALYSIS Approve restated mission State commander’s intent Approve CCIR
Issue cdr’s guidance
COA DEVELOPMENT
REHEARSAL
EXECUTION & ASSESSMENT
COA COMPARISON
COA ANALYSIS (War Game)
COA APPROVAL Approve COA Refine commander’s intent Specify type of rehearsal Specify type of order
ORDERS PRODUCTION Approve order
Staff
Estimates
(continual process)
Commander’s
Estimate
(continual process)
WARNING ORDER
WARNING ORDER
WARNING ORDER
Commander’s Responsibility
NOTE 4: At any time during execution and assessment, situation may require the process to start again.
NOTE 3: For a discussion of rehearsals, execution, and assessment, see Chapter 6 and Appendix G.
NOTE 1: Commander may conduct phases independently or in conjunction with staff.
NOTE 2: Staff coordination is continual up and down.
Figure 5-1. The military decision-making process
Staff officers must constantly update their staff esti- mates and other critical information. This information allows them to develop assumptions that are necessary to the planning process. Staff officers must be aggres- sive in obtaining this information.
Reporting of this information must be a push sys- tem versus a pull system. Subordinate units must rap- idly update their reports as the situation changes. Good reporting SOPs must be developed, practiced, and enforced.
Once the new mission is received, the commander and the staff must do a quick initial assessment. It is designed to optimize the commander’s use of time while preserving time for subordinate commanders to plan and complete combat preparations. This assessment—
- Determines the time available from mission receipt to mission execution.
- Determines the time needed to plan, prepare for, and execute the mission for own and subordinate units.
- Determines the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Determines the staff estimates already available to assist planning. Additional factors to consider are—
- Ambient light requirements for planning, rehears- als, and movement.
- The staff’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress. The critical product of this assessment is an initial al- location of available time. The commander and the staff must balance the desire for detailed planning against the need for immediate action. The commander must pro- vide guidance to subordinate units as early as possible to
RECEIPT OF MISSION
MISSION ANALYSIS
COA DEVELOPMENT
COA COMPARISON
COA ANALYSIS
(War Game)
COA APPROVAL
ORDERS PRODUCTION
NOTE 1: denotes commander’s responsibility NOTE 2: Underlying the entire process are continuing commander’s and staff estimates.
7!! 7 7 7!!!!!!!!!! 7 7 7 7 7 7 Cdr’s initial guidance Warning order 1
Initial IPB products Restated mission Cdr’s intent Cdr’s guidance Warning order 2 Staff products Battlefield framework Preliminary movement COA stmts and sketches
War-game results Task organization Mission to subordinate units CCIR
Decision matrix
Approved COA Refined cdr’s intent Specified type of order Specified type of rehearsal High pay-off target list OPLAN/OPORD
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Mission received from higher HQ or deduced by the commander/staff
Higher HQ order/plan/IPB Staff estimates Facts & assumptions
Restated mission Cdr’s guidance Cdr’s intent Staff estimates & products Enemy COAs Enemy COA COA stmts and sketches Staff COA
War-game results Establish criteria
Decision matrix
Approved COA
INPUT OUTPUT
Figure 5-3. Staff inputs and outputs
allow subordinates the maximum time for their own planning and preparation for operations. This, in turn, requires aggressive coordination, deconfliction, integra- tion, and assessment of plans at all levels, both vertically and horizontally.
As a general rule, the commander allocates a mini- mum of two-thirds of available time for subordinate units to conduct their planning and preparation. This leaves one-third of the time for the commander and his staff to do their planning. They use the other two-thirds for their own preparation.
Time, more than any other factor, determines the de- tail with which the staff can plan. Once time allocation is made, the commander must determine whether or not to do the full MDMP, or to abbreviate the process.
The commander then issues his initial guidance (not to be confused with commander’s guidance, Step 15, mission analysis). Although brief, it includes—
- How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required (page 5-27).
- Initial time allocation.
- Liaison officers to dispatch.
- Initial reconnaissance to begin.
- Authorized movement.
- Additional tasks the commander wants the staff to accomplish.
The last step in the mission receipt phase is to issue a warning order to subordinate and supporting units. This order must include as a minimum the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial time line, and any movement or reconnaissance to initiate. (See Figure H-6, page H-27.) Warning orders facilitate paral- lel planning. Parallel planning means that several eche- lons will be working on their MDMP concurrently. This is essential to speed up the process for subordinate units and allow subordinates the maximum time to conduct their own planning. Parallel planning relies on accurate and timely warning orders and a full sharing of informa- tion between echelons as it becomes available. Parallel planning is a routine procedure for the MDMP.
Mission Analysis Mission analysis is crucial to the MDMP. It allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization. The result of mission analysis is defining the tactical problem and beginning the process of determining
feasible solutions. It consists of 17 steps, not neces- sarily sequential, and results in the staff formally briefing the commander. (See Figure 5-4.) In addi- tion to the staff ’s mission analysis, the commander conducts his own mission analysis so that he has a frame of reference to assess the staff’s work. During mission analysis, estimates continue. Anticipation, prior preparation, and a trained staff are the keys to a timely mission analysis.
Step 1. Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Order The commander and his staff thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters’ order to establish horizontal and vertical nesting, not just for maneuver, but also for all combat support and combat service support. This step is to ensure they completely understand—
- The higher headquarters’— — Commander’s intent. — Mission, including tasks, constraints, risk, available assets, and area of operations. — Concept of the operation, including the decep- tion plan.
Step 1. Analyze the higher headquarters' order. Step 2. Conduct initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Step 3. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. Step 4. Review available assets. Step 5. Determine constraints. Step 6. Identify critical facts and assumptions. Step 7. Conduct risk assessment. Step 8. Determine initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Step 9. Determine the initial reconnaissance annex. Step 10. Plan use of available time. Step 11. Write the restated mission. Step 12. Conduct a mission analysis briefing Step 13. Approve the restated mission. Step 14. Develop the initial commander's intent. Step 15. Issue the commander's guidance. Step 16. Issue a warning order. Step 17. Review facts and assumptions.
Figure 5-4. The steps in the mission analysis
Implied tasks are those that must be performed to ac- complish a specified task, but which are not stated in the higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters’ or- der, the enemy situation and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit’s current location in relation to its future area of operations provides insights into im- plied tasks that may be required to perform specified tasks. Additionally, an analysis of the doctrinal require- ments for each specified task may provide implied tasks. Only those implied tasks that require allocation of re- sources should be retained.
Once staff officers have a list of specified and im- plied tasks, they ensure they understand each task’s spe- cific requirements. After analyzing specified and implied tasks, they present to the commander for his ap- proval a tentative list of tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission. These tasks are the essential tasks.
Step 4. Review Available Assets
The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the current task organization, support re- lationships, and status (current capabilities and limita- tions) of all units. They consider the relationship between specified and implied tasks and available as- sets. From this they determine if they have the assets to perform all specified and implied tasks. If there are shortages, they identify additional resources needed for mission success. The staff needs to pay particular atten- tion to deviations from what the commander considers his normal task organization.
Step 5. Determine Constraints
A higher commander normally places some con- straints on his subordinate commanders that restrict their freedom of action. Constraints can take the form of a re- quirement to do something (for example, maintain a re- serve of one company) or a prohibition on action (for example, no reconnaissance forward of a line before H-hour). The commander and his staff must identify and understand these constraints. They are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of opera- tions, and coordinating instructions.
Step 6. Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
The staff gathers two categories of information con- cerning assigned task—facts and assumptions. Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation,
including enemy and friendly dispositions, available troops, unit strengths, and material readiness. Assumptions are suppositions about the current or fu- ture situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavail- able, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about a situation. An assumption is appropri- ate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity. Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. “Assuming away” potential problems, such as weather or likely en- emy options, would result in an invalid assumption. Ne- cessity is whether or not the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assump- tion, it is not necessary and should be discarded. When possible, assumptions are cleared with the higher head- quarters to ensure they are consistent with higher head- quarters’ plan. Assumptions are replaced with facts as soon as possible. To determine assumptions, planners should—
- List all appropriate assumptions received from higher headquarters.
- State expected conditions over which the com- mander has no control but which are relevant to the plan.
- List conditions that would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations.
Step 7. Conduct Risk Assessment The commander and staff identify accident risk haz- ards and make an initial assessment of the risk level for each hazard. The commander also makes an initial assessment of where he might take tactical risk. (See Appendix J.)
Step 8. Determine Initial Commander’s Critical In- formation Requirements (CCIR) The CCIR identify information needed by the com- mander to support his battlefield visualization and to make critical decisions, especially to determine or vali- date courses of action. They help the commander filter information available to him by defining what is impor- tant to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of his subordinates and staff, assist in the allo- cation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations. The CCIR should be limited to 10 or less to enhance comprehension. The CCIR directly af- fect the success or failure of the mission and they are time-sensitive in that they drive decisions at decision points. The key question is, “What does the commander
need to know in a specific situation to make a particular decision in a timely manner?”
The commander alone decides what information is critical, based on his experience, the mission, the higher commander’s intent, and input from the staff. The staff nominates information requirements (IR) to become CCIR. CCIR are situation-dependent and specified by the commander for each operation. He must continu- ously review the CCIR during the planning process and adjust them as situations change. During the MDMP, CCIR most often arise from the IPB and war gaming.
The CCIR are normally expressed as priority intelli- gence requirements (PIR)—information about the en- emy; essential elements of friendly information (EEFI)—information needed to protect friendly forces from the enemy’s information-gathering systems; and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR)—in- formation about the capabilities of his or adjacent units.
Step 9. Determine the Initial Reconnaissance Annex
Based on the initial IPB and CCIR, the staff, primar- ily the G2 (S2), identifies gaps in the intelligence avail- able and determines an initial reconnaissance and surveillance plan to acquire information based on avail- able reconnaissance assets. The G3 (S3) turns this into an initial reconnaissance annex to launch reconnais- sance assets as soon as possible to begin their collection effort. This initial reconnaissance annex should contain, as a minimum:
- The area of operations for reconnaissance.
- Mission statement.
- Task organization.
- Reconnaissance objective.
- PIR and IR.
- Line of departure (LD)/line of contact (LC) time.
- Initial named areas of interest (NAIs).
- Routes to AO and passage of lines instructions.
- Communications and logistics support.
- Fire support measures.
- Medical evacuation. This annex sets reconnaissance in motion. As more information becomes available, it is incorporated into a complete reconnaissance annex to the operation order (OPORD). (See Figure H-22, page H-60.) As these
assets collect information, and other intelligence sources fill in gaps, the taskings to reconnaissance assets must be updated to reflect new CCIR.
Step 10. Plan Use of Available Time The commander and his staff refine their initial plan for the use of available time. They compare the time needed to accomplish essential tasks to the higher head- quarters’ time line to ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time. They also compare the time line to the enemy time line developed during the IPB. From this they determine windows of opportunity for exploitation or times when the unit will be at risk from enemy activity. The commander and staff specify when and where they will conduct the briefings that result from the plan- ning process and when, where, and in what form they will conduct rehearsals. The commander can maximize available planning time for his own and subordinate units by sending additional warning orders as detailed planning develops. This allows parallel planning by subordinate units. The commander also uses LNOs to stay abreast of changes at higher headquarters.
Step 11. Write the Restated Mission The CofS (XO) or G3 (S3) prepares a restated mis- sion for the unit based on the mission analysis. The re- stated mission must contain all elements of a mission statement:
- Who (what types of forces) will execute the action?
- What type of action (for example, attack, defend) is contemplated?
- When will the action begin?
- Where will the action occur (area of operations and objectives)?
- Why (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation? The element of what states the essential tasks. The restated mission will include on-order missions; be- prepared missions will be in the concept of operations.
Step 12. Conduct a Mission Analysis Briefing Time permitting, the staff briefs the commander on its mission analysis using the following outline:
example, the Fire Support Annex to an OPORD will con- tain a concept of support, but not an intent statement. However, the OPORD issued to an artillery battalion sup- porting a maneuver brigade contains the intent statement of the artillery battalion commander.
The intent statement in an OPORD or OPLAN is af- ter the heading for paragraph 3, Operations, and before paragraph 3a, Concept of Operations. The intent state- ments of the next two higher echelon commanders are contained in paragraph 1b of the OPORD or OPLAN to ensure that the staff and supporting commanders under- stand the intent two echelons up. At battalion level and higher, the order, containing the intent, is also written. This decreases the chances of misunderstanding.
Step 15. Issue the Commander’s Guidance
After the commander approves the restated mission and states his intent, he provides the staff with enough additional guidance (preliminary decisions) to focus staff activities in planning the operation. This guidance is essential for timely COA development and analysis. By stating the planning options he does or does not want them to consider, he can save staff members time and ef- fort by allowing them to concentrate on developing COAs that meet the commander’s intent. The comman- der’s guidance may be written or oral.
The commander’s guidance must focus on the essen- tial tasks supporting mission accomplishment. The guidance emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how he intends to mass his combat power to accomplish the mission according to his higher commander’s intent. Commander’s guidance should include priorities for all combat, CS, and CSS elements and how he envisions their support of his concept. The amount of detail in the guidance depends on the time available, the staff’s level of proficiency, and the flexibility the next higher com- mander provides. Guidance that is broad and general in nature provides the staff maximum latitude, allowing a proficient staff to develop flexible and effective options. As time becomes more constrained, the commander’s guidance must become more specific and directive. The more detailed the guidance, the more quickly the staff can complete the plan. However, this increases the risk of overlooking or insufficiently examining things that might affect mission execution. See Appendix B for in- formation that can be included in detailed guidance.
If, during the estimate process, the commander has identified one or more decisive points, or an action he considers decisive, he should convey this to the staff. This should be a point where an enemy weakness allows
maximum combat power to be applied, leading to mis- sion accomplishment. This point can be a location on the ground, a time, or an event. It is not an end state, but a point where decisive results can be achieved. The commander can describe it verbally, with a sketch, or on a map. It should explain how he visualizes the array of forces at the decisive point, what effects he sees it hav- ing on the enemy, and how these effects will lead to mis- sion accomplishment. As a minimum, the commander’s guidance should address—
- Specific courses of action to consider or not to con- sider, both friendly and enemy, and the priority for ad- dressing them.
- The CCIR.
- The reconnaissance guidance.
- Risk guidance.
- Deception guidance.
- Fire support guidance.
- Mobility and countermobility guidance.
- Security measures to be implemented.
- Additional specific priorities for combat support and combat service support.
- Any other information the commander wants the staff to consider.
- The time plan.
- The type of order to issue.
- The type of rehearsal to conduct.
Step 16. Issue a Warning Order Immediately after the commander gives his guid- ance, the staff sends subordinate and supporting units a warning order that contains, as a minimum—
- The restated mission.
- The commander’s intent.
- The unit’s AO (a sketch, an overlay, or some other description).
- The CCIR.
- Risk guidance.
- Reconnaissance to be initiated by subordinate units.
- Security measures.
- Deception guidance.
- Mobility and countermobility guidance.
- Specific priorities.
- The time plan.
- Guidance on rehearsals.
Step 17. Review Facts and Assumptions
During the rest of the decision-making process, the commander and staff periodically review all available facts and assumptions. New facts may alter require- ments and analysis of the mission. Assumptions may have become facts or may have become invalid. When- ever the facts or assumptions change, the commander and staff must assess the impact of these changes on the plan and make the necessary adjustments.
Course of Action Development
After receiving guidance, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must in- volve the entire staff in their development. His guidance and intent focus the staff’s creativity to produce a com- prehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His direct participation helps the staff get quick, accu- rate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design un- predictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce).
Qualities of COAs
Each COA considered must meet the criteria of—
- Suitability. It must accomplish the mission and comply with the commander’s guidance. However, the commander may modify his guidance at any time. When the guidance changes, the staff records and coor- dinates the new guidance and reevaluates each COA to ensure it complies with the change.
- Feasibility. The unit must have the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of available time, space, and resources.
- Acceptability. The tactical or operational advan- tage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources, especially casualties. This assessment is largely subjective.
- Distinguishability. Each COA must differ signifi- cantly from any others. Significant differences may re- sult from use of reserves, different task organizations,
day or night operations, or a different scheme of maneu- ver. This criteria is also largely subjective.
- Completeness. It must be a complete mission statement. (See page 5-8.) A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events dur- ing execution. It also provides the maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. The order from higher headquarters normally pro- vides the what, when, and why for the force as a whole. The who in the COA does not specify the designation of units; it arrays units by type (for example, generic ar- mored battalion or mechanized battalion). Designation of specific units comes later. During COA development, the commander and staff continue the risk management process, focusing on Steps 1 through 3. (See Appendix J.)
Guidelines and Steps to Develop COAs There are normally six steps in COA development:
- Analyze relative combat power.
- Generate options.
- Array initial forces.
- Develop the scheme of maneuver.
- Assign headquarters.
- Prepare COA statements and sketches. The following paragraphs describe each step in detail. Step 1. Analyze Relative Combat Power. Combat power is the effect created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in com- bat against the enemy. The commander integrates and applies the effects of these elements with other potential combat multipliers (combat support (CS), combat ser- vice support (CSS), and available assets of other ser- vices) against the enemy. His goal is to generate over- whelming combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost. By analyzing force ratios and determining and com- paring each force’s strengths and weaknesses as a func- tion of combat power, planners can gain some insight into—
- What friendly capabilities pertain to the operation.
- What type operations may be possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives.
basis for the scheme of maneuver, planners must consider—
- The unit’s restated mission and the higher com- mander’s intent and guidance.
- The air and ground avenues of approach (both en- emy and friendly).
- As many possible enemy COAs as time permits, starting with the most likely and including the worst case (most dangerous).
Planners then determine the ratio of friendly to enemy units required for each task, starting with the main effort and continuing through all support- ing efforts. (They consider the entire battlefield framework, including close, deep, rear, reserve, reconnaissance, and security operations.) Such ratios are planning tools for developing COAs only and not for actual combat. (FM 34-130 contains preferred minimum planning ratios to array forces.) Some operations, such as pursuit, exploi- tation, and movement to contact, require no par- ticular ratio; however, planners can use a ratio of 1:1. This ratio considers terrain and mission but not weather, initiative, surprise, logistics, or intan- gibles such as leadership, training, and morale. The ratio is a starting point only; planners can ad- just the ratio as they develop the COA.
Planners next determine a proposed forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) for a defense or an LD/LC for an offense. The G2’s (S2’s) initial terrain analysis should validate the selection, or determine a recommended change, which must then be resolved with higher headquarters.
Planners then consider the deception story. Because aspects of the story may influence unit positioning, plan- ners must consider the story’s major elements before de- veloping any courses of action.
Planners next make the initial array of friendly forces, starting with the main effort at the decisive point and continuing through supporting efforts. Planners normally array ground forces two levels down. The ini- tial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific type or task organization, and then considers all combat multipliers, as appropriate. For example, at corps level, planners array two levels down using generic brigades consisting of three battal- ions. During this step, planners do not assign missions to arrayed units; they merely consider what forces they must allocate to accomplish the mission.
The initial array identifies the total number of units needed, develops a base of knowledge to make decisions, and identifies possible methods of dealing with the enemy during scheme-of-maneuver development. If the number arrayed is less than the number available, the additional units are placed in a pool for use during scheme-of- maneuver development. If the number arrayed is greater than the number available, the shortfall is identified as a possible requirement for additional resources. Step 4. Develop the Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the commander’s intent. It is the central ex- pression of the commander’s concept for operations and governs the design of supporting plans or annexes. Planners develop a scheme of maneuver by refining the initial array of forces and using graphic control mea- sures to coordinate the operation and to show the rela- tionship of friendly forces to one another, the enemy, and the terrain. During this step, units are converted from generic to specific types of units, such as armor, light infantry, and mechanized infantry. The scheme of maneuver includes—
- The purpose of the operation.
- A statement of where the commander will accept tactical risk.
- Identification of critical friendly events and phases of the operation (if phased).
- Designation of the main effort, along with its task and purpose.
- Designation of supporting efforts, along with their tasks and purposes, linked to how they support the main effort.
- Designation of reserve, to include location, compo- sition, task, and purpose.
- Deep, close, and rear operations.
- Reconnaissance and security operations.
- An outline of the movements of the force.
- Identification of maneuver options that may de- velop during an operation.
- Location of engagement areas or attack objectives and counterattack objectives.
- Responsibilities for area of operations (AO).
- Concept of fires.
- C^2 -attack priorities.
- Prescribed formations or dispositions when necessary.
- Priorities for each CS and CSS element in support of the operation.
- Integration of obstacle effects with maneuver and fires.
- Considerations of the effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the force.
Planners select control measures (graphics) to control subordinate units during the operation. Planners base control measures on the array of forces and the scheme of maneuver to defeat probable enemy courses of action. Control measures clarify responsibilities and synchro- nize combat power at decisive points while minimizing the command’s risk of fratricide. All control measures impose some constraints on subordinate commanders. Control measures used should be the minimum required to exercise necessary control over the operation while still allowing as much freedom of action as possible to subordinate commanders.
Control measures should not split avenues of ap- proach or key terrain between two units. Planners should provide space on the flanks of each avenue of ap- proach to allow for maneuver and fires. The area of op- erations the planner designates as the main effort may be narrower than others to add weight to that AO. Planners should also develop phase lines to implement expected branches and sequels.
When developing the scheme of maneuver, planners should use any forces remaining from the initial array to provide depth to the battle, provide additional reconnais- sance or security, or act as a reserve.
Step 5. Assign Headquarters. Planners next assign headquarters to groupings of forces, creating a task or- ganization. This assignment should consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and its span of control. Planners should not exceed the allocated head- quarters’ span of control. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate maneuver units, but not more than five. If planners need additional headquar- ters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task or- ganization takes into account the entire battlefield framework. It also accounts for the special command and control (C^2 ) requirements of operations that have special requirements, such as passage of lines, river crossings, or air assaults.
Step 6. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches. The G3 (S3) prepares a COA statement and supporting sketch for each COA developed. The COA statement must clearly portray how the unit will accomplish the mission and explain the scheme of maneuver. It should include the mission and end state and address the battle- field framework. The sketch provides a picture of the maneuver aspects of the COA. Together, the statement and sketch cover who (generic task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (purpose) for each subordinate unit, and any significant risks and where they occur for the force as a whole. (See example of COA statement and sketch at Figure 5-5.) As a minimum, the sketch should include the array of generic forces, and control measures such as—
- Planning unit and subordinate unit boundaries that establish the AO.
- Unit movement formations (does not specify for- mations of subordinate units).
- The FEBA or LD/LC and subsequent phase lines.
- Reconnaissance and security (R&S) graphics.
- Ground and air axes of advance.
- Assembly areas, battle positions, strongpoints, en- gagement areas, and objectives.
- Obstacle control measures and tactical mission graphics.
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Designation of the main and supporting efforts.
- Location of command posts.
- Enemy known or templated locations. Planners can enhance the sketch with identifying fea- tures (cities, rivers, roads) to help orient users. The sketch may be on any media—what it portrays is more important than its form.
COURSE OF ACTION CRITERIA
- Suitability
- Feasibility
- Acceptability
- Distinguishability
- Completeness
COA Briefing (Optional)
After the COAs have been developed, they are briefed to the commander for review. The COA briefing includes—
- Updated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Possible enemy COAs (event templates).
- The restated mission.
- The commander’s and the higher commanders’ in- tent (two echelons above).
- The COA statement and sketch.
- The rationale for each COA, including— — Considerations that might affect enemy COAs. — Deductions resulting from a relative combat power analysis.
— Reason units are arrayed as shown on the sketch.
— Reason the staff used the selected control measures.
— Updated facts and assumptions. After the briefings, the commander gives any addi- tional guidance. If he rejects all COAs, the staff begins again. If he accepts one or more of the COAs, staff members begin the war-gaming process.
Course of Action Analysis (War Game) The COA analysis identifies which COA accom- plishes the mission with minimum casualties while best positioning the force to retain the initiative for future op- erations. It helps the commander and his staff to—
- Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and mini- mizing collateral damage.
- Have as near an identical vision of the battle as possible.
- Anticipate battlefield events.
- Determine conditions and resources required for success.
- Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities.
- Focus IPB on enemy strengths, weakneses, center of gravity, desired end state, and decisive points.
- Identify the coordination requirements to produce synchronized results.
- Determine the most flexible course of action.
The War-Gaming Process Course of action analysis is conducted using war gaming. The war game is a disciplined process, with rules and steps, that attempts to visualize the flow of a battle. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the area of operations. It relies heavily on a doctrinal foundation, tactical judg- ment, and experience. It focuses the staff’s attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. War gaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with tactical possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. War gaming is the most valuable step during COA analysis and comparison and should be allocated more time than any other step. How- ever, the commander or CofS (XO) must determine at this point how much time he can commit to the war- gaming process, and ensure this time line is followed. During the war game, the staff takes a COA and be- gins to develop a detailed plan, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. War gaming tests a COA or improves a developed COA. The com- mander and his staff may change an existing COA or de- velop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.
The General Rules of War Gaming War gamers need to—
- Remain objective, not allowing personality or their sensing of “what the commander wants” to influence them. They must avoid defending a COA just because they personally developed it.
- Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident.
- Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the COA. If a COA fails any of these tests during the war game, they must reject it.
- Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gather- ing facts to support such conclusions.
- Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This must wait until the comparison phase.
War-Gaming Responsibilities
The CofS (XO) is responsible for coordinating ac- tions of the staff during the war game.
The G1 (S1) analyzes COAs to project potential per- sonnel battle losses and determine how CSS provides personnel support during operations.
The G2 (S2) role-plays the enemy commander. He develops critical enemy decision points in relation to the friendly COA, projects enemy reactions to friendly ac- tions, and projects enemy losses. He captures the results of each enemy action and counteraction and correspond- ing friendly enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By try- ing to win the war game for the enemy, he ensures that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each en- emy COA. For the friendly force, he—
- Identifies information requirements and refines the event template to include NAIs that support decision points and refines the event matrix with corresponding DPs, target areas of interest (TAIs), and high-value tar- gets (HVTs).
- Refines situation templates.
- Participates in the targeting conference and identi- fies high-value targets as determined by IPB.
The G3 (S3) normally selects the techniques and methods that the staff will use for war gaming. He en- sures the war game of the COA covers every operational aspect of the mission, records each event’s strengths and weaknesses, and annotates the rationale. This is used later to compare COAs.
The G4 (S4) analyzes each COA to assess its sustain- ment feasibility. He determines critical requirements for each sustainment function by analyzing each COA to identify potential problems and deficiencies. He as- sesses the status of all sustainment functions required to support the COA and compares this to available assets. He identifies potential shortfalls and recommends ac- tions to eliminate or reduce their effect for that COA. While improvisation can contribute to responsiveness, only accurate prediction of requirements for each sus- tainment function can ensure the continuous sustain- ment of the force. In addition, the G4 (S4) ensures that available movement times and assets will support the course of action.
Special staff officers help the coordinating staff by analyzing the COAs in their own areas of expertise, indi- cating how they could best support the mission. Every staff member must determine the force requirements for external support, the risks, and each COA’s strengths and weaknesses.
War-Gaming Steps The staff follows eight steps during the war-gaming process:
- Gather the tools.
- List all friendly forces.
- List assumptions.
- List known critical events and decision points.
- Determine evaluation criteria.
- Select the war-game method.
- Select a method to record and display results.
- War-game the battle and assess the results. Step 1. Gather the Tools. The CofS (XO) directs the staff to gather the necessary tools, materials, and data for the war game. Units need to war-game on maps, sand ta- bles, or other tools that accurately reflect the nature of the terrain. The staff then posts the COA on a map dis- playing the operations area. Tools required include, but are not limited to—
- Current coordinating staff estimates.
- Event template.
- Recording method.
- Completed COAs, to include maneuver and R&S graphics.
- Means to post enemy and friendly unit symbols.
- Map of AO. Step 2. List all Friendly Forces. The commander and staff consider all available combat, CS, and CSS units that can be committed to the battle, paying special atten- tion to support relationships and constraints. The friendly force list remains constant for all COAs the staff analyzes. Step 3. List Assumptions. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued validity and necessity.
The avenue-in-depth technique focuses on one ave- nue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort (Figure 5-7). This technique is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.
The box technique is a detailed analysis of a criti- cal area, such as an engagement area (EA), a river- crossing site, or a landing zone ( LZ). (See Figure 5-8.) It is most useful when time is limited, as in a hasty attack. When using this technique, the staff iso- lates the area and focuses on critical events in it. Staff members assume that friendly units can handle most of the situations on the battlefield and focus their at- tention on essential tasks.
Step 7. Select a Method to Record and Display Re- sults. Recording the war game’s results gives the staff a record from which to build task organizations, synchro- nize activity, develop decision support templates (DSTs), confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or or- ders, and analyze COAs based on identified strengths and weaknesses. Two methods are used to portray the ac- tion—the synchronization matrix (Figure 5-9, page 5-20) and the sketch note. In both, staff members record any re- marks regarding the strengths and weaknesses they dis- cover. The amount of detail depends on the time available. Details and methods of recording and display- ing war-game results are best addressed in unit SOPs.
The synchronization matrix method allows the staff to synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the enemy COA. An advantage of this method is that it can be readily translated into a graphic decision-making product, such as a decision support template, at the war game’s conclusion. The first entry is time or phases of the operation. The sec- ond entry is the most likely enemy action as deter- mined by the G2 (S2). The third entry is the decision points for the friendly COA. The remainder of the matrix is developed around selected functional areas or the major subordinate commands of the unit con- ducting the war game. Other operations, functions, and units that are to be integrated, or the use of which the staff wants to highlight, can be incorporated into the matrix.
However, the passage of time between the creation of the synchronization matrix and the execution of opera- tions may result in changes to the initial conditions with respect to the enemy, status of friendly forces, and even weather. Once execution begins, the predictability of enemy actions at any point on the synchronization ma- trix decreases the further away those actions are on the time line. This decreases the likelhood that the synchro- nization matrix will be correct and increases the likeli- hood that adjustment to the plan will have to be made.
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
X
X X
BELT 1 BELT 2^ BELT 3
OBJ
X
X X
I I
III
X
Figure 5-7. Avenue-in-depth war-gaming technique
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
X
X X
BELT 1 BELT 2^ BELT 3
OBJ
X
X
III
X X
Figure 5-8. Box war-gaming technique
PLUM (^) BLUE
WHITE
BLACK
1 2
3 4
PL BOB PL BILL
PL TOMCABLE
X BOXES
X
ROSE
EA ACE
OBJ LARRY
OBJ PAUL
ATK 1
ATK 2
TIME -18hr^ -14hr
Enemy monitors movements Continue deep preparation
Cav prepares to screen north flank I Bde moves on routes 1 & 2 3 Bde moves on routes 1 & 2
Initiate movement
Recon secures routes
Confirm second belt and RAG position Route maintenance
Cannibalization authorized at DS level
Cache artillery ammunition
Initiate movement from AA ROSE Finance service suspended TAC CP with lead bde
NOTE: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit individual needs such as including information operations.
Establish div main CP
Replacements held at division
Confirm reserve position
Weapons HOLD Weapons TIGHT
AA ROSE
-12hr
ENEMY ACTION DECISION POINTS DEEP SECURITY CLOSE
M A N E U V E R C S S
RESERVE REAR AIR DEFENSE FIRE SUPPORT IEW
ENGINEER
MAN ARM FIX FUEL MOVE SUSTAIN C 2
Figure 5-9. Example of synchronization matrix
