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C O N T E N T S
- VI. 6th week (Common Carriers; Carriage of Passengers).................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 1 Del Prado v MRR, 52 Phil 900 –Respicio..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 2 Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. CA, 202 SCRA 574* -Perez de Tagle............................................................................................................................................................
- 3 La Mallorca v. CA, 179 SCRA 95* -Razon.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 4 Aboitiz Shipping v. CA, 179 SCRA 95* -Santos...............................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 5 PAL v. CA, 226 SCRA 423* -Superable............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 6 Japan Airlines v. CA, 294 SCRA 19 –Tandoc.................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 7 Bachelor Express, Inc. v. CA, 188 SCRA 216* -Tiu.....................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 8 Fortune Express, Inc. v. CA, 305 SCRA 14 –Puno.......................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 9 Gillaco v. MRR, 97 Phil 884 –Sanchez.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 10 Maranan v. Perez, 20 SCRA 412* -Nathan Oducado...............................................................................................................................................................................................
- 11 Manila Railroad v. Ballesteros, 16 SCRA 641* -Bascara.......................................................................................................................................................................................
- 12 Vda. De Abeto v. PAL, 115 SCRA 489* -Respicio......................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 13 PAL v. NLRC, 124 SCRA 583 –Aquino..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 14 Pilapil v. CA, 180 SCRA 546 –Benedicto......................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 15 Gacal v. PAL, 183 SCRA 189* -Chan..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 16 Quisumbing v. CA, 189 SCRA 605* -Cortez................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 17 Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil 181 -Cruz Nenzo........................................................................................................................................................................................
- 18 Lara v. Valencia, 104 Phil 65 -Dela Paz.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 19 Fabre, Jr. v. CA, 259 SCRA 426* -Geraldez..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
- 20 Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. CA, 246 SCRA 299* WRONG CASE. THIS IS FOR 7th WEEK.......................................................................................................................................
- 21 Mariano v. Callejas, 594 SCRA 569 –Lagos................................................................................................................................................................................................................
V I. 6 T H W E E K ( C O M M O N C A RR I E R S ; C A R R I A G E O F P A S S E N G E R S )
1 DEL PRADO V MRR, 52 PHIL 900 –RESPICIO
Doctrine: CARRIERS; STREET RAILWAY; PASSENGER BOARDING MOVING CAR; DUTY OF MOTORMAN NOT TO INCREASE RISK.-Though there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to take on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage, nevertheless when the motorman sees a person attempting to board the car while in motion, and at a place not appointed for stopping, he should not do any act to increase the peril of such person; and if, in violation of this duty, the motorman in charge of a car prematurely accelerates speed while the intending passenger is in the act of boarding the car, with the result that he slips and gets his foot crushed under the wheel of the moving car, the company is civilly liable in damages. Common Carrier Manila Electric Company Passenger Ignacio del Prado Problem Ignacio made " para " the street car. It slowed down, so Ignacio attempted to board as the it moving. But before he even secured his position, the operator jerked the street car forward causing Igancio to fall, his right foot crushed under the car amputated. Who won Passenger Ignacio del Prado EMERGENCY: Manila Electric operates street cars (ung mga mukhang tren sa lansangan, meron nito sa Pinas noong early 1900s. See footnote^1 ) The subject car traverses Hidalgo St. Manila. There are designated loading and unloading stops. However, Ignacio made " para " the car. The street car appeared to have slowed down and so Ignacio attempted to board as the train was moving: he held the rails with one hand and placed his one foot on the platform. But before he even secured his position, the operator jerked the street car forward causing igancio to fall, his foot crushed under the car. He was amputated. ISSUE: Who is at fault? The Manila Electric Company because of Culpa Contractual. Although Ignacio attempted to board the car at an undesignated loading station, the operated is still required to observe diligence. He cannot just jerk the car forward. The defense of diligence is not tenable because that only obtains culpa aquiliana. This is culpa contractual, and since there is a breach of duty, Manila Electric is liable. While ignacio may not be completely without fault, his fault is not the proximate cause of injury, but his actions warrant a reduction of damages. Dissent: the motorman did not see Ignacio boarding and he was careful, his alleged jerking of the streetcar is not true.
FACTS
the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City for the conveyance of passengers; 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as Manila Electric's motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance, however, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being made from the left. The car was of the kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the movement of the Ignacio was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the car was passing. The testimony of the Ignacio and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to shows that the Ignacio, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car, in response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping. Upon this the Ignacio seized, with his hand, the front perpendicular handspot, at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform. However, before the Ignacio's position had become secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached the flat form, the motorman applied the power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden impulse to the car caused the Ignacio's foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost, He therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day the member had to be amputated in the hospital. The witness, Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as the Ignacio started to board the car, he grasped the handpost on either side with both right and left hand. The latter statement may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the Ignacio, but we are of the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the motorman slowed up slightly as the Ignacio was boarding the car that the Ignacio's fall was due in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at the moment when the Ignacio put his foot on the platform is supported by the evidence and ought not to be disturbed by us. Issue: Is the manila electric liable? Yes. Ratio The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the Ignacio attempting to board the car; that he did not accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the Ignacio's witnesses; and that he in fact knew nothing of the incident until after the Ignacio had been hurt and some one called to him to stop. We are not convinced of the complete candor of this statement, for we are unable to see how a motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person boarding the car under the circumstances revealed in this case. It must be remembered that the front handpost which, as all witness agree, was grasped by the Ignacio in attempting to board the car, was immediately on the left side of the motorman.
o That the appellee acted with imprudence and lack of due care in attempting to board a street car while the same was in motion; and o That he contributed to his own injury, without any negligence or malice or imprudence on the part of the defendant. There is nothing in the record which even remotely justifies a contribution of damages between the appellee and the Manila Electric. The appellee should be required to suffer the damages which he himself, through his own negligence, occasioned, without any negligence, imprudence or malice on the part of the Manila Electric. Therefore, the judgment of the court a quo should be revoked, and the Manila Electric absolved from all liability under the complaint. 2 DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. V. CA, 202 SCRA 574* - PEREZ DE TAGLE DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents. October 7, 1991 REGALADO, J Doctrine: Civil Law; Contract of carriage; Case at bar; The victim in the case at bar, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation Common Carrier Dangwa Transportation Co. Passenger Pedrito Cudiamat Driver Lardizabal Problem Bus was at full stop when the victim Cudiamat boarded it. Driver prematurely stepped on the accelerator without waiting for passenger to first secure seat. Victim fell from the platform of the bus and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle. Who won Passenger EMERGENCY: SC decides to believe CA facts because the evidence is more persuasive. Bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat boarded the same. Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver in prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. Trial court rules for Dangwa; Pedrito is negligent. CA reverses. Dangwa is negligent (bus at full stop when Pedrito boarded; did not exhibit extraordinary diligence at that point; did not bring Pedrito to hospital within a reasonable time) SC sides with CA It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so o GPT : by stopping, bus offers services to public. Should have exercised EO diligence at that point. It did not. Instead it accelerated, causing Pedrito to fall and be crushed under the rear wheels. It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience o GPT : even assuming that the bus was moving, it was moving slowly. Court rules that a reasonable person would board a slow moving vehicle. Pedrito not negligent. In fact, CC’s need to exhibit EO diligence even in that case. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. The circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous indifference. SC affirms CA. Dangwa negligent. Pay heirs of Pedrito. COMPLETE FACTS: 1985, Benguet Injured Party’s Version: Allegedly, Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. Instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired. Dangwa’s Version: Dangwa alleges that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary
diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the supervision of the employees Alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident. Lower Courts Trial Court: Dangwa wins. Cudiamat Negligent. BUT Dangwa must pay Cudiamat heirs (equitable considerations) CA: Reversed. Dangwa loses. It is negligent. Issue: WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed. (NO) Held : WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED. Ratio: SC decides to review the facts because the lower court and the CA disagreed. Instant case falls under the exception to the GR that the SC is not a trier of facts. Trial Court This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a moving vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And, without having given the driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to board the bus. But defendants can also be found wanting of the necessary diligence. In this connection, it is safe to assume that when the deceased Cudiamat attempted to board defendants' bus, the vehicle's door was open instead of being closed CA Testimony of appellees' own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is evident that the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat boarded the same as it was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja alighted from the bus. Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee- driver in prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle SC sides with CA. Testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle , Corollary to their extraordinary diligence requirement, CC’s are required to exhibit such diligence when at full stop. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so Such duty extends to those passengers who board and alight slow moving CC’s It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. Cites Civil Code Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations. After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off. Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents. The trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses and costs. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of carriage already ceased at the time of the accident? NO HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as actual damages. RATIO: It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran. The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000. was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule.5 Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of
Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently, meritorious. 4 ABOITIZ SHIPPING V. CA, 179 SCRA 95* -SANTOS ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents. Doctrine: The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Common Carrier Aboitiz Shipping Corp. Passenger Anacleto Viana Problem VIANA who had already disembarked went back to the ship because he forgot his cargoes. While he pointed to the crew where his cargoes were located, the crane operated by Pioneer Stevedoring hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He died 3 days later. Who won Passenger Viana, although SC held Viana as contributorily negligent ER:
1. ANACLETO VIANA boarded a vessel owned by ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. it was bound for manila 2. At the pier, the passengers disembarked, a gangplank was provided to connect the side of the vessel with the pier. ANACLETO did not use this plank but disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. 3. Thereafter, PIONEER STEVEDORING took over the control of the cargoes loaded on the vessel pursuant to a memorandum of agreement between them and ABOITIZ. 4. 1 hour after the passengers had disembarked, PIONEER started to operate a crane to get the cargo. ANACLETO VIANA who had already disembarked went back to the ship cause he remembered that some of his cargoes was still **loaded in the vessel.
- He pointed to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were** loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He died after 3 days. 6. Heirs of VIANAS filed a complaint for breach of contract against ABOITIZ. ABOITIZ pointed to PIONEER: it was their employee, and the vessel was under their exclusive control. 7. Trial Court ordered ABOITIZ to pay, PIONEER to reimburse ABOITIZ. CA affirmed but absolved PIONEER from liability. 8. ABOITIZ contends that since an hour has passed from when the ship arrived ANACLETO is not anymore a passenger. 9. ISSUE: IS HE A PASSENGER? 10. SC YES. ABOITIZ is liable. It did not prove that PIONEER was negligent. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. 11. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. 12. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. 13. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in ABOITZ’ premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. FACTS:
deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit: It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad company and its agents. In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong , the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near ABOITIZ's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of ABOITIZ's business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, ABOITIZ cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from ABOITIZ's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage. It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked from the vessel. ABOITIZ failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in ABOITZ’ premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of ABOITIZ's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. More particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry
the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists. The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that ABOITIZ failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that ABOITIZ had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to prevent the accident from happening. As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does NOT show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by ABOITIZ. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept ABOITIZ's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a- vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that ABOITIZ was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers. While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still ABOITIZ's aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, ABOITZ has expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that ABOITIZ did not present sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross negligence. No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the part of PIONEER, a confirmation of the trial court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability. As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its liability. 5 PAL V. CA, 226 SCRA 423* -SUPERABLE
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS;
September 15, 1993 (NONS)
KEYWORD: diverted PAL plane, had to disembark in Cotabato instead of
Ozamis
DIVISION: First Division
PONENTE: Bellosillo
Common
Carrier
Philippine Airlines
Passenger Pedro Zapatos
Problem Plane can’t land in Ozamis because of wet runway, and
proceeded to Cotabato. Zapatos was supposed to disembark
in Ozamis.
Who won Passenger (Zapatos) but damages reduced
EMERGENCY RECIT
Pedro Zapatos was on board a PAL flight (Cebu-Ozamis-Cotabato) and he was
supposed to disembark in Ozamis. However, the plane can’t land because of the
weather conditions so the plane continued on to Cotabato. There, the diverted
passengers, including Zapatos, was given the option to either take a flight
leaving that day or stay in Cotabato and wait for the next flight 2 days from that
day. Zapatos was not able to take the flight. He demanded priority in
accommodation and was denied. He was given a free ticket to Iligan, but instead
of using it, he bought another ticket to go to Iligan and from there proceeded by
land and water to finally arrive in Ozamis. There, he filed a complaint for
HELD: 1. YES. 2. SOME, SINCE PAL WAS NEGLIGENT, BUT OTHER AWARD
OF DAMAGES WAS REDUCED. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with modification however that the award of moral damages of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is reduced to Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) while the exemplary damages of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) is also reduced to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The award of
actual damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
representing business losses occasioned by private respondent’s being
stranded in Cotabato City is deleted.
RATIO:
1. On PAL’s negligence not being alleged in the complaint
PAL’s contention that its negligence (failure to attend to the needs of
the diverted passengers, and the denial of the demand for priority) was
not put in issue in the complaint is wrong.
The amended complaint touched on PAL’s indifference and inattention
to his predicament. It was alleged that PAL allowed other passengers
to take Zapatos’ seat in the PAL plane bound for Cebu, leaving him
stranded and exposed to the peril and danger of Muslim rebels
plundering at the time, which entitles Zapatos to damages.
According to Zapatos’ testimony:
o He was the last passenger left in the terminal, and that he can’t
find transportation to bring him to Cotabato City. He was able
to find a vehicle at around 7pm which brought him to the city.
He was asked who he was and what he was doing there.
o According to his conversation with the manager, the manager
told him that it was not their fault that he was stranded. After
a while, he saw a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel and he
stopped the vehicle to ask for a ride to Cotabato City. He was
not accommodated.
(EVIDENCE related) PAL did not object to the introduction of evidence
alleging that it was negligent in caring for its stranded passengers. The
rule is that objection must be made at the time the evidence being
objected to is being offered or when the question to the witness is
being asked/when it was being answered. There being no objection,
such evidence becomes property of the case and all the parties are
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the
evidence.
PAL tried to rebut the testimony (that PAL actually helped Zapatos!)
but it failed to do so. In fact, Zapatos was able to state that PAL did not
even try to accommodate him while he was in Cotabato City.
Having joined in the issue over the alleged lack of care it exhibited
towards its passengers, PAL cannot now turn around and feign
surprise at the outcome of the case. When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
2. On the damages awarded (and common carrier related)
PAL asserts that the award of damages was improper.
o The diversion of the flight was due to fortuitous event, thus it
was not charged with the task of looking after the passengers’
comfort and convenience. If it was made liable, it was beyond
its duties as a common carrier.
o Even if PAL was negligent, PAL cannot be liable in damages in
the absence of fraud or bad faith since (1) Zapatos failed to tell
PAL the nature of his trip and possible business losses; and,
(1) Zapatos should be blamed because he unreasonably
refused to use the free ticket.
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public
interest, the law requires common carriers to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
In Air France v. Carrascoso, the SC held that the air carrier generates a
relation attended with a public duty, and as it invites people to avail of
the comforts and advantages it offers.
While it is true that the diversion was due to inclement weather,
nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL’s contract with its
passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to
operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations
as in the case at bar.
The contractual relation between the passenger and the carrier
continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carrier’s premises. Hence, PAL
necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in
safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded
passengers until they have reached their final destination.
Yet, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between
government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that
the Zapatos was a stranger to the place.
As the CA correctly ruled, it has not been disputed by PAL that Ozamis
City has no all weather airport and has to cancel its flight to Ozamis
City or by-pass it in the event of inclement weather.
o Knowing this fact, it becomes the duty of defendant to provide
all means of comfort and convenience to its passengers when
they would have to be left in a strange place in case of such by-
passing.
o No evidence was presented that PAL accommodated the 7
passengers who were left at Cotabato City for the 2 days they
had to wait for the next flight.
o If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a
fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only cause (Art. 1755
C.C., Art. 1733 C.C.) Since part of the failure to comply with
the obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers
safely to their destination lay in PAL’s failure to provide
comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using
extra-ordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is
not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due
to something which PAL could have prevented, PAL
becomes liable to Zapatos.
However, there’s no basis that PAL failed to inform Zapatos about the
fact that he can’t take Flight 560. It was proved that based on the
report that the Station Agent submitted to his Branch Manager in
Cotabato City on Aug. 3, 1975 that Zapatos was informed of PAL’s
policies on his non-accommodation.
The report an entry in the course of business is prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. Zapatos did not offer any evidence that would
have controverted the report. Also, if it was true that PAL omitted to
inform the diverted passengers of their options, the other passengers
would have complained. In this case, only Zapatos complained.
Also, it should be noted that Zapatos’ demand to be given priority in
accommodation was unreasonable considering that it was force
majeure that caused the flight’s diversion. This unreasonable demand
also led to his staying longer in the airport than necessary. According
to his testimony, by the time that he finished arguing with the PAL
personnel, he was the only one left out of 16 passengers who had to
stay in Cotabato City.
There’s also no evidence to support that PAL employees were
disrespectful and inattentive towards Zapatos. On the contrary,
Zapatos was attended to not only by the personnel of PAL but also by
its Manager.
Because of this, the award of P50,000.00 (unreasonably excessive!) in
moral damages was reduced to P10,000.00, and the award of P10,
in exemplary damages was reduced to P5,000.00.
Moral damages are not intended to enrich Zapatos. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action.
The actual damages of P5,000.00 representing Zapatos’ alleged
business losses due to his stay in Cotabato City is also baseless.
Zapatos’ testimony that he had a scheduled business “transaction of
shark liver oil supposedly to have been consummated on August 3,
1975 in the morning” and that “since (private respondent) was out for
nearly two weeks I missed to buy about 10 barrels of shark liver oil,”
are purely speculative.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be
duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have
suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.
6 JAPAN AIRLINES V. CA, 294 SCRA 19 –TANDOC
Doctrine : Adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks Common Carrier Japan Air Lines Passenger Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose Miranda Problem The 2nd^ leg of the flight from Japan-Manila kept getting cancelled coz NAIA was inaccessible due to the ash fall from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. After a few days, JAL refused to pay for the hotel and accommodation expense of passengers during their stay in Narita Japan. Who won JAL was not held liable for the passengers’ living expenses while in Japan. But JAL was liable for nominal damages coz passengers were obliged to make the necessary flight arrangements themselves EMERGENCY: On June 13, 1991, Jose Miranda, et al rode on an airplane operated by Japan Air Lines (JAL). The flight was from United States to Manila with an overnight stopover in Narita, Japan. JAL bound itself to pay the expenses for the overnight stay in Japan. They arrived in Japan on June 14. The next day, they went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, NAIA was inaccessible due to the ash fall. The trip to Manila was suspended indefinitely. Their flight was rebooked to June 16. However, to their dismay, the said flight was cancelled. JAL also informed Miranda, et al that it would not shoulder anymore their hotel and accommodation expenses. Hence they were forced to pay said expenses which they incurred from June 16-21.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume. Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.
- We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents’ living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from “transit passengers” to “new passengers” as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day. We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA’s closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination. Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. 7 BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC. V. CA, 188 SCRA 216* -TIU Doctrine: In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Rephrased: A common carrier must prove both force majeure and extraordinary diligence to avoid liability. Common Carrier Bachelor Express Passenger Ornominio and Narcisa Problem Stabbing incident inside the bus, leading to a commotion and a stampede, killing Ornomio and Narcisa in the process Who won Passengers (heirs) ER: Ornominio and Narcisa were passengers in a bus by Bachelor Express en route to Cagayan de Oro. While the bus was in Butuan, it picked up a passenger and 15 minutes thereafter, one of its other passengers stabbed a PC soldier, causing commotion and panic. The other passengers pushed and shoved their way out of the lone exit of the bus and Ornominio and Narcisa died as a result of this stampede. The heirs of Ornominio and Narcisa filed a complaint for a sum of money against Bachelor and driver Rivera. The RTC, siding with Bachelor that the incident was a fortuitous event, dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and held Bachelor and Rivera solidarily liable, prompting the latter to elevate the case to the SC. Can Bachelor be held liable? Yes. The SC agreed with Bachelor that the stabbing was a fortuitous event, but ruled that a fortuitous event, alone, is not enough to absolve a common carrier from liability – the common carrier must also show that it exercised extraordinary diligence under the circumstances. Here, The SC agreed with the findings of the CA that 1) the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; 2) the bus was speeding from a full stop; 3) the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; 4) the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; 5) and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law. Thus, Bachelor failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law. Passengers win. COMPLETE Facts: On 1 August 1930, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. ( Bachelor ) and driven by Cresencio Rivera ( Rivera ) was the situs of a stampede, resulting in the death of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. - The bus came from Davao on its way to Cagayan de Oro. While passing through Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger. About 15 minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier, causing commotion and panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio and Narcisa were found lying down the road dead. The passenger assailant tried to escape but was killed by the police.
- The heirs (parents) of Ornominio and Narcisa, filed a complaint for sum of money against Bachelor, its alleged owner Samson Yasay, and driver Rivera.
- Bachelor denied liability for the death the passengers, arguing that Rivera was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective places of destination except Ornominio and Narcisa, who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor. Moreover, the incident was not a traffic or vehicular accident, such that it was beyond Bachelor’s control.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed and held Bachelor and Rivera solidarily liable.
- Bachelor appealed and maintained that that proximate cause was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and stabbed another passenger of the bus. The stabbing incident triggered off the commotion among the passengers who pushed one another and that presumably out of fear and moved by that human instinct of self-preservation, Narcisa and Ornominio jumped off the bus while the bus was still running resulting in their untimely death. Issue: Was the stabbing a fortuitous event? In the affirmative, did Bachelor exercise extraordinary diligence? Yes and no. Held : (1) In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. Here, Ornominio and Narcisa were passengers of Bachelor and, while passengers therein, suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence. (2) Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
- A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
- Some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor or of his employees is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Here, the running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other, resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Narcisa and Ornominio causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. (4) [IMPORTANT] However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure , it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.
- For the defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper, the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human intervention. Here, as found by the CA, the negligence of Bachelor, through its employees, was exemplified by the driver's belated stop and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast speed. At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative officer, Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on passengers and the public at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the two deceased, jumped out of the window, leading it to conclude that Bachelor is not liable for their deaths. But there is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door of the bus was locked as to prevent the passengers from passing through. Cullano, testifying for the defense, clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the passengers were shouting that the bus stop while they were in a state of panic. Better categorically stated that she actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the force of the onrushing passengers. 8 FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC. V. CA, 305 SCRA 14 –PUNO Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Paulie U. Caorong, and minor children Yasser King Caorong, Rose Heinni and Prince Alexander, all surnamed Caorong, and represented by their mother Paulie U. Caorong G.R. NO. 119756 18 March 1999 Mendoza, J. Key Words: Ambush of Bus, Passenger died, Carrier liable Doctrine: a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts of other passengers , if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Common Carrier Fortune Express Inc. Passenger Atty. Talib Caorong (deceased passenger, represented by Heirs) Problem 3 armed Maranaos pretended to be passengers & seized the bus.
For example, a common carrier was liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned. (Vasquez v CA) This factor of unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of Fortune’s buses and the assurance of Fortune’s Operations Manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by Fortune to protect the safety of passengers. NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE Atty. Caorong was not guilty of contributory negligence. He was allowed by the armed men to retrieve whatever he needed from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the Good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness. AWARD The following were granted as recoverable damages:
- Indemnity for death - P50,000 (per Art. 1764 in re Art. 2206)
- Actual Damages – P30,000 (for the wake and burial per Art. 2199)
- Moral Damages – P100,000 (per Art. 2006)
- Exemplary Damages – P100,000 (per Art. 2232)
- Attorney’s Fees: P50,000 (per Art. 2208)
- Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity – P2,121,404.
- Costs of Suit 9 GILLACO V. MRR, 97 PHIL 884 –SANCHEZ Doctrine:
- EXTENT OF CARRIERS' LIABILITY.- While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it.
- RULE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF 1889.- The old Civil Code of 1889 did not impose upon carriers absolute liability for assaults of their employees upon the passenger.
- CARRIER Is EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY FOR ACTS NOT DONE IN LINE OF DUTY.- Where the crime was committed by a train guard who had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the victim, the crime stands on the Common Carrier Manila Rail Road (MRR) Passenger Lieutenant Tomas Gillaco Problem An off-duty TRAIN GUARD of MRR SHOT Gillaco due to a long standing personal grudge Who won CC MRR, there’s no way MRR could foresee or avoid the incident by exercising extraordinary diligence ER: GILLACO was a passenger of Manila Rail Road from Calamba to Manila. The train stopped at Paco station. DEVESA, a train guard of MRR assigned at the Manila-San Fernando La Union line, was waiting for the train to transport him to Tutuban station. DEVESA SHOT GILLACO upon seeing him at the train coach (due to a personal grudge). GILLACO died. His wife sued MRR and the CFI granted her 4,000 pesos as damages. MRR appeals. Issue: WON MRR is liable as a common carrier for the act of its employees. NO! Ratio: [1] The responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. MRR had no means to foresee the personal grudge between GILLACO and DEVESA. [2] DEVESA is to be treated as a stranger or a co-passenger because his duty has not yet started at the Paco station. He’s only on his way to work when he shot GILLACO. FACTS: - At 7:30 AM of April 1, 1946, Lieutenant Tomas Gillaco was a passenger of Manila Railroad from Calamba to Manila. - When the train reached Paco station, Emilio Devesa, a TRAIN GUARD of MRR assigned in the Manila-San Fernando La Union line, while waiting to be transported to Tutuban station, SHOT Gillaco with his carbine furnished by MRR to him. This was because Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Gillaco dating back during the Japanese occupation. - Gillaco died. Devesa was convicted of homicide. - The wife of Gillaco sued MRR for the death of Tomas. The CFI of Laguna sentenced MRR to pay the wife 4,000 pesos as damages. - MRR appeals the finding of the CFI. ISSUE: WON MRR is liable as a common carrier for the act of its employee. (NO. It is not liable.) HELD: Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint ordered dismissed, without costs. So ordered. RATIO: - There can be no quarrel with the principle that a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. But under the law of the case, this responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. - The old Civil Code of 1889 did not impose upon carriers absolute liability for assaults of their employees upon the passenger. [Carlo: The old Civil Code was used because the NCC took effect on August 30, 1950. The shooting incident was on 1946.]
o But as can be inferred from the previous jurisprudence of this Court, the Civil Code of 1889 did not impose such absolute liability (Lasam vs. Smith, supra). The liability of a carrier as an insurer was not recognized in this jurisdiction.
- The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was **entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co.
- The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet,** nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. - Finally, when the crime took place, DEVESA had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of GILLACO from Calamba to Laguna. o Devesa had only been waiting to be transported to Tutuban station, where his duty will start. At this point in time, he is to be treated as a stranger or co-passenger in relation to Gillaco. o A carrier is exempt from liability for acts not done in line of duty. 10 MARANAN V. PEREZ, 20 SCRA 412* -NATHAN ODUCADO ANTONIA MARANAN v. PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL G.R. No. L-22272 - June 26, 1967 BENGZON, J.P., J. DOCTRINE: Because of Art. 1759, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. Excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders is not a defense. Common Carrier Taxicab Company owned and operated by Pascual Perez Driver Valenzuela Passenger Rogelio Corachea Problem Passenger Corachea was stabbed and killed by the taxicab driver Who won Passenger Corachea Emergency Recit: Corachea was stabbed and killed by the taxicab driver, Valenzuela. Perez owns and operates the taxicab company. Valenzuela was found guilty. While the criminal case was pending, Maranan (Corachea’s mother) filed for damages against Perez and Valenzuela. Perez claimed that it was a caso fortuito , hence the CC is not liable. TC ruled against Perez and dismissed the damages case against Valenzuela. ISSUE: WON Perez, as the operator, should be held liable to the acts committed by its employee, Valenzuela. YES. Perez, as the operator, should be held liable to the acts committed by its employee, Valenzuela. It is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. Excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders is not a defense. It is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude. Facts:
- Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab (owned and operated by Pascual Perez) when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela, was found guilty by the CFI of Batangas and was sentenced to imprisonment as well as to indemnify the heirs of Corachea.
- While Valenzuela’s appeal is pending in the CA, Atonia Maranan, mother of Corachea, filed for damages against Perez (Operator) and Valenzuela Valenzuela and Perez argued that it was self-defense since Corachea assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Perez further claimed that it was a caso fortuito , hence the CC is not liable.
- The trial court ruled against Perez and dismissed the case against Valenzuela (damages case). Issue: W/N Perez, as the operator, should be held liable to the acts committed by its employee, Valenzuela. YES. Held: Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest. Ratio: Defendant’s reliance on ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co. In that case, the Court held that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. However, the facts are very different. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. In this case, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. He was therefore acting within his scope of duty when it was committed. Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 Old Civ Code did not impose upon CC absolute liability for the safety of passengers against willful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civ Code and Art. 1174 of the new Civ Code, clearly removed the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. New Civil Code expressly imposes liability to common carriers for assaults committed by its employees Art. 1759 of the New Civil code states that, Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
