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Tobacco usage
Typology: Study Guides, Projects, Research
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Thousands of internal tobacco industry documents released through litigation and whistleblowers reveal the most astonishing systematic corporate deceit of all time. What follows is a survey of the documents, 1,200 relevant and revealing quotes grouped under common themes.
Chapter 1 Smoking and health Publicly the industry denied and continues to deny that it is clear that smoking causes lung cancer - yet it has understood the carcinogenic nature of its product since the 1950s. It is now clear that the industry’s stance on smoking and health is determined by lawyers and public relations concerns.
Chapter 2 Nicotine and addiction Until recently the industry has denied its product is addictive. Most recently it has used a definition of addictiveness so broad that it encompasses shopping and the Internet. Internally, it has known since the 1960s that the crucial selling point of its product is the chemical dependence of its customers. Without nicotine addiction there would be no tobacco industry. Nicotine addiction destroys the industry’s PR and legal stance that smoking is a matter of choice.
Chapter 3 Marketing to children The companies deny that they target the young. The documents reveal the obvious - that the market of young smokers is of central importance to the industry. Many documents reveal the companies’ pre-occupation with teenagers and younger children - and the lengths they have gone to in order to influence smoking behaviour in this age group.
Chapter 4 Advertising The industry maintains that advertising is used only to fight for brand share and that it does not increase total consumption - academic research shows otherwise. The documents show that advertising is crucial in nurturing the motivation to smoke by creating or projecting the positive values, such as independence, machismo, glamour or intelligence, erroneously associated with the product.
Chapter 5 Cigarette design The documents show that the companies initially hoped to make safer cigarettes, but then abandoned the enterprise when it recognised that this would expose their existing products as ‘unsafe’. The industry has deliberately promoted ‘low-tar’ cigarettes knowing that they would offer false reassurance without health benefits. It has manipulated nicotine and introduced additives to change the delivery of nicotine. It recognises the cigarette as a drug delivery device.
Chapter 6 Second-hand smoke The industry is challenged by second-hand smoke in two ways. First, measures to protect non-smokers will reduce the opportunities to smoke and contribute to its social unacceptability. Second, the ‘freedom to smoke’ arguments are confounded if non-smokers are harmed. The industry has refused to accept the now overwhelming consensus regarding the harm caused by second-hand smoke - instead it has denied and obfuscated, and sought to influence debate by buying up scientists on a spectacular scale.
Chapter 7 “Emerging markets” Faced with reducing levels of smoking in the West and an insatiable need for money, the companies have moved aggressively into developing countries and Eastern Europe. The documents reveal an arrogance and fanaticism that has imperialist echoes.
1 Smoking and health
“A demand for scientific proof is always a formula for inaction and delay and usually the first reaction of the guilty … in fact scientific proof has never been, is not and should not be the basis for political and legal action”
An example of (private) candour from a scientist at the tobacco company BAT 1. (S J Green
1.1 Summary
At the beginning of the fifties, research was published showing a statistical link between smoking and lung cancer. At the same time the tobacco industry’s own research began to find carcinogens in smoke and began to confirm the relationship between smoking and cancer. This posed a serious problem for the industry: whether to admit to the health problems and try and find marketable solutions, or whether to basically deny everything.
In the face of mounting damning evidence against their product, the companies responded by creating doubt and controversy surrounding the health risks, whilst at the same time by responding to the growing public concern by putting filters on cigarettes and promising research into the health effects of smoking. They lulled the smoking public into a false sense of security, because, whilst this had the hallmarks of responsible companies acting in the public interest, it was actually a public relations strategy to buy time, at the expense of public health.
Many of the internal documents reveal that the industry was trying to look responsible in public, but privately was out to convince the public that smoking was not harmful. Despite decades of evidence to the contrary, and millions of deaths caused by tobacco, the industry still largely maintains that the case against the cigarette is unproven.
1.3 What the industry knew and what it said
Independent research shows there is a problem
Dr. Richard Doll and Professor Bradford Hill publish an article in the BMJ , which states that there is a: “real association between carcinoma of the lung and smoking. ” 8 (1952) The US journal Cancer Research publishes details of experiments undertaken by Dr. Ernest Wynder on mice, which show that 44 per cent of animals whose skin was painted with smoke condensate developed cancerous tumours. Wynder notes that the “ suspected human carcinogen has thus been proven to be a carcinogen for a laboratory animal. ” 9 (1996)
Tobacco companies seem to accept it
“ Studies of clinical data tend to confirm the relationship between heavy and prolonged tobacco smoking and incidence of cancer of the lung. ” 10 (RJR,
Respond with public relations
Companies are advised they need a two-pronged PR attack to “ get the industry out of this hole. ” 11 (Hill and Knowlton,1953) Leading PR firm Hill & Knowlton are hired: “ We have one essential job -- which can be simply said: Stop public panic … There is only one problem – confidence, and how to establish it; public assurance, and how to create it... And, most important, how to free millions of Americans from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths – regardless of any pooh-poohing logic - every time they light a cigarette ”.^12 (Hill and Knowlton, 1953)
Tobacco companies start the denials
The US tobacco industry responded to the public concern by producing the ‘Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers’, which sets the tone for the next few decades: “Distinguished authorities point out:
1. That medical research of recent years indicates
many possible causes of lung cancer.
2. That there is no agreement among the authorities **regarding what the cause is.
…but take care to avoid commitments
An early draft of the Frank Statement, includes the following text, which is struck out before publication: “We will never produce and market a product shown to be the cause of any serious human ailment … The Committee will undertake to keep the public informed of such facts as may be developed relating to cigarette smoking and health and other pertinent matters. ” 14 (Tobacco Industry Research Committee, December, 1953)
UK Government accepts there is a problem in 1954
“I have come to the conclusion that the statistical evidence does point to a causal relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer, but that there are important qualifications. There is no precise evidence of how tobacco smoking causes lung cancer or indeed of the extent to which one causes the other.”^15 (Minister of Health, 1954).
Industry public denials continue
“ there still isn't a single shred of substantial evidence to link cigarette smoking and lung cancer directly. ” 16 (RJR, 1954)
Industry scientists accept privately there is a problem and want to tackle it…
Alan Rodgmen, a chemist for RJ Reynolds, argues that: “ Since it now well-established that cigarette smoke does contain several polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and considering the potential and actual carcinogenic activity of a number of these compounds, a method of either complete removal or almost complete removal of these compounds from smoke is required.”^17 (Cited in Dirty Business, 1998)
Worried tobacco scientists want to find a solution
Alan Rodgman, a research chemist with RJ Reynolds writes that the company is publicly denying a link between smoking and cancer in public, whilst the company’s own research shows there is a link. “ What would be the effect on this company of not publishing these data now, but being required at some future date to disclose such data, possibly in the unfavourable atmosphere of a lawsuit? … It is recommended that the Company’s management recognise that many members of its Research Department are intensely concerned about the cigarette smoke-health problem and eager to participate in its study and solution .” 23 (RJR,
UK and US evidence accumulates
The Royal College of Physicians issues the first major report on “Smoking and Health”, which concludes: “ Cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer and bronchitis … cigarette smoking is the most likely cause of the recent world-wide increase in deaths from lung cancer.”^24 (RCP, 1962) The First Report of the US Surgeon-General, “Smoking and Health”, concludes: “ Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men; the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs all other factors.”^25 (US Dept. of Health, 1964)
Lawyers suggest warnings to offset against liability
“ I have no wish to be tarred and feathered, but I would suggest the industry might serve itself on several fronts if it voluntarily adopted a package legend such as ‘excessive use of this product may be injurious to health of susceptible persons’ … This is so controversial a suggestion – indeed shocking- that I would rather not try to anticipate the arguments against it in this note but reserve my defence. ” 26 (Brown and Williamson, 1963)
Lawyers must be put in charge
The strategy became increasingly defensive and early talk of safer cigarettes and scientific solutions to the problem gave way to denial and a legal approach: “ The main power on the smoking and health situation undoubtedly rests with the lawyers ... the U.S. cigarette manufacturers are not looking for means to reduce the long-term activity of cigarettes. ” 27 (P Rogers, G Todd, 1964)
The public Following the US Surgeon General’s report of January 1964, a Philip Morris
denials continue
director dismissed the findings:
“ We don’t accept the idea that there are harmful agents in tobacco. ” 28 (Philip Morris, 1964)
Lawyers arguing to “research the disease” not tobacco
According to a memo taken by Brown and Williamson, Janet Brown an attorney with American Brands argued in favour… “ of the long established policy to ‘research the disease’ as opposed to researching questions more directly related to tobacco … first, we maintain the position that the existing evidence of a relationship between the use of tobacco and health is inadequate to justify research more closely related to tobacco, and, secondly, that the study of the disease keeps constantly alive the argument that, until basic knowledge of the disease itself is further advanced, it is scientifically inappropriate to devote the major effort to tobacco.”^29 (Brown and Williamson, 1968)
And there’s a agreement to scale down in- house research
Philip Morris Vice President Helmut Wakeham, writes about a ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ under which the companies had agreed to refrain from conducting in- house biological experiments on tobacco smoke: “We have reason to believe that in spite of gentlemans [sic] agreement from the tobacco industry in previous years that at least some of the major companies have been increasing biological studies within their own facilities.”^30. (Philip Morris, undated c. 1965)
Respond by creating controversy and contradiction
Carl Thompson from Hill and Knowlton writes a letter on the best angles for the industry magazine, Tobacco and Health Research : “The most important type of story is that which casts doubt in the cause and effect theory of disease and smoking. Eye-grabbing headlines were needed and “should strongly call out the point – Controversy! Contradiction! Other Factors! Unknowns!”^31 (Hill and Knowlton, 1968)
Focus tobacco industry research on denying
Helmut Wakeham, Head of Research and Development of Philip Morris, writes: “Let's face it. We are interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegations that cigarette smoking causes disease.”^32 (Philip Morris, 1970)
Evidence is so great it is time to change tack on causation
A “strictly confidential” internal BAT document says “While in the past it has seemed good sense for the industry to contest the validity of all the evidence against smoking (and may still be necessary to avoid damages in lawsuits), there is little doubt that the inflexibility of this attitude is beginning to create in some countries hostility and even contempt for the industry among intelligent, fair-minded doctors … it is thought that we should reconsider our basic answer on causation.”^38 (BAT, 1970)
…the “we are not doctors” stance is not working
Dr Green from BAT writes : “I believe it will not be possible indefinitely to maintain the rather hollow ‘we are not doctors’ stance and that, in due course, we shall have to come up in public with a more positive approach towards cigarette safety.”^39 (BAT, 1972)
…and it was only ever PR anyway…
A memo from Fred Panzer of the US Tobacco Institute says: “It is my strong belief that we now have an opportunity to take the initiative in the cigarette controversy, and turn it around. For twenty years, this industry has employed a single strategy to defend itself on three major fronts – litigation, politics and public opinion. While the strategy was brilliantly conceived and executed … it is not - nor was it intended to be - a vehicle for victory. On the contrary, it has always been a holding strategy, consisting of
− Creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it.
− Advocating the public’s right to smoke, without actually urging them to take up the practice. − Encouraging objective scientific research as the only way to resolve the question of health hazard.”^40 (Tobacco Institute, 1972)
Meanwhile the public denial continues
“It is our opinion … that the repeated assertion without conclusive proof that cigarettes cause disease
- however well-intentioned - constitutes a disservice to the public.”^41 (Brown and Williamson, 1971)
We have retreated behind impossible demands for “scientific proof”
“The industry has retreated behind impossible demands for ‘scientific proof’ whereas such proof has never been required as a basis for action in the legal and political fields … It may therefore be concluded that for certain groups of people smoking causes the incidence of certain diseases to be higher than it would otherwise be … A demand for scientific proof is always a formula for inaction and delay and usually the first reaction of the guilty.”^42 (BAT, 1976)
Publicly: “we are not doctors”
Imperial Tobacco shrugs and stands by the 'we are not doctors' ploy: “As a company we do not make, indeed we are not qualified to make, medical judgements. We are therefore not in a position either to accept or to reject statements made by the Minister of Health.”^43 (Imperial Tobacco UK, 1975)
So the denials continue
“None of the things which have been found in tobacco smoke are at concentrations which can be considered harmful. Anything can be considered harmful. Apple sauce is harmful if you get too much of it.”^44 (Philip Morris, 1976).
Industry wrestles with its credibility gap
A secret BAT document shows that: “The company’s position on causation is simply not believed by the overwhelming majority of independent observers, scientists and doctors … The industry is unable to argue satisfactorily for its own continued existence, because all arguments eventually lead back to the primary issue of causation, and at this point our position is unacceptable … our position on causation, which we have maintained for some twenty years in order to defend our industry is in danger of becoming the very factor which inhibits our long term viability … On balance, it is the opinion of this department that we should now move to position B, namely, that we acknowledge ‘the probability that smoking is harmful to a small percentage of heavy smokers’…. By giving a little we may gain a lot. By giving nothing we stand to lose everything.”^45 (BAT,
Murray Walker, Vice President and Chief Spokesperson for the Tobacco Institute, testifying at the Minnesota Trial: “We don't believe it's ever been established that smoking is the cause of disease.”^51 (M. Walker 1998)
But the denials continue into 1998 and under oath
Geoffrey Bible, Chairman of Philip Morris, testifies at the Minnesota trial: “I'm unclear in my own mind whether anyone dies of cigarette smoking-related diseases.”^52 (Cited in Pioneer Press
…and fudging continues in the press
John Carlisle of the Tobacco Manufacturers Association is questioned in a magazine: Question : Does it [smoking] cause lung cancer? John Carlisle : “There's no shortage of statistics: it's extraordinary the amount of research that has gone into our product and the many and varied opinions that people hold about it.”^53 (UK TMA, 1998)
..and to the BBC the industry still will not give a straight answer
Following the release of a 1970 memo showing that Gallaher accepted that smoking caused lung cancer, John Carlisle of the TMA is interviewed on BBC Radio’s flagship Today programme. Question: “What would it take to convince you that tobacco can be harmful, Mr Carlisle, if this doesn’t? John Carlisle: “Well, I … one cannot pull out just one report which has been leaked to a national newspaper and say this is the evidence we have been waiting for.” Apparently Mr. Carlisle has not noticed numerous reports of the Royal College of Physicians and US Surgeon General, and is still waiting for evidence. Question: “But Mr. Carlisle this is absolutely conclusive evidence that, apart from what the research shows, that Gallahers has concealed conclusive knowledge about the harmful effects of tobacco for all those 30 years.” John Carlisle: “… There is no such thing as conclusive evidence when you are talking about such a vast subject.”^54
1.4 References
(^1) S. J Green, BAT, 1980 (^2) Health Education Authority, Unpublished, London, 1996, December. (^3) Office of National Statistics, 1998, General Register Office for Scotland, 1998. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 1998. Figures for 1996. (^4) Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health, 1998. See para 1.5 page 17. (^5) R. Peto, A. Lopez, J. Boreham et al_. Mortality from Smoking in Developed Countries 1950-2000_ , Oxford, ICRF and WHO. OUP, 1994. Updated 1997. (^6) R. Peto, A. Lopez, J. Boreham, 1994. op cit. (^7) US Surgeon General, Smoking and Health , 1988. (^8) Dr. Bradford Hill, Letter quoted in Central Health Services Council , Standing Cancer and Radiotherapy Advisory Committee, Note by the Secretary, 1952, May. (^9) P. J. Hilts, Smokescreen - The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up , 1996, Addison Wesley, p4; R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris , Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p161-2. (^10) C. Teague, RJ Reynolds, Survey of Cancer Research with Emphasis Upon Possible Carcinogens from Tobacco , 1953, 2 February. (^11) B. Goss, Hill and Knowlton: Background Material on the Cigarette Industry Client, Minutes of Meeting, 1953, 15 December (Minnesota Trial Exhibit 18,905). (^12) Hill and Knowlton, Memo, 1953, December, quoted on www.tobacco.org. (^13) TIRC , A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers , 1954, 4 January. (^14) Comments on the Frank Statement to the Public by the Makers of Cigarettes, 1953, 26 December. (^15) Minister of Health, Memorandum on Tobacco Smoking and Cancer of the Lung to the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee, 1954, 26 January. (^16) Quoted in Report of Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations Regarding Non-Liggett Privilege Claims , Minnesota Trial Court File Number C1-94-8565, 1998, 8 March, quoting Pioneer Press , 1954, 24 October. (^17) P. Pringle, Dirty Business – Big Tobacco at the Bar of Justice , Aurum Press, 1998, p130-1. (^18) RD 14 Smoke Group Programme for Coming 12-16 Week Period, Southampton Research and Development Establishment (R&DE), British American Tobacco Company, Ltd, 1957. (^19) Report on Visit to USA and Canada by H R. Bentley, DGI Felton and WW Reid of BAT, 1958, 17 April – 12 May (Minnesota Trial Exhibit 11,028). (^20) P. J. Hilts, Smokescreen - The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up , 1996, Addison Wesley, p26 quoting C. V. Mace, Memo to R. N. DuPuis, untitled, 1958, 24 July. (^21) E. J. Partridge, Letter to Sir John Hawton, 1956, 9 March. (^22) P. J. Hilts, Smokescreen - The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up , 1996, Addison Wesley, p25 quoting A. D. Little, Confidential Limited Memo, L&M – A Perspective Review, 1961, 15 March. (^23) A. Rodgman, A Critical and Objective Appraisal of The Smoking and Health Problem, 1962, (Minnesota Trial Exhibit 18,187). (^24) Royal College of Physicians, Smoking and Health. A Report of the Royal College of Physicians on Smoking in Relation to Cancer of the Lung and Other Diseases , Pitman Medical Publishing Company, 1962, p43. (^25) US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking and Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon- General of the Public Health Service , US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1964, Public Health Service Publication No 1103. (^26) A. Yeaman, Implications of Battelle Hippo 1 & 11 and the Griffith Filter, 1963, 17 July, Memo (S. Glantz, J. Slade, L. Bero, P. Hanauer, D. Barnes, The Cigarette Papers , University of California Press, 1996, Document Number 1802.05). (^27) P. Rogers, G. Todd, Strictly Confidential , Reports on Policy Aspects of the Smoking and Health Situations in USA , 1964, October. (^28) H. Cullman, board member of Philip Morris. 1964. Cited in R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris , Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p (^29) Brown and Williamson, Internal Letter, 1968, 19 January (Minnesota Trial Exhibit 21,804). (^30) S. Karnowski, 'Gentlemen's Agreement' is one key to State's Tobacco Case, AP/Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune , 1998, 23 February; H. Wakeham, Need for Biological Research by Philip Morris, Research and Development, undated (Minnesota Trial Exhibit. 2544). (^31) R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris , Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p324 quoting C. Thompson, Memo to Kloepfer, 1968 18 October (Cipollone Trial Exhibit 2725). (^32) H. Wakeham, Best Program for CTR, 1970, 8 December (Minnesota Trial Exhibit 11,586). (^33) R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris , Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p325 quoting Duns Review , 1968, April. (^34) Gallaher Limited, Re, Auerbach/Hammond Beagle Experiment, 1970, 3 April (Minnesota Trial Exhibit 21,905).
15 Nicotine and addiction
2 Nicotine and addiction
"…the entire matter of addiction is the most potent weapon a prosecuting attorney can have in a lung cancer/cigarette case. We can't defend continued smoking as 'free choice' if the person was 'addicted'."^1
The Tobacco Institute in 1980, revealing why the industry consistently refuses to accept that nicotine is addictive - its legal defences would be wrecked and its 'freedom to smoke' arguments would be defeated.
2.1 Summary
Beginning in the early sixties, industry documents discuss the addictive nature of nicotine, and recognise that the primary reason for people to continue smoking is nicotine addiction. The documents show that the industry believes nicotine to be a drug. “We are in the business of selling nicotine - an addictive drug” one lawyer wrote as far back as 1963. The documents are peppered with statements about the pharmacological or psychopharmacological effects of nicotine - its effect on the brain or central nervous system.
Publicly the industry has maintained that nicotine is not addictive – culminating in Congressional hearings in 1994 when seven Chief Executive Officers of American tobacco companies all testified that nicotine is not addictive. The industry has always said publicly that nicotine was important for taste or flavour – not addiction.
By the early seventies, industry lawyers were worried that the “free choice” argument the industry was using to defend smoking was being negated on the grounds of addiction, and could have implications for litigation against the industry.
In the seventies and eighties, industry researchers investigated the addictiveness of nicotine, on, amongst others, monkeys and rats. In the experiments, animals became dependent on nicotine – but the lawyers normally took over the control of the results.
In the US, the industry, knowing that without nicotine in them, cigarettes would not be a viable product, became terrified that the Food and Drug Administration would regulate cigarettes as a drug, and hence regulate tobacco and nicotine content. In the early eighties, BAT at least, was considering becoming involved in the marketing of other nicotine delivery systems, but decided against the move because it feared that it might heighten the chances of FDA regulation.
In the late nineties, as many internal documents showing that cigarettes are addictive reach the public domain, the companies have responded by trying to fudge and change the definition of addiction - which they now apply to such activities as shopping or the Internet. In 1997, Liggett broke ranks and became the first company to admit that “smoking is addictive”. Many companies still openly deny that nicotine is addictive.
Nicotine and addiction 16
2.2 What is known - key facts about nicotine addiction
2.3 What the industry said and what it knew
What the chief scientist said
Sir Charles Ellis, from BAT “…smoking is a habit of addiction …nicotine is … a very fine drug.”^6 (BAT, 1962)
What the lawyers said
17 July: Addison Yeaman from Brown and Williamson: “Nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug.”^7 (Brown and
