Why SPNE is Inadequate in Extensive Games: A Game Theory Analysis - Prof. Z. J. Grossman, Study notes of Economics

The limitations of the sequential perfect bayesian equilibrium (spne) concept in extensive games. Using the example of a variant of the entry game, the text introduces the concepts of belief systems, assessments, and perfect bayesian equilibrium. The document argues that spne fails to capture rational behavior in extensive games where players have incomplete information.

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Econ 171 Fall 2008
Lecture 16
November 20
Why SPNE is inadequate
Recall how we originally motivated SPNE with this entry
game:
Out
1,0
In
1
A
2,1
F
1,1
2
Figure 1: The entry game
F A
In 1,1 2,1
Out 1,0 1,0
Figure 2: The entry game in normal form
Out
2,4
RU
1
F
1,1
A
3,3
F
0,2
A
4,3
2
Figure 3: A variant of the entry game.
Definition 1 A belief system in an extensive game is a
function that assigns to each information set a prob-
ability distribution over the histories in that informa-
tion set.
Definition 2 An assessment in an extensive game is a pair
consisting of a strategy profile and a belief system.
1
pf2

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Econ 171Lecture 16 Fall 2008 November 20

Why SPNE is inadequate

Recall how we originally motivated SPNE with this entrygame:

Out 1 , 0

In^1 A 2 , 1

F

Figure 1: The entry game In − 1 F, −^1 2 A, 1 Out 1 , 0 1 , 0 Figure 2: The entry game in normal form

Out 2 , 4

R U

F

A

F

A

Figure 3: A variant of the entry game.

Definition 1 A belief system in an extensive game is a

function that assigns to each information set a prob-

ability distribution over the histories in that informa-

tion set.

Definition 2 An assessment in an extensive game is a pair

consisting of a strategy profile and a belief system.

Out 2 , 4

R U

F

A

F

A

Figure 4: Player 2 prefers to fight if the challenger is unready, but not if she is ready.

Definition 3 An assessment in an extensive game is a per-

fect Bayesian equlibrium if

• Sequential Rationality: Each player’s strategy spec-

ifies optimal actions, given her beliefs and the strate-

gies of the other players and

• Consistency of Beliefs: Each player’s belief is con-

sistent with the strategy profile (following Bayes

rule, where appropriate).