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The limitations of the sequential perfect bayesian equilibrium (spne) concept in extensive games. Using the example of a variant of the entry game, the text introduces the concepts of belief systems, assessments, and perfect bayesian equilibrium. The document argues that spne fails to capture rational behavior in extensive games where players have incomplete information.
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Econ 171Lecture 16 Fall 2008 November 20
Out 1 , 0
In^1 A 2 , 1
Figure 1: The entry game In − 1 F, −^1 2 A, 1 Out 1 , 0 1 , 0 Figure 2: The entry game in normal form
Out 2 , 4
Figure 3: A variant of the entry game.
Out 2 , 4
Figure 4: Player 2 prefers to fight if the challenger is unready, but not if she is ready.