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Oligopolio e prodotti differenziati, Dispense di Economia Industriale

Dispense del Prof. Filistrucchi per il corso magistrale di economia pubblica

Tipologia: Dispense

2018/2019

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Oligopoly and
Product
Differentiation
N. Doni and
L.Filistrucchi
University of
Florence
Duopoly with
homogeneous
products
Duopoly competition
and product
differentiation
Discrete choice
models
Horizontal
differentiation
Vertical
differentiation
Oligopoly and Product Differentiation
N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi
University of Florence
October 2016
N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence Oligopoly and Product Differentiation October 2016 1 / 25
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Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation

N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi

University of Florence

October 2016

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction

Introduction

The general set-up:

P(q) = a − bq and Q(p) = a−b p; 2 firms with Ci (qi ) = cqi , ∀i = 1 , 2.

Strategic interaction:

price competition (Bertrand model); quantity competition (Cournot model).

Common elements:

profit maximization; simultaneous choices; clearing market price.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Price competition

Price competition with homogeneous products

Firms’ maximization problem:

Maxpi (pi − c)qi (pi ) where: qi (pi ) = Q(pi ) if pi < pj ; qi (pi ) = Q( 2 p i^ )if pi = pj ; qi (pi ) = 0 if pi > pj.

Strategic analysis:

firms’ reaction functions are (weakly) upward-sloping; both firms set pi = c (equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies); every firm produces qi = a 2 −bc ; paradox: the strategic outcome of the duopoly resembles perfect competition: πi = 0.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Price competition

Price competition with homogeneous products

Firms’ maximization problem:

Maxpi (pi − c)qi (pi ) where: qi (pi ) = Q(pi ) if pi < pj ; qi (pi ) = Q( 2 p i^ )if pi = pj ; qi (pi ) = 0 if pi > pj.

Strategic analysis:

firms’ reaction functions are (weakly) upward-sloping; both firms set pi = c (equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies); every firm produces qi = a 2 −bc ; paradox: the strategic outcome of the duopoly resembles perfect competition: πi = 0.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Price competition

Price competition with homogeneous products

Firms’ maximization problem:

Maxpi (pi − c)qi (pi ) where: qi (pi ) = Q(pi ) if pi < pj ; qi (pi ) = Q( 2 p i^ )if pi = pj ; qi (pi ) = 0 if pi > pj.

Strategic analysis:

firms’ reaction functions are (weakly) upward-sloping; both firms set pi = c (equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies); every firm produces qi = a 2 −bc ; paradox: the strategic outcome of the duopoly resembles perfect competition: πi = 0.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Price competition

Price competition with homogeneous products

Firms’ maximization problem:

Maxpi (pi − c)qi (pi ) where: qi (pi ) = Q(pi ) if pi < pj ; qi (pi ) = Q( 2 p i^ )if pi = pj ; qi (pi ) = 0 if pi > pj.

Strategic analysis:

firms’ reaction functions are (weakly) upward-sloping; both firms set pi = c (equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies); every firm produces qi = a 2 −bc ; paradox: the strategic outcome of the duopoly resembles perfect competition: πi = 0.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Price competition

Price competition with homogeneous products

Firms’ maximization problem:

Maxpi (pi − c)qi (pi ) where: qi (pi ) = Q(pi ) if pi < pj ; qi (pi ) = Q( 2 p i^ )if pi = pj ; qi (pi ) = 0 if pi > pj.

Strategic analysis:

firms’ reaction functions are (weakly) upward-sloping; both firms set pi = c (equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies); every firm produces qi = a 2 −bc ; paradox: the strategic outcome of the duopoly resembles perfect competition: πi = 0.

Oligopoly and Product Differentiation N. Doni and L.Filistrucchi University of Florence

Duopoly with homogeneous products Introduction Price competition Quantity competition Duopoly competition and product differentiation Discrete choice models Horizontal differentiation Vertical differentiation

Duopoly with homogeneous products Price competition

Price competition with homogeneous products

Firms’ maximization problem:

Maxpi (pi − c)qi (pi ) where: qi (pi ) = Q(pi ) if pi < pj ; qi (pi ) = Q( 2 p i^ )if pi = pj ; qi (pi ) = 0 if pi > pj.

Strategic analysis:

firms’ reaction functions are (weakly) upward-sloping; both firms set pi = c (equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies); every firm produces qi = a 2 −bc ; paradox: the strategic outcome of the duopoly resembles perfect competition: πi = 0.