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Book VI [You've] often heard it said hat he Form of the good is the most important thing tu Icarn about and that its by their relation to it thatjus things and the others become useful and beneticial. You know very well now that I am going to say this, and, hesides, that we have no adequate knowledge ol'it. And you also know that, if we don't Enow it, even the (ullest possible inowledge of other things is of no benefit to us, any more than if we acquire any pussession without the good of'it. Or do you think chat it is any advantage to have every kind of possession without the good of it? Or ta know eversthing except the good, thereby knowing nothing fine or good? No, by god, T don't. Furthermore, you certainly know that the major- ity believe that pleasure is the good, while the more ted believe that it is Inowledge. 1 do. And you know that those who helieve this can't tell'us what suri of knowledge it is, however, but in the end are forced Lo say that it is Inowledge of the good. And that's ridiculous. Of course ît is. They blame us for nor knawing the good and then turn arvumd and talk to us 25 if we did know it. They say that it is knowledge of the good — as if we understood what they're speaking about when thev utter the word “govd.” That's completely true. ‘What about those who detine the goud as pieasurc? Are they any less full of confusion than, the others? Aren’t even they forced to admit that there are bad pleasures? Most definitely. So, E think, they have to agree that the same things are bath good and bad. Isn't that true? Of course. Its clear, then, isp’tit, why there are many large controversics about this? How could il be otherwise? And isn'( this also clear? In the case af just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believed to be so, even il they aren'1 really so, and they act, acquire, and form their nwn beliefs n that basis. Nubudy is satisfied Lo acquire things that are merely believed to be good, however, hut everyone wants the things that really 4re good and disdains mere belief here. Editor's title. Previously published as Republic in Pato: Complete Works. ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Grube and Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), pp. 1125-42, Books VI and VII, Scetions S(He 5250. Reprinted by permission of Hackett Publishing Company Inc, ALI rights reserved. ‘ DD LI Thats right. Every soul pursucs the gaad and docs whatever in does for its sake. Il divines that the gond is some- Tuming the Psyche time being, for even to arrive at my own view about it is too hig a topic for the discussion we are now started on. But T am willing to tell you about what atiing bur ir is perplexed and cannot adcquately grasp is apparently an offspring of the good and must like what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has ve about other things, and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give. Will we allow the best people în the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of this kind and of this importance? That's che last thing we'd do. 1 don't suppose, at least, that just and fine things will have acquired much of a guardian in someone who docsn't even know in what way they are good. And 1 divine that no one will have adequate know- ledge of them until he knows this. You've divined well. But won't our constitution be perfectly ordered, + if a guardian who knows these things is in charge borit Necessarily. But, Socrates, you must also tell us whether you consider the good ro he knowledge or pleasure or something else altogether. What a man! lvs been clear for some time that other people’s opinions about these matters wouldn't satisfy you. Well, Socrates, it doesn't scem right ro me for you to be willing to state ather people's convictions but nor your own, especially when you've spent so much time occupied with these matters. What? Do you think it's right ta talk about things one doesn't knaw as if one does know them? Not as if one knvws them, he said, bur one vught to be willing tv state one's opinions as such. WI at? Haven't 't you i noticed dat opinione. with- x different from blind people who happen to ight road? "Theyre no different Do you want to look, at shameful, blind, and erypked things, then, when yau might bear .illumin- ating and fine ones from other people? By god, Socrates, Glaucon said, don't desert us “with che end almost in sight. We'll be satisfied if you discuss the goad 25 you discussod justice, mndera- tion, and the rest. That, my friend, I said, would sati L00, but PI dis- trying. So.Jet's usciCis for. the it. Is tha agreeable to you, ur would you rather we jet the whole matter drop? It is. The story about the father remains a debt you?ll pay another time. 1 wist that I could pay the debr in full, and you receive il instead sis the interest. Su here, then, that I don't = decove you ‘ceiempni ina by giviog you an illegitimate account ol the child. We'll be as careful as pussible, so speak on. I will when we've come to an agreement and recalled some things that we've already said both here and many other times. Which ones? We say that there are many bequtilul things and many good things, and so un for cach kind, and in his way we distinguish them in words. We do. And beauty itsell and good itself and all the things that we cherehy set down as many, reversing ourselves, we set duwn according to a single form of each, believing that there is but one, and call it “the being” of each. That's true, cer a 85 we say that the many beautiful things and fhe restare visible but not intelligibile, while the forms re intelligible but.not visible. Fari complerels true. With whar part of ourselves do we see visible things? With our sight. And so audible things are heard by hearing, and wirh our other senses we perceive all the other per- ceptible things. Thars right. Have you considered how lavish the maler of our senscs was in making the power to sce and be scen? I can't say T have. Well, consider it this way. Da hearing and sound need another kind of thing in order [or the former to hear and the larter to be heard, a third thing in whose absence ihe one won't hear or the other be heard? No, they need nothing clse. And if there are any others that need such a thing, there can't be many of them. Can you think afane? Ica D pr fi paded Mace — Understand, then, that, as we said, th va {hings, one suvereign of the intelligibile kind and place, the other of the visible (l don’ sar Sol bcaven” so as not ra secm to you to be playing the sophist with the name)." In any case, you have.ayo Lin hing, visible and intelligible. 7 Itis like a line divided into two unequal sections? ‘ Then divide each section — namely, thar of the i visible and that of the intelligible — in the same i ratio as rhe line. In terms now of relative clarity jand opacity, one subsection nf the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, first, shadows, i then reflecrions in water and in all clase-packed, £ smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of that sort, if you understand. L 1 do. In the other subsection af the visible, put the originals of these images, namely, the animals around us, all rhe plants, and the whole class vf manu- faclured things. Consider them put. Would you be willing to say that, as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this proportion: As the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to the thing that ir is like? Certainly. Consider now how the section of the intelligible #6 to be divided. How? As follows: In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses, procceding mot to a first principle but to a conclusion, In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is 201 a hypothesis, procceding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through them. don't yer fully understand what you mean, (0 Ters try again, You understand it more easily after the following preamble. I think you know thar students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypo- thesize the odd and the even, the varivus figui the chree kinds v( angles, and other things akin to these in each af their investigations, as if they knew them. "l'hey make these theîr hypotheses and don't chink it necessary ro give any account of them, either ro themselves or to others, as if they were clcar to evervane. And going from rhese first principles through che remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement. Tuming the Psyche T certainly know that much. ‘Then you also know that, although they use visible figures and make claims about them, their thought isn’t directed to them but to thuse orher things that rhey arc like, They make their claims for the sake of square itsell and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. ‘These figures that rhey make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, în seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought. ‘That's true. This, then, is the kind of thing that, on the one hand, T said is inteiligible, and, on the other, is such that the soul is forced to use hypotheses in che investigation of it, not travelling up to a first prin- ciple, since it cannot reach beyond its hyporhescs, but using as images those very things of which images were made in the section below, and whiek, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and to be valued as such. T understand that you mean what happens in geametry and related scienocs. ‘l'hen also voderstand that, by che other sub- section ol the intelligible, I mean rhat which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider rhese hypotheses as first principles hui truly as hypotheses — but as stepping stones to take aff from, cnabling ir to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Mlaving grusped this prin- ciple, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion with- vut making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms. 1 understand, if not yet adequately (for.in my opinion you’re speaking uf an enormaus task), that you want tu distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the sciente of dialecti a ilcirer ian the part studied by the so-cglled sciences, for which their hypotheses are first prin- ciples. And although those who study the objecrs of these sciences are forced to da so by means of thought rather than sense perccption, stili, because they do nar go back to a genuine first principle, but proceed from hypotheses, you don't think. that they understand them, even. though, given such a principle, they arc inielligible. And you.seem.io.me to call the state of the geometers thought but not understanding, thonght being intermediate benycen opinion and understanding, ED The Nature and Aims of Education Your cxposition is most adequate, Thus there ns of vur line: Understanding: hi for the second, belief for. the degree that the subsection it is set over irc dA fn T understand, agree, and arrange them as you s way up, whiclis both open (0 the light and 25 wide as the cave itself. They've been rhere since childhood, fixed in the same place, with their necks and legs fettered, able to sce only in front of them, because their bonds prevent rhem from turning their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Also bchind them, but on higher ground, rhere is a path stretching between them and the fire. Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the sercen in front of puppercers above which they show their puppers. T'm imagining it. Then also imagine that there arc people along the wall, carrying all kinds af artifacts that project above it — statues of people and other animals, made out of stone, woud, and every material. And, as you'd expect, some of the carriers are talking, and some are silent. Itîs a strange image you're describing, and strange prisoners. They're like us. Do you suppose, first of all, that these prisoners see anything of themselves and one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall in front af them? How could thev, if they have to keep their heads motionless throughout lifc? Whar about the rhings being carried along the wall? Isn't the same true of them? Of course. And if they could talk ro one amorher, don't you think they'd suppose chat the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?* They"d have t0. And what if their prison also had an echo from the wall facing them? Don't you think they'd believe that the shadows passing in front of them were ED) . talking whenever one of the carriers passing along in the soul, corresponding ysthe wall was doing su? I certainly do. | Then the prisoners would in every way believe jthat the truth is nothing other than the shadows of \those artifacts. * They must surely believe that. Consider, then, what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would naturally be like, if something like this came to pass. When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he'd scen before. What du you think he’d say, if we told him that what he°d seen before was incansequential, but that now — because he is a bit closer to the things that are and is turned towards things that are more he sees more corrceily? Or, to put it another way, if we pointed to each of he things passing by, asked him what cuch of them is, and compelled him to answer, don't you think he'd beat a loss and that hed believe that the things he sow earlier were truer than the ones he was now being shown? Much truer. And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn't his eyes hurt, and wouldn't he turn around and flee towards the things he's able to see, believing rhat they're really clearer chan che ones he's being shown? He would. And if someone dragged him away from there hy force, up the rough, steep path, and didn't let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn't he be pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn't he be unable to sce a single one pf the things now said to be true? He would be unable tn see them, at least at first. I suppose, then, that he'd need time to get adjusted before he could sce things in the world above. Ar first, he'd see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these, he'd be able ro study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the muon, than during the day, looking at rhe sun and the light of the sun. Of course. Finally, I supposc, hed be able to see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but che în irs own place, and be able to study il. ine Nature ana AIMS OT EOUCAUON They de say that. But our present di: cussion, on the other hand, shows thai the power tò [ea is present in cvery- ane’s soul and that che instrument with which cach leamns is Tiké an eye ihat cannot be ttrmed arvund to light without turning the whole body. T'his insrrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming inio bcing wirhour turn- ing the whole soul until it is able ta study that which is and the brightest ching chat is, namels, the one we call the good. Isn't that right? Yes Then education..ia_the craft concerned with “ dning this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do iL Ti isn't the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn't.turned the right way or look- ing where it cught to look, and it tries,to redirect it appropriately. So ît seems. Now, it looks as though the other so-called virtues of the soul are akin to those of the body, for they really aren't there beforchand but are added later by habit and practice. However, the virtue of reason scoms to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its puwer but is cirher useful and beneficia] or uscless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned. Or have you never noticed this abour people who are said 10 be vicious but clever, how ken the vision of their little souls is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is wrned towards? This shows that its sight isn't inferior ut rather is forced to serve evil ends, so rhat the sharper it sccs, rhe more evil it accomplishes. Absolutely. However, if a nature ol this sort had been hammered at from childhood and freed from the bonds of kinship with becoming, which have becn fastened to it by feasting, grecd, and other such plcasures and which, like leaden weights, pulì its vision downwards - if, being rid of these, it turned tn look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would sce these most sharply, just as it now does the things it is presently turned towards. Probably so. And what about the uneducated who have no experience of truth? Isn't it likely — indeed, duesn’ it follow necessarily from what was said before that they will never adcquately govern a city? But neither watld those who've been allowed to spend their D whole lives being educated. The former would fail becuuse they don't have a single goal at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim; the latter would fail because theyd refuse to act, thinking that they had sertled while still alive in the faraway Tsles of the Blessed. That's true. It is our task as faunders, then, co compel the best natures ro reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, lo make the ascent and see the good. But when they've made it and luoked sufficiently, we mustn°t allow them tv do what they're allowed to do today. What's that? ‘o stay there and refuse to gu down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labors and honors, whether they arc of less warth or of greater. “Then are we to do them an injustice by making them live a worse life when they could live a better one? You are forgetting again thar it isn't the laws concern to make any one class in the city outstand- ingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each orher through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other che benefits that cach class can confer on the community.” The law praduces such people in the city, not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction they want, but to make use of them to bind the city together. That's true, T had forgotten. Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won't be daing an injustice to those wha've become philosophers in our city and that what we'll say to them, when we compel them Lo guard and care for the others, will be just. We'll say: “When people like you come to be in other cities, theyre justified in not shar- ing în their city's labors, for they've grown there spontanevusty, against the will of the constirution. And what grows of îts own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its side when it isn't keen to pay anyonc for that upbringing. But we've made you kings in our ciry and leaders of the swarmi, as ît were, both for yourselves and for the rest of the city. You're better and more completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both types of life. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the uthers and grow accustamed ra seeing in the dark. When you are used to it, yowll see vastly better than the people there. And because you've i fscen the truth about fine, just, and good things, quali know each image for what it is and also that ef which it is the image. Thus, for you and for us, È be city will be governed, not like rhe majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight over shaduws amd struggle against one another in order to rule asif that werca grcat good — but by people who are amate rather than dreaming, for the truth is surely bis: A city whose prospective rulers are least cager sorule must of ncecessity be most free from civil war, mmberess a city with the opposite kind of rulers is garvermedl in the opposite way.” Absolutely. Then do you think that those we've nurtured will disobey us and refuse to share the labors of the city, each in turn, while living the greater part of their sie with one another in the pure realm? It isn’0 possible, for we'll be giving just arders sa just people. Fach of them will certainly g0 ro ale 25 (0 somerhing compulsory, however, which ss enactly che opposite ol what's done by those who mow rule in cach city. This is how it is. If you can find a way of life that's better rhan ruling for the prospective rulers, your well-governed city will become a possibility, for only in it will the truly rich rule — not those who are rich in gold but those who ant rich in the wealth chat the happy must have, mamely, a good and rational life. But if beggars tsongry for private guods go into public Life, think- ing that the good is there for the scizing, then the well-governed city is impossible, for then ruling is something fought over, and this civil and domestic war destroys these people and che rest of the city as well. That's very true. Can you name any life that despisus political rule besidcs that of the rrue philasopher? No, by god, I cant. But surely it is those who are not lovers of rating who must rule, for if they don't, the luvers ofit, who are rivals, will fight over it. OL course. Then who will you compel to become guardians of the city, if nor those who have the best under- standing of what matters for good government and wha have other honors than political ones, and a better, life as well? No one. Do you want us to consider now how such our city and how — just people will come LO be in ic up fron Hades to the as some are said tu have gon gods — we'll lead them up to the light? Of course I do. ‘This isn’l, il seems, a matter of tossing a coin, but af turning a soul from a day chat is a kind of night to the true day — the ascent to what is, which we say is true philosophy. Tndeed. “Then must we try to discover rhe subjecrs rhat have the power ta bring this about? Of course. So what subject is îr, Giaucon, that draws the soul from the realm of becoming to the rcalm af what is? And it occurs to me as I'm speaking that we said, didn't we, that it is necessary for the pro- spective rulers tu be athletes in war when they're young? Yes, we did. Then rhe subject we're looking for must alsa have this characteristic in addition tv the former one. Which one? Tr musinÈt be useless to warlike men. If it's at all possible, ir musun't. Now, prior to this, we educated them in music and poetry and physical training. We did. And physical training is concemed with whar comes into being and dies, for ît oversecs the grawth and decay of the body. Apparently. So it couldn't be the subject we're looking for. No, it couldn't. Then, could ir be the music and poetry we described before? But that, if you remember, is just the counter- part of physical] training. Tr educated the guardians through habits. Its harmonies gave them a certain harmoniousness, not knowledge; its rliythms gave and its stories, them a certain rbythmical quality; whether fictiunal ar nearcr the truth, cultivatod other habits akin to these. Bur as for the subject you're looking for now, there's nothing like that in music and poetry. Your reminder is exactly to the poin really nothing like that in music and poetry. But, Glaucon, what is there that does have this? The crafts all seem to he base or mechanical. + How could they be orherwise? But apart from {music and poctry, physical training, and the crafs, {har subject is left? ‘Well, if we can't find anything apart from these. levs consider one of the subjects that touches all U; there I i of them. What surt of thing? CD Ifivs evidentiy twn, won't each be evidently dis- tinct and one? Yes. Then, if each is one, and both two, the soul will understand that the two are separate, for it wouldn't understand the inseparable to be rwo, but rather one. That's right. Sight, huwever, saw the big and small, not as separate, but as mixed up together. Isn't that st Yes. ad And in order to ger clear about all this, und standing was compelled to sce the big and the small, not as mixed up together, but as separate — the opposite way from sight. True. And isn't it from these cases rhat it first occurs to us to ask what the big îs and what the small is? Absolutely And, because of this, we called rhe one the intel- tigiblc and the other the visible. Thar's right. This, then, is what I was trying to express before, when I said that some things summon thought, while others don't. ‘Those that strike the relevant sense at the same time as rheir opposites 1 cali summoners, those that don't do this do not awaken understanding. Now I understand, and L think you're right. Well, then, to which of them do number and the one belong? I don't know. Reason it out from what was said hefore. Lf the one is adequately seen itsell by itself or is so per- ceived by any of the other senses, then, as we were saying in the case of fingers, it wouldn't draw the soul towards being. But if something opposite to it is always seen at the sumo time, so that nothing is apparemily any more one than the opposite of Notes 1. “Thraughour, Socrates is punning on the word fofos, which means either a child or the interest on capital 2. The play may be on the similarity ol sound between suranou (“of heaven") and Aorarou (“of the visible”). More likely, Socrates is referring to the fact that ouranou seems lo contain the word nos, the genitive case of aus (“understanding”), and relative of noetoz (uf the intelligible”). TF he said that the sun was sovercign of heaven, he might be taken to suggest in sophistical fashium that it was sovercign af the intel- ligible and that there was no real difference berwcen the guod and che sun. luming tne Fsycne one, then something would be needed to judge the matter. The soul would then be puzzled, would look for an answer, would stir up its understanding, and would ask what the one itself is. And so this would be among the subjects that lead che soul and turn it around towards the study of that which is. But surely the sight nf the one does passes this characteristic to a remarkable degree, for we scc the same thing to be both one and an unlimited num- ber at rhe same time. Then, if this is true of the one, wnn°t it also be true of all numbers? Of course. Now, calculation and arithmetic are wholly con- cerned with numbers. Thats right. Then evidentiy they lead us towards truth. Supernaturaliy sc ‘Then they belong, it scoms, to the subjects we're sccking. They are compulsory for warriors because of their vrderly ranks and for philosophers because thev have ta learn to rise up out vf becoming and grasp being, if they are ever to bocome rational. "That's right. And our guardian must be both a warrior and a philosopher. Gertainly. “Then it would be appropriate, Glaucon, to leg- islate this subject for those who are going ta share in the highest officcs in the city and to persuade them 10 turn to calculation and take il up, not as laymen X<" do, but staying with it until they reach the study of the patures of che numbers by means of under- standing itself, nor like tradesmen and retaîlers, for the sake ol buying and selling, but for the sake of war and for case în turning the soul around, away from becoming and towards truth and being. Well pui. “The line is illustrated below: Understanding (nazsis) I Thought (dannia) T Belief (pisss) I Imagination (eitusia) Reading parionta autous nomizein onemazein in bS Reading fioia ris an iz phusci, ci in c5 Odyssey xi, 489-490. See 420b-421c, 4622-4660. Eialala ©>i LW}e ought to take che preliminary stcp of defining education and its potentialities, because we have ventured on a discussion wlich is intended to lead us to the god of wine, and we are agreed that education is as it were the route we have to take. Cu Certainly let's do that, if you like ATRENIAN: 1 am going to explain how one should describe education: see if you approve uf my account. Cunias: Your explanation, then, please. ATHENIAN: IL is this: I insist that a man who intends to he good at a particular occupation must practice il from childhond: both at work and ar play he must be surrounded by the special ‘tools of the trade”. For instance, the man who intends to be a guod farmer must play at farming, and the man who is to be a good builder must spend his playtime building toy houses; and in cach case the teacher must provide miniature Lools thar copy the real rhing. In particular, in this clementary stage they musr learn the cssential elementary skills. For cxample, the carpenter must learn in his play how to handle a rule and plumb-line, and the soldier must learn to ride a borse (either by actually doing it, in play, or by some similar activity). We should try ro use the children's games to channel their pleasures and desircs towards the activities in which they will have to engage when they are adult. Ta sum up, we say that the correct way to bring up and educate a child is to use his playtime to imbue his soul with the greatest possible liking far rhe occupation in which he will have to be absolutely perfect when he grows up. Now, as T suggested, consider the argument so far: du you approve of my account? Cuivias: Of course. Amuenian: But let's not leave our description ofeducation in the air. When we abuse or commend the upbringiny of individual people and say that gne of us is educated and the nrher uneducated, we sometimes use rhis latter term of men wha have in fact had a thorough education — one directed towards petty trade or the merchant-shipping busi- ness, or something like that. But 1 take it that for the purpuse of the present discussion wc are not going to treat this sort of thing as ‘education’; what we have in mind is education from childhond in varie, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows haw ro rule and be ruled as justice demands. T suppose we should want to mark Editor's tirle. Previousls published in Pluto: The Lams, cd. and trans. Trevor J. Saunders (Londan: Penguin Classics, 1970), pp. 72 5; 6431-645c. © Trevor J. Saunders 1970, Reprinted with permission of Penguin Books UK L.id. Edited by Randall Curren ( Blackwell 4, Publishing Editorial material and organization © 20417 by Blackwell Publishing Lrd BLACKWELL PUBLISHING 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia The right of Randall Curren to be identified as the Author of the Editorial Material in this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No parc of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, cxccpt as permitted by rhe UK Copyright, Designs, and Parents Act 1988, withaur the priar permission of the publisher. First published 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd 82014 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Philosophy of education : an anthology / edited by Randall Curren. p. cm, — (Blackwell philosophy anthologics) Includes bibliagraphical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4031-3022-6 (hardback : al. paper) ISBN 978-1-4051-3023-3 (pbk. : all. paper) I. Education Philosophy. I. Curren, Randall R. LB17.P484 2006 370%.1—de22 2006019407 A catalngue record for this rirle is available from che Nritish T.ibrary. Sct in 9/11pt Ehrhardi by Graphicraft Timited, Tong Kong Printed and bound in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd ‘The publisher's poli to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. 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