Game Theory: Median Voter Theorem and Nash Equilibrium, Lecture notes of Chemistry

There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue. ▷ There are two candidates. ▷ 10% of the voters hold each position ...

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2022/2023

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Review
We considered the game:
IThere is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue
IThere are two candidates
I10% of the voters hold each position
IVoters will vote for the candidate who holds the closest views
ICandidates will split the vote of views that are the same
distance to both candidates
IEach candidate wants to maximize their share of the vote
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Review

We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue

Review

We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue I (^) There are two candidates

Review

We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue I (^) There are two candidates I (^) 10% of the voters hold each position I (^) Voters will vote for the candidate who holds the closest views

Review

We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue I (^) There are two candidates I (^) 10% of the voters hold each position I (^) Voters will vote for the candidate who holds the closest views I (^) Candidates will split the vote of views that are the same distance to both candidates

Political Spectrum

I (^) Are there any dominated strategies?

Political Spectrum

I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2

Political Spectrum

I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2 I (^) 10 is weakly dominated by 9 I (^) 3 does not dominate 2

Political Spectrum

I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2 I (^) 10 is weakly dominated by 9 I (^) 3 does not dominate 2 but after we remove 1 it does

Political Spectrum

I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2 I (^) 10 is weakly dominated by 9 I (^) 3 does not dominate 2 but after we remove 1 it does I (^) If we iterate this, the candidates end up in the central positions I (^) This is The Median Voter Theorem “Majority rule voting will select the median preference”

Median Voter Theorem

Problems?

Median Voter Theorem

Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout

Median Voter Theorem

Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout I (^) Assuming that there are only two candidates

Median Voter Theorem

Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout I (^) Assuming that there are only two candidates I (^) Assuming voters are rational I (^) Assuming that candidates are rational, and that they assume that there opponent is rational Examples:

Median Voter Theorem

Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout I (^) Assuming that there are only two candidates I (^) Assuming voters are rational I (^) Assuming that candidates are rational, and that they assume that there opponent is rational Examples: I (^) Kennedy (‘60) I (^) Nixon (‘68) I (^) Clinton (‘92)