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There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue. ▷ There are two candidates. ▷ 10% of the voters hold each position ...
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We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue
We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue I (^) There are two candidates
We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue I (^) There are two candidates I (^) 10% of the voters hold each position I (^) Voters will vote for the candidate who holds the closest views
We considered the game: I (^) There is a spectrum of 10 points on a certain political issue I (^) There are two candidates I (^) 10% of the voters hold each position I (^) Voters will vote for the candidate who holds the closest views I (^) Candidates will split the vote of views that are the same distance to both candidates
I (^) Are there any dominated strategies?
I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2
I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2 I (^) 10 is weakly dominated by 9 I (^) 3 does not dominate 2
I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2 I (^) 10 is weakly dominated by 9 I (^) 3 does not dominate 2 but after we remove 1 it does
I (^) Are there any dominated strategies? I (^) 1 is weakly dominated by 2 I (^) 10 is weakly dominated by 9 I (^) 3 does not dominate 2 but after we remove 1 it does I (^) If we iterate this, the candidates end up in the central positions I (^) This is The Median Voter Theorem “Majority rule voting will select the median preference”
Problems?
Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout
Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout I (^) Assuming that there are only two candidates
Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout I (^) Assuming that there are only two candidates I (^) Assuming voters are rational I (^) Assuming that candidates are rational, and that they assume that there opponent is rational Examples:
Problems? I (^) Assumed distribution was constant I (^) Assuming full voter turnout I (^) Assuming that there are only two candidates I (^) Assuming voters are rational I (^) Assuming that candidates are rational, and that they assume that there opponent is rational Examples: I (^) Kennedy (‘60) I (^) Nixon (‘68) I (^) Clinton (‘92)