Pragmatics 2 – Implicature (conversational & conventional)

The notion of implicature (both conversational and conventional) was originated by the Oxford

philosopher H. P. Grice.

In these lectures, Grice presented a panorama of his thinking on meaning and communication—what

he called his ‘tottering steps’ (Grice 1989: 4) towards a systematic, philosophically inspired pragmatic

theory of language use, which has since come to be known as Gricean pragmatic theory.

2.1. Classical Gricean theory of conversational implicature

There are two theories: a theory of meaningn[on]n[atural] and a theory of conversational implicature.

In theory of meaningnn, Grice emphasized the conceptual relation between natural meaning in the

external world and non-natural, linguistic meaning of utterances.

(2.1) Grice’s theory of meaningnn

S meansnn p by ‘uttering’ U to A if and only if S intends:

(i) A to think p,

(ii) A to recognize that S intends (i), and

(iii)A’s recognition of S’s intending (i) to be the primary reason for A thinking p.

Where S stands for the speaker, A for the audience, U for the utterance, and p for proposition.

2.1.1. The co-operative principle and the maxims of conversation

In his theory of conversational implicature, Grice suggested that there is an underlying principle that

determines the way in which language is used with maximum efficiency and effectively to achieve

rational interaction in communication.

The co-operative principle and its component maxims ensure that in an exchange of conversation, the

right amount of information is provided and that the interaction is conducted in a truthful, relevant and

perspicuous manner.

(2.2) Grice’s theory of conversational implicature

a. The co-operative principle

b. The maxims of conversation

Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the

exchange).

Relation: Be relevant.

Manner: Be perspicuous. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief.

2.1.2. Relationship between the speaker and the maxims

What can a speaker do with regard to the maxims? In the first place, he or she can straightforwardly

observe the maxims. Second, he or she can violate a maxim. For example, he or she may breach the

first submaxim of Quality by telling a deliberate lie. Third, he or she can opt out of a maxim. Fourthly,

a speaker can ostentatiously flout or exploit a maxim.

2.1.3. Conversational implicatureO versus conversational implicatureF

Assuming that the co-operative principle and its associated maxims are normally adhered to by both

the speaker and the addressee in a conversational interaction, Grice suggested that a conversational

implicature—roughly, a set of non-logical inferences which contains conveyed messages which are

meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense – can arise from either strictly observing or

ostentatiously flouting the maxims.

Let us call conversational implicatures that are engendered by way of directly observing the maxims

conversational implicaturesO.

2.5 Quality:

Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1989.

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The notion of implicature (both conversational and conventional) was originated by the Oxford philosopher H. P. Grice. In these lectures, Grice presented a panorama of his thinking on meaning and communication—what he called his ‘tottering steps’ (Grice 1989: 4) towards a systematic, philosophically inspired pragmatic theory of language use, which has since come to be known as Gricean pragmatic theory. 2.1. Classical Gricean theory of conversational implicature There are two theories: a theory of meaningn[on]n[atural] and a theory of conversational implicature. In theory of meaningnn, Grice emphasized the conceptual relation between natural meaning in the external world and non-natural, linguistic meaning of utterances. (2.1) Grice’s theory of meaningnn S meansnn p by ‘uttering’ U to A if and only if S intends: (i) A to think p, (ii) A to recognize that S intends (i), and (iii)A’s recognition of S’s intending (i) to be the primary reason for A thinking p. Where S stands for the speaker, A for the audience, U for the utterance, and p for proposition. 2.1.1. The co-operative principle and the maxims of conversation In his theory of conversational implicature , Grice suggested that there is an underlying principle that determines the way in which language is used with maximum efficiency and effectively to achieve rational interaction in communication. The co-operative principle and its component maxims ensure that in an exchange of conversation, the right amount of information is provided and that the interaction is conducted in a truthful, relevant and perspicuous manner. (2.2) Grice’s theory of conversational implicature a. The co-operative principle b. The maxims of conversation Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true. Quantity : Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). Relation: Be relevant. Manner: Be perspicuous. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief. 2.1.2. Relationship between the speaker and the maxims What can a speaker do with regard to the maxims? In the first place, he or she can straightforwardly observe the maxims. Second, he or she can violate a maxim. For example, he or she may breach the first submaxim of Quality by telling a deliberate lie. Third, he or she can opt out of a maxim. Fourthly, a speaker can ostentatiously flout or exploit a maxim. 2.1.3. Conversational implicatureO versus conversational implicatureF Assuming that the co-operative principle and its associated maxims are normally adhered to by both the speaker and the addressee in a conversational interaction, Grice suggested that a conversational implicature—roughly, a set of non-logical inferences which contains conveyed messages which are meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense – can arise from either strictly observing or ostentatiously flouting the maxims. Let us call conversational implicatures that are engendered by way of directly observing the maxims conversational implicaturesO. 2.5 Quality: Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1989.

+> The speaker believes that Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1989, and has adequate evidence that he did. 2.6 Quantity: John has six credit cards. +> John has at most six credit cards. Given the second submaxim of Quality, when a speaker makes an assertion, he or she conversationally implies that he or she believes it, hence the relevant conversational implicature in 2.5. The submaxim can also account for ‘Moore’s paradox’, so called by Wittgenstein. The paradox is concerned with the question why an utterance such as (2.9) is pragmatically anomalous. (2.9) ?Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1989 but I don’t believe he did. Secondly and more interestingly, conversational implicatures can be generated by way of the speaker’s deliberately flouting the maxims. Let us call conversational implicatures thus induced conversational implicaturesF. Faced with such a conspicuous flouting by the speaker, the addressee then has two options. 1 - to think that the co-operative principle has been abandoned as well. 2 – to assume that despite the speaker’s apparent failure of co-operation, he or she is still observing the co-operative principle, and reasons roughly thus. (2.10) Quality: Chomsky is a great sociolinguist. +> Chomsky is no sociolinguist at all (2.11) Quantity: War is war. +> e.g., Terrible things always happen in war. That’s its nature, and it’s no use lamenting that particular tragedy (2.12) Relation: John: Susan can be such a cow sometimes! Mary: Oh, what a lovely day today! +> e.g., One shouldn’t speak ill of people behind their back (2.13) Manner: a. John smiled. b. The corners of John’s lips turned slightly upward. +> John did not exactly smile Any student of linguistics knows that (2.10) is patently false, thereby clearly and openly flouting the maxim of Quality. We thus have the first Gricean dichotomy between conversational implicatureO and conversational implicatureF, namely, the distinction between those conversational implicatures that are generated from a simple assumption that the speaker is observing both the maxims and the co-operative principles, and those that are engendered in more complex ways on the basis of the speaker flouting a maxim but nevertheless following the co-operative principle. 2.1.4. Generalized versus particularized conversational implicature Conversational implicatures which arise without requiring any particular contextual conditions and those which do require such conditions. Grice called the first kind generalized conversational implicatures , as in (2.14), and the second kind particularized conversational implicatures , as in (2.15). (2.14) Most of John’s friends believe in marriage. +> Not all of John’s friends believe in marriage (2.15) John: Where’s Peter? Mary: The light in his office is on. +> Peter is in his office

2.3. Conventional implicature A conventional implicature is a non-truth-conditional inference which is not deductive in any general, natural way from the saying of what is said, but arises solely because of the conventional features attached to particular lexical items and/or linguistic constructions. A few standard examples follow (I use ‘+>>’ to stand for ‘conventionally implicates’.) (2.90) p therefore q +>> q follows from p He is a Chinese; he therefore knows how to use chopsticks. (2.91) p but q +>> p contrasts with q a. John is poor but he is honest. b. Our sales have gone up but theirs have gone down. 2.3.2. Properties of conventional implicature The main similarity between conventional and conversational implicature is that neither makes any contribution to truth conditions. (2.95) a. We want peace and they want war. b. We want peace but they want war. Conventional implicatures are not derived from the co-operative principle and its component maxims, but are attached by convention to particular lexical items or linguistic constructions. *Conventional implicatures are not calculable via any natural procedure. *Conversational implicatures are calculable using pragmatic principles, contextual knowledge, and background assumptions. *Conventional implicatures are not cancellable, conversational – are. Conventional implicatures are detachable, because they depend on the particular linguistic items used. Conventional implicatures are not universal; conv. – are.

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