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Godisnik na Fakultetot za bezbednost - Skopje 2013 godina
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Издавач: ФАКУЛТЕТ ЗА Б ЕЗБ ЕДНОСТ - Publisher: FACULTY OF S ECURITY – Скопје Skopje
За изд авачот: For the Publisher: Ред. проф. д-р Оливер Бачановиќ, Декан Dr. Sc. Oliver Bachanovic, Dean
Меѓународен уред увачки одбор: Internati onal editorial board: Проф. Д-р Борис Мурговски, ВД Декан Dr. Sc. Boris Murgovski, VD Dean of Faculty of на Факу лтето т за безбедност-Скопје Security- Skopje, Macedonia Проф. Д-рГоран Милошевиќ, Декан на Криминалистич ко Dr. Sc. Goran Milošević, Dean of the Academy of
Уред увачки од бор: Editorial Board: Ред. проф. д-р Цане Мојаноски Dr. Sc. Cane Mojansoki Вон. проф. д-р З лате Димовски Dr. Sc. Zlate Dimovski Вон. проф. д-р Мар јан Нико ловски Dr. Sc. Marjan Niko lovski Доц. д-р Драгана Батиќ Dr. Sc. Dragana Batic Доц. д-р Катерина Крстевска Dr. Sc. Katerina Krstevska Доц. д-р Марјан Арсовски Dr. Sc. Marjan Arsovski
Главен и одговорен уред ник: Editor in Chief: Ред. проф. д-р Томе Батковски Dr. Sc. To me Bat kovski,
Секретар: Secretary : Aсс. м-р Аљоша Недев Fel. А ljosha Nedev, MA
Лектура и коректура: Proofreading: Анче Белада Ance Belada Александра Теодору Aleksndra Teodoru Лазар Попов Lazar Popov
Компјутерска обработка и дизајн: Design and Computer Processing: Кемал Рушид Kemal Rusid
Печати: Print: "Ван Гог" - Скопје " Van Gog" - Skopje
Ад реса на редакцијата Address of the Publisher Факултет за безбедност Faculty of Security – Skopje 1000 Скопје 1000 Skopje Пош. фах 103 P.O. Bo x 103 тел:+++(02)2546211 tel :+++(02)
GOCE ARIZANKOS KI JONCHE IVANOVS KI, PH.D AN ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE SOCIOLOGY OF TERRORIS M (AN ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE NEW SCIENTIFIC BRANCH OF SOCIOLOGY OF SAFETY) ..................................................................................... 111
DUS KO IVANOV, MA CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ILLEGAL ARMS TRADE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA........................................................................................................................................................................... 121
MARIJANA BLAZEVS KA, MPHIL MONEY LAUNDERING AND OTHER PROCEEDS FROM CRIME AS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (CURRENT CONDITON) ............................................................................................... 128
CRIMINOLOGY
OLIVER BACANOVICH, P H.D NATAS HA JOVANOVA, MSC THE GENDER AND FEAR OF CRIME ................................................................................................................................. 137
PHD MARJ AN NIKOLOVKS I ASSOC. PROFESSOR, FROS INA T. REMENS KI, P HD CONNECTIONS AND DIFFERENC ES BETWEEN TERRORIS T AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS .... 142
MR.SC. TONI MUZOS KI DR.SC. J AS MINA BUNEVS KA TALEVS KA DR.SC. IVO DUKOS KI THE ANALYS IS OF DELIVER Y-PICKUP FLOWS SAFETY PERFORMANCES IN AN URBAN MICRO LOGIS TICS DIS TRIBUTION S YSTEM: A CAS E S TUDY.............................................................................................. 150
IVAN RIS TOV, MS C THE FEELING OF S ECURENESS OF THE HIGH SCHOOL YOUTH THROUGH THE PRIS M OF TRUS T IN THE POLICE AND THE PROBLEM WITH "BLACK" WEAPONS ON THE THERITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA................................................................................................................................................... 158
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ZLATE DIMOVS KI, PH.D ICE ILIJ EVS KI, MS C, ASSISTANT AND PH.D. S TUDENT KIRE BABANOSKI, MS C, PH.D. STUDENT THE DISPUTE OVER MACEDONIA'S NAME – A SOURCE OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE CITIZENS OF THE TWO BALKAN COUNTRIES .................................................................................................................................. 170
TATJ ANA GERGINOVA PHD EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION - ECONOMIC THREATS TO SAFETY............................................................................................................................................................................................. 180
INTERNATIONAL POLICE
MARJAN ARSOVS KI, PH.D. INSTRUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE MISS IONS CONDUCTED B Y THE EUROPEAN UNION ........................................................................................................................................................... 189
POLICE S CIENCES
JONCHE IVANOVS KI, PHD PROPER TRAINING AND US AGE OF POLICE UNITS – А S IGNIFICANT FACTOR FOR PERFORMANCE OF PROFESS IONAL TAS KS................................................................................................................. 196
BILJANA GJORGJ EVA, MA PREVENTIVE FUNCTION OF THE POLICE IN PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUS E AMONG MINORS ............................................................................................... 202
ALEKS ANDRA DIMITROVS KA, MA COGNITIVE ABILITIES AND PERSONALITY TRAITS AS PREDICTORS OF MACEDONIAN POLICE SPECIAL UNITS’ PERFORMANCE....................................................................................................................................... 211
METODOLOGY OF INVES TIGATING S ECURITY PHENOMENA, CRIMINALITY
MLADEN TRAJ KOV, MA IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW METHODOLOGY OF POLICING IN S KOPJ E AND ES TABLIS HMENT OF REPORTING AND COMMAND CENTER (RCC).............................................................................................................. 224
PROCEDURES. BOOK III” BY PROF. CANE MOJANOSKI, PhD..........................................................
the organs and bodies of the Faculty, which means that inthe future we should put joint additional efforts to overcome this situation. For achieving this, we also expect assistance by the University. An example of good practice of our Faculty is the inclusion of students in scientific and research work, thus creating preconditions for recruiting young researchers and scientists. Such practice should be encouraged in future as well. Sporting activities of the students of the Faculty of Security occupy a prominent place in the promotion both of the students themselves and the Faculty, within the University “St. KlimentOhridski” Bitola, The Ministry of Interior, and also internationally.
What are the problems we face and the difficulties we encounter?
Zoran KILIBARDA, Associate Professor УДК: 620.9:622.691/.692(497) Marko FILIJOVIC, PhD candidate Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Due to its convenient geographical position, situated between the European Union - one of the largest importers of energy on one hand, and the region with the largest surplus of these goods on the other, and the fact that the existing supply lines are inadequate and not quite reliable, the Balkan region is increasingly seen as an alternative transit route of vital importance for energy security of the European area. This role gives an opportunity to the Balkan countries to fight for better treatment of the region in the division of profits and responsibilities in the “great game” with energy-generating products. The common regional energy strategy that would result from such an approach, or at least a clear expression of support for such an effort, could be a solid basis for economic recovery and political stabilization of the Balkans; then, it would cease to be synonymous with nightmarish situations, conflicts, and disintegrative processes. Vantage in this regard is that the plans of “big players” based on the logic of geopolitical competition increasingly give way to those guided by market logic. Of course, taking advantage of this opportunity is accompanied by certain restrictions, which, apart from chronic intra-regional rivalries inherited from the distant and recent past, also result from the different interests of powerful external factors which create the game rules binding for the less influential stakeholders.
Key words: energy security, the Balkans, pipelines
In the present times of constant growth of the energy demand, it is vital for the customer countries to provide a regular supply of these goods in sufficient quantities, at reasonable price, and free of political conditionality. At the same time, exporting countries, seeking the most favorable conditions for the placement of their energy surpluses are trying to animate and “bind” to themselves the proven reliable (capable of payment, professionally correct and politically stable) purchasers. The degree of achievement of these goals is the essence of what is called energy stability or energy security. Of course, a richer offer guarantees a higher degree of energy security of customers, while growing demand, as a rule, is the purpose of strengthening energy security of vendors, provided that they dispose (without the political tutelage of the powerful) of their energy resources. The aspect of balance between the supply and demand in the actual state of the energy market - favors one side or the other - sometimes the customer and other times the seller. The pace of these fluctuations also influences the changes in the state of their energy security. What circumstances dictate the pace?
In addition to the degree of imbalance of the energy surplus on the side of the exporter and the energy deficit on the side of the importer, the important factors for achieving mutual energy security are the energy delivery routes – their ramification, capacity, complementarity and characteristics of the areas through which they pass. This is especially the case in situations where the purchasers and suppliers are geographically distant from each other. Leaning on the most advanced and energy most “thirsty” part of Europe on one hand, and the energy richest regions of the Euro-Asian range on the other, the Balkan region, despite the still-existing (and probably justifiably assigned) reputation of turbulent area (“Powder Keg”), inevitably found itself on the maps of the pipelines that should facilitate the flow of additional quantities of energy from the respective manufacturers to the respective consumers.
In this way, the traditional determinants of the Balkans as a “frontal defense” at the confrontation line of “different worlds” and a buffer zone between the ideologically opposing blocks, give way to some different characteristics which promote it as the energy corridor. This corridor, if the circumstances are met as described in the optimistic scenario, could do the “impossible mission” of bridging the centuries,
market-based regulatory system and the geopolitical importance of securing different routes of the energy supply of Europe ”.^4
A special value of this step, according to experts from the field, is the opening of the region for the necessary investments, showing solidarity and support to the development of energy resources of the member states. At the same time, through the SEE Energy Community, the Western Balkans^5 is also offered an opportunity to participate in a kind of “exercise for integration into the Union“, through the “export” of management models and community law.^6 Therefore, it is the conceptualization of a “wider geo-political platform”, where the logic of regional integration is based on the highly competitive area such as energy, and gradually, in parallel with the process of stabilization and enlargement of the Union, spreads to other areas. In this regard, the EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs points out that:
“ The Energy Community leads to creation of joint regulatory space around Europe, gradually developing the rules of trade, transit, and environmental protection, harmonization of the market and its integration. This creates a predictable and transparent market which stimulates investment and growth, as well as security of supply for the EU and its neighbors “.^7
Through such arrangements, the Balkan countries are included in the energy space of the Union, practically coming under the “multinational energy umbrella”. This paradigm valorizes their transit potential, i.e. shows its growing importance, in proportion to the certainty of construction of the planned routes of energy. Accordingly, they join the EU efforts to strengthen its own concept of the energy community by implementation, or by participating in the implementation of several major infrastructure projects. Among them, the gas bridge - “Nabucco” stands out as the most ambitious. It would be used in the aim of transport of gas to Europe from Central Asian and Caspian resources through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria.^8 It normally reduces the dependence of Europe on Russian gas and, perhaps because of this, it is backed by the United States. This makes it an additional attraction. However, Nabucco, in addition to being oversized in relation to the energy capacities provided so far, is also the most controversial from the standpoint of energy security of the Balkans as a whole, since it completely bypasses its “non-Europeanized” part – the Western Balkans, waiting in line for admission to the EU. In this situation, as “comforting solution” for its energy “care”, there is the oil pipeline project Constantza-Trieste left.
Of course, the Nabucco pipeline does not exclude other gas arrangements, either in terms of different routes of pipelines or other suppliers. Most frequently mentioned alternative, which is also the most relevant to the energy security of the Balkans is the gas corridor “South Stream” that goes along the following direction: Russia (Black Sea) – Bulgaria / bifurcation to Greece and Italy / – Serbia – Hungary – Austria.^9 Therefore, the Russian gas would arrive in Europe via the “South Stream”, part of which passing through the Western Balkans. The choice of the route of this pipeline is the result of considering the importance of the Balkan region observed from slightly different angle than the American one – through the prism of the interests of Russia as the largest exporter of energy to Europe and a geo-strategic player who has not permanently given up its traditional aspirations to exercise political influence in the parts of the Balkan region. With supplies of oil and gas, and existing transportation facilities that justify its classification in the group of “energy hegemony / leading powers”, it remains an indispensable partner of the EU, an important factor for its energy security, despite the evident discomfort of some Union members and allies across the Atlantic.^10 As for the Balkan countries, they should not matter such a Russian position. Moreover, when it
(^4) SEE Stability Pact, Speech by Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the St ability Pact at the Treaty Signing Ceremony establishing
Energy Community between the European Union and South Eastern Europe, Athens, October 25, 2005, accessed on September 25, 2011 http://www.stabilitypact.org/pages/speeches/detail.asp?y=2005&p= (^5) Typically, Western Balkans is a territory covering the states – the former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (except Slovenia) and Albania. (^6) Simurdić, “ EU Energy Policy, Western Balkans, Serbia ”. (^7) Andris Piebalgs, “ A Common Energy Policy for Europe ”, Brussels, 9 M arch, 2006, accessed on M arch 20, 2009, http://europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_5777_en.htm 8 Ronald Getz: “A Pipeline Race between the EU and Russia”, in: Katrinka Bariš (ed.), Pipelines, Policy and Power – The Future of Energy Relationships EU - Russia 9 , Belgrade, The Center for European Reform, European M ovement in Serbia (2009): 93 - 103.
10 Getz: “A Pipeline Race between the EU and Russia”, 93 - 103. In 2007, at the Energy Summit in Zagreb, then Russian President Vladimir Putin explained the objectives of the energy policy on the Balkans. “The strategic goal that we are implementing - said Putin - is to ensure reliable supply of energy for all countries in the region ... our policy takes into account the inclusion of the Balkan states into the European integration process, and we are ready to
comes to their energy security, certain advantages can be drawn. In fact, one of the priorities of the Russian energy policy is the diversification of energy supply routes to reduce dependence on transit countries, as well as the valuation of oil and gas prices over the entire length of the transit route to the end users. Route selection of a new gas corridor to Europe via the Balkans came out of these priorities. The competitiveness of this corridor to the corridor Nabucco can extort more favorable conditions for the supply of consumers in the regions they pass through, or branch off, and this is what ultimately supports the energy security of the Balkans in general.^11
Otherwise, most analyses of the relationship “South Stream” – “Nabucco” cover wider geopolitical and geo-economic aspects. Therefore, for example, Nicolo Sartori believes that Moscow is aware of the EU efforts to diversify gas supply, and seeks to consolidate its position in the Balkan states, primarily in their energy market, because they are future Member States.^12 In Bonino’s opinion, this behavior of the relevant institutions in Moscow stems from the fact that “the Balkans has long been the region of a particular Russian interest and is unlikely to be freed of that in the near future”.^13 There is also an opinion that with a greater presence in the Balkan energy sector, Russia primarily wants to create a counterweight to the orientation of the Balkan countries towards North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the EU. In this sense, Smith estimates that the “South Stream” pipeline and the Alexandropoulos-Burgas oil pipeline are the primary means of strengthening of the Russian influence on the Balkans and Southeastern Europe and are part of the energy strategy towards the EU.^14 Views from the Balkan region to the energy policies of EU and Russia also differ, but do not often result in emphatically black and white perceptions. Contrary to those views favoring the “zero-sum games”, under which one party must lose so that another could win, the assessments that the Russian energy policy including the part of it relating to the Balkans and the EU energy policy are not necessarily divergent - are much more convincing. It is in the Balkan region as a transit area that the Russian energy policy meets with the EU policy, which has ambitions to expand its regulations to the Russian “Near Abroad” through the “export” of its regulations, or expanding the validity of the internal market rules.^15 In doing so, the Balkans, for both Russia and the EU, has the prior importance of a transit area. With the EU energy supply from the “South Stream” (through the Balkans), Russia reduces its high dependence (of almost 80%) on the existing transit via Ukraine, while with the supply from Nabucco (again through the Balkans), the EU reduces its high dependence (of about 40%) on the Russian gas.^16
How will the competition of these two geo-energy concepts finally affect the energy security of the Balkans also depends to a considerable extent on the position of the United States. The States, as mentioned above, favor the “Nabucco” over the “South Stream”, but are interested in diversification of energy corridors in the spirit of the general principles of energy policy. This is also confirmed by their support to the construction plans relating to the ABMO Corridor (Burgas-Vlore). This project was launched in 1996 by the namesake company (AMBO), and should have been developed as a joint package of Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria within the so-called South Balkan Development Initiative (SBDI) and through the Trade and
develop our relations in cooperation with the EU”. “… Russian relations with partners on the Balkans have traditionally been based on mutual sympathy, common spiritual traditions, familiarity of languages and cultures and common history” (Putin’s speech at the Energy Summit in Zagreb, June 24, 2007; available at www.kremlin.ru, stated by Simurdić M ilan, “Russian Energy Policy and the Balkans”, Energy in South East Europe, the Sixth Report within the project: “ Monitoring Russian-Arab relations ” (Belgrade: ISAC, 2009): 62. (^11) As for the possible benefits that one or the other route brings to some parts of the region, we can say that every state as a rule “supports” the one passing through its territory, seeing it as a greater guarantee of a stable supply and certain financial benefits arising from transit position. (^12) Nicolo Sartori, “Russia's Energy Strategies in the Balkans“, Interns Yearbook (Skopje: Analytica, 2009): 48. (^13) Peter Bonin, “The last reserve of the imagined Great Power – On the significance of the Balkans for Russian political and economic actors“, 14 New Balkan Policy , no. 3 (Skopje, 2002): 10. M ark A. Smith, “Russian Energy Interest in the Balkans”, Balkan Series , (London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom,
So far, the trans-Balkan dynamics has not been in favor of the idea to form intraregional infrastructural energy network which would be primarily funded by the regional states and significantly contribute to a stable transit of energy. There were several initiatives of this kind but they were not implemented in practice because they were, as a rule, depreciated by megalomaniac plans of external factors. Kostas Ifantis and Theodor Tsakiris remind that in 2003, there were intentions to bu ild interregional gas network in the Balkan region. 23 Namely, the Greek energy giant DEPA and the Turkish company Botas launched the idea of building a so-called Western Balkans Gas Ring (Western Balkans Gas Ring Project). The plan involved the construction of a few small to medium capacity gas inter-connectors, which would be supplied from Caspian deposits by ITGI pipeline (Iran - Turkey - Greece - Italy). DEPA, Botas, and the Western Balkan state companies signed in 2003 the Memorandum of Understanding. However, they did not move far beyond, due to, as it is explained, the lack of demand for gas in the countries of the region 24 and because the access to Caspian reserves was not guaranteed. In addition to the Western Balkan Gas Ring, there are two more ideas for interregional energy connection: the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and its possible extension - Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP). TAP was expected to transport gas from the Caspian sites across Turkey, Albania, and Greece, to Italy and Switzerland. Shortly after the presentation of the project, the idea of the Western Balkan Gas Ring was revived where, through the supplement of the initial solution, building the pipeline branch from Albania to Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia was envisaged. However, this plan, together with the IAP, also ceased to be attractive and was abandoned. Announcement of construction of the terminal for liquefied natural gas in Croatia, on the island of Krk, reportedly contributed to this, although probably the main reason was that they were seen as direct competition with the Nabucco and ITGI project, supported by the EU. In addition, it is possible that, as Ifantis and Tsakiris believe, intensive campaign in favor of the South Stream project definitely made them unrealizable.^25 What are the chances that this practice of discrediting intraregional projects changes in favor of their affirmation in accordance with the real importance of the transit capacity of the region to profitability of “major projects”?
Indications of such change are already there. For example, when it comes to the game “Nabucco” – “South Stream”, the Russian and EU views reveal the pragmatic approaches that point more to compatibility in the field of transit and less to the opposition and exclusion. Former statements of European and Russian officials that have suggested the concept of “zero-sum games” were replaced by the benign attitudes. For example, the EU Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger, at the conference dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the Energy Dialogue EU - Russia said, “South Stream project is of great importance ... It is not in my best interest to block it, but to comply with the EU legislation”.^26 Austrian president Heinz Fischer said that “Europe needs both energy routes (South Stream and Nabucco)”, and that “both are significant and full”.^27 From the other side, from Russia, statements of similar tones were also delivered. Alexei Miller, chairman of the board of the Russian holding company “Gazprom” claimed that his company does not oppose the construction of the Nabucco, but recalls that the pipeline filling is the problem of Europeans. “If Europeans want the Nabucco”, says Miller “...they must build it. We have nothing against it. Nabucco is their problem. Our mission is to fulfill our contractual obligations with gas supplies to consumers”.^28
The manifested trend change in the relations between two key factors of Trans-European energy complex certainly opens the door to more independent and proactive approach of the Balkan transit countries. This is encouraged by increasingly common view that, as Simurdić assesses, all regional pipeline projects are, observed “from a wider angle ... essentially complementary. For, they strengthen competitiveness, reliability of supply, and thus overall energy security”.^29 Close to this view are the
(^23) Theodor Tsakiris and Kostas Ifantis, “Secure gas supplies will empower Balkan integration”, Trans-conflict (on-line) , 2010, accessed on M arch 28, 2011, http://www.transconflict.com/think/transenergy/secure-gas-supplies-will-empower-balkan-integration (^24) It is estimated that, although the gasification process takes place, coal has maintained the leading role in the regional energy mix. (^25) Tsakiris and Ifantis, “Secure gas supplies will empower Balkan integration”, op. cit. (note 22) (^26) “EU: The South Stream and Nabucco pipelines will be competing”, Blic (on-line) , November 22, 2010, accessed on January 8, 2011, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Svet/219128/EU-Gasovodi-Juzni-tok-i-Nabuko-bice-konkurenti (^27) “Europe needs both South Stream and Nabucco”, Balkan Magazine (on-line) , M ay 20, 2011, accessed on August 1, 2011, http://www.balkanmagazin.net/kolumna/3e/evropi_potrebni_i_juzni_tok_i_nabuko.xhtml 28 “For now, no unification of the South Stream and Nabucco pipelines”, Blic (on-line) , January 10, 2011, accessed on August 2, 2011, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Ekonomija/228469/Za-sada-bez-ujedinjenja-gasovoda-Juzni-tok-i-Nabuko (^29) Simurdić, “ EU Energy Policy, The Western Balkans, Serbia ”, op.cit. (note 4)
assessments that come from competent professional circles in the US, which, analyzing the situation from the perspective of the overall Euro-Atlantic plans relating to the mentioned region, recognize that the upgrade of the Balkans complex is not only necessary but also inevitable. For example, that is, more or less explicitly, expressed in the Report of the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), entitled Re-linking the Western Balkans: the Energy Dimension. In addition to analyzing the current situation in terms of energy infrastructure and energy market on the Balkans in general, the Report discusses the missed opportunities in respect of the EU and the US in the field of energy in order to promote interaction and integration of the regional states, and consequently their integration with the EU. In doing so, it points to serious shortcomings in the operation of Brussels and Washington when it comes to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans in the field of energy, stating that the importance of individual countries or their strategic position in relation to the overall regional pattern is not well perceived. The case of Serbia is referred to as a good example of this. Specifically, it was estimated that the South Stream project complicated to a significant degree the Euro- Atlantic plans, and that the Russian-Serbian arrangement, which has strengthened Russian position in the region (primarily the purchase of the Oil Industry of Serbia - NIS) is only the product of neglecting Serbia, i.e. “its diplomatic isolation by the West caused by the Kosovo issue”.^30 Paying special attention to Serbia in this report is motivated, obviously, by its geographical position, which, of course, was also like this when the mentioned omissions of Brussels and Washington were made. Recognizing post festum this fact as very important for the articulation of relations with Serbia, the United States and its European partners seem to “rediscover the Balkans”.^31 This “discovery” cannot compensate for the damage caused by the missed opportunities, but can probably create some new ones. Based on the “new analysis of the Balkan energy potential”, the Report makes numerous recommendations to the authorities in Brussels and Washington on how to reorganize and better implement energy diplomacy in the region within their strategic policies, taking into account the full potential of all countries and at the same time, respecting individual national needs. First, it was recommended that efforts should be directed towards the intensive development of energy networks, with particular emphasis on the so-called regional inter-connectors. In this sense, when it comes to oil infrastructure, in addition to the total rehabilitation of oil refineries, the following has been suggested: support for the plans of the Greek Hellenic Petroleum to extend the pipeline Thessaloniki - Skopje to Pristina and Nis, then, support for the financing of a feasibility study for construction of the pipeline Serbia - Croatia, which would function independently of the “Adria” system and the Constantza - Trieste project, as well as approval of financial assistance for construction of the energy line Albania - Kosovo, with the possibility to continue to Montenegro, which would allow to the economically weakest countries the import diversification.
In the field of gas infrastructure, the following has been recommended: the construction of the inverse gas inter-connector Serbia - Croatia, support for the timely completion of inverse inter-connector Bulgaria - Serbia (for which there is already an agreement); support for the financing of a feasibility study of potential inter-connectors from Serbia and Croatia to the gas pipeline “Nabucco” in order to foster the import diversification for these countries; support for the completion of a feasibility study for the construction of the gas inter-connector Serbia - Romania to assist Serbia (and subsequently Bosnia and Herzegovina) in case of a new gas crisis, regardless of the outcome of the “Nabucco” project (!); support for the financing of a feasibility study for the gas inter-connector between Greece and Albania and Greece and Macedonia, as well as establishing a regional Gas Emergency Response Plan within the ongoing negotiations related to the proposal from the Commission about the review of the Security of Gas Supply Directive in 2004.^32
The foregoing recommendations are based, as stated in the conclusion of the Report, on the two basic assumptions: firstly – that greater cooperation, harmonization and integration of Southeast Europe, in all its dimensions, from transport and trade to energy and security, is relevant for the whole region including the EU member states (Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania); that such a process would contribute to the gradual integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU and NATO; that, otherwise, negligence and lack of attention to this region can contribute to new problems, and even starting new conflicts in its most unstable areas, and secondly – that the partnership between the United States and Greece will, in particular,
(^30) “Re-linking the Western Balkans: The Energy Dimension”, CSIS-EKEM Policy Report , Policy Report Three , September 2010
(Washington D.C./Athens: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Hellenic Centre for European St udies (EKEM ), 2010): 5. 31 M arko Filijović, “Is the South Stream at Risk?”, Balkan Magazine (on-line) , M arch 31, 2011, accessed on 9 August, 2011, http://www.balkanmagazin.net/kolumna/nauka/da_li_je_juzni_tok_u_opasnosti.xhtml (^32) “Re-linking the Western Balkans: The Energy Dimension”, op. cit. (note 29): 8.
