

Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
This document from the communications of the acm explores the concept of recommender systems, which use collaborative filtering and aggregation to provide personalized recommendations based on user evaluations. The article discusses various types of recommendations, including explicit and implicit, anonymous and attributed, and their aggregation methods. It also touches upon business models, incentives, and privacy concerns in recommender systems.
Typology: Study notes
1 / 3
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!


56 March 1997/Vol. 40, No. 3 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM
Recommender systems assist and augment this natural social process. In a typical recommender sys- tem people provide recommendations as inputs, which the system then aggregates and directs to appropriate recipients. In some cases the primary transformation is in the aggregation; in others the system’s value lies in its ability to make good matches between the recommenders and those seeking recom- mendations. The developers of the first recommender system, Tapestry [^1 ], coined the phrase “collaborative filtering” and several others have adopted it. We prefer the more general term “recommender system” for two rea- sons. First, recommenders may not explictly collaborate with recipients, who may be unknown to each other. Second, recom- mendations may suggest particularly interesting items, in addition to indicat- ing those that should be filtered out. This special section includes descrip- tions of five recommender systems. A sixth article analyzes incentives for provision of rec- ommendations. Figure 1 places the systems in a technical design space defined by five dimensions. First, the contents of an evaluation can be anything from a single bit (rec- ommended or not) to unstructured textual annota- tions. Second, recommendations may be entered explicitly, but several systems gather implicit evalua- tions: GroupLens monitors users’ reading times; PHOAKS mines Usenet articles for mentions of
URLs; and Siteseer mines personal bookmark lists. Third, recommendations may be anonymous, tagged with the source’s identity, or tagged with a pseudo- nym. The fourth dimension, and one of the richest areas for exploration, is how to aggregate evaluations. GroupLens, PHOAKS, and Siteseer employ variants on weighted voting. Fab takes that one step further to combine evaluations with content analysis. Referral- Web combines suggested links between people to form longer referral chains. Finally, the (perhaps aggregated) evaluations may be used in several ways: negative rec- ommendations may be filtered out, the items may be sorted according to numeric evaluations, or evaluations may accompany items in a dis- play. Figures 2 and 3 identify dimensions of the domain space: The kinds of items being recommended and the people among whom evaluations are shared. Consider, first, the domain of items. The sheer volume is an important variable: Detailed textual reviews of restau- rants or movies may be practical, but applying the same approach to thousands of daily Netnews mes- sages would not. Ephemeral media such as netnews (most news servers throw away articles after one or two weeks) place a premium on gathering and distributing evaluations quickly, while evaluations for 19th century books can be gathered at a more leisurely pace. The last dimension describes the cost structure of choices people make about the items. Is it very costly to miss
personal experience of the alternatives. In everyday life, we rely on
recommendations from other people either by word of mouth, rec-
ommendation letters, movie and book reviews printed in newspapers, or
general surveys such as Zagat’s^ restaurant guides.
Figure 1. The technical design space
Future systems will likely need to offer some incentive for providing recommendations.
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM March 1997/Vol. 40, No. 3 57
Contents of recommendation
a) numeric: 1– b) seconds
numeric: 1–
mention of a person or a document
mention of a URL
mention of a URL
Explicit entry?
a) explicit b) monitor reading time
explicit
mined from public data sources mined from usenet postings mined from existing bookmark folders
Anonymous?
pseudonymous
pseudonymous
attributed
attributed
anonymous
Aggregation
personalized weighting based on past agreement among recommenders personalized weighting; combined with content analysis assemble referral chain to desired person
one person one vote (per URL)
frequency of mention in overlapping folders
Use of recommendations
display alongside articles in existing summary views
selection/ filtering
display
sorted display
display
GroupLens
Fab
ReferralWeb
PHOAKS
Siteseer
a good item or sample a bad one? How do those costs compare to the benefits of hitting a good one? This cost structure is likely to interact with technical design choices. For example, when the costs of incorrect deci- sions are high, as they would be, say, with evaluations of medical treatments, evaluations that convey more nuances are likely to be more useful. Next, consider the set of recommendations and the people providing and consuming them. Who provides recommendations? Do they tend to evaluate many items in common, leading to a dense set of recommen- dations? How many consumers are there, and do their tastes vary? These factors also will interact with techni- cal choices. For example, matching people by tastes automatically is far more valuable in a larger set of peo- ple who may not know each other. Personalized aggre- gation of recommendations will be more valuable when people’s tastes differ than when there are a few experts.
Social Implications Recommender systems introduce two interesting incentive problems. First, once one has established a profile of interests, it is easy to free ride by consuming evaluations provided by others. Moreover, as Avery and Zeckhauser argue, this problem is not entirely solved even if evaluations are gathered implicitly from exist- ing resources or from monitoring user behavior. Future systems will likely need to offer some incentive for the provision of recommendations by making it a prereq-
uisite for receiving recommendations or by offering monetary compensation. Second, if anyone can provide recommendations, content owners may generate mountains of positive recommendations for their own materials and negative recommendations for their competitors. Future systems are likely to introduce precautions that discourage the “vote early and often” phenomenon. Recommender systems also raise concerns about personal privacy. In general, the more information individuals have about the recommendations, the bet- ter they will be able to evaluate those recommenda- tions. However, people may not want their habits or views widely known. Some recommender systems per- mit anonymous participation or participation under a pseudonym, but this is not a complete solution since some people may desire an intermediate blend of pri- vacy and attributed credit for their efforts. Both incentive and privacy problems arise in an evaluation-sharing system familiar to our readers: the peer review system used in academia. With respect to incentives, every editor knows the best source for a prompt and careful review is an author who currently has an article under consideration. With respect to pri- vacy, blind and double-blind refereeing are common practices. These practices evolved to solve problems inherent to the refereeing process, and it may be worth- while to consider ways to incorporate such practices into automated systems.