BRITISH EMPIRE AND AMERICAN REVOLUTION
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British Empire and American
Revolution
At the outbreak of the Seven Years War (1756), no one could have
predicted that the future would bring swift and dramatic change to
Britain’s mainland colonies. Yet that conflict–which simultaneously
removed France from North America and created a huge war debt
Britain had to find ways to pay–set in motion the process leading to
American Independence.
British Empire and American independence
In 1763
Britain secured huge gains from the Seven Years War
(1756-63). The war had been a Europe-wide struggle, in which Brit-
ain, allied with Prussia, fought a coalition of France, Austria and Rus-
sia. It had also been conducted on a worldwide scale, as Britain wrested
colonial territory away from France. As a result, Britain ceased to be a
mere colonial power: it became imperial power. The problem now was
to protect this new empire. Nowhere was the problem more acute than
in North America. The vast areas controlled by the Thirteen Colonies
had to be defended. In addition, a long and continually advancing
frontier needed to be policed. This was no simple matter. An unim-
pressive performance by American militia troops during the war indi-
cated that regular British troops were going to be necessary for the
task. All of this amounted to a very costly burden, deeply resented by
British taxpayers, who were already alarmed at the rapid growth of the
national debt during the war. British efforts to limit this burden, and
to shift part of it onto the colonists, were to lead to trouble.
Real difficulties resulted from attempts to impose a more effective
tax regime on the colonies. Britain had hitherto been relatively lax in
enforcing taxation in America; smuggling was rife. The Americans had
become accustomed to this state of affairs. They were outraged when
it became clear that the British were now serious about making them
pay some of the costs of governing and defending them. The resis-
tance to new taxes was both determined and on such a scale that the
British government was stunned. Indeed, the colonists began to chal-
lenge Britain’s right to tax them. They were, after all, not represented
in the parliament that enacted these new taxes. The cry of ‘no taxation
without representation’ was one the British understood–it was a prin-
ciple the British held dear.
Unfortunately, however, the British government was not prepared
to compromise: another principle they held dear was that parliament
alone must control state finances. If they allowed a source of revenue
to escape that control, there was a risk that the king would gain control
of it. That would be dangerous: a financially independent king might
be tempted to rule without parliament. The British therefore retreated
in the face of determined opposition to new taxes and were willing to
back down over the form of taxation–but they refused to accept the
colonists’ constitutional case, insisting that they had the right to im-
pose whatever taxes they chose over their colonies.
Their successful resistance encouraged further defiance on the part
of the colonists, while British intransigence on the matter of principle
led to a hardening of attitudes. Relations deteriorated to the point that,
when the British authorities attempted to confiscate colonists’ arms at
Concord in April 1775, a confrontation between colonists and British
troops developed at nearby Lexington, which resulted in the opening
shots of the War of Independence.
A world war
Many British observers expected a quick victory, not believing that
the colonists could withstand regular troops. Only a few recognized
the problems: the territory was vast, and the lines of supply so long,
that there was no realistic possibility of a British victory. The Ameri-
cans had sufficient resources and manpower (2 million people, one
quarter of Britain’s population), to make their land unconquerable.
British forces floundered; they could make British rule effective wher-
ever they stood, but only for as long as they remained there. They
could and did win battles, but could not exploit them; they simply did
not have the manpower. By 1778, it was clear that they were not win-
