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Unit 8: Gender Inequalities Introduction Extraordinary change in gender inequalities and gender relations over the last five decades. To what extent can we identify a ‘revolution’ in gender relations? In what dimensions? Gender inequalities integrate elements of economic relations, cultural patterns, family dynamics, power struggles. All these elements have to be taken into consideration. We read The Incomplete Revolution as an instance of an attempt to grapple with this multidimensionality of gender inequality in comparative, longitudinal perspective. The argument Descriptive dimension and causal dimension Gender relations have undergone an unquestionable ‘revolution’: important equalization of life structures. Uniform cross-national pattern. Yet it’s an incomplete revolution: a. (^) It’s stratified by class or education level b. It has developed further in labor market than family relations. Multidimensional causal argument: chain of succesive reductions in inequalities
“With rising education attainment, women became endowed with greater productivity in the market place and, thus, the results to lifetime employment dedication rose. (…) This transition, however, required exogenous drivers. As is often stressed, women’s autonomy, was in the first round spurred by birth control technologies, the abolition of marriage banns and the advent of divorce laws” (Esping-Andersen 2010: 13).
The Ideal-types
Bread-winner Transitional Egalitarian Female education
Lower than male education
Equivalent Equivalent to male education Female participation
Lower than men
Equivalent but with segregation
Equivalent to male education Household chores and family care
Women Mostly women Indistinctively
Key life events Ordered Partially non- ordered
Non-ordered Divorciality Low Intermediate (?) Closest paradigmatic example
Postwar period, everywhere
1980s-2010s OECD countries Sweden(?)
Theoretical Approaches Dominant theoretical approaches to the extent and changes in gender inequality. Gary Becker’s model: gender specialization Assumes rational action: Family is a unit of welfare income maximization. Also assumes unitary utility function. In capitalism, income maximized through specialization. Family actors should specialize. Role- taking determined by productivity. Women specialize in household due to ‘comp. advantage’. Implication: Prod. Equalization -> ↓ gender specialization “Theorem 2.2: If all members of a household have different comparative advantages, no more than one member would invest in both market and household capital. Members specializing in the market sector would invest only in market capital, and members specializing in the household sector would invest only in household capital” (Becker 1993[1981]: 34).
‘Doing gender’ model: feminist theory. Sex ≠ gender Gender inequalities reflect persistent gender norms that include duties of men and women. Norms are hierarchically arranged, with men’s more valuable. Gender is ‘done’ constantly through “symbolic violence”. Roles: economic – men; reprod/household – women Unequal valorization of actions. Implication: Feminist mobilization -> Reduced gender ≠
b. Problems of reconciling children and career Should the postwar period really be the reference period? A typical stage due to particular economic context. In fact some demographic patterns are better accounted by economic cycle than changes in preferences. Unemp., job insecurity help explain low fertility rates. Educational structuration of gender equalization within families Not all education groups have reacted equally to the new gender regime. Household production equalization has been more intense among among highly-educated groups. Exposure to egalitarian discourse. Financial opportunity cost. Time availability. Awareness importance educ. skills. Education effect is bolstered by homogamy. (Hours devoted to household chores by women)/(Hours devoted to household chores by their partner) among people in a relationship if both work by level of education of the women, 2012
(Hours devoted to family members by women)/(Hours devoted to family members by their partner) among people in a relationship if both work by level of education of the women, 2012
Gender Inequality in Family Relations The “acid test” of women’s new economic status is in non-economic behavioral patterns. Gendered behavior in domestic sphere is very resilient. Descriptively: Genuine but partial equalization in household work. “Couples may still be ‘doing gender’ but they certainly are going it much less” (Esping-Andersen 2010: 37). ↓ Women’s domestic work > ↑ men’s work Tech change Persistent gender norms exert an influence in practices. Daily minutes devoted to "unpaid work" by men and women, 1987 and 2009
(Check two tables about laundry and grocery.) -> The gender revolution has been more pronounced in the economic sphere than in the private, family sphere. How to disentangle the role of (a) productivities, (b) preferences-norms, and (c) barganing power? E-A conducts an analysis of household chores distribution across genders. Barganing power – relative income weight, opposite effect Preferences – educ. homogamy (through self-selection) Productivities – same income quartile
Main finding: The level of couple specialization is driven by bargaining power. Secondary finding: preferences and norms matter, but only among the most educated. Homogamy is more influential for the most educated. Self-selection, predisposed dual-earnings couple. Upper classes have bigger reaping benefits for dual-income partnership “Conventional ‘doing-gender’ practices erode in tándem with women’s attainemnt of greater economic autonomy” (Esping-Andersen 2010: 49). Structural Consequences of Incomplete Revolution Incomplete revolution contributes to the rising tide of income inequality. Lone parenting and divorciality are increasingly biased towards the less-educated -> ↑≠ Similarity in preferences -> increasing educ homogamy at the top -> ↑≠ Rising returns to skills -> differences in female employment engagement by education grow + wage distributions more unequal among women -> ↑≠ Probability of having been divorced by years of education in three countries, 2012
Unit 9: Religiosity and Secularization Conceptual Introduction Why should we care about religiosity and religiosity levels? Source of collective identity. Institutionalizes collective rules of conduct and behavior Early explanation of the social and natural world. Source of psychological wellbeing (meaning and strength) Sociologists have historically paid intense attention to religion as a source of social stability, inequalities and social change. Marx – Mechanism of domination Durkheim – Collective consciousness Tocqueville – Loser of the French Revolution Weber – Force supporting capitalism expansion What is religion? Religion ≠ Churches Durkheim’s definition: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. “(1912: 62) -> Religion is multidimensional and multilevel! Refers to:
Societal secularization
Low High Individual secularization
Low Developing countries, Israel US
High Russia, Scandinavia, Spain France
Individual Secularization in the Very Long-term Excessive attention to the post-war period. Classical sociology predicts that secularization is a very long term process. Data is limited for the very long-term, but can be collected. One possible indicator is the percent of priest per capita (especially in countries where a church has a religious quasi-monopoly). Spain is a natural experiment in that sense. Ideas of the French Enlightenment poured into Spain since XVII cent. Also experience of the French Revolution. Individual-level Secularization in Recent Decades Following Durkheim’s definition, we can distinguish between (a) participation in rituals, (b) beliefs, and (c) religious self-identification. a. Rituals: conventionally measured with attendance in religious services (normally % who attend weekly or more). b. Beliefs: beliefs in God, commandments or major sacred actors. c. Religious self-identification: Identification with a given Church. The data for the 1980s- period reveal some support to the notion of a process of secularization. -Ritual practices: Secularization mostly among European countries (except UK)- Among Non-European countries the situation is more diverse. -Secularization in USA (!) and Argentina. But no secularization of ritual practices in Mexico, Nigeria, Russia and Turkey.
This evidence is consistent with the paradox posed by Norris and Inglehart (2004) that Europe has secularized, although the world as a whole is increasing religious: “1. The public of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless,
- The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before – and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population” (2005: 5). Religious beliefs:
Belief in God has decline in major European countries. In most non-European countries it has remained stable. -> Secularization has affected mostly ritual participation, not so much beliefs and self-identification. Are beliefs ‘stickier’ than practices or persistent commitment is simply less costly?
Percent of individuals that belief in God, 1981- early 1980s
early 1990s
mid 1990s early 2000s
mid 2000s early 2010s
Trend Only European countries France 65 62 61 Stable(?) Germany 80 60 51 54 52 Clear decline Spain 92 86 91 87 76 Clear decline Sweden 60 45 56 53 45 Clear decline Not only-European countries Iran 99 100 100 Stable Mexico 98 93 92 98 94 Stable South Africa 98 98 99 98 Stable US 98 96 96 96 89 Decline(?) Source: WVS
Explaining Cross-national Levels How can we account for these substantial cross-national differences in religiosity? Large empirical literature on the determinants of religious attendance (mostly) and beliefs. -> Ruiter and van Tubergen (2009) make a major empirical contribution. The frame: Intense debate between the ‘secularization theory’ (ST) and ‘religious market theory’ (RMT). Both have faced important empirical challenges: ST: In the US and Eastern Europe no decline Ruiter and van Turbergen’s article advocates for the persistent predictive power of ST. Previous research has strong limitations e.g. theories tested separately
- Scientism (Weber, Berger): 1.a. Increasing formal education encourages critical thinking. ‘Value rationality’ is undermined.
Modernization of social inequalities (+) Weakness of social ties (+) Scientific and formal education not related to secularization.
The Multidimensionality of Religiosity Levels If religiosity is really multidimensional, we shouldn’t find perfect correlations between different elements of individual and collective religiosity. True! Beliefs and practices are far from perfectly correlated both at the individual and country level. Individual level:
Correlation matrix between three dimensions of religiosity, WVS 1981- Weekly attendance Religion is important in my life Religion is important in my life. God exists .26.
Cross-national Levels in the 2000s Secularization and convergence could have led to small cross-national differences in religiosity or to large ones. Can we group these countries along these dimensions? We can capture the overall religiosity level through a simple indicator: Religiosity= (%_believe_in_God + %_attend_weekly + %_religion_is_important) / This indicator suggests the persistence of large cross-national variations in religiosity levels. -Most secularized countries: Western Europe and Australia/New Zealand; China; Japan; Eastern-European (Russia, Ukraine…) -Intermediate countries: Latin American; US -Least secularized countries: South-east Asian; Sub-Saharan African; Middle-Eastern
Unit 10: Comparative Education Introduction Long literature in the area of sociology of education. Why education matters? Absorbs about ¼ of our lives Affects ‘life chances’: occupation, class position, political engagement , employment Contributes to the formation of national identities
Individual-level Theories of Education Expansion Human capital theory (Becker): Education enhances producitivity. Education is a form of investment. Decision made in comparison to other yields & forgone income and leisure. Income premium ≈ 4-6% per years of educ. Macro-level implications: ↑ educ levels -> ↑ econ growth. Signalling theory (Sorensen): Education is a proxy for ‘unobservables’. Signals determination, learning capacity, diligence. Credentialism theory (Collins): Educ ensures ‘social closure’ (e.g. PhDs and professors). Signals same status and similar values. Weberian approach: Bureaucratization increases demand of formal degrees. Credentialism ensures minimum standards and high wages. Institutionalism (Meyer): Educ is a taken-for-granted social norm in global culture. It’s independent from productivity.
Persistent Cross-national Inequalities
Despite the convergence among young cohorts, cross-national differences in educational attainment persist. Highest levels: English-speaking countries, Nordic countries Intermediate: Central European countries Lowest levels: Mediterranean countries Differences between higher-education attainment are smaller. Differences among younger-age groups tend to be smaller.
Institutional Characteristics of Educational Systems Cont. educational systmes do not emerge from rational planing. Rather result of power struggles and cultural preferences. -Childcare and pre-school: Clear expansion in recent decades. There is a growing consensus that early schooling is positive for cognitive, health development, socialization, communication skills. Enrollment levels highest in Scandinavia, France and Southern Europe -Primary education: Substantial uniformity in enrollment rates and the curricula. Practially all children at 6-12 age are enrolled. Focus on native language, reading and writing, numeracy and nature. In some countries no clear transition to secondary educ.
-Secondary education:Oriented to prepare students for (a) higher education or (b) the labor market. Usually lasts 9 years. Took long time to expand it. Traking: segregation of student body based on competence or speciality. Early tracking is specially present in Central Europe. Shaped by production model and valuesPros and cons of early tracking -Tertiary education: Has grown much in recent decates. In many countries dominant education level among young cohorts. Driven by search for professionalization and expansion service sector. Institutional models of higher education in Europe: a. Binary model: basic research univ and practical work univ. GE, ND, DK b. Sequentially organized: cycles of 2-3 years. FR, SP, BEL c. Diversified model: limited involvement of the state and blurred boundaries. UK mostly Class Inequalities Educational attainment and achivement is distributed highly unequally in all affluent democracies. Important because it challenges the official principle of ‘equality of opportunity’, not so much meritocratic values. Meritocracy: social hierarchy where productivity determines capacities. Two types of disparities: Primary (within-stage performance) Secondary (between-stages transitions) Strong evidence that parental background affects both achievement and attainment. Variance explained in three tests by the level of socio-economic status of the 15-years old student (PISA) Top: Hungary, Belgium, Turkey Last: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Iceland
-Causes of upper-middle class educational advantage: Better material conditions for learning at home; Higher intellectual stimulation at home; Parental expectations; Different opportunity cost of schooling; Expected profitability of degree varies by class; More likely to attain cultural standards of the society that instructors reward. “Educational attainment is strongly enhanced by growing up in a family with parents who were highly educated” (Müller and Kogan 2010: 505). Long-standing debate about the trends in the impact of social origin. Growing consensus that inequalities of education attainment have declined in most OECD countries. Especially in Western Europe. Still not well documented why are inequalities larger in some countries than others. Factors that increase the role of SES (Müller and Kogan 2010): Extension of pre-school education; Early tracking; Extension of public sector education (not confirmed)
-Welfare functions: provide social welfare and fill areas of ‘state failure’ or ‘market failure’ (e.g. charitable orgs). -Cohesion function (Kornhauser): facilitate social cohesion through the moderation of social-political stances. -Social function (Putnam): fosters social trust. When we analyze CS and civic engagement, we normally refer to partiticipation in a formal organization, not a non-voluntary network. Civic engagement is multidimensional: Formal Membership; Participation in organized activities; Donations; Volunteering These forms of engagement are nested and tend to be related. Membership > Participation > Volunteering Based on ESS data, Immerfal, Priller and Delhey write that “the positions of the individual countries do not change substantially with respect to the different types of civil engagement. Countries in which many citizens are members of civil society organizations and also participate in their activities, also have very large shares of citizens who make donations to organizations.” (2010: 16) Organizational basis of civic engagement. Mayor types of voluntary organizations: a. (^) ‘Old’ social movements: mostly related to economic interests. e.g.: trade unions, political parties, prof. organizations (b) ‘New’ social movements: mostly related to non-economic, expressive interests. e.g.: sports, artistic, environmental, humanitarian Sports, arts and trade unions are the ones with higher membership Individual-level Determinants of Civic Engagement Individual level determinants: Higher education (more cognitive abilities); Higher income (more to lose); Employment (more to gain from
trade CSOs memberships); Post-materialism (orientation to others); Men (more oriented towards non- domestic matters); Trust in others (predisposes favorable); Total number of friends Cross-national Differences in Civil Society Strength Topic of long-term interest in the social sciences. Marx: Frenchmen pesants not engaged Tocqueville: Americans are ‘joiners’ while Frenchment not Based on ESS data, Immerfal, Priller and Delhey argue that there is a clear north-south gradient in Europe and a smaller west-east gradient. Within Europe, engagement is highest in Scandinavia, followed by Western Europe and is lowest in Eastern- Europe and Southern Europe. Neat characterization, but limited to Europe. Using the latest WVS wave: -countries with most engaged citizenries: A group of Subsaharan countries (Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana) Anglo-saxon (US, NZ, AUS) and Sweden
-Intermediate: Germany, Japan, South American countries (Ecuador, Peru), Spain -Low: Northern African countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria), Former USSR (Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbequistan) , China
Does it matter much on membership to religious organizations? Not really Weak evidence of a form of US exceptionalism concerning civil engagement. SE and NZ/AU have higher values. Differences in the meaning of Membership varies by countries? Pol party membership is different in US and Europe. When we disagregate by type of voluntary organizations, differences aren’t large. SP has lower rates than SE for all types of vol orgs US has higher rates than SE among relig and self-help orgs Trends in Civil Society Strength Social scientists debate intensely about the long-term trends in civic society engagement. Two main positions: -Putnam leads the decrease camp, Americans “bowl alone”. Some evidence of decline for the US “whereas in Western and Scandinavian countries there was no quantitative shift away from involvement in voluntary organizations” (Immerfall et al. 2010). -Schofer and Fourçade-Gourinchas (2001) expect the opposite: Global sacralization of individual, personal autonomy autonomy and of human rights -> ↑ engagement. Using data of the 1980s, they observe a clear increase. “Among the 19 countries with membership data for both 1981 and 1991, the national membership average increases from .81 to .93” (2001: 823). The WVS allows to asses longitudinal changes in membership rates from a range of countries. Only comparable waves are those of the mid-1990s and early 2010s. For a large number of countries, we observe a decline in the percentage of members to any form of voluntary organization. Cases: US, Spain, Germany, China, Russia, Sweden. Exception: India Could this be driven by secularization? Given the imp of religious organizations. It’s not driven by secularization. Decreases in membership rates predominate among three types of very different organizations: Recreational, sports organizations; Professional organizations; Charitable organizations. Maybe related to the Great Recession (2008-).
Theories of Civil Society Strength We still have a limited understanding of the structural-contextual determinants of civic engagement.
In non-corporate systems, individuals considered most legitimate political actors. Orgs only as aggregates of ind interests. Origins: FR modernization by abolishing absolutist privileges -> aversion to corporatism. In English-speaking individual considered best judge of priorities. Effects: State doesn’t actively promote civic engagement as much as in corporate systems. By legitimating centralized incorporation, corporatist structrues should increase the level of associational life. Determinants of Civil Society Strength Country level determinants: Interestingly, democracy not significant. Freedom of association is a basic democratic right! Infrarepresentation of non-democratic countries? Statism has a negative and significant effect: Statism deters CS activism; State covers all field of political decision-making Corporateness has a positive and significant effect: State actively encourages CS activism, especially in old SM GDP per capita has no effect: Challenges value modernization theory
