Docsity
Docsity

Prepara tus exámenes
Prepara tus exámenes

Prepara tus exámenes y mejora tus resultados gracias a la gran cantidad de recursos disponibles en Docsity


Consigue puntos base para descargar
Consigue puntos base para descargar

Gana puntos ayudando a otros estudiantes o consíguelos activando un Plan Premium


Orientación Universidad
Orientación Universidad


conducta novedosa, Apuntes de Psicología

Asignatura: Aprendizaje, complejo y cognición, Profesor: María Francisca Arias, Carrera: Psicología, Universidad: US

Tipo: Apuntes

2016/2017

Subido el 13/02/2017

hannahriver
hannahriver 🇪🇸

4.5

(6)

25 documentos

1 / 3

Toggle sidebar

Esta página no es visible en la vista previa

¡No te pierdas las partes importantes!

bg1
2010 May–June 183www.americanscientist.org
Mac rosco pe
Designing Minds
Edward A. Wasserman and Mark S. Blumberg
The basic argument of intel-
ligent design was famously set
forth in the watchmaker analogy of
William Paley in 1802: The complex-
ity and functionality of a watch im-
ply a watchmaker; analogously, the
complexity and functionality of living
things also imply a designer, albeit one
vastly more potent than a mere watch-
maker. This argument rests on a sim-
ple analogy between the design of hu-
man artifacts and the design of natural
forms. For the analogy to work, we
must first accept that we design our
inventions with purpose and foresight.
On this point, most evolutionists and
creationists agree. What distinguish-
es these two camps is that, when ac-
counting for the origin of living things,
proponents of intelligent design sum-
mon a divine creator, whereas evolu-
tionists credit natural selection. Thus,
evolutionists share with creationists
the same understanding of design; they
differ only in how they invoke it.
Discussions of design are promi-
nent in the writings of evolutionists
from Darwin to Dawkins. Ponder-
ing the implications of his theory of
natural selection for Paley’s “old ar-
gument of design in nature,” Charles
Darwin wrote in his autobiography
that we can no longer argue that “the
beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must
have been made by an intelligent be-
ing, like the hinge of a door by man.
There seems to be no more design in
the variability of organic beings and
in the action of natural selection, than
in the course which the wind blows.
Everything in nature is the result of
fixed laws.” A century later, Richard
Dawkins pursued the issue of design
and divided the world “into things
that look designed (such as birds and
airliners) and things that don’t (rocks
and mountains).” He further divided
those things that look designed into
“those that really are designed (sub-
marines and tin openers) and those
that aren’t (sharks and hedgehogs).”
What did Dawkins mean when he
wrote of things that “really are de-
signed”? In The Blind Watchmaker, he
provided a clear answer: “All appear-
ances to the contrary, the only watch-
maker in nature is the blind forces of
physics….A true watchmaker has fore-
sight: He designs his cogs and springs,
and plans their interconnections, with
a future purpose in his mind’s eye”
[emphasis added].
Such uncritical acceptance of pur-
pose and foresight in human design
may well be unwise. After all, do we
really know how door hinges and
can openers were created? In fact,
we may know less about the origins
of these everyday contrivances than
we know about the origins of bivalve
shells, sharks and hedgehogs. By at-
tributing the origins of animals and
artifacts to different kinds of design-
ers—one blind, the other intelligent—
both Darwin and Dawkins lapse into
the same kind of “designer thinking”
that ensnared creationists like Paley.
Such thinking rests on the familiarity
and deceptive simplicity of mentalis-
tic explanations of behavior, as when
Dawkins uncritically appeals to the
foresight and purpose of the watch-
maker rather than entertaining possi-
bly deeper questions about the origins
of the watch. He may be giving human
designers too much credit.
Form Follows Failure
The engineer Henry Petroski has writ-
ten extensively and convincingly about
our often misguided characterizations
of the origins of human inventions. In
The Evolution of Useful Things (1993),
Petroski argues that artifacts “do not
spring fully formed from the mind
of some maker but, rather, become
shaped and reshaped through the
(principally negative) experiences of
their users….” In short, form follows
failure, not function.
And what about those failures? It
is all too easy to forget that the first
attempts at flight featured impossible
aircraft with flappable wings, man-
of-war sails, and box-kite frames. Do
we see the origins of today’s jumbo
jets in those early, comical failures?
Similarly, do we appreciate the knowl-
edge gained by bridge builders from
studying the undulating destruction of
the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Wash-
ington or, more recently, the wobbling
of the Millennium Bridge in London?
Do we understand that even the most
tragic failures—such as the Hyatt Re-
gency walkway collapse in Kansas
City or the Challenger space shuttle
explosion—are the consequences of
human tinkering on a grand scale?
Beginning with the very first glimpse
of a problem or an opportunity, such
failures—whether large or small, trag-
ic or comic—prompt the fine-tuning
and retrofitting that, over time, have
shaped even our greatest engineering
achievements, from Egyptian pyra-
mids to medieval cathedrals to sus-
pension bridges to spacecraft.
Edward A. Wasserman (ed-wasserman@uiowa.edu) is
Dewey B. and Velma P. Stuit Professor of Experimen-
tal Psychology at the University of Iowa and coeditor
with Thomas Zentall of Comparative Cognition:
Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence
(Oxford University Press, 2006). Mark S. Blumberg
(mark-blumbe[email protected]) is F. Wendell Miller
Professor of Psychology at the University of Iowa, edi-
tor-in-chief of Behavioral Neuroscience and author
most recently of Freaks of Nature: What Anomalies
Tell Us About Development and Evolution (Ox-
ford University Press, 2009). Both are members of the
Delta Center at the University of Iowa, dedicated to the
investigation of learning, development, and change.
How should we
explain the origins of
novel behaviors?
pf3

Vista previa parcial del texto

¡Descarga conducta novedosa y más Apuntes en PDF de Psicología solo en Docsity!

www.americanscientist.org 2010 May–June 183

Macroscope

Designing Minds

Edward A. Wasserman and Mark S. Blumberg

T

he basic argument of intel- ligent design was famously set forth in the watchmaker analogy of William Paley in 1802: The complex- ity and functionality of a watch im- ply a watchmaker; analogously, the complexity and functionality of living things also imply a designer, albeit one vastly more potent than a mere watch- maker. This argument rests on a sim- ple analogy between the design of hu- man artifacts and the design of natural forms. For the analogy to work, we must first accept that we design our inventions with purpose and foresight. On this point, most evolutionists and creationists agree. What distinguish- es these two camps is that, when ac- counting for the origin of living things, proponents of intelligent design sum- mon a divine creator, whereas evolu- tionists credit natural selection. Thus, evolutionists share with creationists the same understanding of design ; they differ only in how they invoke it. Discussions of design are promi- nent in the writings of evolutionists from Darwin to Dawkins. Ponder- ing the implications of his theory of natural selection for Paley’s “old ar- gument of design in nature,” Charles Darwin wrote in his autobiography that we can no longer argue that “the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent be- ing, like the hinge of a door by man.

There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows. Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws.” A century later, Richard Dawkins pursued the issue of design and divided the world “into things that look designed (such as birds and airliners) and things that don’t (rocks and mountains).” He further divided those things that look designed into “those that really are designed (sub- marines and tin openers) and those that aren’t (sharks and hedgehogs).” What did Dawkins mean when he wrote of things that “really are de- signed”? In The Blind Watchmaker, he provided a clear answer: “All appear- ances to the contrary, the only watch- maker in nature is the blind forces of physics….A true watchmaker has fore- sight: He designs his cogs and springs, and plans their interconnections, with a future purpose in his mind’s eye” [emphasis added]. Such uncritical acceptance of pur- pose and foresight in human design may well be unwise. After all, do we really know how door hinges and can openers were created? In fact, we may know less about the origins of these everyday contrivances than we know about the origins of bivalve shells, sharks and hedgehogs. By at- tributing the origins of animals and artifacts to different kinds of design- ers—one blind, the other intelligent— both Darwin and Dawkins lapse into the same kind of “designer thinking” that ensnared creationists like Paley. Such thinking rests on the familiarity

and deceptive simplicity of mentalis- tic explanations of behavior, as when Dawkins uncritically appeals to the foresight and purpose of the watch- maker rather than entertaining possi- bly deeper questions about the origins of the watch. He may be giving human designers too much credit.

Form Follows Failure The engineer Henry Petroski has writ- ten extensively and convincingly about our often misguided characterizations of the origins of human inventions. In The Evolution of Useful Things (1993), Petroski argues that artifacts “do not spring fully formed from the mind of some maker but, rather, become shaped and reshaped through the (principally negative) experiences of their users….” In short, form follows failure , not function. And what about those failures? It is all too easy to forget that the first attempts at flight featured impossible aircraft with flappable wings, man- of-war sails, and box-kite frames. Do we see the origins of today’s jumbo jets in those early, comical failures? Similarly, do we appreciate the knowl- edge gained by bridge builders from studying the undulating destruction of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Wash- ington or, more recently, the wobbling of the Millennium Bridge in London? Do we understand that even the most tragic failures—such as the Hyatt Re- gency walkway collapse in Kansas City or the Challenger space shuttle explosion—are the consequences of human tinkering on a grand scale? Beginning with the very first glimpse of a problem or an opportunity, such failures—whether large or small, trag- ic or comic—prompt the fine-tuning and retrofitting that, over time, have shaped even our greatest engineering achievements, from Egyptian pyra- mids to medieval cathedrals to sus- pension bridges to spacecraft.

Edward A. Wasserman ([email protected]) is Dewey B. and Velma P. Stuit Professor of Experimen- tal Psychology at the University of Iowa and coeditor with Thomas Zentall of Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2006). Mark S. Blumberg ([email protected]) is F. Wendell Miller Professor of Psychology at the University of Iowa, edi- tor-in-chief of Behavioral Neuroscience and author most recently of Freaks of Nature: What Anomalies Tell Us About Development and Evolution (Ox- ford University Press, 2009). Both are members of the Delta Center at the University of Iowa, dedicated to the investigation of learning, development, and change.

How should we

explain the origins of

novel behaviors?

184 American Scientist, Volume 98

It is through this plodding process that today’s designs—typically instan- tiated in the form of a detailed blue- print—embody all of the hard, painful, but often unacknowledged lessons of the past. Most of us are ignorant of that history, yet we glibly proclaim that the final products were intelligently de- signed, thereby perpetuating the myth of the creative moment. We then carry that myth forward and attribute each new artifact to individual insight, cre- ativity and genius. But this myth can- not cheat reality; the failures just keep coming, as most recently illustrated by the massive worldwide recall of Toyo- ta automobiles. As Petroski notes in To Engineer Is Human (1985), despite their mathematically precise understanding of structural materials, engineers still cannot “calculate to obviate the failure of the mind.” Because of the writings of Darwin, Dawkins and other biologists, many of us are now open to understanding the organic world in evolutionary terms— but are we equally willing to apply such evolutionary thinking to that last bastion of designer intelligence, our minds? Curiously, just as Petroski and others are painstakingly detail- ing the origins of human inventions, researchers are increasingly invoking unsubstantiated mental processes to explain complex human and animal behaviors.

Insight About Insight A salient recent example can be found in a report in the Proceedings of the Na- tional Academy of Sciences in Spring 2009, in which crows were observed to fashion wire into hooks that were then used to retrieve out-of-reach food

items. These behaviors have been in- terpreted by some authors as products of this species’ creativity and insight. In contrast, other scientists have in- vestigated similar “insight” problems in crows, monkeys and other animals; but by focusing on the origins of these behaviors, they have discovered the critical learning experiences, as op- posed to forethought, that gave rise to them. Nonetheless, we seem to be in the midst of a resurgence of faith among some scientists that animal be- havior can be explained by creativity, insight and other mentalistic concepts. For our part, we remain skeptical about the utility of such groundless explana- tions. Indeed, we are unconvinced that creativity and insight are proper expla- nations even for human behavior. Of course, few people are unnerved when the cognitive prowess of crows or other animals is questioned. Things get stickier when we express similar skepticism about the human mind. Yet as with the invention of human artifacts , we see good reason to doubt the prevailing belief that novel human behaviors —what we might call behav- ioral inventions—are necessarily the products of a designing mind.

Successful Flop A celebrated case of human behavioral invention lends credence to our view. Dick Fosbury revolutionized the high jump with a world-record bound of 7 feet, 4 ¼ inches, which earned him a gold medal at the 1968 Olympics. Some might suspect that his innova- tion—the so-called Fosbury Flop was designed with purpose and foresight in a single creative moment. In fact, it unfolded over considerable time, be-

ginning in high school when Fosbury used the outmoded “scissors” jump. Urged by his coach to adopt the more sophisticated “straddle,” his lanky body failed to comply with his coach’s wishes. When Fosbury reverted to the “scissors,” he began to lift his hips to reach higher altitude, thereby forcing back his head and shoulders. In this way, the flop evolved, not from de- sign, but from a protracted trial-and- error process that combined repeated

In 2003, a wild chimpanzee named JJ was observed by Shinya Yamamoto and colleagues in New Guinea using a long, rigid tool to harvest carpenter ants (left). This was the first observation of ant-fishing in trees. JJ succeeded in three of 14 attempts, with three painful bites along the way. Two years later, JJ was seen using a shorter, more flexible wand to feed without being bitten (right). Was this change the result of trial and error or foresight?

American Journal of Primatology

/Wiley and Sons

Until the Fosbury Flop (bottom) revolution- ized high jumping, athletes used the “scis- sors” or “straddle” (top). By Dick Fosbury’s own account, the flop evolved without fore- thought through a trial-and-error process. After Fosbury won the gold medal at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, his flop quickly dominated the sport. (Photograph at bottom by Matthew L Romano/U.S. Navy.)

Bettman/CORBIS