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Tu Drormal Arvaón. SEticlh ¿ALI ED ROME AND MACEDON, 205-200 B.c.* By J. P. V. D. BALSDON This article has no more ambitious purpose than to sow doubt. As an inquiry into the policy of Ra jn declaring war on Philip Y in 200 B.c., it cannot pretend to be anything EE In England at least, studies of the question are based nowadays on the brilliant writings of M. Holleaux and the scholarly work of F. W. Walbank and A. H. MeDonald,* which in the main derives from Holleaux. Within thirty years or so what started as paradox has become respectable orthodoxy-—which De Sanctis has resisted, but few others, It is believed that, until the Romans were actively engaged in the second Macedonian war, they- pursued no thoughtful policy in the world east of the Adriatic ; that, if they had possessed real knowledge of that world, they would not, in a panic, have gone to war with Philip in 200 (and so the Roman Empire would, perhaps, never have become anything more than a western Mediterranean Empire); that in the historical writing of the second and early first centuries B.c. Truth was deliberately falsified by the Roman * annalists *, whose account is the basis of such of the surviving history of this period as does not derive from Polybius, As reconstructed, this (lost) account was that Rome went to war with Philip in 200 B.c. from the noblest altruistic motives—to defend her weaker * allies *. Alternatively, with K.-E. Petzold,? you may accept the hypothesis that what we have, chiefly in that part of Livy which is not a simple translation of Polybius, is not Truth, but the invention of the Roman annalists, but you may explain it differently. You may suggest that what the annalists were misrepresenting was the fact not that in 200 B.C. Rome had neither policy nor interest in the East but that she had a policy of aggressive imperialism. In Holleaux's view the “annalist * historians papered over the cupboard because there was nothing inside ; in the view of Petzold they papered it over because it contained a skeleton. There is a further difficulty. Who was it who first * married ' the * annalist * with the Polybian account of the preliminaries of the second Macedonian war ? Holleaux and his school assume that it was Livy and that Livy himself was responsible for distortions of the Polybian account which, it is alleged, were made in order to conceal the inconsistencies between that account and the account of the annalists. There is no doubt that, in his translation and paraphrase, Livy often gave a certain twist, in the epic spirit of Augustan imperialism, to what Polybius had written,? but it is not so easily proved as assumed that he manipulated historical evidence as Holleaux and others have claimed. Petzold appreciated this difficulty and sought to solve it by claiming that the ' marriage ' of Polybian and annalist accounts was made by Livy's predecessors, the Sullan annalists, Petzold has recognized a real difficulty ; but A. Klotz has shown that there are no smaller difficulties over his suggested solution; he has argued persuasively that the Sullan annalists did not use Polybius.1 The time is ripe for a re-examination of the original hypothesis that the (lost) * annalist * account differed toto caelo from the account, also for the most part lost, which Polybius gave. he précis of a very long article—' ad s —which | wrote some years ago, for which no periodical could be expected to find room. | was much helped then, as 1 have been helped since, by the eriticism of Mr. C. Hignett, which lue the more highly since he is unsympa- thetic with much of my argument, and 1 have gained much from discussion with undergraduates who have attended the class on Polybius and Livy which 1 have held from time to time in Oxford. 1 M. Holleaux, Rome, la Gr.ce et les monarchies hellemistiques (Paris, 1920), referred to henceforth as * Hollesux, Rome; CAH vu, chapters 5 and 6 and, of his numerous articles, particularly * Le prétendu recours des Athéniens aux Romains en 201/20, RÉA 22 (1920), 77-96; F. W. Walbank, Philip Y of Macedon (Cambridge, 1940), referred to henceforth as ' Walbank, Philip"; A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, * The Origins of the second Macedonian Ber JRS 27 (1937), 180-207, referred to henceforth * MeDonald-Walbank ”. 1 K..E. Petzold, Die Eróffmung des orweiten rómisch makedomischen Krieges (Berlin, 1940). 3 See H. Hoch, Die Darstellung der politischen Sendung Roms bei Livius (Frankfurt a.M., 1951). 'e Benutzung des Polybios bei rómischen Schriftstellern, Studi ital. de fil. class. 25 (1951), 243-65, especially 243, N. 1, 249, 0.1. 1 regret very greatly that A, Klotz, ' Livius und seine Vorginger,” Neue Wege zur Antike, 2, 1940-1, 9-11, is NOt acces- sible to me. Pe ROME AND MACEDON, 205-200 B.C. 31 E's PREVIOUS EASTERN RELATIONS AND HER CONDUCT OF THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR M1 ES (a) Botero did not believe that there was any truth in the records of Roman negotiations carnania or with Seleucus (? Callinicus) in the third century because he thought that orical facts were inconsistent with the existence of foedera between Rome and se powers. In the case of Egypt, and also Athens, he thought that the efforts hich they made in the first Macedonian war to persuade the Aetolians to stop fighting and hal heipe e with Philip precluded the possibility of their being at the time Rome's allies, aa thought in terms of societas based on foedus. But Miss L. E. Matthaei had already shown in brief,3 and A. Heuss has since demonstrated full and convincing detail, $ that amicitia without foedus was a current form of diplomatic relationship under which little more was undertaken by the two parties (and that not contractually) than not to engage in war, once with another, and not to assist each other's enemies. Once you cease to think in terms of foedera, you no longer find Holleaux's argument compelling. In the case of the first Macedonian war, a war which Rome certainly did not want and one in which Philip by his alliance with Hannibal was certainly the aggressor, it is argu that the half- heartedness of Rome's conduct of the war shows how little interest ha government took in affairs east of the Adriatic. Why, otherwise, did she take four years to make an alliance with the Aetolians ?7 Why, that alliance made, did the Romans hesitate another two years before its ratification ? Why did Rome withdraw her forces from Greece the two years 207 and 206? Why, after her * desertion * by Aetolia in 206, did she herself so readily conclude peace with Philip a year later ? But these questions are not all unanswerable. When Philip contracted an alliance with Hannibal after Cannae, he made the mistake of thinking that the war in Jtaly was as good as over.* Hieronymus of Syracuse made the same miscalculation.? You do not turn neutrals into allies in war until you give them some reason for thinking that you may be going to win; and it was not until after 212 that the Romans could offer such a hope, as is made very clear to us in Livy's account of Rome's negotiations with Aetolia in 211.1% As for the two years' delay before the treaty was ratified at Rome, it is evident that the combined operations of Romans and Aetolians on the Greek mainland were not affected by the delay,!! whose cause may have lain in prudent Roman caution : the Aetolians in Rome were as good as hostages, and it may have seemed advisable to keep them until reports from Greece made it clear that the Aetolians really meant business. !* As for the supposed * withdrawal ' of Roman forces from Greece in 207 B.C., what is the evidence ? “The single sentence of Livy,!? * Neglectae eo biennio "—207-6 B.C.—' res in Graecia erant *, Galba, the Roman commander who had been in Greece since his consul- ship of 211 B.C., was certainly not recalled ; and it is not to be imagined that he remained without his fleet. Livy's words mean no more than that he was not reinforced (even to the point of making good wastage) in 207. At the end of 206 11 P, Sempronius Tuditanus with y large force indeed arrived to succeed him—only to find that the Aetolians had made peace. Rather than continue the war alone, it suited the Romans to make peace and to concentrate on the invasion of Africa and the conclusion of the war with Hannibal. This is an inteligible course of events, and nothing that Holleaux has written proves it wrong. Le emher 061 ** On the Classification of Roman Allies,' CQ 1 ML. 26, 24, 15, ' Nec tamen impedimento id (1907), 182-204. * “Die volkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der rómi- schen Aussenpolitik in republikanischer Zeit; Klio Beiheft 31 (1033). Sec, especially, p. 57 f.. in criticism of Holleaux. — cf. chapter 4 of S. Áccame, H «dominio romeno in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad ¿lugusto, Rome, 1946. * 'Rome's culpable delay in securing the help of Aetolia, Walbank, Philip, 104. * Plolybius) 5, 101, Ó-102, 1; 105, 1; 108, 4-7; 109, 1-; Y P.7,3,2; Líivy)24, 6,4f. ; cf. Sallust, BJ 14; 5. 1 1.26, 24, 2. rebus gerendis fuit” 12 A suggestion which 1 owe to Miss M. E Hubbard of Somerville College. 3 L.(P) 29, 12, 1. 14 L; (out of P., by an annalist, it is alleged) 29, 12, 1 ff. Livy says the expedition was equipped and sailed before news arrived that Aetolia had made peace with Philip. There is no reason to deny this and to cluim, as Holleaux does, that the expedition was sent because the news of Aetolia's secession had already arrived in Rome, and in the hope of forcing her back into war. ef.J.A. O. Larsen, CP 32 (1937), 31andn. 48. ROME AND MACEDON, 205-200 B.C. 33 Al. of carl epistula Graeca * which the Emperor Claudius read to the Senate later 9 as evidence y friendship of Rome and Ilium cannot be disproved by an examination of Roman- *iqn relations in the third and second centuries B.c. [fit is to be disproved, the searchlight Sym icism must be turned on to Claudius himself. All that he displayed, after all, was the cl si a letter from Rome to Seleucus ; he gave no evidence that Seleucus had paid any sn in to it. The argument that, if Rome had been in friendly relation with Tlium, rea sacus in 196 would have made llium, her neighbour, her intermediary in negotiating he Rojrc 25 instead of making the long journey to her kinsmen in Marseilles, is no Y ament at al.25 You could as well argue that, with one small window of a room open, obody could possibly wish to open a second and large one. *'he notion of minor parties being * adscripti * to a peace between two major powers was a not uncommon one in the Hellenistic east. Eyypúpew or ousrrepilauPávew were the technical Greek words; * and epigraphy supplies the convenient parallel of Lampsacus secking * adscriptio ' to the Peace of Rome and Macedon in 196. "There is no room here to examine the precise nature of the Peace of Phoenice, whether or not it was another kowh clpñvn.2% All that mattered in fact was the interpretation placed on it by the high contracting parties ; and, while it is not to be disputed that, once iowas signed, Philip made the mistake of thinking (as Rome, no doubt, wished that he should) that Rome had abandoned her interest in the East, it is probable that Rome saw it as the likely means of a convenient * casus belli ' against Philip, once her own hands should be free. Letone of her own * adscripti * complain of Philip's aggression, and there would be a ready excuse for the declaration of war. Nobody has thought of a reason for the false insertion of Ilium in the list of “ad- scripti *, other than Roman vanity. In the case of Athens, more substantial reason for the supposedly false insertion is adduced : namely that, in the * annalist * account, the Roman declaration of war in 200 B.c. was (falsely) claimed to have been provoked by Philip's aggression against the Athenians.*% But was this in fact the accepted * annalist' account? From the Periocha of Livy XXXI you would think so; but not from Livy xxx1 itself. That Athens was the place where the four major opponents of Philip just before the outbreak of the second Macedonian war met and exchanged plans is certain, from Polybius, not from the Roman annalists.% That the alleged aggression of Philip against Attalus and Rhodes supplied, rightly or wrongly, the Roman pretext in diplomacy for going to war is certain too, from Polybius' account,3! But there are two other facts to be taken into account. The first is that the first Roman * ultimatum * was delivered by Romans in Athens, in an effort to relieve Athens from a Macedonian siege. For this our source is Polybius alone * in a passage which, for whatever reason, Livy did not choose to incorporate in his own history, though it would have given substance to the supposed * annalistic * view of the origins of the war. The second is that when Aemilius met Philip in 200 B.c. and presented his * ultimatum ', and Philip claimed that Attalus and Rhodes, not himself, were the aggressors, Aemilius, according to a Polybian passage % which Livy copied, asked, * What, then, about the Athenians and the people of Cius and Abydos?* Livy's translation is, * Num Abydeni quoque ultro tibi intulerunt arma?" 3% Why, if Athens was so much in his mind, as in the mind of the annalists who supposedly led him astray, did he not bother to translate, tí 51 "Abnvaños. 2 Suet., Claud., 25, 3. (For Holleaux's criticism, s the inscription contains — clear references to the kinship of Rome and Lampsacus through liurn in. 18 f., 21 f., 25, 31. The argument of Holleaux, Rome, 53-6, has no force. 5 P.25,2, 12; SIG? 588, 58; 591, 65; E. Bickermann, Rev. de phil., 61 (1935), 66. *= As Bickermann claimed (n, 27), 66 fT, stressing the strangeness of the Latín phrase " pax communis * in L (P) 29, 12,8. 2% For this argument, see Holleaux, Rome, 26971. > P.16,25f. 3 P.16,27,2; 16,34, 3. These are both frag- ments from the anthologist, the editor of the De legatiomibus. 'The name of Rhodes may, therefore, have fallen out in the former passage, and it is dangerous to draw such inferences from the omission as are drawn by MeDonald-Walbank, 200. " P.16,27. 34 J. P. Y. D. BALSDON There is no convincing case, therefore, against accepting the list of * adscripti * in to; including Hlium and Athens.35 (c) PHILIP'S * VIOLATIONS * OF THE PEACE OF PHOENICE, 205-201 B.C. It must be made clear at the start that, except for Philip's marauding in the Propon: and eastern Aegean in 2021, Polybius' account of his behaviour in this period is lost It evidently contained nothing to interest the later excerptors. Polybius' references to tl period in his preliminary outline, where he showed how he proposed to treat his subje are far too slight to be helpful,% and we cannot argue back from the implications of hi account of the second Macedonian war itself; for the bulk of that account was in bool xvm, which is completely lost, leaving—except where Livy was evidently using it—n n Livy's account of the years 205-200, derived almost exclusively from earlier Roma historians, we.are told that 4,000 Macedonians fought for Hannibal at Zama, that * social urbes * in Greece informed Rome of the dispatch of those troops and complained furthe of Philip's depredations in Greece; thata Roman embassy of three was sent with a watchin; f to Greece in 203 ; *? and that from 203 to 201 the Romans received complaints from of Philip's misconduct and from Philip of its; and also that Philip's envoys at Rom claimed the restoration of the Macedonians taken prisoners after Zama.** This in the interval before an Aetolian embassy (certainly historical, for Polybius evidently alluded to it) came to Rome to complain of Philip's behaviour in 202, and envoys reached Rome from! Attalus, Rhodes and Athens at the end of 201.% In the whole of this story, if we believe Holleaux, there is, apart from the Aetolian embassy of 202 and the Rhodian and Pergamene envoys in 201, not a word of truth. There: were no Macedonians in Africa at the time of Zama ; Philip made no annexations in Greece: in this period ; no Roman embassy was appointed and sent to Greece in 203. The whole story is an * annalistic invention , designed to justify Rome's quite unjustified declaration, of war on Philip in 200 B.c. In thé case of the Macedonians at Zama, the sceptic's case appears at first a very strong one. Polybius' description of the Carthaginian order of battle at Zama survives ; so does Livy's, which is palpably a direct translation of Polybius (unless, of course, both Polybius and Livy derive from a common source); and so does Appian's.1! The three accounts agree in every important particular but one—the * Macedonum legio *. Tt is not mentioned by Polybius or by Appian; Livy inserts it “in secunda acie * with the Cartha- ginians and Áfricans.* Even in Livy, it makes no appearance in the subsequent fighting. There is no reason why Polybius and Appian should have suppressed any mention of the Macedonian unit. So that 1t is tempting to think that either Livy independently or the *annalist tradition * which he followed has invented it. If this is the case, Holleaux's suggestion about motive is the obvious one. Yet it is not the only possible explana! They are rather circumstantial, these Macedonians. As we learn elsewhere in Livy (not in his account of the battle of Zama), they were 4,000 in number and their commander, Sopater, was a Macedonian of distinction.* They were mercenaries (' mercede militas- sent ') and they do not appear to have suffered any casualties in the battle, at the end of which they found themselves prisoners in Roman hands. It may be, then, that this mer- cenary force was in Carthage in 202 B.c.; where Livy (or an annalist before him) went | wrong was in thinking they were present at the battle of Zama itself, 33 Following De Sanctis (n. 19), 111, 11, 436-9, and WL.(A) 31, 1,10; App., Mae. 4; ef.P. 16, Rív. dí fil., 64 (1936), 198, n. 1; Bickermann (n. 27), Bda de 68; Klotz (n. 4), 248 f. and, in the case of llium, MP. 15,11; L.30,33; App., Pur, 4 David Magie, W. H. Buckler Studies, 161 £. * The Macedoníans aleo appear, derivarively, in Erontinus, Strat., 2, 3, 16 and in Silius ltalicus, In recent times E. J. Bickerman, 33,1 £; (4.3, 32,7. > L.(A.) 30, 26, 1-4. Pun., 17, 418 fl. CP 40 (1945), 143, N. 77, is unusual in thinking that 38 1.(4.) 30,40, 6; 30,42, 1-10; cf. 31, 5, 5 fl * App. Mac., 43 L. (PJ 31,29, 45 Walbani there may be an element of truth in the story. Philip 310 f. 2 L.30, 34 55359 + L,3o, 26,3; 30,42,4and 6. 36 J. P. Y. D. BALSDON Pausanias, describing the tomb of the Athenian statesman Cephisodorus on the roa, from Athens to Eleusis, says that when the response to Athens' appeals for help fro Egypt (Livy (A.) 31, 9, 1, confirms that the Athenians sought help from Egypt), Mysia, Crete, and Rhodes was too slow and Rhodes was of little assistance except by sea, Cephis dorus went to Rome and was successful in his request; the Romans sent * an army an a general *,52 Holleaux dated Cephisodorus' mission to 198/7 B.C. and dismissed Livy's Athenian! missions to Rome in 201-200 as annalistic fiction.** In his view the Athenians made no appeal to Rome at all and therefore had no influence whatever on the Roman decision to! declare war. The dates, for Holleaux, decide the issue. The Macedonian attack on Athens was made in retaliation for the Athenian execution of the two Acarnanians who violated the Eleusinian mysteries. If these were the Great Mysteries of August-September, 201, Philip—then in Asia Minor; he was to spend an uncomfortable winter there, at Bargylia—could not have authorized an assault on Athens until his return to Macedon in spring, 200. On chrono- logical grounds, therefore, both the first two of Livy's Athenian embassies are ruled out.* Even so, Cephisodorus remains a problem. Pausanias' evident belief that he went to Rome before the outbreak of the second Macedonian war has to be rejected; it must be ascribed, like all other pollutions of truth, to * annalistic fiction *,%5 But this is nonsense, Pausanias was giving the text of an inscription which he copied ín situ; he was not writing history. His evidence is not strengthened in any way at all by the decree recently discovered at Athens, which, recording Cephisodorus' career, alludes in general terms to his diplomatic missions,% and, as evidence, it did not need strengthening. lt was as strong as evidence could be already. Wise historians have recognized this. Struggling, however, to salvage as much as possible of Holleaux's reconstruction, some have suggested that Cephisodorus' embassy was the third one mentioned by Livy, the one which met the Roman fleet east of the Adriatic in late 200 B.c.57 But this is to reject Pausanias' explicit statement that he sailed * to Italy", Others, therefore, have had the courage to admit that Holleaux was wrong but not, alas, to admit that Livy was anywhere near right. They have recognized that an Athenian embassy under Cephisodorus came to e in 200 B.c.—but, they claim, after the decision to go to war had already been 55 This half-heartedness derives from the belief that Athens had nothing to complain about until the Macedonian attack on the city in response to the appeal of the Acarnanians (Livy (P.) 31, 14, 9) ; that no act of Macedonian aggression can have occurred except on the explicit orders of Philip himself; % and that Philip was in no position to issue such orders until the spring of 200. But this view of Macedonian dependence on Philip's orders and, indeed, of a complete break of contact between Philip and Europe for a long period of the mn and winter 201-200 is sheer hypothesis, and the first rupture with Macedon, cated by the abolition of the two Macedonian tribes (Antigonis and Demetrias) is now dated with some assurance to early in the year 201.% The Macedonian attack of Livy 31, 14, 9, probably happened in late autumn of that year. There is therefore no reason at all 52 Pausanias 1, 36, 6. 3* McDonald-Walbank, 203; Walbank, Philip, 13 RÉA 2 (1920), 77-96, esp. 84; CAH 8, 161, n.2. The claim is that in 7, 7, 6 f. (a not altogether accurate account of events in 198 B.c.) Pausanias is trustworthy, but that in 1, 36, 6 (where he was copying an inscription), he was misled by a Roman annalist, See Petzold (n. 2), 81, for the same sugges- tion, See Walbank, Philip, 311 FE. for this argument, and for full references to the views of other scholars. de st, Holleaux, REA 22 (1920), 84; Petzoló se Hesperia, 5 (1936), 419 f.; Ml. 18-23 of the inscription refer to his diplomatic successes 5% So A. Passerini, Athenaewm 9 (1931), 285, followed by J. A. O. Larsen, CP 32 (1937), 23. 312 %* 1 am fully conscious of the objection that 1 do not take L. (P. - gens Acarnanum ad Philippum derulit * VW, S, Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens (London, 1911), 268, n. 4, and «Athenicn Tribal Cycles (Harvard, 1932), 141,0. 1, dated the abolition of the Macedonian tribes to late 201 (after September). Now, however, lt seems that a date early in 201 must be accepted : so W. K. Pritchett, The five Attic Tribes after Cleis- thenes (Baltimore, 1943), 33, following W. B. Dins- maor, The Atheman Archon Lists (Columbia, 1939), 172 É, and Pritchett-Meritt, The Chrowology of Hellemstic Athens (Harvard, 1940), 109. ROME AND MACEDON, 205-200 B.C. 37 fusing to accept Livy's statement that complaints from Athens to Rome were partly mental in persuading the Romans to go to war. inst (e) THE PACT OF THE TWO KINGS 's account having been rejected, it was necessary for Holleaux to find some other Liv a E son for the Roman declaration of war; and, as he believed the Roman government ve been rigidly opposed since 205 B.C. to further interference in eastern affairs, it had 10 be a startling reason. This he found in the * secret pact ' of Philip and Antiochus to de k Egypt and share the spoil. Why, one might ask, should this piece of eastern politics e e government which had turned its back so resolutely on the East? The answer is this: the envoys from Attalus and Rhodes gave a false account of the * pact* to the : norant Roman Senate ; they declared that Rome was marked down as the ultimate victim of the two conspirators. A hypothetical * false account ' of a ' secret pact': it is a wonderful tour-de-force on Holleaux's part to have persuaded historians to accept his own unsubstantiated hypothesis in place of Livy's reasonable account. For what are the facts ? In the moment of Egypt's grave weakness at the accession of the boy-king Ptolemy V Epiphanes, Antiochus and Philip certainly saw their opportunity and made some kind of agreement.*!* From the start each of the two powers double-crossed the other. Philip was in diplomatic communication with the country which he was supposed to be attacking, since attempts were being made to arrange a dynastic marriage between that kingdom and his own; *% Antiochus' lieutenant in Asia Minor at first withheld the assistance for which Antiochus' * partner * Philip asked.% Tt was a secret pact and so, naturally, its terms were not shouted from the house-tops. Appian says the news of it created a panic in the East and reached Rome through the Rhodian envoys in late 201.% Modern hypothesis has suggested that it was the * leakage * of the secret which successively persuaded Artalus and Rhodes to appeal to Rome * and Athens to abolish the Macedonian tribes.*? Polvbius, naturally, was enormously interested in the moral aspect of a criminal association in which both criminals, by simple Túxn (Roman intervention) met their just deserts,** but in his references to it he makes no suggestion at all that the pact was directly responsible for Roman intervention in the East in 200 and later. Livy knew of it from Polybius, and mentions it as a cause of Philip's confidence in aggression in Asia Minor in 200.% Appian, allowing the Rhodians to bring the news of it to Rome, only couples the news with the complaints of the Athenians and of the Aetolians before them as prompting the Roman diplomatic démarches in the East in 200, and it is sheer wilfulness to strain off the Rhodian message and the Aetolian embassy as genuine and to reject the rest of Appian's account as * annalistic dregs *. interes (f) THE DECLARATION OF WAR IN 200 AT ROME If the recorded anger of Rome with the Aetolians for making peace with Philip in 206 is accepted as historical—and the whole story of their relation with Aetolia from then onwards, even including the chill invitation to them to join the war in 199 and ' work their passage , consistently reflects that coldness *1—then, whether or not the news of Zama had reached Rome at the time, there is nothing surprising in the Romans having declined to use the Aetolian complaints against Philip in 202 B.C. as a casus bellí. When war came they wanted all Greece on their side, and the experience of the first war had shown them “Pp. 3,2,8; 15,20; cf.16,10,1; 16,24,3. That there never was in fact any sort of pact has been argued, by no means unpersuasively, by D. Magie. The * agreement * between Philip Y and Antiochus 111 for the partition of the Egyptian Empire, JRS 139), 3244. * Po 15, 25, 13; cf. 16, 22, 3 M.; Holleaux, CAH 8, 150 E.” Bickermann (n. 27), 162 f. suggests that Philip had not only a secret pact with Ántiochus against Egypt, but another with Egypt against Antiochus ! % P.16,1,9; butcf.16, 24,6 3% The * pact' is generally dated to late 203 or early 202. Mac. 4. MeDonald-Walbank, 187. * MeDonald-Walbank, 191; Walbank, Philip, 124 15 20,5 31, 14,5 Mac, 4. 2 L.(PP Dar, 31,20. ROME AND MACEDON, 205-200 B.C. 39 rded by Livy (following an annalist) among the various administrative arrangements ciel llocation of provinces to praetors) which normally constituted the earliest senatorial [aa s of the consular year. The new consular army was enrolled and equipped and bir «d (volunteers from África and all) and ready to be embarked for the war (with all the e transport ships available) by the early autumn. dia ¿e of these facts, then, it does not seem possible to believe in any long interval at all between the two Comitia. (2) EVENTS IN ATHENS IN SPRING AND SUMMER, 200 B.C. We have what at first appear to be three episodes of Athenian history in 200—one described by Polybius and, in translation, by Livy; one described by Polybius alone and one by Li y alone. And we have no glue with which to stick them together and make a nice connected story. First, Attalus was invited to Athens and, hearing that there were Roman envoys at the Peiraeus, he came and spent a profitable day in conference with them : confirming that he still stood well in Roman favour and that Rome was ready for war with Philip. On the following day, with the Romans, he went up to Athens, where he received high honours. Then Rhodians arrived; they, like Attalus, were highly honoured and Athens, in response to the olicitation of Attalus, declared war on Philip. self-contained extract of Polybius we owe to the Constantinian anthology De legationibus. lt is translated almost verbally by Livy, who makes it follow an account of the Athenian execution of the Acarnanians who violated the mysteries and of the con- clusion of the first Acarnanian- Macedonian raid on Athens— et irritatio quidem animorum va prima fuit; postea iustum bellum decretis tatis ultro indicendo factum.' Polybius” account of these preliminaries, from which Livy's is derived, does not survive. This is the first episode. The second is supplied by the following Polybian extract in the De legationibus.%* Atralus and the Rhodians have now left Athens; the Roman envoys are still there. The Macedonian Nicanor attacks, advancing as far as the Academy. The Roman envoys go out, meet him, and deliver a message, for submission to Philip. Philip is to stop fighting Grecks and to submit to arbitration in respect of his offences against Attalus. Nicanor leaves with the message. The Romans then deliver—or have already delivered —the same message to the Epirots at Phoenice, to Amynander in Athamania, to the Aetolians at Naupactus, and to the Achacans at Aigion. Livy does not translate this passage at all. One may wonder why. The following Polybian extract in the De legationibus, the delivery of the * ultimatum * to Philip by the young M. Aemilius at Abydos, he does translate.** In the interval Livy's account has been based on Polybian passages which have survived in Codex Urbinas. There can be no doubt, of the De legationibus extracts, where, roughly, this account of Nicanor came in Polybius' narrative. It came after Attalus' visit to Athens, and it came before the time when Aemilius confronted Philip at Abydos. _ Yet, in roughly the same place, between the declaration of war by Athens and the ry of the ultimatum—if it was an ultimatum—at Abydos, Livy does mention a Macedonian attack on Athens : * Philocle quodam ex praefectis suis cum duobus milibus peditum, equitibus ducentis ad populandos Atheniensium agros misso.' 6 Nicanor must, surely, have been under Philocles' orders.*? In which case we have, after all, two episodes of Athenian history, not three. The Roman embassy—C. Claudius Nero, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, both consulares, and the young M. Aemiltus Lepidus—was dispatched to Egypt (whether or not to negotiate peace between Ptolemy and Antiochus) in late 201 or early 200. By September, 200, they had got as far as Rhodes, from which island Aemilius went to Abydos to meet Philip. How is their dawdling to be explained ? Pat, a5 fo LP) 30 14 5 L.(P.) 31,16, 2. * As De Sanctis suggested, 1V, 1, 35, M. 67. 6, 27. M0 P016,34; L.(P) 31,18. 40 J. P. Y. D. BALSDON (a) The mission to Egypt was a blind, They were under instruction from the Rom: Senate to ' create an incident ' in Greece, on the report of which the ingenuous and deepl; shocked populace at Rome would forget its war-weariness and declare war on Philip. P. Culmann.** (6) Attalus had appealed to Rome against Philip under the terms of the Peace ol Phoenice. Though war with Philip was the last thing she wanted, Rome could not disregar: the appeal. The embassy was sent, therefore, with a very gentlemanly ultimatum, tone down as far as was compatible with Roman honour. Philip would no doubt give way, ani the Romans would do everything possible to safeguard his dignity. It would all *arranged '. Instead, Aemilius at Abydos lost his head, He was a young man with n diplomatic experience. He was rude to Philip, and Philip was a King, unaccustomed to such. language. After this lamentable breach, Rome had no alternative but to declare war. So Bickermann.*% (e) The envoys left Rome with an ultimatum, ready for presentation to Philip as soon as the news reached them in Greece that the assembly had declared war. There was a long delay before the news came and the envoys were, naturally, in an embarrassing position. When they were besieged in Athens, the news from Rome had not yet come, and in presenting the ultimatum to Nicanor they lost their heads. “They had, so to speak, beaten the clock. They retired to Rhodes. Philip disregarded the Roman message and sent Philocles to attack Athens. By now, happily, the news of Philip's aggression in Thrace and, especially against Attalus, had reached Rome. The Roman populace, not anxious for war on its own account, was fired v a desire to avenge Artalus. So war was now at last declared. What, then, was the legal position ? Was the message to Nicanor an indictio bell? Were the Romans, by a happy accident, on the right side of the fetial law after all ? No harm could be done by their giving a repeat performance, delivering a second indictio belli, just to drive the point home. So Aemilius was sent. He was a young man, and could act without compromising the dignity of the Senate. So Walbank and McDonald. ] (d) The envoys went to Egypt in winter 201-200 and, on their way back, at Rhodes, received from their home government an ultimatum to deliver to Philip. This they delivered. So Mommsen and, with certain differences, Th. Walek-Czernecki.M (e) There were two embassies, both consisting of the same three men. The first embassy went to Egypt in winter 201-200. The second went out East and delivered the ultimatum to Philip in 200. So Scullard.** Why, on the occasion of Attalus' visit to Athens in spring, 200, while high honours were bestowed on Attalus and the Rhodians, were similar honours not bestowed on the Roman envoys?%% Why, when Livy translated Polybius' account of Attalus' visit to Athens, did he not mention the presence of the Roman envoys at all? For Holleaux the answer to the second question is to be found in the fact which underlies the first: Livy's embarrassment at the slighting of the Roman envoys at a moment when, according to his own (annalist) account, relations between Rome and Athens were so close. And the answer to the first question is to be found in the fact that, despite the false claims of the Roman annalists, the Romans had, as yet, no close connexions with Athens. But this is not an altogether satisfactory answer. The honours to Attalus and the Rhodians were * for services rendered ' and even the annalists did not claim that Rome had done any comparable to Athens as yet. Secondly, the Romans acere given a very good reception on this occ Polybius says so. And, thirdly, there is Livy's further omission to mention the matum ' of the legatí to Nicanor which needs to be explained, The truth appears simply 5% Die rónische Orientgesamdischaft vom Jahre *: Mommsen, RH (ET), 11, 418; Th. Walek- 201-200 (Dis. Giessen. 1922), esp. p. 19. Cuemecki, Eos 31 (1928), 379 Mi. "See n, 27 above. On this view Aemilius” ulti- 3 A History of the Roman World from 753 to matum was the rerum repetitio or demuntiatio bell, not 146 8.C.* (London, 1951), 232, n. 3. (as Walbank thinks) the indictio belli. > Bellum mp 16,25f Philippicum' CP 40 (1945), 137-148, by E. J. » Holleaux, ickerman, represents a considerable change of mind (1020), 91 f. on the part ob its author 3 P.16,25,6. * MeDonald-Walbank, esp. pp. 192; 196 f.; 200; Walbank, CP 44 (1949), 18, n. 22. APS 30, 14 01 18, 161, 0.2; 1635 RÉd 22 42 ROME AND MACEDON, 205-200 B.C. Cracks, therefore, have been exposed in the edifice and, ¡fit still stands, that is becau: it is buttressed up by three hypotheses. The first is the hypothesis—and it is nothing mo: than a hypothesis—that what turned the Athenians against Macedon in 201 was ' the p: of the Kings * and not Macedonian aggression. The second is the hypothesis (for whicl there is no ancient evidence at all) that there was an interval of several months between the meeting of the Comitia in 200 which turned down the proposal for war and the mecting which later accepted the proposal. The third hypothesis is associated with the assumptio! of the long interval between the two Comitia; it is that (despite silence on the point by ou: ancient sources and, in the case of Livy, a suggestion to the contrary) the formalities of t ius fetiale, rerum repetitio, and indictio bell were being practised by Roman envoys in the East in 200. As long as these buttresses hold, all is well. If they go—perhaps, if even one of them goes—then the edifice itself may collapse; and the * edifice ' is the whole of present-day" orthodoxy on this subject, the whole of Holleaux's triumphant paradox, the view that Rome's eastern empire might never have come into being if the senators had not been so gullible as to believe in 201-200 B.cC. the lies which the envoys from Rhodes and Pergamon told them. !" 142 A very full bibliography on the questions raised by K.-E. Petzold in Gnomon 25 (1953), 399-407, is by this paper is to be found on pp. 226-256 of L. De useful for those to whom Perzold's important book Regibus, La republica romana e gli ultimi re dí (n. 2 above) is not available. Macedonia (Genova, 1951). The review of this book