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L e s É t u d e s d u C E R I N° 117 - 118 - septembre 2005
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh
with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan Abstract Is the concept of “human security”, which has been discussed and debated in international organizations and academic circles since 1994, simply “hot air”, as its critics claim? Or does it provide a suitable framework for proposing multi- sectoral, integrated solutions in a world that is increasingly interconnected? While there is no consensus as to the exact definition of the term, human security goes beyond traditional notions of security to focus on such issues as development and respect for human rights. To some the concept is attractive, but analytically weak since it introduces too many variables that are not necessarily linked together. To others, human security concerns should be limited to situations marked by the threat or outbreak of violence. For those who favour a broad definition (as does this author), the human security agenda provides the means to assess the root causes of conflict (whether intra-state or inter-state), to propose adequate policies for resolving crises, and to provide the means for sustainable peace-building. In so doing human security policies focus on social and economic issues as they affect the individual, arguing that security (in the narrow sense of the term) is dependent on a wide-ranging network of factors that require a comprehensive approach to be effective. The paper introduces the various documents on the subject produced by international organizations, takes up the problem of the relation between academic research and policy-making, and points to a certain number of cases in which nations or regional organizations have included human security as a foreign policy option. Throughout the paper reference is made to the case of Afghanistan that is treated in the study reproduced in annex. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh
Application aux défis de la situation afghane après l’intervention Résumé Le concept de « sécurité humaine », en discussion dans les organisations internationales et les milieux académiques depuis 1994, n’est-il que du vent, comment l’affirment ses détracteurs? Ou bien offre-t-il un cadre pertinent pour élaborer des solutions multisectorielles et intégrées, mieux adaptées à notre monde de plus en plus « interconnecté »? S’il n’en existe pas de définition consensuelle précise, on peut dire du moins qu’il s’agit de dépasser la notion habituelle de sécurité pour s’intéresser plus spécifiquement à des considérations de développement et de respect des droits de l’homme. Pour certains, c’est là une notion séduisante mais faible sur le plan analytique, car elle fait intervenir trop de variables qui ne sont pas nécessairement liées entre elles. Pour d’autres, il faut en limiter l’usage aux situations marquées par une poussée ou une menace de violence. Pour ceux qui préfèrent en donner une définition plus large (c’est le cas du présent auteur), l’approche en question offre des moyens d’apprécier les causes profondes d’un conflit (inter- ou intra-étatique), de proposer des politiques adéquates pour résoudre les crises et d’aboutir à l’établissement d’une paix durable. A cette fin, les politiques de sécurité humaine prennent en compte de manière privilégiée les questions sociales et économiques en ce qu’elles affectent l’individu, considérant que la sécurité (au sens étroit) dépend de tout un tissu de facteurs qui exigent une approche globale. L’auteur présente les divers écrits sur le sujet produits par les organisations internationales, examine le problème de la relation entre recherche académique et production des politiques, et relève un certain nombre de cas où des nations ou des organisations régionales ont fait entrer la sécurité humaine parmi leurs options de politique étrangère. Tout au long de l’article, il est spécialement fait référence à l’Afghanistan, dont le cas est traité dans l’étude reproduite en annexe.
As the first comprehensive analysis of the development situation in Afghanistan since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghanistan National Human Development Report argued that in a county where GDP per capita was $200, life expectancy 44.5 years, and the literacy rate 28.7 %, the priority of the new government should be to provide “human security” as a public good for all. This responsibility, to be assumed by the newly appointed president, was to take precedence over what the American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, had set as the agenda for the government, namely, eliminating the threat of the Taliban, demobilizing the remaining Afghan militias and suppressing the narcotics trade. The policy position that this report took was that the “human security” of the Afghan people, defined as freedom from both fear and want, should not take a back-seat to the security interests of the state or to those of the international community which is currently using Afghanistan as a base from which to conduct a global war against terror. Ultimately, the report argued, allowing grievances and insecurities to continue was both dangerous and immoral. Between 2001 and 2004 the twin terms, danger and morality, constantly reappeared in analyses of the situation in Afghanistan. Unless urgent steps were taken to deal with underdevelopment there was danger of conflict breaking out anew. Morality required that the new government and the international community establish viable, responsible institutions. This approach meant that security was to be redefined as a subjective experience at the micro level. It sought to find answers to questions such as “security from what?”, “whose security?”, and “security by what means?” And to find answers to such questions in terms of people’s experience. “Security” for a farmer growing poppies in Badakhshan or Helmand was the livelihood he gained from selling his crops to a middleman, but this form of security was very different from the “security” interests of recipient states concerned about their drug addicts and about the terror-crime-drug-mafia networks. For a school teacher in Jalalabad security was the fact that he could properly clothe and educate his children and invest in the construction of his house, confident that the little he had today would not be taken away from him tomorrow. His security was quite a different matter from that of the coalition troops in Paktika, fearful of a suicide attack or a renewal of insurgency by the Taliban or Al Qaeda. The redefinition of security (security from the point of view of people, as opposed to that of other “referents”) was initiated in 1994. In this new perspective, the answers, and more importantly the questions, were not what traditional security studies had been engaged with. Security, seen as the Westphalian prerogative of the nation, was a contract between sovereign states. At the domestic level, the state would enter into a Hobbesian bargain with subjects who would trade in certain rights in exchange for protection by the Leviathan against war. What this bargain had failed to foresee was a situation in which the state was unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, when threats were not of a military nature coming from other states, but consisted of gross violations of human rights practiced by the state itself or of underdevelopment that the state did nothing to correct. In such cases the state could no longer claim that its use of force was legitimate These are the realities of Afghanistan today. A human security approach attempted to transform traditional notions of security, framed in terms of national and regional stability and the stability of political and economic systems, and to focus on human beings. This meant that the primary threats to be dealt with were no longer the exclusive domain of military forces. Primary threats were seen as internal:
economic failure, violation of human rights, political discrimination. Hence, the guarantee of national security no longer lay in military power, but in favorable social, political and economic conditions, the promotion of human development, and the protection of human rights. This paper is divided into two parts. Part One examines the definitions of human security and its reception by the international community. The second part analyses the implications that the adoption of a human security approach imply in deciding policies and applying programs. The inserts that appear throughout the paper apply the analysis to Afghanistan based on research conducted for the National Human Development Report between 2001 and 2004 (see Appendices)^2. What Is Human Security? To begin with, there is no single definition of human security. In the literature devoted to international relations and to development issues it has been referred to in various terms: as a new theory or concept, as a starting point for analysis, a world view, a political agenda, or as a policy framework. Although the definition of human security remains an open question, there is consensus among its advocates that there should be a shift of attention from a state- centered to a people-centered approach to security, that concern with the security of state borders should give way to concern with the security of the people who live within those borders The simplest definition of security is “absence of insecurity and threats”. To be secure is to be free from both fear (of physical, sexual or psychological abuse, violence, persecution, or death) and from want (of gainful employment, food, and health). Human security therefore deals with the capacity to identify threats, to avoid them when possible, and to mitigate their effects when they do occur. It means helping victims cope with the consequences of the widespread insecurity resulting from armed conflict, human rights violations and massive underdevelopment. This broadened use of the word “security” encompasses two ideas: one is the notion of “safety” that goes beyond the concept of mere physical security in the traditional sense, and the other the idea that people’s livelihoods should be guaranteed through “social security” against sudden disruptions. The concept of human security was elaborated on the basis of empirical research conducted after the end of the post-Cold War period. Respect for sovereignty was shaken by too many examples where states themselves became perpetuators of insecurities, not only failing to fulfill their obligations toward their subjects but threatening their very existence. At the same time, this era saw a variety of new and often unsuccessful international interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. While conflicts seemed to be settled, the very reasons that had led to conflict in the first place were not dealt with through (^2) All inserts are adapted from the UNDP National Human Development Report of Afghanistan: Security with a Human Face , Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, editor in chief, Daud Saba, Omar Zakhilwal principal writers, and Michael Schoiswohl and Aby Masefield contributing writers.
Advocates of human security are divided between those who are content with a narrow definition, focusing exclusively on factors that perpetuate violence and those for whom a broad definition which encompasses issues of human rights and underdevelopment is to be preferred. Proponents of a broad definition argue that instead of lamenting the lack of workable definitions, research should be concerned with the way in which the definitions insisted on by security studies circumvent political, moral and ethical concerns in order to concentrate on relations of power^4. In this perspective the lack of an agreed-upon definition is not a conceptual weakness but represents a refusal to succumb to the dominant political agenda. A broad definition is therefore critical to transforming the ethos and engaging in the “political” act of raising questions that are peripheral to security studies. This approach encourages comprehensive measures which can be applied to issues that affect the everyday lives of people. For these advocates, human security provides a language and rationale for taking into account the concerns of the majority of humanity; these concerns may be subjective, but it is nonetheless the subjective sense of the security of individuals that in the last analysis is of paramount importance. If security is ultimately a feeling, then human security must be a felt experience. The main challenge within the academic community is twofold. First, as an interdisciplinary concept human security has to forge a dialogue between security and development specialists so as to find common ground in at least two different and up-to-now seemingly unrelated fields. A comprehensive, pluralistic approach to the establishment of a human security framework creates tangible difficulties given current compartmentalization of disciplines within academia and policy-making institutions. Within the university, interdisciplinary studies, although desirable, are difficult to put in place given the rigidity of administrative structures^5. Within policy circles and international institutions, the difficulty is compounded by the lack of interdisciplinary approaches among donors and governments, each with different “mandates” in the case of the former, and different ministries in the case of the latter. While multi-disciplinary or multi-sectoral approaches have been experimented with, for example through the creation of commissions on cross-cutting issues such as poverty or gender, the real difficulty is the lack of experience in this domain, and the lack of methodological know-how. Second, debate has also taken place between academic researchers and policy makers, who for the most part clash when they don’t simply avoid all form of dialogue. It is not here a question of choosing a narrow or a broad-based definition of human security, but a question of whether academic research has an effect on policy setting. Is it simply the availability of funds and the attraction of innovating concepts that stimulates academic research, unconnected to any practical application? Or can there be a successful marriage Security Dialogue , Vol. 35, n° 3, September, 2004. (^4) Kyle Grayson, in What is Human Security? Comments by 21 Authors , op. cit. (^5) The Tufts Center for Human Security is one of the few universities that has been able to create a multi- disciplinary program (a human security certificate) that integrates research in the disciplines of development, human rights and conflict resolution. The University of British Columbia offers another (successful) program of a similar kind.
between research and policy? Are policy decisions taken on theoretical grounds, or do we act first and then adjust the theory later? Human security is in an uncomfortable position, caught between the normative and positivist approaches, caught in the dichotomy between the pragmatic and the theoretical. Human security still has a long way to go before there is agreement on one precise definition; however it may prove to be more effective as a broad flexible framework rather than being codified in rigorous terms. More important than discussion of definitions is analysis of the consequences (both positive and negative) when a human-security type of approach is adopted. If addressing security issues entails the necessity to establish priorities for action and policy, which of the many threats that exist deserve the most attention? Human security as a policy tool has been criticized by those who claim that crowding the list of threats makes the prioritization of political action impossible and leaves “securitization” (by which is meant a call for rapid military solutions) as the only option. Critics lament that prioritizing everything is equivalent to prioritizing nothing, and therefore leads to inaction. They argue that a human security definition which includes so many components, ranging from the physical to the psychological, without a clearly established hierarchy, presents difficulties for policy makers forced to choose between competing goals and to concentrate their resources on specific solutions to immediate problems. Such criticism stems from the fear that the result of expanding the definition of security will be an increased use of force considered as the “responsibility” of the international community. One can counter this criticism by recalling two obvious but often forgotten facts: states alone are not the only “policy” actors, and “interventions” should not only be through military means but should involve longer- term engagements, including incentives such as trade expansion and delivering on promises of aid and debt relief, as well as “sticks” such as judicial prosecutions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Securitization should not be taken to mean militarization. The discourse on human security does not seek to raise every possible issue to the highest policy priority; it only seeks to establish thresholds below which people’s lives are in danger and their dignity threatened. On the question of priorities, it should be said that the fallacy is in assuming that viable policies are to be made by top “political actors”, who sift through competing demands in order to choose one or two suitable targets for attention and resources; their decisions ignore that reality may in fact be many-faceted, involving a host of interconnected factors. Policy-making should not be a vertical process but a networked, flexible and horizontal coalition of approaches corresponding to a complex paradigm. Furthermore, to “hierarchize” and prioritise among human security goals may be a futile exercise, as the concept is based on the postulate that all threats are interdependent: the eradication of one of them is of little effect without the implementation of comprehensive security to restore individuals' dignity. Perhaps then it is less a question of prioritisation among competing goals for policy makers than about identification of thresholds of minimal welfare and human dignity. Such thresholds, which involve setting up criteria for the measurement of human security, are difficult to establish given the distinction between objective and subjective factors; security, at whatever level, will always remain in part a subjective feeling, and thresholds of tolerance will be different in different cultures, at different times, and in different places. That these thresholds are defined circumstantially does not make them
level of life of its citizens Hence, if a failed state is traditionally considered as one that threatens regional security, from a human security point of view, a weak or failed state is primarily one which cannot deliver on the state-society bargain inside its own borders. When states are not willing or capable of bearing the ‘responsibility’ of their own sovereignty, other actors, such as international organisations, have, if not an obligation, a moral responsibility to act. The discussion of who should provide human security in the case of weak or collapsed states is therefore closely linked to the debates on international intervention. It prompts a shift in both the ends and means of intervention, and focuses the debate on new ways of engagement at the international level. The new forms of engagement for collective human security involve not only military intervention as a reaction to crisis, but a responsibility for the prevention of crises and the rebuilding of society. Human security interventions and engagements should therefore be long-term and focus on eradication of grievances, and not only come into play when a breakdown has already occurred. One of the most important challenges is to determine whether in fact this approach will result in the widening of the North/South divide. To many G77 countries, “human security” is seen as yet another criterion that challenges, on moral grounds, the sovereign role of the state by threatening intervention by the international community on behalf of the population. Its focus on the individual is considered as misplaced by proponents of the Asian model of social development, while others fear that the result will be the adoption of a double standard, whereby rich western nations will use human security as a pretext for adopting punishing measures in dealing with developing countries, without abiding by its tenets themselves. Critics among the G77 argue that human security is yet another ethno- centric paradigm which emphasizes subjective aspects and values while reinforcing the economic might of the North; it represents yet another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies. Their concern is strengthened by their belief that rich countries, faced with economic and social underdevelopment in the South which, if allowed to continue, will breed political instability that will eventually spill over to North, will decide to press for further militarization, as has been the case in the current global war against terrorism. They argue that it is precisely this security dilemma and militarization that threatens a South already weakened by interventions, economic sanctions and debt crisis. Such fears are confirmed by the fact that most of the literature on human security treats it exclusively as part of an internationalist agenda. Some countries have adopted it as a foreign policy, but no Western country has made use of the concept in a domestic context to analyze the needs of its own citizens.
2001 and 2003, the concept was revived in the debate on the “responsibility to protect”, spearheaded by the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and in the discussions on the “responsibility for development” initiated by the Japanese Commission on Human Security (CHS), with the two governments – Canada and Japan – providing the necessary leadership and funding for including human security on the global agenda; 3) in the years 2004-2005, as the need to readjust to the new realities of the 21st^ century and in particular to find means of mounting concerted, collective responses to new threats became increasingly clear, human security, conceived of as the linking of security to development, became a topic of reform agendas in the UN and in such regional organizations as the European Union. From its debut as a concern of international development agencies, to its adoption as a foreign policy option by some Western countries, to its acceptance today as a framework for reforming global institutions, the concept has gradually moved into mainstream politics. What does acceptance of such an approach imply about the political identity of the states and institutions that have adopted it? Will human security be proposed and voted on as a resolution of the General Assembly within the next few years? Will a consensus on a definition be found? As in the case of terrorism, the lack of agreement on a definition has for decades been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. Terminology consensus will be necessary if a comprehensive human security program is to be decided on and implemented. But there is little chance that a globally satisfying definition will be found in the near future, and equally little chance that the UN will adopt human security resolutions. Critics of the concept, including China, India, France and the US – acting out of fear that such an approach would provide new excuses for unwarranted interventions and thus violate state sovereignty and convinced, as well, that there would be no agreement on enforcement mechanisms – would most likely block any such resolution.
- For the UNDP an opportunity to take advantage of the end of the Cold War and promote “secure” human development Much of literature on human security attributes the official “launching ” of the concept in global politics to the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994, which treated it as an extension of the human development paradigm. For the 1994 HDR definition, human security, characterized as “freedom from fear and freedom from want”, had two aspects: first, protection from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and second, protection from sudden, harmful upheavals of daily existence, touching on housing, employment and community life. The 1994 definition was broken down into seven components : the economy, food, health, the environment, security of persons, community security, and freedom to engage in political activities. Going beyond the more traditional weaknesses associated with underdevelopment (poverty, hunger, disease, pollution etc.) an attempt was made to define insecurity as a form of structural violence. This human development approach to human security was not only concerned with gross violations of human rights, armed conflicts, and natural disasters, but encompassed wide-ranging aspects of underdevelopment: inequality, public health, international crime, population growth and environmental degradation. These were to be the new focuses of development assistance for the international community; preventing them would be less costly than having to deal with their subsequent consequences.
of 2004, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility 8 advanced the cause of human security. It set a broad framework for collective programs to address new and exacerbated security threats. The panel grouped today’s threats into six clusters: economic and social threats, such as poverty and deadly infectious disease; inter-state conflict and rivalry; internal violence including civil war, state collapse and genocide; nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. But beyond recognition of these threats, it also made clear the connections between them. Poverty, infectious disease and war were recognized as feeding on one another in a deadly cycle. Poverty was closely associated with the outbreak of civil wars – wars that disrupted and destabilized societies and their economies. Diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS caused large numbers of deaths and so contributed to increased poverty. The High-Level Panel thus argued that broadly based development was indispensable for the establishment of the new collective security, development that would entail greater intergovernmental cooperation and for which partnership between national, regional and civil society actors was an essential element. The High-Level Panel outlined a reform package which Kofi Annan proposed to the member states in March of 2005 aimed at restoring UN credibility and relevance for this new era of collective security. Although the report, entitled In Larger Freedom s, did not specifically employ the term “human security” for fear of raising questions concerning a concept not yet debated by the General Assembly, it clearly underscored the linkages between human rights, development and security as three imperatives which reinforced each other. “ While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to “cause” civil war, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence […] And countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to development”^9. The report stressed the fact that poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation could have “ consequences as catastrophic” as civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Alluding to the widespread preoccupation with conditions created when states failed to provide for the basic needs of their citizens, the report stressed that these threats could undermine not only people’s survival but also “the state as the basic unit of the international system” 10 . While it did not establish a policy framework, the document was important in terms of the institutional reform proposals it made, notably four that – even though they have not been adopted so far – are under active consideration: expanding the UN Security Council, defining terrorism, increasing foreign aid, and replacing the UN Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council. Underlying these proposals was the basic issue of how the UN could effectively learn from its failures in places like Bosnia and Rwanda a (^8) High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004, http://www.un.org/secureworld/ (^9) Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary General, A/59/2005, http://www.un.org (^10) Ibid.
decade ago, Darfur and the Congo today. Yet, the validity of collective action on the part of the UN has been challenged by new interventions, especially unilateral ones as in the case of Iraq, interventions based on national interest but undertaken using human security as a cover. For example, among the many arguments advanced for the invasion of Iraq were, on one hand, the supposed existence of WMDs, which were said to threaten the security of the American people, and on the other hand the goal of “bringing democracy” to the people of Iraq as a way of providing peace and prosperity. Both were human security arguments, but were used to justify what many consider an illegal and immoral unilateralism. In order to counter such attempts to misapply the human security concept in this manner, the UN sought to position itself as the sole authority capable of organizing multilateral initiatives and global networks, functioning as a neutral supra-national body.
- For global commissions, the need to redefine the conditions for intervention and engagement One of the most salient criticisms of a human security approach, especially when promoted by states on behalf of the people of other states, is the fear that it will turn into a carte blanche for intervention. To alleviate such fears and clarify the conditions and modalities for intervention, the Canadian government launched an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) co-chaired by Gareth Evans, ICG Director and Mohamed Sahnoun, the Algerian Special Advisor to the Secretary General. By the time the Commission began its work in November 2000, the international community had encountered serious problems regarding intervention policies and practices that it had undertaken: the uncertain status of the campaign waged in Kosovo, the failure to intervene in Rwanda, the precipitous withdrawal from Somalia that left the country in shambles, and the failure to protect vulnerable communities in Bosnia – in short a dismal record that prompted review of the policy of intervention in general. Responding to the Secretary General’s challenge to take into account the existence of people’s sovereignty within state sovereignty, the ICISS was to examine new actors and institutions, new security issues and new demands and expectations, using human security as a conceptual framework that in a world characterized by globalization and the spread of technology would provide expanded opportunities for common action. The final report, entitled The Responsibility to Protect, by way of answer to critics of military interventions in sovereign states for humanitarian purposes, made a number of important points. First it redefined the meaning of sovereignty to include a dual responsibility: in foreign affairs respect for the sovereignty of other states and within its borders respect for the dignity and basic rights of all its people. The report echoed Kofi Annan’s insistence that sovereignty belonged to the people as well as to the state. Second, it redefined interventions as actions taken against a state or leader, with or without its or his consent, for purposes defined as humanitarian or protective. These could mean both military interventions as well as alternatives such as economic sanctions, criminal prosecution, etc., used as preventive measures (to forestall the need for military action). However, the Commission also set a number of conditions that had to be fulfilled before intervention was to take place, conditions which in fact severely limited reliance on the military. Responsibility to protect also entailed the responsibility to prevent crisis by taking measures early on to deal with the underlying causes. There was a duty to intervene in crisis
- For regional actors, the occasion to rethink collective security policies Both of these Commissions stressed the importance of regional intergovernmental organizations as better placed then the states themselves to ensure human security within their defined boundaries, a role endorsed by Article 52 of the UN Charter. Three arguments were advanced in asserting the primary role of regional actors in providing preventive and protective human security. First, regional bodies are quick to recognize the importance of dealing swiftly and effectively with catastrophes that have significant direct effects on neighboring countries through spill-over across national borders (for example the passage of refugee flows or rebel groups across state borders). Second, regional actors may well be in a position to understand the cultural dynamics of strife more intimately than outsiders. Finally, involvement by other regional powers is less likely to be perceived as illegitimate interference than when other states intervene. But their effectiveness is also limited by several factors. Regional organizations are often structurally weak and reluctant to become involved in civil wars; they may also be partial, having a stake in particular aspects of a conflict; and finally the lead role may be taken up by one player for its own foreign policy interests. Nevertheless, two regional organizations have spearheaded attempts to include human security as a part of their regional agenda: the European Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The EU. Human security was proposed as a foreign security policy for the EU by a group of experts from LSE who presented The Human Security Doctrine for Europe to Javier Solana in September 2004 at the Barcelona Forum. The rationale for acceptance of the doctrine by the EU, the largest contributor to humanitarian and development assistance in the world, was twofold. First, as an outward-looking strategy, it could reinforce the image of the EU as a successful example of peaceful development based on cooperation, and on core values: respect for diversity, the rule of law, human rights, democracy and citizen participation. Second, as a defense strategy, the report argued that a contribution to global human security was now the most realistic security policy for Europe, given that where people lived in poverty, where violence and lawlessness reigned under dogmatic ideologies, there was fertile ground for human rights violations, for criminal networks and for terrorism with as consequence the importation of hard drugs and weapons into the European Union^11. The aim of the doctrine was to stress the need to address the increasing insecurity that existed beyond the borders of Europe. The doctrine defined human security as the freedom for individuals from the harm caused by human rights violations. The proposal came in three separate parts. First a set of seven principles that would serve as guidelines in terms of objectives and methods of operation. These guidelines concerned 1) the type of operation, 2) the necessity to pay primary attention to human rights, 3) adoption of a regional focus, 4) a bottom-up approach directed at the mass of the population, 5) dialogue and consultation, 6) intelligence gathering, and 7) sustainability. Second, the report proposed a “Human Security Response Force”, composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). This force would be drawn from troops and from civilian organizations made available by member (^11) Mary Kalder, “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, Paper presented at the Universal Forum of Cultures, Barcelona, Spain, September 2004.
states as well as from a proposed “Human Security Volunteer Service”. Third, the report proposed a new legal framework that would govern both the decision to intervene and the operations on the ground. This new legal framework would be based on the laws and practices of the intervening states and on international criminal and human rights law. The proposed doctrine was an elaboration of the European Union’s attempts to develop a common security policy, based on preventive engagement and effective multilateralism, a policy which had previously been formulated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) report, A Secure Europe in a Better World, in December of 2003. It reflected as well changes in the strategic environment after September 11th^ and Iraq, where Europe hoped to play a more active role in the responsibility for global security and for the protection of its own borders from new global threats. The doctrine reaffirmed the close connections between conflict, insecurity and poverty and called for the courage to tackle root causes. Nonetheless, the recommendations that were made still granted the leading role to military rather than to civilian campaigns. While the report did recognize non-military considerations – such as competition for natural resources – policy recommendations remained vague on issues such as the handling of incipient crises, avoiding conflicts, and addressing the underlying causes of instability. If the policies set forth in the European report can be considered as an enhanced defense strategy that focused in large part on avoiding the dangers inherent in immigration and terrorism, another more human-security oriented proposal was the framework prepared by the Dochas (The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations) for the Irish EU Presidency in 2004^12. This proposal’s human security perspective for European policy adopted a more developmental approach by emphasizing human rights, democratic participation and strict standards of accountability. Among the issues raised were European trade policy, EU commitment to multilateralism, the fight against HIV, and the financing of developmental projects. The paper claimed that the EU could make of its own accomplishments an effective foreign policy argument, demonstrating how economic integration and the adoption of a common set of rules and regulations could reduce the probability of warfare. It remains to be seen how such an enhanced security and development agenda can be implemented by a region in which 25 member states have to agree on a common doctrine, while at the same time including human security provisions as part of their own national policy. The ASEAN. For South-East Asian countries, except for Thailand, the 1994 UNDP definition of human security was initially seen as a critique of the region’s comprehensive security approach. In the mid-1980s this approach had been developed on the basis of the Japanese sogo anzen hosho , which considered the states and their ruling regimes as the source of political stability, economic development and social harmony. The concept called for cooperation within the region based on respect for sovereignty and a policy of non- interference. There was no common definition of what an outside menace might consist of; threats to individual states were seen as threats to the security of all the states, given the close ties that bound the societies of the region together. The 10 ASEAN countries, although set apart by their differing colonial experiences, their wide variety of political systems, their (^12) Dochas, “Why the EU Should Focus on Human Security”, 2004, http://www.dochas.ie/Working_Groups/Presidency/human_security.htm
strengthening of their roles in the regional order. The failure of a collective response to the East Timor crisis should serve as a lesson. The challenge for the ASEAN is also to enhance the capacity of its weak states, such as Cambodia and Laos, as there remains widespread belief in the crucial role of the state in providing human security for the public good. A number of countries still view human security with suspicion, considering it as a potential obstacle to regime survival; this attitude deepens the North/South divide concerning human security issues. The ARF, with its diverse membership, is yet to forge a consensus on the principles of security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region; the ASEAN is still in the discussion stage concerning means to protect people and markets in the region against sudden downturns and global financial volatility. Yet the increased inter-dependence of East Asian countries is making regional cooperation for human security mandatory. Despite commitments to new approaches designed to combine security issues with development, it is likely that these regional organizations will continue to concentrate primarily on state (or regime) security rather than on human security. This is due on the one hand to the nature of the intergovernmental regional bodies which are hesitant to interfere with state sovereignty. On the other hand, the difficulty is compounded by a global environment where there is a clear tension between a commitment to disarmament that involves a non-military approach to security and a simultaneous commitment to developing a force for mutual defense and peacekeeping. It remains to be seen how the ASEAN, and the EU will manage this tension and how they will evolve.
- For national governments: human security as a foreign policy tool Is human security a concept that in the last analysis serves only the interests of the state? There are two inherent problems concerning the adoption of the human security concept as a policy tool. One is that despite the fact that human security seeks to establish “justice” and provide for the protection and safety of the individual, it has raised fears that in practice it will lead to interventions that threaten state sovereignty Second is the fact that although it has been propounded as a doctrine that downplays the importance of state-centered security interests, it is the states that have adopted it as a foreign policy tool – states such as Canada, Norway and Japan – while it has largely been ignored as a domestic policy on development and human rights. The reasons why some states have adopted human security as their foreign policy option, and other have not, are twofold. One factor is the dynamics of the state’s domestic politics (as in the case of Canada), and another the desire by elite sectors of society to adopt the policy as a way to enhance the role of their country on the international scene. Human security as foreign policy is as an opportunity to draw attention to states with middle-power influence and status in the international arena. Yet, how can a people-centered approach to security be promoted by a state as a foreign policy without becoming an interest-based agenda used as a vehicle for furthering national power? As a foreign policy option it serves as a demonstration of a government’s interest in the well-being of people of other states, rather than its own. This interest is open to suspicion when the state in question pursues its own “traditional” security concerns for itself. Japan presents a good example. While supporting a human security mandate for its ODA, national military expenditures remained high. The North Korean issue has strengthened defensive policy and Japan has built a substantial nuclear power industry to reduce its reliance on imported oil. Although Japanese
citizens are economically well taken care of, human rights practices remain a concern: namely, racism and discrimination in Japanese society, the refugee issue and the issue of capital punishment. Ultimately, when human security is adopted as a government’s diplomatic policy, and thus endorsed by the state, the paradigm is redefined so as to serve particular state-centered national interests. This has been the course taken by Canada and Norway for example, who have seen in the issue of human security an opportunity for “middle-power” states to gain greater independence vis-à-vis international institutions, greater influence in the United Nations, and increased credibility on the international stage, particularly (in the case of Canada and Japan) as regards the United States. For Japan, contributions of approximately $170 million to the Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN Secretariat has cemented its status as a primary donor to Overseas Development Assistance and reinforces the country as an economic power not only regionally but internationally. Through the Ottawa Process, Canada focused on gaining recognition for its handling of post-conflict situations as peacekeepers – an area in which it had already established a reputation. These countries used the new human security paradigm to turn situations to their own advantage. Japan: Freedom from Want. Japan has been one of the leading countries that has provided leadership and funding for human security, prompted by its desire to accede to a permanent seat at the UN. It is the second largest donor in the field. The Japanese approach to human security concentrates on “Freedom from Want”, one of the two goals set by the 1994 UNDP report. It promotes measures designed to protect people from threats to their livelihoods and dignity while supporting self-empowerment to bring out the people’s potential. In December 1998, in the context of the “Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow,” Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi launched the Japanese program on human security, citing it as a foreign policy based on “comprehensively seizing all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings and strengthening efforts to confront threats.” To add credibility to its initiative, Japan established a Commission on Human Security and set up the largest Trust Fund in the United Nations. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the use of force to solve disputes, leaving Japan possessing only self-defense forces for international security purposes. Japan has used its engagement in developmental assistance as a way to circumvent its military limitations while at the same time playing an important economic role in the region. Beyond the constitutional constraints that prevent any kind of involvement in the field of traditional security, there are other reasons for the Japanese government’s commitment to human security. These include the goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the desire to play a leading regional role in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis. The Asian crisis began as a monetary crisis, quickly became a financial crisis, then broadened into a full-scale economic crisis that had socio-political consequences that threatened regional security – proof, if needed, of the inter-dependence of the countries involved. The events of 1997 made the Japanese government aware of the fragility of the region’s economic base and the need for Japan to play a greater role in stabilizing the area’s economy by adopting a long-term agenda which the human security concept was in a position to provide. Through the Trust Fund, Japan also sought to open up the region, a region that held out great economic promise with China’s entry into the WTO, but which was also fraught with danger due to North Korean nuclear proliferation. The Japanese human security policy took
